Drafts by Catharine Diehl
Theories of grounding and ontological dependence raise a new challenge to the capacity of the Lew... more Theories of grounding and ontological dependence raise a new challenge to the capacity of the Lewisian/Stalnakerian account of propositions to provide sufficient fineness of grain. In On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis argues that modal realism yields a satisfying theory of propositions as sets of worlds. But I will show that the propositions figuring in grounding statements must possess a finer-than-modal structure. I argue that the Lewisian theory can be modified to meet the challenge posed by grounding. Any account must satisfy two desiderata: first, it must supply sufficient fineness of grain to make distinctions that are not captured by differences in possible worlds. Second, it must offer some sort of story about how these differences could be in the world. To show that a Lewisian-inspired approach is capable of satisfying the first, I propose a modification of John Bigelow's framework for belief contexts to account for the grounding operator. With regard to the second desideratum, we have to distinguish two senses of world-liness. I claim that a theory is strongly worldly iff its content does not involve represen-tational or mental items. Roughly speaking, it is weakly worldly just in case substituting expressions with other expressions that are referentially equivalent in the sentences of the theory does not affect the truth of the theory. The approach I suggest fails to be strongly worldly. However, it satisfies at least some forms of weak worldliness, and I'll argue that this is all that matters.
Papers on contemporary philosophy by Catharine Diehl
Ergo , 2018
According to ontological nihilism
there are, fundamentally, no individuals. Both natural languag... more According to ontological nihilism
there are, fundamentally, no individuals. Both natural languages and standard predicate logic, however, appear to be committed to a picture of the world as containing individual objects. This leads to what I call the expressibility challenge for ontological nihilism: what language can the ontological nihilist use to express her account of how matters fundamentally stand? One promising suggestion is for the nihilist to use a form of predicate functorese, a language developed by Quine. This proposal faces a difficult objection, according to which any theory in predicate functorese will be a notational variant of the corresponding theory stated in standard predicate logic. Jason Turner (2011) has provided the most detailed and convincing version of this objection. In the present paper, I argue that Turner's case for the notational variance thesis relies on a faulty metasemantic principle and, consequently, that an objection long thought devastating is in fact misguided.
Response to Katharina Felka's book, Talking About Numbers (2016). (The publisher does not permit ... more Response to Katharina Felka's book, Talking About Numbers (2016). (The publisher does not permit me to put a copy here. Send me an email if you don't have library access and would like a draft.)
In his reply to our article on 'neutral realism,' Gabriel claims that our criticism of his theory... more In his reply to our article on 'neutral realism,' Gabriel claims that our criticism of his theory is based on a severe misunderstanding and misrepresentation of his actual views. In this article, we show that Gabriel’s claim is incorrect and that our original criticism remains unrefuted.
Wir untersuchen Markus Gabriels sogenannten 'neuen' bzw. 'neutralen' Realismus und kommen zu dem ... more Wir untersuchen Markus Gabriels sogenannten 'neuen' bzw. 'neutralen' Realismus und kommen zu dem Schluss, dass die meisten von Gabriels Thesen verschiedene Lesarten zulassen, von denen die einen akzeptabel aber philosophisch wenig originell, die anderen dagegen unplausibel und schlecht begründet sind.
Papers by Catharine Diehl
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2018
According to ontological nihilism there are, fundamentally, no individuals. Both natural language... more According to ontological nihilism there are, fundamentally, no individuals. Both natural languages and standard predicate logic, however, appear to be committed to a picture of the world as containing individual objects. This leads to what I call the expressibility challenge for ontological nihilism: what language can the ontological nihilist use to express her account of how matters fundamentally stand? One promising suggestion is for the nihilist to use a form of predicate functorese, a language developed by Quine. This proposal faces a difficult objection, according to which any theory in predicate functorese will be a notational variant of the corresponding theory stated in standard predicate logic. Jason Turner (2011) has provided the most detailed and convincing version of this objection. In the present paper, I argue that Turner's case for the notational variance thesis relies on a faulty metasemantic principle and, consequently, that an objection long thought devastating is in fact misguided. B oth standard metaphysics and common sense are, plausibly, committed to a picture of the world as containing individual objects: these objects range from the mid-sized dry goods of everyday life such as trees, tables, and turnips to electrons, protons, and neutrons. These objects belong to kinds-biological, chemical, physical, etc.-but they are particular instances of these kinds. It is these particular objects that we seem to encounter in perception, and they are central to much of our ordinary communication about the world. Viewing the world as containing concrete, particular objects-henceforth 'individuals'-is so fundamental to our cognitive operations that the project of devising a metaphysics without individuals might seem hopeless. Recently, however, several philosophers have challenged this picture, motivated by puzzles stemming from both metaphysics and (a certain interpretation of) the findings of physics. They argue that contrary to appearances, fundamental reality does not include any individual
diacritics, 2008
Through an historical investigation of the concept of the zero from Gauthiot to Deleuze, this pap... more Through an historical investigation of the concept of the zero from Gauthiot to Deleuze, this paper examines a peculiar object, the signifying nothing. Saussure founds his science of linguistics on the claim that the opposition between something and nothing provides the minimal ...
