Husserlian phenomenology

My paper addresses the founding body emotions of architecture, and in particular it aims at redefining the sublime into phenomenological terms. Starting from Kant, it argues that the phenomenological sublime is a bodily-felt emotion aroused by the excess of sensuousness over conceptuality. But at present, the body metaphor does no longer guarantee order and symbolic meaning. This disruption was brought about by Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's criticism of compossibility and representation, which led, paradoxically enough, to a sublime bodily experience of space. As contemporary architectural space shows, body and space are affectively intertwined, but this co-belonging is characterized by conflicts, tensions, and the suspension of meaning.

A tout instant, quoi que nous fassions, nous sommes environnés par des corps qui réduisent l’espace et opposent de la résistance. Que sont ces corps qui saturent notre quotidien et avec lesquels il nous faut constamment négocier l’espace ? Plus radicalement, pourquoi y a-t-il des corps ? Je soutiens dans cet ouvrage que la psychologie et la physique ne disposent plus des moyens de répondre à cette question. La désubstantialisation du réel amorcée par la révolution quantique sape les fondements de l’explication objectiviste de la perception privilégiée par la première, et elle évide de sa portée ontologique le discours de la seconde.
Expliquer pourquoi la réalité se présente sous la forme d’un agencement de corps exige en premier lieu de comprendre le rôle que remplit l’anticipation du possible dans la perception. Dans le toucher comme dans la vision, poser l’existence d’un corps implique d’anticiper les contraintes que ce corps exerce sur notre champ de possibilités pratiques, accréditer de manière présomptive la disponibilité ou l’indisponibilité de certaines possibilités d’action. C’est donc uniquement parce que notre subjectivité donne sens à ce qui est en le référant à ce qui peut être que la réalité macroscopique à laquelle nous introduit la perception consiste en un monde solide.
Pour développer cette idée, l’ouvrage dresse une critique de la conception actualiste du phénomène de corps, qui subordonne celui-ci à l’expérience en acte d’une résistance, et il déconstruit l’approche physicaliste et objectiviste, qui prétend dériver les propriétés des corps que nous percevons des propriétés de structures physiques qui leur seraient antécédentes ontologiquement. Si la sémantique des corps présuppose l’épaisseur du temps humain et une perspective foncièrement pragmatique sur l’environnement, il n’est plus question d’assimiler sans autre forme de procès le corps à une « structure physique », quelle qu’en soit la teneur. Les corps sont un produit de l’activité constructrice de notre subjectivité, et seule une incursion profonde dans les mécanismes et principes qui régissent cette activité pourra permettre d’accéder à leur vérité.

This paper will focus on the aims, methods and problems of both Husserl's and Foucault's projects in order to mark their differences and their similarities. In so doing, it will underscore their shared (Kantian) goal: to strengthen the human capacity for reason as a critical means of theoretical and practical reflection. It is my contention that the differences between the thinkers' specific aims only reinforce their respective routes towards a common objective. In this respect, I will argue that both thinkers actually engage in a project to objectify subjective reason. My reasoning follows that both apply a methodological reduction in order to understand and thereby reduce the discursive and social powers that determine the praxis of reasoning. As a result, Husserl sought to make the sciences aware of their foundations in the life-world, while Foucault sought to expose their basis in and through the workings of power.

In this chapter I focus on a few selected building blocks that will pave the way for a renewed, thorough, and sober phenomenological reading of Marx’s philosophy. I intend to show here that this can be done best through 1) moving Marx away from a Hegelian framework, 2) understanding the concept of critique as an attempt to de-naturalize social phenomena and as disclosure, and 3) showing that Marx’s concept of philosophy, his method, as well as his understanding of technology, are forms of “disclosure.” This, in turn, should point us away from a dialectical understanding of Marx and open up new venues for a phenomenologically inspired critique of political economy.

Abstract
Tanto Kant como Husserl fundamentan su filosofía en la distinción entre las cosas tal como son en sí mismas y el fenómeno. Pero mientras que en Kant esta distinción reposa en las facultades respectivas y en la función mediadora de la imaginación, para Husserl ella es una función del proceso de percepción mismo. En cuanto a la cosa en sí, cuyo principal sentido es en Kant el de noúmeno o ente inteligible, para Husserl es primeramente el ideal de la dación adecuada de una realidad particular de la cosa. El artículo desarrollará la reformulación crítica de Husserl tomando como eje los diferentes significados de la cosa en sí en ambos autores.
Palabras clave: Husserl, Kant, cosa en sí, fenómeno, constitución, ideas, idealización
The relevance of the distinction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself for phenomenology - The different meanings of the thing-in-itself in Kant and Husserl
Abstract
Kant’s and Husserl’s philosophies both ground on the distinction between the things in themselves and the phenomenon. While for Kant, this distinction rests in the respective faculties and the mediating function of imagination, for Husserl it is a function of the perceptual process itself. Concerning the thing in itself, its main sense for Kant is that of noumenon or intelligible being, while for Husserl it ismainly the ideal of the adequate givenness of a particular reality of the thing. This contribution aims at developping Husserl’s critical reformulation of Kant’s thing in itself by analysing its different senses and interpretations at both authors. Keywords: Husserl, Kant, thing in itself, phenomenon, constitution, ideas, idealisation

De wil tot waarheid is vanaf het begin van de filosofie de voornaamste drijfveer geweest om filosofie te bedrijven. Hoewel filosofie volgens Husserl nooit iets op een objectief geldige manier heeft kunnen stellen, hebben de wetenschappen een bepaalde objectiviteit bereikt, een geldigheid die op veel vertrouwen van de mensen kan rekenen. Met die geldigheid mogen filosofen echter geen genoegen nemen. Deze berust namelijk op een problematische veronderstelling, het naturalisme. Filosofie kan en moet ook een wetenschap worden volgens Husserl, maar haar wetenschappelijkheid moet fundamenteel anders zijn dan die van bijvoorbeeld de natuurwetenschappen. Zijn voorstel is de fenomenologie. De vraag waarop we een antwoord zullen vinden is de volgende: In hoeverre vormt Husserls fenomenologie een gepast antwoord op de vraag naar filosofie als strenge wetenschap?

