Undergraduate Papers by Matt D'Cruze
One way of thinking about explanations that are mind-independent in
science is that it answers “w... more One way of thinking about explanations that are mind-independent in
science is that it answers “what-if-things-had-been-different” questions, supplying information about what changes in some phenomena if some change is made—these sort of statements are counterfactuals. Often in science there is physical phenomena that is not able to be explained in terms other than those of the mathematics, as opposed to explanations where mathematics seems to play the mere role of representing causal or physical facts. This raises a question: could the sort of dependence of physical facts on mathematical facts be counterfactual? In this dissertation I will argue that a counterfactual theory of extramathematical explanation can appeal to a metaphysical necessitation constraint to distinguish between cases where mathematics plays a merely representational role in explaining some physical phenomena, and cases where there is genuine mathematical explanations for the physical phenomena, a challenge raised by Baron (2016b) that I will call the explanatory genuineness problem. Using a new example of the usage of coprimeness facts in computer encryption algorithms, which is analogous to the usage of coprimeness facts in the explanation of cicada life-cycles, I argue that the fact that mathematical explanations can occur in multiple physically distinct systems is evidence in favour of the view that mathematical facts that play a genuine explanatory role represent truths about metaphysical
necessity, thus accounting for metaphysical necessitation. However, appealing to the metaphysical necessitation constraint introduces a further challenge: as evaluating a counterfactual under the metaphysical necessitation constraint will involve evaluating how a physical system is affected by the hypothetical changing of a mathematical fact at an impossible world, I argue that there is competing ways to model the effects of the same mathematical
intervention. This shows us that it is not exactly clear what aspects
of mathematical facts are representing the underlying metaphysical constraints. I conclude that even if a demarcation can be drawn between mathematical facts that play a representational and genuine explanatory role using metaphysical necessitation, a truly counterfactual theory of eme must give some epistemic position for why some evaluation of a mathematical counterfactual is agent independent.
Containing numerous content and writing quality related mistakes, this paper was submitted for my... more Containing numerous content and writing quality related mistakes, this paper was submitted for my 2018 Honours unit on Metaphysics at UWA.
Containing numerous content and writing quality related mistakes, this paper was submitted for my... more Containing numerous content and writing quality related mistakes, this paper was submitted for my 2018 Honours unit on Wittgenstein at UWA.
Containing numerous content and writing quality related mistakes, this paper was submitted for my... more Containing numerous content and writing quality related mistakes, this paper was submitted for my 2017 Honours unit on Consciousness at UWA.
In this paper I examine the modal commitments, in terms defined by Sider (2003), of Physicalist and Dualist responses to Chalmers (1996, 2009)’s Conceivability Argument. In Section 1. I outline central positions one can take with respect to modality and pose a fundamental epistemic problem that all views holding objective modality must solve. In Section 2 I explain Weak Modal Rationalism in brief detail, showing that it solves an epistemic problem for objective modality via conceivability. If Weak Modal Rationalism is successful, it licenses the Conceivability Argument against Physicalism. In Section 3 I flag Vaidya (2017a, 2017b) as raising an epistemic problem for Weak Modal Rationalism which it prima facie is not able to answer. However, I consider the popular alternative of A Posteriori Physicalism, and show that Chalmers argues convincingly that it is likewise faced with its own epistemic Problems, even against a recent defence given by Goff and Papineau (2014). In Section 4 I briefly suggest an alternative, yet extreme, solution for A Posteriori Physicalists: due to epistemic problems, Modal Empiricists reject that there is any objective modality (although Ismael (2017) holds that this doesn’t entail that true modal beliefs are epistemically reducible to actuality, as there are just no ontologically objective possible truths overall (only actual truths)), while preserving their conceivability. The success of the Modal Empiricist’s response to the Conceivability Argument is obviously dependent on whether Modal Empiricism is a coherent, acceptable notion. I conclude that it is an unintuitive view, but an enemy that both Dualists and Physicalists should take seriously.
