Metametaphysics

This is a contribution to the symposium on Tim Scanlon's Being Realistic about Reasons (2014). We have two aims here: First, we ask for more details about Scanlon's meta-metaphysical view (about his notion of a domain, his criterion of existence, his ambition to remain ontologically thin, and on the role of pragmatic considerations in Scanlon's pictures), showing problems with salient clarifications. And second, we raise independent objections to the view - to its explanatory productivity, its distinctness, and the argumentative support it enjoys.

Ontology after Carnap focusses on metaontology in the light of recent interest in Carnap’s ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’. That paper is at the centre of things, as it is where Carnap formulates his internal/external dichotomy. If you haven’t already encountered the dichotomy, then neither Ontology after Carnap, nor this review, is for you. My aim in this review is to try to tease out some of the book’s themes, thereby giving some sense of contemporary neo-Carnapianism.

Abstract: The aim of this article is to develop an argument against metaphysical debates about the existence of
human races. I argue that the ontology of race is underdetermined by both empirical and non-empirical evidence due
to a plurality of equally permissible candidate meanings of “race.” Furthermore, I argue that this underdetermination
leads to a deflationist diagnosis according to which disputes about the existence of human races are non-substantive
verbal disputes. While this diagnosis resembles general deflationist strategies in contemporary metaphysics, I show
that my argument does not presuppose controversial metametaphysical assumptions.

Dans la Présentation qu'il consacre à « La question de l'être, aujourd'hui » 1 , Jean-François Courtine résume le partage entre continentaux et analytiques ainsi : « Analytiquement parlant, la ''question de l'être'' n'est pas une question, ou en tout cas, pas une question qui se pose sensément 2 . » Et si « analytiquement parlant » (i.e. pour la philosophie analytique) la « question de l'être » ne se pose pas, c'est parce que les énoncés ontologiques y sont systématiquement référés à la norme quinienne de « l'engagement » ou de « l'assomption » ontologique : Quine réduit en effet la question de l'être à la question de l'existence tout en réduisant la question de l'existence à la question de savoir quelles sont les entités que nos meilleures théories doivent assumer ou présupposer 3 pour être vraies. Ainsi, la théorie de la gravitation assume l'existence de corps pourvus d'une certaine masse quand elle énonce que deux corps quelconques s'attirent en raison de leur masse (et en raison inverse du carré de leur distance de leurs centres de gravité). Ces engagements ontologiques des théories sont eux-mêmes révélés, selon Quine, par une procédure de traduction de leurs énoncés dans une langue formelle, la logique de premier ordre, qui fait apparaître explicitement l'entité assumée par le moyen de la variable, x, qui en porte la référence : dans la traduction formelle des énoncés de la théorie, l'entité qui prend la valeur d'une variable (liée au quantificateur existentiel 4 '∃') est celle dont la théorie assume l'existence. Le sens de l'être, ou de l'existence, est alors exclusivement rendu par le quantificateur existentiel de la logique du premier ordre : '(∃x)'. D'où la formule quinienne de l'engagement ontologique qui sert de norme à toute ontologie future : « Être, c'est être la valeur d'une variable liée » 5 . Toujours dans « La question de l'être aujourd'hui », Stéphane Chauvier explicite la réduction de la question de l'être formulée par J.-F. Courtine : « On pourrait, en première approche, écrit-il, être tenté de répondre que l'affaire propre de la métaphysique analytique, c'est ce qu'il y a » 6 ; mais il enchaîne : « En amont des réponses du métaphysicien, il y a, non pas la question énigmatique « Qu'y a-t-il ? », mais une pluralité de questions de la forme « Y a-t-il des F ? » 7 . En somme, la question de l'être serait réduite à la question de l'existence de tel ou tel type d'entités, des F ou des G, des quarks ou des nombres, et cela pour les théories qui les assument ou s'y engagent dans leurs expressions. À la première réduction de la différence de l'être et de l'existence succède donc la réduction de la différence entre des types d'entités 1 Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4, Octobre 2006 (notée RMM : 2006). 2 J.-F. Courtine, RMM : 2006, p. 433-4. 3 En fait, assomption ontologique et présuppositions ne sont pas tout à fait substituables, même si J. Hintikka a interprété l'une par l'autre. Voir là-dessus l'excellent P. Gochet, Quine en perspective, Paris, Flammarion, 1978, p. 104-105. 4 Si une théorie, traduite dans la logique du premier ordre avec quantification qui fait apparaître les assomptions d'existence, implique (∃x) (x est un nombre premier) (« il existe au moins un x tel que x est un nombre premier »), c'est qu'elle assume l'existence d'au moins un nombre premier qui rend vrai cette formule ; si elle implique (∃x) (x est un événement), c'est qu'elle assume l'existence d'entités du type « événement » qui rend vraie cette formule, etc. 5 W. V. Quine, « De ce qui est » dans Du point de vue logique, tr. sous la direction de S. Laugier, Paris, Vrin, 2003, p. 43. 6 S. Chauvier, RMM : 2006, p. 497. 7 S. Chauvier, RMM : 2006, p. 497. d'une part et des types d'existence entre les entités de tel ou tel type d'autre part -quarks ou nombres, arbres ou nuages, substances ou trous. Les jugements de J.-F. Courtine et de S.