Dialectics of the fable
"The Matrix", A philosophical Machine
By Alain Badiou

“Nevertheless we must recognise that the three films have a problem in common, which is simply the fundamental problem of cognition: what is it that, from within our own capacity to know testifies that is indeed the real that is at stake in our cognition?”(Badiou, 2004)

How do these 3 movies ("The Matrix", "Cube","eXistenZ") philosophically distinguish what is real and what's not?

Putting the question of the long development and inheritance of immune functions (phylogenesis) in touch with that of cultural inheritance (epiphylogenesis), the article questions lines of continuity between somatic mutation, consciousness, technics, time, and media. For instance, drawing on a tradition that acknowledges Immanuel Kant, Edmund Husserl, Theodor Adorno, and Martin Heidegger, Bernard Stiegler’s attempt to mobilize the structure of the trace in the philosophy of Jacques Derrida results in a profound challenge to a technics that can be regarded as a powerful complement to biological evolutionary inheritance.

took his position in the Methodenstreit of his day largely in a polemic against what he regarded as invalid methodologies of psychological reductionism, social organizism, evolutionism, and both idealist and materialist teleologies. Because he was far more interested in empirical studies, Weber never developed his own position in any comprehensive and formal treatment. It was Alfred Schutz who sought to provide this "underlaborer" philosophy for verstehende Soziologie, grounding an examination of subjective meaning in the lifeworld?the world of everyday activity?and in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Yet Schutz never really used his methodological critique as a basis of substantive investigation. Thus, there has been a hiatus between the interpretive sociology of Weber and the sociological implications of the analysis of the lifeworld developed by Schutz.

Professeur de philosophie à l'Université Saint-Louis à Bruxelles et à l'Université du Luxembourg, où il enseignait la logique et la philosophie contemporaine de l'esprit et du langage, Robert Brisart est décédé le 25 février 2015.
Réunissant ses collègues et amis autour des thèmes philosophiques qui lui étaient chers et qui ont constitué le coeur de ses recherches, ces journées veulent lui rendre hommage.

В статье рассматривается сознанный Фирдоуси образ Искандера в «Шахнаме» через призму онтологической безопасности. Под онтологической безопасностью понимается защищенный горизонт между онтологическим ядром человека и внешним миром. Как исторический аналог горизонту Э. Гуссерля рассматривается «завеса» Али ибн Усман аль-Худжвири. Искандер «Шахнаме» – это идеальный государь, царь-философ, проповедник ислама, устанавливающий горизонты мироздания. Требования онтологической безопасности влияют на процесс отбора и адаптации чтений источников, что приводит к разрыву с персидско-зороастрийской традиции изображения Александра как жестокого завоевателя; повествование отрывается от изображения исторических фактов, наполняется легендами и фантазиями, иллюстрирующими «завесы»-печати сущего мира иранца X века / The article considers the image of Iskander realized by Ferdowsi in “Shahnameh” through the prism of ontological security. Ontological security refers to a protected horizon between the ontological core of man and the outside world. As a historical analogue to the horizon of E. Husserl, the “veil” of Ali Ibn Uthman al-Hudjwiri is considered. Iskander “Shahnameh” is an ideal sovereign, a philosopher king, a preacher of Islam, setting the horizons of the universe. Ontological security requirements affect the process of selecting and adapting source readings, which leads to a break with the Persian-Zoroastrian tradition of depicting Alexander as a cruel conqueror; the narrative is detached from the depiction of historical facts, filled with legends and fantasies illustrating the “veils” of the present world of an Iranian man of the 10th century

The question of personal identity in Husserl's work: Husserl's analysis shows that the perceptual present always displays a train of retained impressions; retention motivates protention through a passive process of association, governed by essential laws of genesis. Intentionality changes over time and experience ; so we can say that intentionality is constituted by experience that pre-delineates horizons of possible experiences. In this conceptual framework the ego as an identical pole that accompanies every experience is investigated because , in constituting the object, the ego constitutes itself. Person is the conscious being in the fullest account of constitution, not just as psyche but a conscious and responsible agent living in a state of affects, emotions, etc. and as essentially embodied. Finally, the self-constitution of the ego through its own habitus is discussed focusing on the concept of monad and on Derrida's point of view. 1. Breve storia della persona n termini foucaultiani potremmo dire che il termine persona costituisce un dispositivo che articola una distinzione funzio-nale all'interno della società romana  o si è persona o si è nella di-sponibilità delle persone  e, attraverso la non aderenza della per-sona al corpo, una distinzione all'interno dello stesso individuo: si è persona fin quando, per colpa di alcune circostanze, non si diventa una cosa, mettendo il proprio corpo nella totale disponibilità di una persona, come accadeva ad un debitore insolvente. Mettendo da parte la filosofia cristiana e la distinzione ontologica che il disposi-tivo della persona comporta  si è persona nella misura in cui si riesce a padroneggiare l'altra parte, quella materiale , a noi interes-I P.O.I.-RIVISTA DI INDAGINE FILOSOFICA E DI NUOVE PRATICHE

Il volume raccoglie alcune riflessioni composte da Husserl nel 1927. Nei testi, l’autore insiste sull’importanza del “mondo–della–vita” soggettivo–relativo, utile “terreno di fondazione” anche per il mondo oggettivo delle scienze. Le teorie scientifiche conservano, infatti, un loro contenuto positivo, un riferimento oggettivo alla realtà, proprio mediante nozioni pre–scientifiche che cercano invece di naturalizzare; di fatto, quando si verifica una crisi, il ricorso a questo “mondo–della–vita” pre–scientifico, come si manifesta nelle nostre esperienze intuitive, diviene necessario. Questa visione offre un’alternativa filosofica valida alla posizione naturalistica adottata ancora oggi da molti filosofi analitici.

