In recent academic debates, a lot has been said about metaontology. Usually, the main point of di... more In recent academic debates, a lot has been said about metaontology. Usually, the main point of disagreement in these debates is the relationship between ontology and the logical existential quantifier. It has been well-known, since the famous 'On What There Is' (1948), that the dominant view regarding the meaning of the existential quantifier of formal logic is ontological, which means that the ontological notion of existence is completely captured by it. This association between ontological existence and the logical existential quantifier is explicitly defended by Quine with his criterion of ontological commitment. However, the most curious aspect about Quine's criterion that is commonly put aside, on purpose or not, is that it is a clear and extreme attempt to reduce ontological and metaphysical debates to the field of logic and semantics, more specifically, to the theory of reference. His criterion, as it was proposed, can be seen as a tool with which he defends the idea that the correct and only approach to answer the main ontological question " What is there? " is through logical analysis. If this interpretation is correct, the criterion of ontological commitment, although toughly defended by metaphysicians nowadays, is much closer to a deflationist point of view than is usually assumed. This is due to the fact that, as I intend to show, the relation between ontological existence and the logical existential quantifier, especially as proposed by Quine, is reductionist, superficial and completely anti-intuitive.
In recent academic debates, a lot has been said about metaontology. Usually, the main point of di... more In recent academic debates, a lot has been said about metaontology. Usually, the main point of disagreement in these debates is the relationship between ontology and the logical existential quantifier. It has been well-known, since the famous 'On What There Is' (1948), that the dominant view regarding the meaning of the existential quantifier of formal logic is ontological, which means that the ontological notion of existence is completely captured by it. This association between ontological existence and the logical existential quantifier is explicitly defended by Quine with his criterion of ontological commitment. However, the most curious aspect about Quine's criterion that is commonly put aside, on purpose or not, is that it is a clear and extreme attempt to reduce ontological and metaphysical debates to the field of logic and semantics, more specifically, to the theory of reference. His criterion, as it was proposed, can be seen as a tool with which he defends the idea that the correct and only approach to answer the main ontological question " What is there? " is through logical analysis. If this interpretation is correct, the criterion of ontological commitment, although toughly defended by metaphysicians nowadays, is much closer to a deflationist point of view than is usually assumed. This is due to the fact that, as I intend to show, the relation between ontological existence and the logical existential quantifier, especially as proposed by Quine, is reductionist, superficial and completely anti-intuitive.
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