Neo-pragmatist approaches have been making a comeback lately in various local debates. Expressivist approaches to moral discourse have drawn increasing attention, and allied non-representational views of modal, logical, and even epistemic discourse have also been developed. Huw Price has argued for a form of global pragmatism, applied to all areas of discourse. But other defenders of local pragmatisms (such as Simon Blackburn) have denied that pragmatism can be extended globally, in part because it cannot be extended to everyday talk about ordinary objects. Here I examine the question: can a broadly pragmatist approach be extended to cover talk about ordinary objects? If so, what would this form of pragmatism look like, and what would the consequences be for ontology and metaontology?

In den letzten Jahren begegnen dem Beobachter der akademischen Philosophie -sowohl in Deutschland als auch im angelsächsischen Raum -in zunehmendem Maße Publikationen, Vorträge und Tagungen, die sich metaphilosophischen Disziplinen verschrieben haben. Neben der bereits Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts etablierten Metaethik ist inzwischen auch regelmäßig von Metaepistemologie, Metaontologie und Metametaphysik die Rede. Im Folgenden geht es um eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Phänomen, vermeintlich neue philosophische Disziplinen durch einen Wechsel auf eine Metaebene zu bilden. Die diesbezüglich kritische These lautet, dass das Wesen philosophischer Überlegungen in ihrer internen Reflexivität liegt. Wie gezeigt werden soll, bedeutet dies, dass die Philosophie immer auch schon ihre eigenen Voraussetzungen zum Gegenstand hat, weshalb die Rede von metastufigen Disziplinen in der Philosophie streng genommen unsinnig ist. Insofern diese Disziplinen nicht nur Träger eines unglücklich gewählten Namens sind, verfehlen sie es, philosophische Disziplinen im eigentlichen Sinne zu sein. Hierfür

How do we come to know metaphysical truths? How does metaphysical inquiry work? Are metaphysical debates substantial? These are the questions which characterize metametaphysics. This book, the first systematic student introduction dedicated to metametaphysics, discusses the nature of metaphysics - its methodology, epistemology, ontology and our access to metaphysical knowledge. It provides students with a firm grounding in the basics of metametaphysics, covering a broad range of topics in metaontology such as existence, quantification, ontological commitment and ontological realism. Contemporary views are discussed along with those of Quine, Carnap and Meinong. Going beyond the metaontological debate, thorough treatment is given to novel topics in metametaphysics, including grounding, ontological dependence, fundamentality, modal epistemology, intuitions, thought experiments and the relationship between metaphysics and science. The book will be an essential resource for those studying advanced metaphysics, philosophical methodology, metametaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of science.

Monografia filosófica onde estabeleço as diretrizes centrais de minha meta-metafísica que orienta minhas pesquisas de doutorado. Ademais, como um primeiro "case study", avaliamos a obra Après la Finitude de Quentin Meillassoux, além de vários comentadores. Em conclusão, postulamos uma taxonomia diferente para estudar o correlacionismo e pleiteamos uma filosofia da complexidade.

In diesem Aufsatz bringe ich die Frage nach dem Absoluten mit derjenigen nach der Voraussetzungslosigkeit von Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik zusammen. Dabei ist mir wichtig, zwischen dreierlei Weisen zu unterscheiden, eine Lehre vom Absoluten zu artikulieren: exoterisch, unbefangen und esoterisch. Während meistens auf Hegels exoterisch ausgerichtete und in der Regel in Einleitungen, beiläufigen Anmerkungen und Vorlesungen zu findende Lehre vom Absoluten Bezug genommen wird, wird
das Kapitel der Logik, das mit "Das Absolute" betitelt ist und bereits unbefangen zu erkennen gibt, dass es eine Lehre vom Absoluten enthält, nur selten gelesen. Meine Argumentation geht aber schließlich dahin, Hegels Exposition des Begriffs, und zwar des Begriffs als solchen und als spekulativer Methode, als Hegels eigentliche, ‚esoterische‘ Lehre vom Absoluten zu verstehen. Diese Exposition interpretiere ich als methodologische Auskunft über die Voraussetzungslosigkeit der Logik und nenne sie Epistemologie des begreifenden Denkens. Hegels beeindruckende Wende angesichts der Absolutheitsfrage besteht in diesem Sinne in der Einsicht, dass wahrhaft absolut nicht die Annahme des Absoluten ist, sondern die Methode, rein logische Begriffe überhaupt sowie das Absolute selbst voraussertzungslos zu begreifen.