How is a process of serial drawing understood to record the phenomenological ‘stream of consciousness’ that underpins it? This research question emerges from a hypothesis driving the research: that when considered as a form of expression which ‘speaks’ in a particular way (Tormey, 2007), drawing re-presents (‘records’) the stream of consciousness underpinning it in a rather fundamental manner. The purpose of this first person, practice-led research is to question how this hypothesis is understood, treating it as an assumption to be tested via practice and theory combined. Within the research this hypothesis is linked to both the wider assumption that ‘drawing records thought’ (Rosand, 2002) and to the contemporary idea that drawing is a form of ‘perpetual becoming’ (Hoptman, 2002; de Zegher & Butler, 2010) given the temporality which underpins the act of drawing. To help facilitate investigation of the hypothesis, the assumption that ‘drawing records thought’ is duly suspended (bracketed) for the duration of the research, allowing the structure and process of serially developed drawing (Chavez, 2004) in conjunction with first-person methods for approaching phenomenal consciousness (Varela & Shear, 1999; Depraz, 1999) to investigate it in practical terms.
The significance of the research resides in a scrutiny of the drawing process, undertaken in close relation to Husserl’s (1931/2012; 1950/1999) Phenomenology. As a result, the phenomenon of drawing is re-described as a self-temporalizing phenomenon, emphasising how the appearance of drawing (noun) not only re-presents the prior act of drawing (verb) which produced it, but also provides the practitioner with a look ahead, indicating the hope and expectation of drawings not yet made. This claim emerges via the specific manner in which my serially developed drawings demonstrate re-presenting the ‘streaming’ of consciousness described (in Husserlian terms) as the self-temporalization of consciousness, experienced within the duration of now. This phenomenological description of how drawing operates builds upon Rawson’s (1969/1987) statement regarding the ‘special charm’ of drawing - the underlying quality of movement that drawings (noun) exhibit on the basis they were drawn. Husserl’s protentional focus on ‘hope’ and ‘expectation’ (de Warren, 2009) allows the research to expand upon this idea, describing the underlying movement within drawing as a form of self-temporalization that also points ahead to what is not yet drawn. This forward looking, practitioner centred claim is intended to compliment the focus on ‘trace’ and ‘memory’ that a proportion of the current critical discourse on drawing remains engaged with (Newman M, 1996; Tormey, 2007; Newman & de Zegher, 2003; Derrida J, 1993).

Felsefe târihi içinde filozofların zihnini meşgûl eden sorulardan belki de en önde geleni, hakîkatin ne olduğu sorusudur. Yaklaşık iki bin beş yüz yıldır bu soruya cevap arandığına göre hakîkat, filozofun gözlerini kamaştıran, büyüsünden kurtulamadığı, peşinde olduğu ancak bir türlü ulaşamadığı bir şey olsa gerek. Bunca zamandır hakîkat hakkında söylenmedik bir söz, yapılmadık bir tartışma da pek kalmamış gibi. Belki filozoflar, hakîkatin ne olduğu konusunda anlaşamıyorlar; ama, "ne olmadığı" konusunda en azından, elimizde kocaman bir yığın var! Dahası, hakîkatin ne olduğu konusunda anlaşamadıkları gibi, onun nasıl bilineceği konusunda da anlaşamıyorlar; bu konuda mantık, sezgi, inanç gibi farklı yollar öneriyorlar. Hakîkati "tek başına" ortaya koymada yetersiz olduğu; böyle düşünüldüğü için olsa gerek, felsefe târihinde kimi filozoflar, hakîkat ve onun bilgisi konusunda değişik alanlardan "yardım istemişler"; Felsefe'nin içinden çıkamadığı bu ve benzeri sorunları bu yolla çözüme bağlamaya çalışmışlardır. Kuşkusuz, bu alanların önde geleni de sanat olmuştur. Nitekim sanat, özellikle de hakîkat sorunu söz konusu olduğunda, hemen pek çok filozof için "alternatif bir organon" gibi düşünülmüştür. * "Alman İdealizmi'nin ikinci büyük filozofu" olarak anılagelen Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling'e (1775-1854) göre tüm felsefe araştırmalarının en yüksek amacı, "dünyânın vâroluşu sorunu"nu çözmektir. Bilimler, en temelde bu amaca yönelmiş olsalar da bunu başaramazlar; gerek kullandıkları yöntemler, gerekse de inceleme alanlarının sınırlı olması bakımından yetersiz kalırlar. Bu yöntemler muğlâk, yanıltıcı ve yanlışa sürükleyicidir. İnceleme alanlarının sınırlı olması nedeniyle, belirli birtakım ayrımlar yapar ve sorunları bütünlüklü bir biçimde ortaya koyup değerlendiremezler. "Dünyânın vâroluşu sorunu"nu çözmek ve aynı zamanda da kesin bilim olarak Felsefe'yi olanaklı kılmak, ancak belirli türden bir bütünsellik içinde ve empirik olmayan yöntemlerle olanaklıdır. 1 Schelling'e göre