This dissertation demonstrates the fundamental importance of the problem of intensive magnitudes ... more This dissertation demonstrates the fundamental importance of the problem of intensive magnitudes for Leibniz and Kant. While their work has generated an immense scholarly literature, the systematic role of the concept of intensive magnitude has been neglected. I argue that attending to the problem of degree-valued properties reveals new connections among Leibniz's and Kant's metaphysical, epistemological, and aesthetic concerns. I show I have been fortunate to have benefited from the support, intellectual generosity, and erudition of my advisor, Daniel Heller-Roazen. Werner Hamacher's writing and teaching have been crucial to my thinking over the years. I would also like to thank Des Hogan and Daniel Garber for reading chapters of the dissertation and for their helpful comments. Arnd Wedemeyer's critical acumen and dedication have shaped this project from beginning to end. To Beau Madison Mount, I owe a debt beyond all measure: both his philosophical rigor and editorial patience and care have been invaluable. Matthew Moss, Béatrice Longuenesse, Nick Stang, Lucy Allais, and Colin McLear have all provided useful comments and criticism on portions of this work. Anna Glazova, Lisa Cerami, and Sarah Pourciau have enriched this dissertation in various ways. My father, Carl Diehl and my mother, Joanne Feit Diehl, have supported me in every manner possible throughout my time in graduate school. In addition, I would like to thank my mother for her sharp proofreading eye. I am grateful to Tobias Rosefeldt and the members of the colloquia at the Humboldt University in Berlin and at the Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität in Frankfurt for giving me the opportunity to present portions of this work and for the comments I received. I would also like to thank the Fulbright program and the Institute for Cultural Inquiry for financial support. vi Table of Contents Front Matter iii vii 2.2. There are infinitely many petites perceptions, but they do not have infinitesimal magnitudes 2.3. Petites perceptions can make a noticeable difference in our perceptual state even if they are not noticed; the "confused" effect produces the je ne sais quoi 2.4. The complex perceptual state composed of petites perceptions merely appears to be simple §3. Happiness and the Qualitative Infinite §4. Limits Chapter 3: Kant's Theory of Intensive Magnitudes in the Anticipations of Perception §1. Kant's Criticisms of Leibniz in the Amphiboly §2. Negative and Intensive Magnitudes in the Pre-Critical Writings 2.1. Reflection 5270 and the priority of negation 2.2. Real opposition and intensive magnitude in 1763 2.3. Real positing 2.4. Intensive magnitude and limits §3. Positing in Time and the Anticipations of Perception Chapter 4: The Dialectic of Intensity: Infinite Judgment in the Analytic of the Sublime §1. Aesthetic Magnitude: Quantitas and Magnitudo 1.1. Four types of quantitative judgment 1.2. Alle Größenschätzung der Gegenstände der Natur ist zuletzt ästhetisch 1.3. From the great beyond all comparison to viii the sublime §2. Imagination's Infinite Progress, the Aesthetic Maximum, and the Sublime 2.1 Apprehensio, comprehensio, and the generation of the feeling of the sublime 2.2 Simplicity and the Augenblick
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 2016
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Drafts by Catharine Diehl
Papers on contemporary philosophy by Catharine Diehl
there are, fundamentally, no individuals. Both natural languages and standard predicate logic, however, appear to be committed to a picture of the world as containing individual objects. This leads to what I call the expressibility challenge for ontological nihilism: what language can the ontological nihilist use to express her account of how matters fundamentally stand? One promising suggestion is for the nihilist to use a form of predicate functorese, a language developed by Quine. This proposal faces a difficult objection, according to which any theory in predicate functorese will be a notational variant of the corresponding theory stated in standard predicate logic. Jason Turner (2011) has provided the most detailed and convincing version of this objection. In the present paper, I argue that Turner's case for the notational variance thesis relies on a faulty metasemantic principle and, consequently, that an objection long thought devastating is in fact misguided.
Papers by Catharine Diehl
there are, fundamentally, no individuals. Both natural languages and standard predicate logic, however, appear to be committed to a picture of the world as containing individual objects. This leads to what I call the expressibility challenge for ontological nihilism: what language can the ontological nihilist use to express her account of how matters fundamentally stand? One promising suggestion is for the nihilist to use a form of predicate functorese, a language developed by Quine. This proposal faces a difficult objection, according to which any theory in predicate functorese will be a notational variant of the corresponding theory stated in standard predicate logic. Jason Turner (2011) has provided the most detailed and convincing version of this objection. In the present paper, I argue that Turner's case for the notational variance thesis relies on a faulty metasemantic principle and, consequently, that an objection long thought devastating is in fact misguided.