In: Grundlegung des Absoluten? Paradigmen aus der Geschichte der Metaphysik, Ermylos Plevrakis, Max Rohstock (Hgg.), Heidelberg 2019.

In recent academic debates, a lot has been said about metaontology. Usually, the main point of disagreement in these debates is the relationship between ontology and the logical existential quantifier. It has been well-known, since the famous 'On What There Is' (1948), that the dominant view regarding the meaning of the existential quantifier of formal logic is ontological, which means that the ontological notion of existence is completely captured by it. This association between ontological existence and the logical existential quantifier is explicitly defended by Quine with his criterion of ontological commitment. However, the most curious aspect about Quine's criterion that is commonly put aside, on purpose or not, is that it is a clear and extreme attempt to reduce ontological and metaphysical debates to the field of logic and semantics, more specifically, to the theory of reference. His criterion, as it was proposed, can be seen as a tool with which he defends the idea that the correct and only approach to answer the main ontological question " What is there? " is through logical analysis. If this interpretation is correct, the criterion of ontological commitment, although toughly defended by metaphysicians nowadays, is much closer to a deflationist point of view than is usually assumed. This is due to the fact that, as I intend to show, the relation between ontological existence and the logical existential quantifier, especially as proposed by Quine, is reductionist, superficial and completely anti-intuitive.

In this paper I present 5 different approaches to the debate between Platonism and Nominalism: (1) the quantifier approach, (2) the reductionist approach, (3) the mind / language dependence approach, (4) the extension versus intension approach and (5) the hierarchichal approach. Each one has its advantages and disadvantages that have to be discussed in detail.

To what extent are the subjects of our thoughts and conversations real? This is the question of realism. In this book, Justin Clarke-Doane explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. He argues that, contrary to widespread belief, our mathematical beliefs have no better claim to being self-evident or provable than our moral beliefs. Nor do our mathematical beliefs have better claim to being empirically justified than our moral beliefs. It is also incorrect that reflection on the "genealogy" of our moral beliefs establishes a lack of parity between the cases. In general, if one is a moral antirealist on the basis of epistemological considerations, then one ought to be a mathematical antirealist as well. And, yet, Clarke-Doane shows that moral realism and mathematical realism do not stand or fall together -- and for a surprising reason. Moral questions, insofar as they are practical, are objective in a sense that mathematical questions are not. Moreover, the sense in which they are objective can be explained only by assuming practical anti-realism. One upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. Another is that the objective questions in the neighborhood of factual questions of logic, modality, grounding, and nature are practical questions too. Practical philosophy should, therefore, take center stage.

Divulgo a versão depositada de minha tese de doutoramento no PPGFIL/UnB. O título completo é "Primeiro esboço de um tratado de metametafísica: introdução ao realismo complexo", trabalho orientado pelo professor Hilan Bensusan.

Esta tese de doutoramento se trata de uma introdução ao Realismo Complexo como metametafísica. A proposta é pagar o preço de abertura de espírito necessário para se pensar a ecologização da metafísica como tarefa de nossos dias. Isso é exercitado através de uma orientação de valores da libertação, da sofisticação, da sutileza e do pertencimento. Introduzindo a discussão na crítica decolonial ao correlacionismo filosófico, chegamos no materialismo especulativo de Quentin Meillassoux. Esta será a orientação basal para traçarmos estratégias para rejeitarmos as metafísicas da supressão da complexidade. Com um conceito operativo de filosofia e uma sucessão sequencial e entrelaçada de métodos, mapeamos como fazer filosofia num território filosófico do realismo complexo. Esta cartografia nos leva à proposição de um Esboço Categorial sobre categorias ontológicas para uma complexificação da pesquisa em metafísica. Aplicamos previamente este Esboço Categorial no estudo da ontologia da comunicação e no desenvolvimento de uma infralinguagem metametafísica. Com todo este aparato, avaliamos brevemente o estado disciplinar e institucional da metametafísica de até então, mapeando falácias, erros e provendo horizontes propositivos para pensar o fazer-se da metafísica na contemporaneidade global.

O link para o repositório da UnB é https://repositorio.unb.br/handle/10482/41938

In this essay I set out to critically analyse the foundations of contemporary analytic metaphysics and I investigate the feasibility of a realist, physicalist and pluralist project in particular. Having done that, I attempt to roughly outline a framework capable of supporting such a project.