Wenn Lernen dort beginnt, wo etwas Neues erlebt wird, so muss der vorreflexive Erfahrungsgrund, das sinnliche, leibliche Erlebnis freigelegt werden. Es ist die primäre Aufgabe einer ontologischen Praxis als
lebendiger Vollzug, die von Husserl aufgedeckten Urtatsachen – Welt, Leiblichkeit, Intersubjektivität, Geschichtlichkeit – in ihrem Sinn für uns zu konstituieren. Der Beitrag zielt darauf hin, diese These im Ausgang der affektiven Erfahrung und des ihr vorausliegenden leibliche Erleben zu beleuchten. In diesem Sinne stehen die Forschungsansätze Husserls und Merleau-Pontys paradigmatisch für die Umwälzung der Beziehungen zwischen Leib und Welt: Von einem Erfahrungssinn, der von einem transzendentalen Ego konstituiert wird, bis zu jenem der leiblich im Fleisch der Welt inkarniert ist. Diese Überlegungen beabsichtigen, einen Beitrag zum Verständnis des Lernprozesses als vorreflexiver Erfahrungsprozess zu
leisten sofern er leibliche Ausdruckleistungen innerhalb konkreter sozial-geschichtlicher undraumzeitlicher Aktionsfelder umfasst.
If the learning process is conceived as the apprehension of something new which is sensuously lived(erlebt), then the underlying sensuous, bodily lived experience (Erlebnis) has to be uncovered. Hence, theprimary task of an ontological praxis conceived as lived effectuation, is to endow the Husserlian primal facts (Urtatsachen) of our existence – world, embodiment, intersubjectivity, historicity – with sense. The article attempts to prove the validity of this thesis starting from the analysis of the affective bodily experience and its underlying bodily lived experience. The confrontation of Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on this subject paradigmatically show a radical change concerning the relationship between body and world: From an experiential sense constituted by a transcendental Ego to a to a sense embodied in the flesh of the world. The article is deemed as a contribution to a conception of the learning process
insofar as pre-reflexive process of experience, which encompasses the achievements of bodily expressions within concrete social, historical and space-time fields of action.

ll phenomenology is correlation-research, that is, it is about the dynamic space of mediation "between" the human knower-or-actor and whatever is known-or-acted-upon. That space is the field of meaning, and phenomenology in its first moment is about the meaningful presence of people and things, what Heidegger called the Anwesen or παρουσία of what we encounterthis in contrast to the intrinsic "being" (Sein) of things that metaphysics was concerned with.

I show some problems with recent discussions within qualitative research that centre around the “authenticity” of phenomenological research methods. I argue that attempts to restrict the scope of the term “phenomenology” via reference to the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl are misguided, because the meaning of the term “phenomenology” is only broadly restricted by etymology. My argument has two prongs: first, via a discussion of Husserl, I show that the canonical phenomenological tradition gives rise to many traits of contemporary qualitative phenomenological theory that are purportedly insufficiently genuine (such as characterisations of phenomenology as “what-its-likeness” and presuppositionless description). Second, I argue that it is not adherence to the theories and methods of prior practitioners such as Husserl that justifies the moniker “phenomenology” anyway. Thus, I show that the extent to which qualitative researchers ought to engage with the theory of philosophical phenomenology or adhere to a particular edict of Husserlian methodology ought to be determined by the fit between subject matter and methodology and conclude that qualitative research methods still qualify as phenomenological if they develop their own set of theoretical terms, traditions, and methods instead of importing them from philosophical phenomenology.

Our lack of awareness of Being results in bewildering experience. The intrinsic inner radiance, the inner light of Being arises out of primordial luminous spaciousness, the unbound openness of unbound pure potentiality. When this primordial ground of Being is veiled and obscured by the lack of experiential awareness, we can be locked into dualistic experiences, and consequently the non-dual nature of the field of Being is experientially foreclosed. The sense of indivisibility of all phenomena and awareness is experientially foreclosed. The capacity to see into, feel into and see through the lucidity of phenomena as the very field of Being becomes foreclosed and densified. We then live contained in mind alone. There is no experience of the field of Being. Without the field of Being we easily become things and objects both to our self and to others.

Husserlian phenomenology is an ambitious project, aiming to be First Philosophy, the ultimate science. For Husserl, this means that for any science, indeed for any piece of knowledge, phenomenology must be capable of elucidating the legitimacy of this science or piece of knowledge. But how can phenomenology, a science of the structures of consciousness, serve as the ultimate science? To answer this question, we shed light on Husserl’s teachings on the variety, epistemic force, and systematic role of experiences. The idea, roughly, is that every piece of knowledge can be traced back to epistemically foundational experiences. To be more precise, it is experiences that bear the mark of originary givenness that play this role. Investigating the sources of knowledge, then, means investigating modes of givenness – the ways experiences present the objects they are directed at. Perceptual experiences, introspective experiences, eidetic intuitions, and evaluative experiences are among the various types of originary presentive experiences. In our Husserlian picture, different sources of knowledge correspond to different types of experiences, which in turn correspond to different types of evidence. It is one of the most important tasks of phenomenology to clarify these correlations.