Containing numerous content and writing quality related mistakes, this paper was submitted on 27... more Containing numerous content and writing quality related mistakes, this paper was submitted on 27th October, 2017 for my Metaethics Honours class at the University of Western Australia
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In this paper I will argue Gibbard hyperplan semantics do not solve the Frege-Geach Problem for metaethical expressivists due to the Negation Problem: being unable to explain attitude discordance without postulating ad-hoc disagreement, due to the usage of disquotation. I conclude by suggesting that Dynamic Semantics can avoid this problem because it is non-disquotational, and that we should adapt our logic to suit the sort of phenomena we want to model, and thus that abandoning disquotational approaches should not be seen as a cost.
Containing numerous content and writing quality related mistakes, this essay is a non-abbreviated... more Containing numerous content and writing quality related mistakes, this essay is a non-abbreviated draft of an undergraduate paper written in 2016 for a Continental Philosophy unit on the essay question "has Derrida finally taken us beyond metaphysics?".
Containing numerous content and writing quality related mistakes, this paper was written in 2015 ... more Containing numerous content and writing quality related mistakes, this paper was written in 2015 for an undergraduate Metaphysics unit.
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Undergraduate Papers by Matt D'Cruze
science is that it answers “what-if-things-had-been-different” questions, supplying information about what changes in some phenomena if some change is made—these sort of statements are counterfactuals. Often in science there is physical phenomena that is not able to be explained in terms other than those of the mathematics, as opposed to explanations where mathematics seems to play the mere role of representing causal or physical facts. This raises a question: could the sort of dependence of physical facts on mathematical facts be counterfactual? In this dissertation I will argue that a counterfactual theory of extramathematical explanation can appeal to a metaphysical necessitation constraint to distinguish between cases where mathematics plays a merely representational role in explaining some physical phenomena, and cases where there is genuine mathematical explanations for the physical phenomena, a challenge raised by Baron (2016b) that I will call the explanatory genuineness problem. Using a new example of the usage of coprimeness facts in computer encryption algorithms, which is analogous to the usage of coprimeness facts in the explanation of cicada life-cycles, I argue that the fact that mathematical explanations can occur in multiple physically distinct systems is evidence in favour of the view that mathematical facts that play a genuine explanatory role represent truths about metaphysical
necessity, thus accounting for metaphysical necessitation. However, appealing to the metaphysical necessitation constraint introduces a further challenge: as evaluating a counterfactual under the metaphysical necessitation constraint will involve evaluating how a physical system is affected by the hypothetical changing of a mathematical fact at an impossible world, I argue that there is competing ways to model the effects of the same mathematical
intervention. This shows us that it is not exactly clear what aspects
of mathematical facts are representing the underlying metaphysical constraints. I conclude that even if a demarcation can be drawn between mathematical facts that play a representational and genuine explanatory role using metaphysical necessitation, a truly counterfactual theory of eme must give some epistemic position for why some evaluation of a mathematical counterfactual is agent independent.
In this paper I examine the modal commitments, in terms defined by Sider (2003), of Physicalist and Dualist responses to Chalmers (1996, 2009)’s Conceivability Argument. In Section 1. I outline central positions one can take with respect to modality and pose a fundamental epistemic problem that all views holding objective modality must solve. In Section 2 I explain Weak Modal Rationalism in brief detail, showing that it solves an epistemic problem for objective modality via conceivability. If Weak Modal Rationalism is successful, it licenses the Conceivability Argument against Physicalism. In Section 3 I flag Vaidya (2017a, 2017b) as raising an epistemic problem for Weak Modal Rationalism which it prima facie is not able to answer. However, I consider the popular alternative of A Posteriori Physicalism, and show that Chalmers argues convincingly that it is likewise faced with its own epistemic Problems, even against a recent defence given by Goff and Papineau (2014). In Section 4 I briefly suggest an alternative, yet extreme, solution for A Posteriori Physicalists: due to epistemic problems, Modal Empiricists reject that there is any objective modality (although Ismael (2017) holds that this doesn’t entail that true modal beliefs are epistemically reducible to actuality, as there are just no ontologically objective possible truths overall (only actual truths)), while preserving their conceivability. The success of the Modal Empiricist’s response to the Conceivability Argument is obviously dependent on whether Modal Empiricism is a coherent, acceptable notion. I conclude that it is an unintuitive view, but an enemy that both Dualists and Physicalists should take seriously.