This book is both an introduction to and a research work on Meinongianism. “Meinongianism” is taken here, in accordance with the common philosophical jargon, as a general label for a set of theories of existence – probably the most basic notion of ontology. As an introduction, the book provides the first comprehensive survey and guide to Meinongianism and non-standard theories of existence in all their main forms. As a research work, the book exposes and develops the most up-to-date Meinongian theory (called modal Meinongianism), applies it to specific fields, and discusses its open problems. The unifying focus of the work is a single, basic philosophical notion: the notion of existence. Each main theory of the notion available in philosophy is introduced via a detailed, self-contained exposition, and critically evaluated, with the original research emerging in the final Chapters. Part I of the book provides a historical introduction to, and critical discussion of, the dominant philosophical view of existence: the “Kantian-Fregean-Quinean” perspective. Part II is the full-fledged introduction to the Meinongian theories of existence as a real property of individuals: after starting with the so-called naïve Meinongian conception and its problems, it provides a self-contained presentation of the main neo-Meinongian proposals, and a detailed discussion of their strengths and weaknesses. Part III develops a specific neo-Meinongian theory of existence employing a model-theoretic semantic framework. It discusses its application to the ontology and semantics of fictional objects, and its open problems. The methodology of the book follows the most recent trends in analytic ontology. In particular, the meta-ontological point of view is largely privileged

ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that metaphysics is a necessary discipline–necessary in the sense that all areas of philosophy, all areas of science, and in fact any type of rational activity at all would be impossible without a metaphysical background or metaphysical presuppositions. Because of the extremely strong nature of this claim, it is not possible to put forward a very simple argument, although I will attempt to construct one.

A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic had been responsible for introducing the Vienna Circle's ideas, developed within a Germanophone framework, to an Anglophone readership. Inevitably, this migration from one context to another resulted in the alteration of some of the concepts being transmitted. Such alterations have served to facilitate a number of false impressions of Logical Empiricism from which recent scholarship still tries to recover. In this paper, I will attempt to point to the ways in which LTL has helped to foster the various mistaken stereotypes about Logical Empiricism which were combined into the received view. I will begin by examining Ayer's all too brief presentation of an Anglocentric lineage for his ideas. This lineage, as we shall see, simply omits the major 19 th century Germanophone influences on the rise of analytic philosophy. The Germanophone ideas he presents are selectively introduced into an Anglophone context, and directed towards various concerns that arose within that context. I will focus on the differences between Carnap's version of the overcoming of metaphysics, and Ayer's reconfiguration into what he calls the elimination of metaphysics. Having discussed the above, I will very briefly outline the consequences that Ayer's radicalisation of the Vienna Circle's doctrines had on the subsequent Anglophone reception of Logical Empiricism.

This is a slightly opinionated review of three main factions in metaontology: Quineans, Carnapians, and Meinongians. Emphasis is given to the last camp, as the metaontological aspect of Meinongianism has been underappreciated. The final section then offers some general remarks about the legitimacy of ontology, touching on ideas I have developed in other publications.

Friedrich Nietzsche was among the figures from the history of nineteenth century philosophy that, perhaps surprisingly, some of the Vienna Circle's members had presented as one of their predecessors. While, primarily for political reasons, most Anglophone figures in the history of analytic philosophy had taken a dim view of Nietzsche, the Vienna Circle's leader Moritz Schlick admired and praised Nietzsche, rejecting what he saw as a misinterpretation of Nietzsche as a militarist or proto-fascist. Schlick, Frank, Neurath, and Carnap were in different ways committed to the view that Nietzsche made a significant contribution to the overcoming of metaphysics. Some of these philosophers praised the intimate connection Nietzsche drew between his philosophical outlook and empirical studies in psychology and physiology. In his 1912 lectures on Nietzsche, Schlick maintained that Nietzsche overcame an initial Schopenhauerian metaphysical-artistic phase in his thinking, and subsequently remained a positivist until his last writings. Frank and Neurath made the weaker claim that Nietzsche contributed to the development of a positivistic or scientific conception of the world. Schlick and Frank took a further step in seeing the mature Nietzsche as an Enlightenment thinker.

This article builds on C. S. Peirce’s suggestive blueprint for an inclusive outlook that grants reality to his three categories. Moving away from the usual focus on (contentious) cosmological forces, I use a modal principle to partition various ontological layers: regular sign-action (like coded language) subsumes actual sign-action (like here-and-now events) which in turn subsumes possible sign-action (like qualities related to whatever would be similar to them). Once we realize that the triadic sign’s components are each answerable to this asymmetric subsumption, we obtain the means to track at which level of complexity semiosis finds itself, in a given case. Since the bulk of such a “trinitarian” metaphysics would be devoted to countenancing un-interpreted phenomena, I argue that current misgivings about sign-based ontologies are largely misplaced.