Die phänomenologischen Prinzipien eines "Gegebenseins" und einer "Selbstgegebenheit" der Dinge können insbesondere für eine Beschreibung und Erforschung derjenigen Phänomene fruchtbar gemacht werden, die sich ihrem ureigenen Wesen nach anderen, vor allem reduktionistisch oder dogmatisch verfahrenden, Ansätzen widersetzen. Zu solchen "widerstandsfähigen" Phänomenen gehören beispielsweise interpersonale, religiöse oder künstlerische Erfahrungen. Der Beitrag möchte zunächst zeigen, wie Husserl auf dem Wege einer Erforschung des reinen Bewusstseins die Ideen einer Gegebenheit und Selbstgegebenheit der Gegenstände als phänomenologische Prinzipien entwickelt hat, die zugleich erkenntnistheoretische Relevanz haben. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch der phänomenologisch erweiterte Begriff der Erfahrung zur Sprache kommen. Im Anschluss soll der sachliche Übergang von einer statischen und genetischen Phänomenologie in die generative Phänomenologie nachgezeichnet und methodische Kriterien für letztere herausgearbeitet werden. Exemplarisch für eine an den »Sachen selbst« orientierte, generative Phänomenologie wird schließlich unter Anthony J. Steinbocks Phänomenologie vertikaler Gegebenheiten am Beispiel mystischer Erfahrungen vorgestellt, wie diese in "Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience" (2007) zur Darstellung kommen. Ein Ausblick auf eine weitere Dimension vertikaler Gegebenheit wird am Ende mit der Sphäre moralischer Gefühle in Steinbocks Werk "Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of the Heart" (2014) gegeben.

This article argues that, propaedeutic to the construction of an Objectivist aesthetics, scholars must refute the irrational/immoral philosophical premises that have been destroying the philosophy of art. Due to the troubling combination of its contemporaneity, extremism, and considerable influence, poststructuralism, which, since the 1960s, has served as the default philosophical foundation for philosophers of art, is the target of this article.

We have two ways of knowing. Our mind knows forms, things, both subtle and gross. Faces, hands, buildings, trees, math formulas, mind knows subject and the mind knows otherness. The mind knows dualities, the mind knows me and you, us and them, and this and that. Mind knows time, mind knows the past, the present and the sense of the future. The mind knows things and entities, the mind knows beings, infinite numbers of beings and things. The mind knows difference. The mind thinks conceptually, feels affectively, imagines through imagery, the mind has sense and the mind has memory. The mind knows dualistically.

In the Gudyargarbha tantra there is this most wonderful verse. Appearances, sounds, and thoughts are the diety, mantra and the state of dharmakaya. What this wonderful language brings forward into our awareness is the amazing understanding that self liberation is the direct experiencing of the appearing of appearances.

„Eine volle Ontologie ist Teleologie“, sagt Husserl, „sie setzt aber das Faktum voraus“. Die Bedingung der Möglichkeit dieser Teleologie ist „das Sein der teleologischen Wirklichkeit selbst“, eben „das Ver-wiesenwerden auf die Urfakta der Hyle“, die nicht weiter hintergehbar ist. Wir stoßen auf einem Bo-den, auf den die konstitutiven Leistungen aufbauen. Auf die Frage nach den Leitfäden der Konstitu-tion bei Husserl bieten sich die „konstitutiven Teleologien“ an, wodurch „Ideen“, sei es von Raum, Ding, Zeit, Welt, den Fortgang der Anschauung regeln oder leiten. Hier möchte ich ers-tens in der husserlschen Umdeutung des Kantischen Begriffs des „Ding-an-sich“ und seine Rol-le in der Konstitution des Dinges eingehen und zweitens, dem Problem der Erfüllung des Kon-stitutionsprozesses nachgehen. Zum Ersten: das Ding (an sich) wird von Husserl als das Ideal der adäquaten Gegebenheit einer gewissen partikulären Wirklichkeit eines Dinges konzipiert, die den Fortgang de Anschauung regelt. Diese Idee öffnet einen Horizont worin sich dieser Fortgang als ein unendliches „Erscheinungskontinuum“ erstreckt. Diese Konzeption des Dings stellt die Kantische Unterscheidung zwischen Erscheinung und Ding an sich in Frage; denn bei Kant liegt dieser Unterschied in den Erkenntnisvermögen, auf denen sie beruhen. Die Konstitu-tion bedarf deshalb der Vermittlung der Einbildungskraft; bei Husserl dagegen, ist sie auf die Funktionsweise des Wahrnehmungsprozesses selber zurückzuführen. Was das Ding an sich betrifft, so ist es, wie bei Kant, als eine Idee gegeben, die eine regulative Funktion in der Erfah-rung erfüllt.  Es war wiederum Kant, der die Notwendigkeit einer Regel einsah, eine „Regel der Anschauungen“.  In Husserls Umdeutung wird einerseits das „An-sich“ den jeweiligen subjekti-ven relativen Erfahrungen zugeordnet, andererseits bezieht sich das Ding an sich auf ein indivi-duelles einzelnes Ding in seiner Einmaligkeit. Durch das Erreichen eines „Optimums“ der Ge-gebenheit ist das Ding in der Erfahrung wirklich und zugleich optimal, d.h. unser Erkenntnisin-teresse erfüllend, gegeben. So erfüllen die empirischen Begriffe ihren Zweck in der Lebenswelt, indem in der Erfahrung selbst der Gegenstand in dem Erfüllen unserer Erkenntnisinteressen sein Ziel erreicht hat.

The historically rich and diverse tradition of phenomenology has contributed broadly to the emergence of environmental thought across the humanities and social sciences and is increasingly influential on environmental ethics and philosophy. Emphasizing the primacy of experience and inquiry into the epistemological and ontological assumptions that inform the historical and contemporary relationship with nature, phenomenology takes a critical distance from metaphysical naturalism and the instrumental framing of environmental problems in resourcist, technological, economic, and managerial terms. The tradition's distinctive contributions to environmental ethics include its focus on the epistemic and ontological revindication of experience, its critique of metaphysical and modernist assumptions, and its aim to articulate a post-metaphysical conception of the self-world relation and an alternative ethos appropriate to our experience of nature. Key concepts that inform current phenomenological research in environmental ethics include the lifeworld, the earth and elements, the chiasm, and poetic dwelling.

