Papers by Frederick Kroon
Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality
One example of the impressive breadth, depth, and deep interconnectedness of Fine’s work concerns... more One example of the impressive breadth, depth, and deep interconnectedness of Fine’s work concerns his views about what sorts of entities we should commit ourselves to, as philosophers. In “The Question of Ontology” he challenges existing accounts of the philosophical task of ontology, rejecting a Quinean concern with what there is in favor of a focus on what entities are real. Fine thinks such a notion of reality is primitive, although linked to the notion of being ungrounded. The present chapter constitutes a critique of Fine’s interconnected set of ideas about the task of ontology, and defends the ability of quantificational constructions to capture ontological commitments, while questioning the usefulness to ontology of a primitive concept of reality.
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2012
Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, 2016
This paper describes a certain interpretation of the Buddhists’ view of empty terms argued for by... more This paper describes a certain interpretation of the Buddhists’ view of empty terms argued for by J.L. Shaw in his paper “Empty Terms: the Nyāya and the Buddhists”, and then defends a view of empty terms that in some ways bears a striking resemblance to what Shaw wants to say. The main aim in this paper to show how some of the intuitions that might have led to their view (if Shaw is right) can be given a sympathetic explanation in terms of some recent ideas in philosophical logic. At the end of the paper I suggest that, even if my account fails as an interpretation of the Buddhists’ view, it fits well with a certain ideal of radical emptiness that may have formed part of the Buddhists’ world-view, and to that extent is a view that the Buddhists may have found congenial.
Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, 2008
Empty names present Millianism with a well-known problem: it implies that sentences containing su... more Empty names present Millianism with a well-known problem: it implies that sentences containing such names fail to express (fully determinate) propositions. The present paper argues that empty descriptions present Millianism with another problem. The paper describes this problem, shows why Millians should be worried, and provides a Millian-friendly solution. The concluding section draws some lessons about how all this affects Millianism and the problem of empty names.
The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Literature, 2018
Trends in Logic, 2019
According to dialetheists, there are true contradictions. Anti-dialetheists deny this. David Lewi... more According to dialetheists, there are true contradictions. Anti-dialetheists deny this. David Lewis famously thought that the dialetheist’s toleration of contradiction was beyond the pale and made dialogue between the two sides impossible. But this sceptical view presents him with at least two problems. First, what do we do about the apparent appearance of contradiction when we reason about certain topics such as truth? Secondly, contrary to any summary dismissal of contradiction, don’t we often at least contemplate and imagine things that are impossible? Lewis responded that we sometimes make believe that impossibilities are possible, “subtle ones at least”, but that these cases seem to require a distinction between the subtle ones and the blatant ones, a distinction that he for one didn’t know how to draw. In this paper, I argue that there is a reading of Lewis’s remarks on which they not only suggest an attractive account of the imaginability of the impossible, but also a potentia...
Philosophical Inquiries, 2016
It is frequently claimed that randomness conflicts with free will because, if our actions are the... more It is frequently claimed that randomness conflicts with free will because, if our actions are the result of purely random events, we must lack control over them. The paper challenges this view. After arguing for a product rather than a process notion of randomness, it uses an intuitive two-stage, contextual definition of free choice to show that, relative to this definition, randomness is compatible with free will. But we also stress that the argument is relative in nature: the conclusion holds only if free will is itself metaphysically possible, a claim that is beyond the purview of the paper.
Journal of Medical Ethics, 2020
In their recent ‘The ethical case for non-directed postmortem sperm donation’, Hodson and Parker ... more In their recent ‘The ethical case for non-directed postmortem sperm donation’, Hodson and Parker outline and defend the concept of voluntary non-directed postmortem sperm donation, the idea that men should be able to register their desire to donate their sperm after death for use by strangers since this would offer a potential means of increasing the quantity and heterogeneity of donor sperm. In this response, we raise some concerns about their proposal, focusing in particular on the fact that current methodologies do not make for a reliable way of ensuring that sperm retrieved postmortem has a good chance of leading to conception, which is in turn likely to make potential recipients reluctant to use such sperm. These concerns add to the ethical doubts that attend aspects of the proposal, making the prospect of implementation of such a policy unlikely at best.
Philosophical Studies, 1986
Research in Ethical Issues in Organizations, 2016
Abstract In this chapter I consider the need for consent in two cases of posthumous donation of p... more Abstract In this chapter I consider the need for consent in two cases of posthumous donation of parts of one’s body: organ donation and the donation of sperm to allow one’s partner to conceive a child after one’s death. What kind of consent is appropriate in these cases and why? In both cases, jurisdictions tend to prefer explicit consent, although many countries now adopt presumed consent (opt-out) in the case of organ donation, and there has been a recent plea for presumed consent in the case of sperm donation as well. In this chapter I first argue that arguments in favour of presumed consent are inadequate as they stand, and then describe another way of understanding opt-out schemes, one that focuses on different models of what is at stake and on the ethical requirements incurred on such models.
Reproductive Biomedicine & Society Online, 2015
This paper compares standard conceptions of consent with the conception of consent defended by Ke... more This paper compares standard conceptions of consent with the conception of consent defended by Kelton Tremellen and Julian Savulescu in their attempt to reorient the ethical debate around posthumous sperm procurement and conception, as published in Reproductive BioMedicine Online in 2015. According to their radical proposal, the surviving partner's wishes are, in effect, the only condition that needs to be considered for there to be a legitimate moral case for these procedures: the default should be presumed consent to the procedures, whether or not the agent did consent or would have consented. The present paper argues that Tremellen and Savulescu's case for this position is flawed, but offers a reconstruction that articulates what may well be a hidden, and perhaps reasonable, assumption behind the argument. But while the new argument appears more promising, the reconstruction also suggests that the position of presumed consent is currently unlikely to be acceptable as policy.
History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand, 2014
Sorts, Ontology, and Metaphor, 1981
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Papers by Frederick Kroon