Timothy Williamson has recently proposed to undermine modal skepticism by appealing to the reducibility of modal to counterfactual logic (Reducibility). Central to Williamson’s strategy is the claim that use of the same non-deductive mode of inference (counterfactual development, or CD) whereby we typically arrive at knowledge of counterfactuals suffices for arriving at knowledge of metaphysical necessity via Reducibility. Granting Reducibility, I ask whether the use of CD plays any essential role in a Reducibility-based reply to two kinds of modal skepticism. I argue that its use is entirely dispensable, and that Reducibility makes available replies to modal skeptics which show certain propositions to be metaphysically necessary by deductive arguments from premises the modal skeptic accepts can be known.

The widespread mistrust of metaphysics-the main obstacle to the unification of physics and philosophy-is based on the myth that metaphysical claims cannot be falsified or verified, because they are supposedly true independently of empirical knowledge. This is not true of metaphysical naturalism, whose approach is to critically reflect on the theories and findings of all the empirical disciplines and abstract from them a theory about such general features of reality that no single empirical discipline can be the authority on. Causation is such a feature, since its instances include anything from planetary motions to particle interactions, chemical reactions, biological functions, and closing a door. Consequently, a general account of causation is beyond any particular empirical discipline. Metaphysical naturalism takes a meta-perspective on the results of the empirical sciences and attempts to figure out how it fits together in a coherent whole, e.g. by offering a general account of causation. General accounts of this kind are falsifiable in so far as the theories are falsifiable from which they are generalizations. The paper also discusses some fundamental metaphysical principles implicitly assumed by the sciences generally, and why they imply that unification is methodologically virtuous.

Metametafysiikka on filosofista tutkimusta, jonka kohteena on metafysiikka, ja Tuomas Tahkon An Introduction to Metametaphysics on tiettävästi alan ensimmäinen oppikirja. Metametafyysinen kirjallisuus on kasvanut etenkin viimeisen 15-20 vuoden aikana räjähdysmäisesti, mutta on usein epäselvää, mitä kaikkia aiheita metametafysiikka sisältää. Varsinkin ero ensimmäisen kertaluvun metafysiikkaan saattaa aiheseen vihkiytymättömille olla ymmärrettävistä syistä epäselvä. Esimerkiksi kysymystä "Mitä on metafysiikka?" käsitellään tyypillisesti metafysiikan oppikirjoissa ja tutkimusartikkeleissa , vaikka se on filosofinen kysymys, joka koskee metafysiikkaa, eli on

è, che cosa è, che cosa viene prima. Tre facce di uno stesso problema Luca Illetterati-Elena Tripaldi, Hegel's Metametaphysics. Logic and/ as Metaphysics in Hegel's Philosophy Graham Priest, Metaphysics and Logic. An Observation in Metametaphysics Gilles Kévorkian-Frédéric Nef, Métaphysique relationnelle et métaphysique du consti-tuant. Plaidoyer métamétaphysique pour une métaphysique mixte Olivier Boulnois, En-deçà de la métaphysique: l'éthique Peter van Inwagen, In Defense of Lightweight Platonism Franca D'Agostini, Reducing Redundancy in Metaphysics (and in Other Philosophical Disciplines) Massimiliano Carrara-Vittorio Morato, Compatibilismo semantico e scetticismo Francesco Berto-Matteo Plebani, Ontologia, metaontologia, e il fantasma di Quine Matti Eklund, Alien Structure and Themes from Analytic Philosophy Stefania Achella, La resistenza dei corpi. Etica della relazione e ontologia dialettica Marco Bastianelli, Filosofia dell'apertura. Per un umanesimo della relazione Mirko Di Bernardo, Plasticità dello sviluppo e codici epigenetici. Verso un approccio meta-biologico Francesca Piazza, Retorica e vita quotidiana. Che cosa ha ancora da dirci Heidegger sulla Retorica di Aristotele Gualtiero Lorini, A Kingdom of God on Earth. Kant's Legacy on Church and State in Ger-man Idealism Furia Valori, Il destino fra Tubinga, Berna e Francoforte nel giovane Hegel Saša Hrnjez, Sull'identità speculativa di essere e linguaggio. Un confronto tra diverse letture ermeneutiche Francesco Affronti, Nel labirinto della metafisica. Gli sviluppi possibili (e auspicabili) della metafisica nel xxi secolo