FROM THE BACK COVER: What is the essential nature of meaning? . . . . . This book answers by examining interpretive theories from the past and present. It finds that an historical struggle with meaning has been underway since the Reformation, a struggle that reaches crisis proportions in the 20th century. On the one hand, this crisis is mollified by Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology, which argues that we are always already in a meaningful relationship to the objects of the world. On the other hand, this crisis is exacerbated when phenomenology, structuralism, and aesthetic theory directly make meaning into an object of study. . . . . . . . . These historical developments culminate with the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, whose non-hermeneutical phenomenology delimits a cause of meaning said to be closely linked to the core of subjectivity. Intriguingly, Lacan's work reveals meaning to be sexual in nature. By integrating his notion of sexual difference with his work in discourse theory and topology, this book demonstrates how the subject's struggle with meaning can be suspended.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Broadly speaking, the majority of books on Jacques Lacan focus on the earlier periods of his career. They also tend to target the psychoanalytic clinical community, or else discuss his work in various political, social, and cultural contexts. But in almost all cases these books refrain from a detailed exegesis of his actual texts. They instead prefer to comment on his theoretical apparatus as a whole before turning to its practical implications. . . . . . This book positions itself against this grain. Firstly, it closely analyzes some half-dozen key Lacanian texts. This analysis is organized under a single thematic – the question of meaning – in order to advance the reader's understanding of the trajectory of Lacan's thought across his entire career, as well as to promote the book's thesis that the field of meaning can be suspended. Accordingly, an initial chapter takes up the hermeneutical tradition from Flacius onward. This is then supplemented by a chapter which surveys phenomenological, structuralist and aesthetic theories of meaning and their differing methods of textual analysis. Together these two chapters provide a unique context for the sustained analysis of Lacan's texts which begins in the third chapter, an analysis that forms the bulk of the book's content. This contextualization potentially widens the book's appeal to any scholar wishing to explore his relationship to those textual objects he interacts with on a daily basis. And because this book assumes the reader has little to no familiarity with Lacan, the reader will find patient explanations of the basics of his theories before slowly being led up to the more difficult theories of his late years. Again the argument is that Lacan has something to offer all scholars. His work is not just reserved for psychoanalysts. . . . . . It is with his late theories that the serious student of Lacan will find the book's most original contribution. For in the fourth chapter a detailed account is provided of how Lacan derived his infamous formulae of sexuation from Aristotelian logic. These formulae are then extensively discussed against the backdrop of interpretive theory and textual analysis, showing how these formulae capture much more than just the difference between the sexes. Strikingly, this difference is also found to run through meaning itself, something the final chapter aims to demonstrate. It does this by amalgamating three key components of late-Lacan: sexuation, discourse theory and his use of topological spaces. This amalgamation is a first in the literature. But this amalgamation is not just useful in demonstrating the book's thesis. It further suggests how seemingly divergent aspects of late-Lacanian theory can be made to work together.

تتناول هذه الدراسة بالمقارنة فيلسوفين من أهم فلاسفة العصر الحديث، إمانويل كانط مؤسس الفلسفة النقدية، وإدموند هوسرل مؤسس الفينومينولوجيا. وتهدف في المقام الأول توضيح أن فينومينولوجيا هوسرل تدين بأصولها لفلسفة كانط، وهي استمرار لأسلوب التفكير الذي ظهر في كتاب كانط "نقد العقل الخالص" والذي أطلق عليه "التحليلات الترانسندنتالية".
وعن طريق عقد مقارنات مفصلة بين الفيلسوفين، تثبت الدراسة قرباً بينهما ووحدة في النظرة والتوجهات: حضور القصدية بالمعنى الهوسرلي في نظرية كانط في العلاقة بين الأحكام والمقولات؛ اشتراك مفهوم "الترانسندنتالي" الكانطي ومفهوم "الفينومينولوجي" الهوسرلي في المعنى ونوعية ومستوى التحليل؛ رد أشكال الفكر إلى الأفعال المعرفية للوعي؛ معالجة المقولات القبلية على أنها أفعال ترانسندنتالية للوعي. كما تثبت أن في تحليلات كانط للمعرفة الإنسانية جانباً فينومينولوجياً واضحاً يستبق فينومينولوجيا هوسرل، وهو وضوح يجعل فلسفة هوسرل هي الامتداد الطبيعي والتوسع المنطقي لنظرية كانط في المعرفة.
ومثلما حاول الفارابي قديماً "الجمع بين رأيي الحكيمين أفلاطون وأرسطو" بتوضيح أن فلسفتيهما متفقتان في الأهداف والمقاصد على الرغم مما يبدو بينهما من اختلاف ظاهري، تطمح هذه الدراسة أيضاً الجمع بين رأيي كانط وهوسرل، عن طريق قراءة كانط قراءة هوسرلية، وقراءة هوسرل قراءة كانطية.

التعرف على فينومينولوجيا هوسرل وعلى العناصر التي استخدمها في تحليلاته الفينومينولوجية
كما نود أن ننبه على أن التركيز في هذه الدراسة سوف يكون على عناصر التحليل الفينومينولوجي لدى هوسرل، لا على خطوات أو لحظات المنهج الثلاث المتعارف عليها: تعليق الحكم والبناء والإيضاح. وننطلق في ذلك من قناعة بأن الفينومينولوجيا في حقيقتها ليست منهجاً يسير حسب خطوات، لأنها بذلك تكون أداة بحث وهي ليست كذلك. إنها في الأساس أسلوب في التحليل وطريقة في دراسة الوعي.