_______________________________________________________________________
In this paper I will argue Gibbard hyperplan semantics do not solve the Frege-Geach Problem for metaethical expressivists due to the Negation Problem: being unable to explain attitude discordance without postulating ad-hoc disagreement, due to the usage of disquotation. I conclude by suggesting that Dynamic Semantics can avoid this problem because it is non-disquotational, and that we should adapt our logic to suit the sort of phenomena we want to model, and thus that abandoning disquotational approaches should not be seen as a cost.
science is that it answers “what-if-things-had-been-different” questions, supplying information about what changes in some phenomena if some change is made—these sort of statements are counterfactuals. Often in science there is physical phenomena that is not able to be explained in terms other than those of the mathematics, as opposed to explanations where mathematics seems to play the mere role of representing causal or physical facts. This raises a question: could the sort of dependence of physical facts on mathematical facts be counterfactual? In this dissertation I will argue that a counterfactual theory of extramathematical explanation can appeal to a metaphysical necessitation constraint to distinguish between cases where mathematics plays a merely representational role in explaining some physical phenomena, and cases where there is genuine mathematical explanations for the physical phenomena, a challenge raised by Baron (2016b) that I will call the explanatory genuineness problem. Using a new example of the usage of coprimeness facts in computer encryption algorithms, which is analogous to the usage of coprimeness facts in the explanation of cicada life-cycles, I argue that the fact that mathematical explanations can occur in multiple physically distinct systems is evidence in favour of the view that mathematical facts that play a genuine explanatory role represent truths about metaphysical
necessity, thus accounting for metaphysical necessitation. However, appealing to the metaphysical necessitation constraint introduces a further challenge: as evaluating a counterfactual under the metaphysical necessitation constraint will involve evaluating how a physical system is affected by the hypothetical changing of a mathematical fact at an impossible world, I argue that there is competing ways to model the effects of the same mathematical
intervention. This shows us that it is not exactly clear what aspects
of mathematical facts are representing the underlying metaphysical constraints. I conclude that even if a demarcation can be drawn between mathematical facts that play a representational and genuine explanatory role using metaphysical necessitation, a truly counterfactual theory of eme must give some epistemic position for why some evaluation of a mathematical counterfactual is agent independent.
In this paper I examine the modal commitments, in terms defined by Sider (2003), of Physicalist and Dualist responses to Chalmers (1996, 2009)’s Conceivability Argument. In Section 1. I outline central positions one can take with respect to modality and pose a fundamental epistemic problem that all views holding objective modality must solve. In Section 2 I explain Weak Modal Rationalism in brief detail, showing that it solves an epistemic problem for objective modality via conceivability. If Weak Modal Rationalism is successful, it licenses the Conceivability Argument against Physicalism. In Section 3 I flag Vaidya (2017a, 2017b) as raising an epistemic problem for Weak Modal Rationalism which it prima facie is not able to answer. However, I consider the popular alternative of A Posteriori Physicalism, and show that Chalmers argues convincingly that it is likewise faced with its own epistemic Problems, even against a recent defence given by Goff and Papineau (2014). In Section 4 I briefly suggest an alternative, yet extreme, solution for A Posteriori Physicalists: due to epistemic problems, Modal Empiricists reject that there is any objective modality (although Ismael (2017) holds that this doesn’t entail that true modal beliefs are epistemically reducible to actuality, as there are just no ontologically objective possible truths overall (only actual truths)), while preserving their conceivability. The success of the Modal Empiricist’s response to the Conceivability Argument is obviously dependent on whether Modal Empiricism is a coherent, acceptable notion. I conclude that it is an unintuitive view, but an enemy that both Dualists and Physicalists should take seriously.
_______________________________________________________________________
In this paper I will argue Gibbard hyperplan semantics do not solve the Frege-Geach Problem for metaethical expressivists due to the Negation Problem: being unable to explain attitude discordance without postulating ad-hoc disagreement, due to the usage of disquotation. I conclude by suggesting that Dynamic Semantics can avoid this problem because it is non-disquotational, and that we should adapt our logic to suit the sort of phenomena we want to model, and thus that abandoning disquotational approaches should not be seen as a cost.