What is, what could, and what should be a speculative phenomenology? If, according to Fink, Husserl's phenomenology was characterized by an "anti-speculative attitude", we have to decide what "speculative" means here and if phenomenology can really take such an attitude. Rather than trying to lead phenomenology toward a speculative thinking that is "extrinsic" to it, we will try to find out in what sense phenomenology can find a speculative thinking that is, and remains, intrinsic to it, in a dimension characterized by a radical metaphysical neutrality. After showing that the phenomenological approach is per se "speculative", namely in the more original and non-metaphysical (or metaphysically neutral) meaning of the ancient "Theôria", I will outline four forms of such speculative phenomenology as forms of Mathesis. In the second part, I will present the basic concepts and theses towards a Mathesis of subjectivity as part of a phenomenological-speculative approach to forms of self-reference and to an existential dimension. In the third part, this approach will be integrated in a renewed form of meta-theoretical Mathesis as a new issue for the old phenomenological project of a theory of possible forms of theories. In the fourth part, I will focus on the deep relationship between a speculative nonmetaphysical approach to knowledge (theories) and the need to sketch a phenomenological meta-ontology (meta-ontological Mathesis). In the fifth and last part of the paper, I will present a general perspective in which the previous forms of Mathesis converge in a non-or metametaphysical questioning about reality.

I raise a problem about the possibility of metaphysics originally raised by Kant: what explains the fact that the terms in our metaphysical theories (e.g. " property ") refer to entities and structures (e.g. properties) in the world? I distinguish a meta-metaphysical view that can easily answer such questions (" deflationism ") from a meta-metaphysical view for which this explanatory task is more difficult (which I call the " substantive " view of metaphysics). I then canvass responses that the substantive metaphysician can give to this Kantian demand for an explanation of reference in metaphysics. I argue that these responses are either inadequate, or depend, implicitly or explicitly, on the idea of " joint carving " : carving at the joints is part of the explanation of reference-facts quite generally and our metaphysical terms in particular refer because they carve at the joints. I examine Ted Sider's recent work on joint carving and structure and argue that it cannot fill the explanatory gap. I conclude that this is reason ceterus paribus to reject the substantive view of metaphysics. Kant's critique, far from being obsolete, applies to the most cutting-edge of contemporary meta-metaphysical views.

This project investigates naturalized metaphysics as a recent trend in analytic
metaphysics originating in the naturalist attitude of James Ladyman and Don
Ross in their seminal work Everything must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized (2007).
The primary focus, however, will be the more recent article “Neo-Positivist
Metaphysics” (2012) by Alyssa Ney that originates in this tradition. The project
will conclude that naturalized metaphysics is an unsuccessful attempt at an
answer to the question ’how is metaphysics possible’. More precisely, the project
will establish that any answer to this question must instruct how to succeed at
attempts at assertions about the Kantian thing in itself. This requirement is
the result of an argument that no other conception of ’reality’ is robust enough
to accommodate an ambitious metaphysics. Subsequently, it will be argued
that naturalized metaphysics is conceived by its proponents as an attempt at
such an answer, but that naturalized metaphysics does not provide the required
instruction. This problem occurs because of Carnap’s challenge to metaphysics.
Carnap observes that no assertion can be made outside a linguistic framework
which has the consequence that metaphysical assertions must be about the
conceptual conventions of the linguistic framework rather than the thing in
itself. It is the view of Ney and the other proponents of naturalized metaphysics
that metaphysics is possible as a naturalized metaphysics; a metaphysics that
appropriately defers or yields to the findings of science. The project argues that
this requirement does nothing to ensure that Carnap’s challenge is avoided. The
challenge is equally significant to naturalized and non-naturalized metaphysics, so
long as both require that successful attempts at metaphysics must be assertions
about the thing in itself.
The project concludes that until or unless Carnap’s challenge is refuted, naturalized
metaphysics remain impossible, just like the metaphysics it is supposed to
replace.

Metaphysicians now typically distinguish between a theory’s ontology and its ideology. But besides a few cursory efforts, no one has explained the role of ideology in theory choice. In this paper I develop a framework for discussing how differing approaches to ideology impact metaphysical disputes. I first provide an initial characterization of ideology and develop two contrasting types of criteria used to evaluate its quality. In using externalist criteria, we judge the quality of a theory’s ideology by its relation to external features of the world. In contrast, in using internalist criteria, we judge the quality of a theory’s ideology by features internal to the theory and the theorizer, e.g. the intelligibility of the terminology employed. I then argue for an unrestricted application of externalist criteria, what I call maximal realism. According to maximal realism, we ought to apply externalist criteria to the entirety of a theory’s ideology – to not only predicates but also to quantifiers and logical operators. I defend maximal realism from what I take to be the best objection to it: that the view leads to bad questions. As part of my defense, I argue that those who would restrict their application of externalist criteria either adopt an unjustified partition of ideology or reject seemingly benign questions. Finally, I apply my discussion of ideology to two extant metaphysical disputes.