Modern psychiatry, as represented by Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926), and phenomenology, as developed by Edmund Husserl, began around the same time, namely, during the last decades of the 19th century. Moreover, psychiatry and phenomenology have always shared a common goal: they have both sought detailed descriptions of human experience. This communality of goals has repeatedly led psychiatrists to turn to phenomenology for aid in explicating mental life. For many psychiatrists it has seemed that phenomenology offered a method that could help them better understand and conceptualize the experiences of their patients. As a result, psychiatrists have utilized various phenomenological approaches just as phenomenologists have explored subjects in psychiatry.

The history of this relationship has remained ambiguous, however. Frequently a gap has yawned between the broad theoretical perspectives adapted from phenomenology and the needs of clinical practice. Furthermore, psychiatrists-who are often trained in the biological and natural sciences-may feel disinclined to delve deeply into explorations of the subjective when these explorations appear to them to remain too abstract or metaphysical. And, returning the compliment, phenomenologists have usually exhibited a profound reluctance to ascribe centrality to biological and naturalistic perspectives. In the post-World War II years, impressive progress in empirical research has provided physicians with powerful means for diagnosis and treatment, for example, with psychopharmacology; because psychiatrists are always pragmatists at heart, these new insights have tended to supplant phenomenological insights.

More recently, the relationship has grown more complicated, and these complexities offer hope of a revitalized cross-fertilization between psychiatry and phenomenology. On the one hand, empirical research in psychiatry continues at an even more rapid pace. On the other hand, many physicians and patients are more aware of the gaps, inadequacies, and even untoward consequences of the one-sidedness of these new developments. This has spurred a turn towards holistic medicine, wellness, and environmental medicine that is more congenial to phenomenological views. Moreover, there is a growing recognition that phenomenological and neurobiological perspectives can no longer oppose one another; when properly conceived, each will strengthen the other. We shall first sketch a brief history of the relationships between phenomenology and psychiatry. Subsequently, we shall delineate possible directions that future inquiry might take.

In my thesis, I examine Husserl's method of reduction – the investigation method of his transcendental phenomenology. I answer the question as to whether or not the method of reduction necessarily leads to solipsism. My point of departure is both the external critique and the internal critique of the method. I especially answer the critique presented by Hubert L.
Dreyfus, according to which Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological investigation necessarily leads to a situation where we cannot pose objective claims. I also analyse internal critique posed by Husserl scholars, according to which the method of reduction is problematic when investigating intersubjectivity and our experience of others.
My work is exegetic in the sense of clarifying what kind of a method Husserl's reduction is, how it is accomplished, and what the distinctive features of transcendental phenomenology are. On the other hand, I aim at systematically examining the question whether the method of reduction leads to problems of solipsism. I apply the results of my exegetic investigation in answering the critiques of the method of reduction.
My investigation of the method is limited to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, especially to his works treating reduction, from the lecture series Die Idee der Phänomenologie to the work Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. I concentrate on the transcendental-phenomenological reduction and the eidetic reduction. I also discuss Husserl's abstractive and solipsistic method, the so-called reduction to the sphere of ownness, which can be accomplished only after the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. The solipsism critique that I treat in my thesis is a common kind of critique against Husserl, but this kind of critique is still a discussed topic.
My conclusions are as follows: The method of reduction is a hypernym for many of Husserl's phenomenological methods. The transcendental-phenomenological reduction and the eidetic reduction are two separate methods that can in principle be accomplished without
accomplishing the other but are both necessary for the transcendental-phenomenological investigation. Regarding the solipsism critiques, the critique posed by Dreyfus is not justified. The internal critique posed by Husserl scholars is partly based on confusions and is partly justified.

A person's own inner most awareness and the movements within their awareness field bring forth their direct personal experience of their cosmological archetypal field of awareness. This spontaneous event is given to us within the archetypal realm of awareness. The archetypal dimension manifests itself as us, and reveals itself to us through our experience of its self-manifestation.

While embodiment is crucial for Husserl’s theory of perception and his account of empathy, it is also the beating heart of his transcendental philosophy. For Husserl, there is neither a purely formal transcendental ego, nor pure forms of intuition. Transcendental subjectivity must necessarily be embodied to make (spatially and temporally concordant) experience possible and thereby to guarantee an objective perception of the world and of others. This article will discuss three dimensions of normality and objectivity as embodied space. It will start by introducing the double constitution of the body as both Leib and Körper, which defines the primordial spatiality of embodiment. It will then highlight the general necessity of a sensing and moving body for the constitution of space and for a concordant and optimal disclosure of the world. The third part explains embodiment in terms of concrete subjectivity, hence articulating the relevance of the body for habitually inhabiting the world and for developing a concordant and stable identity. Finally, the role of the body for intersubjective normality and objectivity will be interrogated. Embodiment, as I will argue, must firstly be understood as a general transcendental condition of every possible experience and objectivity. Secondly, it must be understood as a genetic condition of individual (and intersubjective) experience, that is, as concrete a priori. As such, embodiment dictates the experience of individual subjects and corresponds to a habitual style of experience.

Timeless awareness is the essence of Dzogchen. Time experienced within timeless awareness is also an expression of the essence of Dzogchen. Dzogchen is an ancient form of Tibetan mystic humanism. Dzogchen makes the essential distinction between mind and awareness. A person can be located in mind alone and locked in time. As a person shifts from being located in mind alone (mindfulness) and goes beyond mind alone (mindfulness), one becomes aware of their own awareness. As we focus our awareness on our own innermost awareness, vast dimensions of awareness begin to open and self-reveal its nature to us. Awareness is a multidimensional experience and this awareness is infinite in its horizons. The innate qualities of awareness are spaciousness or openness or emptiness. Another quality of our awareness is luminous radiance and still another is awareness as energy. Awareness is alive and is both vast stillness and unceasing movement. The Union of Mind and Awareness When a person is able to experience the union of their mind and their awareness, then the person has a simultaneous experience of being in time and in timeless awareness. The mind is the place of thinking, feeling, sensation, memory and imagination and the mind is the mode of knowing singularity and difference in the world. This is the realm of ordinary knowingness and this is the realm of duality. Our mind is the realm of time. This time bound knowing is the knowing of you and I, us and them, this or that in time and place.