Ongoing discussion of this paper here: https://www.academia.edu/s/cf13d33860?source=link
Philosophy – whether traditional or contemporary – has nothing to say about the human metaphysical predicament, and cannot even offer a basic phenomenology of the human condition. Part of the problem is the ongoing confusion as to what philosophy actually amounts to, and what it can achieve. It is necessary to demystify philosophy, and have it restricted to the discipline of critical thinking, and it should not be thought of as possessing any substantial theoretical content of its own. It is a method, a skillset, a series of techniques, not a repository of various highbrow theories, whether about mind, epistemology, ontology, cosmology, science, or anything else. Metaphysics is an entirely distinct and separate field of inquiry, and concerns the human predicament, and ultimate human fulfilment, and it is to this end that critical thinking skills can usefully be applied. The purpose of this short study is to give some help to those hoping to gain an insight into the metaphysical realms of their being, and who would like some guidance with regard to those formal and academic disciplines supposedly geared to dealing with that very subject.

This is an essay on philosophical methodology, the disciplinary prejudices of the Anglophone philosophical world, and how these things interact with some aspects of the content and form of Latin American philosophy to preclude the latter's integration with mainstream Anglophone philosophical work. Among the topics discussed of interest to analytic philosophers: metaphilosophy, the status hierarchy of philosophical subfields, experimental philosophy, and patterns of openness and exclusion in philosophy. Among the topics of interest to philosophers interested in Latin American philosophy and comparative philosophy: the nature of disputes about the existence of Latin American philosophy, the significance of this genre of writing, how contributions to it can proceed, and why metaphilosophical concerns in Latin America are problematic for the prospects for integration with the Anglophone philosophical world.

Often philosophers have reason to ask fundamental questions about the aims, methods, nature, or value, of their own discipline. When philosophers systematically examine such questions the resulting work is sometimes referred to as “metaphilosophy”. Metaphilosophy, it should be said, is not a well-established, or clearly demarcated, field of philosophical inquiry like, say, epistemology or the philosophy of art. However, in the last couple of decades there has been a great deal of metaphilosophical work on issues concerning the methodology of philosophy in the analytic tradition. This entry focuses on that work

(forthcoming in Quine, Structure, and Ontology, Oxford University Press, ed. by Frederique Janssen-Lauret) This chapter explores some of the relations between Quine's and Carnap's metaontological stances on the one hand, and contemporary work in the metaphysics of time, on the other. Contemporary metaphysics of time, like analytic metaphysics in general, grew out of the revival of the discipline that Quine's critique of the logical empiricists (such as Carnap) made possible. At the same time, the metaphysics of time has, in some respects, strayed far from its Quinean roots. This chapter examines some likely Quinean and Carnapian reactions to elements of the contemporary scene.

A metametaphysical perspective in no way signifies a final hegemony of metaphysics, conceived as a discipline at once formal and directive, which would replace the metaphysics of first intention. We undertake to show that we can not reduce the metaphysics of the constituent to that of the relation and vice versa and that a mixed metaphysics is inevitable. In this sense, this brief proposition returns to a new interpretation of the paradigmatic couple Plato / Aristotle and in fact contains a plea for Platonist relationalism, partly within the metaphysics of Van Inwagen and Lowe.

Deflationary metaontological views—including the verbal disputes view and the easy ontology view—are often thought to face a common problem: that they cannot charitably make sense of what disputing ontologists are doing. For the verbal disputes view has them uttering trivial truths, while the easy ontologist treats one as uttering an obvious truth and the other an obvious falsehood. I argue that this criticism may be addressed by attending to pragmatics—we can make sense of what disputants in many metaphysical debates are doing, by appealing to the idea of ‘metalinguistic negotiation’. Such disputants may be uttering trivial truths or falsehoods as a way of pragmatically advocating for views about how our terms should be used, or whether they should be used at all. The resulting view preserves the epistemic advantages of deflationism while giving a better account of the depth and importance of many debates in metaphysics.

This article is an evaluation of Le Poidevin’s use of Carnap’s stance on ontology within the philosophy of religion. Le Poidevin claims that (1) theists need to take God to be a putative entity within space-time in order for their claim that God exists to be meaningful, and that (2) instrumentalism about theology is viable. I argue that although Le Poidevin’s response to Carnap’s argument is no less problematic than that argument itself, his position is in fact thoroughly un-Carnapian. The upshot is that his discussion provides some support to atheism, but none to either of his two official conclusions.

If mereology is concerned with the truth-values of statements formulated in mereological vocabulary, e.g. the supplementation principle, metamereology is concerned with the truth-conditions of such statements, the mereological concepts employed in forming mereological statements, and the methods for answering mereological questions. In this essay I give a brief survey of metamereological views. I then develop my own position based on a semantic analysis of terms referring to composite objects in the framework of grounded epistemic two-dimensional semantics. I show that this position has interesting mereological and metamereological implications.