This paper seeks to relate Edmund Husserl’s conception of time to developments in the standardisation of time in the modern period. Assessing Husserl’s innovation with regards to the experience of time and raising key issues pertaining to Husserl’s derivation of objective time from a fundamental absolute flux of consciousness, the paper goes on to address potential relationships between Husserl’s conception of time and the historically unique experience of time associated with the rise of modern clock-time. Based on insights from the discipline of the sociology of time, the paper concludes that Husserl’s time both reproduces and rejects features of modern time relations.

This text examines the many transformations in Husserl’s phenomenology that his discoveries of the nature of appearing lead to. It offers a comprehensive look at the Logical Investigations’ delimitation of the phenomenological field, and continues with Husserl’s account of our consciousness of time. This volume examines Husserl’s turn to transcendental idealism and the problems this raises for our recognition of other subjects. It details Husserl’s account of embodiment and examines his theory of the instincts.  Drawing from his published and unpublished manuscripts, it outlines his treatment of our mortality and the teleological character of our existence. The result is a genetic account of our selfhood, one that unifies Husserl’s different claims about who and what we are.

Sartre’s early works on phenomenology reveal the complexity of his relationship to Husserl. Deeply indebted to phenomenology’s method as well as its substance, Sartre nonetheless confronted Husserl’s transcendental turn from Ideas onward. Although numerous studies have focused on Sartre’s points of contention with Husserl, drawing attention to his departure from Husserlian phenomenology, scholars have rarely examined the way in which Sartre engaged and responded to the early Husserl, particularly to his discussions of intentionality, consciousness, and self in Logical Investigations. This essay focuses on Sartre’s critical response to Logical Investigations, arguing that Husserl’s understanding of these three notions shapes and informs Sartre’s own approach to them in The Transcendence of the Ego (1936-37), “Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology” (1939), and Being and Nothingness (1943). By carefully reading Sartre side by side with Husserl, this essay articulates the ways in which Sartre allowed himself to think along with, and not against, Husserl.

Phenomenology is not so much an exact methodological doctrine as the title of a family of ideas, which originate in the work of the founder of the so-called phenomenological movement, Edmund Husserl. A common denominator that all authors from the phenomenological movement converge upon is that phenomenology is the study of phenomena of conscious experience from the first-person perspective. It includes such diverse objects of study as the perception of ordinary spatio-temporal objects; scientific theories and knowledge systems; the experiential relation to one's own and others' mental states; emotions, space, and temporality; values, norms, or aesthetic objects; and, not least, intersubjective relations, interaction, social facts, and different types of social formations. A central explanandum of phenomenology is the everyday experience of such phenomena, or, to introduce a key notion of classical phenomenology, the "lifeworld" of the experiencing subjects in which these phenomena are always and already embedded.

An exposition in graphic novel form of key concepts and methodological steps in Husserl's Second Cartesian Meditation. Introduces: the natural attitude vs. the transcendental attitude, transcendentally reduced experience (the 'transcendental field') vs Cartesian doubt, cogito-cogitatum, intentionality, synthesis, horizons, and real vs. imaginary object types. I developed this during remote teaching to substitute for in-person studies of phenomena. The passage on horizons is a study for subsequent philosophical work I intend to present in graphic novel format. (The file is in two versions, the one with a gray background for online viewing, the one with a light background for printing. To download the second file, click on the Files drop down above.)

"ABSTRACT:
    This study assumes the subject's pursuit of meaning is generally incapacitating and should be suspended. It aims to demonstrate how such a suspension is theoretically accomplished by utilizing Lacan's formulae of sexuation integrated with his work in discourse theory and topology.
    Part I places this study into context by examining scholarship from the established fields of hermeneutics, phenomenology, (post)structuralism, aesthetic theory and psychoanalysis in order to extract out their respective theory of meaning. These theories reveal that an historical struggle with meaning has been underway since the Reformation and reaches near crisis proportions in the 20th century. On the one hand this crisis is mollified by the rise of Heideggerian-Gadamerian hermeneutical phenomenology which questions traditional epistemological approaches to the text using a new ontological conceptualization of meaning and a conscious rejection of methodology. On the other hand this crisis is exacerbated when the ubiquitous nature of meaning is itself challenged by (post)structuralism's discovery of the signifier which inscribes a limit to meaning, and by the domains of sense and nonsense newly opened up by aesthetic theory. These historical developments culminate in the field of psychoanalysis which most consequentially delimits a cause of meaning said to be closely linked to the core of subjectivity.
    Part II extends these findings by rigorously constructing out of the Lacanian sexuated formulae a decidedly non-hermeneutical phenomenological approach useful in demonstrating the sexual nature of meaning. Explicated in their static state by way of an account of their original derivation from the Aristotelian logical square, it is argued that these four formulae are relevant to basic concerns of textual theory inclusive of the hermeneutical circle of meaning. These formulae are then set into motion by integrating them with Lacan's four discourses to demonstrate the breakdown of meaning. Finally, the cuts and sutures of two-dimensional space that is topology as set down in L'étourdit are performed to confirm how the very field of meaning is ultimately suspended from a nonsensical singular point known in Lacanian psychoanalysis as objet a. The contention is that by occupying this point the subject frees himself from the debilitating grip of meaning."