Arvostelmien jako analyyttisiin ja synteettisiin lienee olion sinänsä ohella Kantin filosofian kiistellyimpiä aiheita. Valitettavasti se on myös väärinymmärretyimpiä. Analyyttisen filosofian piirissä 1900-luvulla käyty keskustelu analyyttisyydestä ja synteettisyydestä on kantilaisesta näkökulmasta ollut väärillä raiteilla. Selvitän tässä artikkelissa, kuinka Kant itse mielsi jakonsa, ja rohkenen esittää arvion, että se on ymmärrettävissä vain hänen semanttisten käsitystensä ja filosofisten tavoitteidensa kautta.

Corrections: P. 2, l. 2: Replace "Siders" by "Sider". P. 11, l. 8-9: Delete ", even if the presence of that tiny piece may provide a physical explanation".
Abstract: Husserl’s conception of the constitution of reality has it that there are layers of reality which are more basic than others, as far as their constitution in consciousness is concerned. The view that reality is structured in such a way that some of its elements depend on other, more fundamental ones is also held by proponents of more recent analytic (meta-)metaphysics, but in connection with a rather dogmatic naturalism. I will begin by explaining Husserl’s conception of constitution. This requires us to go into the motives that led him to “transcendental idealism” to some extent, a position which it may be helpful to compare to (some aspects of) what Hilary Putnam calls internal realism (section 2). It will become clear that as it stands Husserl’s position is not well-argued and less than convincing, but that it can be modified so as to yield a more persuasive view, which can also be used to give substance to (the more plausible aspects of) internal realism. Finally, I will indicate how the claim that Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological analyses provide a non-naïve alternative to today’s naturalistic mainstream meta-metaphysics (to be sketched in section 1) can be substantiated further. To this end, I shall briefly sketch his analysis of the constitution of nature as conceived of in physical (as well as cognitive) science, as developed in the second volume of his work Ideas (Ideas II) (section 3).

(PhD Dissertation). How is one to react to the fact that, since immemorial times, persons have been engaged in disputes in metaphysics? It is argued that one is to adopt a conflictual craft, a synthesis of the skeptic craft and of the dogmatic one that serves to formulate the metametaphysical system of disputes. In making cases for the claims that characterize this system and in seeking to spell out its pertinence to contemporary analytic and continental philosophy, the dissertation starts by articulating an interpretation of two projects that have not been carefully discussed in relation to one another: Friedrich Nietzsche’s libertarian project of overcoming metaphysics and Rudolf Carnap’s egalitarian project of overcoming metaphysics. Then, a synthesis of these two projects is promoted, and dogmatists are criticized on the basis that they have resorted to “subtle” violence, a kind of violence that is not as upfront as corporeal ones, such as that of shooting someone. The dissertation proceeds by addressing the works of Willard van Orman Quine, Saul Kripke and Kit Fine in seeking to show that disputes are micro-political conflicts, that is, they are micro-wars that may be approached from a right-wing allegedly apolitical stance, or from a left-wing stance that seeks to show the political character of disputes. In proposing a heterodox reading of Gilles Deleuze, the dissertation defends the left-wing approach. Moreover, it is argued that micro-wars have an incommensurable greatness because it seems impossible to measure persons’ overall “amount” of emotions and/or time spent in dealing with disputes.

Reading Putnam consists largely of papers from the fantastic 'Putnam @80' conference (organised by Maria Baghramian in 2007) together with replies from Hilary Putnam. Given the diversity of Putnam's work, the papers in this collection cover many different topics. This makes the collection difficulty to read but, ultimately, extremely rewarding. In this review, I focus on the contributions from Michael Devitt, Charles Parsons, Richard Boyd, Ned Block, Charles Travis and John McDowell, together with Putnam's responses. My aim is to highlight some connections  between Putnam's (evolving) views on ontology, conceptual relativism, and perception.

According to a certain familiar way of dividing up the business of philosophy, ontology is concerned with the question of what entities exist (a task that is often identified with that of drafting a “complete inventory” of the universe) whereas metaphysics seeks to explain, of those entities, what they are (i.e., to specify the “ultimate nature” of the items included in the inventory). This distinction carries with it a natural thought, namely, that ontology is in some way prior to metaphysics. One must first of all figure out what things exist (or might exist); then one can attend to the further question of what they are, specify their nature, speculate on those features that make each thing the thing it is. I sympathize with that thought, but there is a major worry lurking in the background and there are several complications that emerge in the foreground. The purpose of this paper is to address such worries and complications and to come up with a plausible way of understanding the “priority thesis” that makes it both reasonable and, hopefully, useful.