Books by Christian Lotz
The Continental Philosophy and the History of Thought series seeks to augment and amplify scholar... more The Continental Philosophy and the History of Thought series seeks to augment and amplify scholarship in continental philosophy by exploring its rich and complex relationships to figures, schools of thought, and philosophical movements that are crucial for its evolution and development. A historical focus allows potential authors to uncover important but understudied thinkers and ideas that were nonetheless foundational for various continental schools of thought. Furthermore, critical scholarship on the histories of continental philosophy will also help re-position, challenge, and even overturn dominant interpretations of established, well-known philosophical views while refining and re-interpreting them in light of new historical discoveries and textual analyses. The series seeks to publish carefully edited collections and high-quality monographs that present the best of scholarship in continental philosophy and its histories.
In The Capitalist Schema, Lotz argues that Kant’s idea of a mental schematism, which gives the hu... more In The Capitalist Schema, Lotz argues that Kant’s idea of a mental schematism, which gives the human mind access to a stable reality, can be interpreted as a social concept, which, using Marx, the author identifies as money. According to the author, money and its “fluid” form, capital, constitute sociality in capitalism and make access to social reality possible. Money, in other words, makes life in capitalism meaningful and frames all social relations. Following Marx, the author argues that money is the true Universal of modern life and that, as such, we are increasingly subjected to its control. As money and capital are closely linked to time, Lotz argues that in capitalism money also constitutes past and future “social horizons” by turning past and future into “monetized” horizons. Everything becomes faster, global, and more abstract. Our lives, as a consequence, become more mobile, “fluid,” unstable, and precarious. The author presents analyses of credit, debt, and finance as examples of how money determines the meaning of future and past, imagination, and memory, and that this results in individuals becoming increasingly integrated into and dependent upon the capitalist world. According to Lotz, this integration and dependence increases with the event of electronics industries and brain-science industries that channel all human desires towards profits, growth, and making more money. In this way, the book offers a critical extension of Adorno’s analysis of exchange and the culture industry as the basis of modern societies. Lotz argues, paradoxically, with and against Adorno, that we should return to basic insights of Marx’s philosophy, given that the principle of exchange is only possible on the basis of more fundamental social and economic categories, such as money.
This book presents the first philosophical investigation of, arguably, one of the most popular an... more This book presents the first philosophical investigation of, arguably, one of the most popular and important painters working today, Gerhard Richter. From monochrome painting and photo realism to conceptual art and gesture-expressive painting, Richter has transformed the spectrum of 20th-Century painting. Building upon Gadamer’s notion of ‘formed images’, the book outlines elements of a hermeneutics and a phenomenology of images and paintings. Moreover, the hermeneutic approach to art is combined with the crucial question of how paintings and photographs are related to each other for Richter. The author suggests that paintings “open up” the fixed relation and intentionality of photographs by idealizing and essentializing the content of the photographs. By relying upon a hermeneutical and phenomenological approach, rather than working from abstract theory, The Art of Gerhard Richter provides philosophical insights developed out of Richter’s works of art. Uncovering key philosophical aspects of Richter’s work, the author’s reflections discuss the relation between appearance and essence, the role of faith and hope, the dialectic of distance and nearness, the issues of death and terror, and the role of beauty and landscapes in Richter’s paintings.Special attention is paid to the following paintings: First Look into the Inside of an Atom in the introduction, Window, Secretary, and Abstract Painting in chapter three, Youth Portrait in chapter four, Reader in chapter five, Moritz, Dead, Man Shot Down, Strontium and Betty in chapter six, as well as Country Path, Clouds, and Forest in chapter seven.
Befreiung von der Arbeit durch Technologie oder Herrschaft der Technologie über die arbeitenden I... more Befreiung von der Arbeit durch Technologie oder Herrschaft der Technologie über die arbeitenden Individuen? Enthält der Kapitalismus den Keim einer befreiten Gesellschaft in sich, oder führt er zur Zerstörung von Arbeit und Erde? Worin besteht dieser grundlegende Widerspruch des Kapitalismus, und was hat das mit der Arbeitszeit und intelligenten Maschinen zu tun? Die Befreiungs- und Unterwerfungspotentiale der Produktivkraft Maschine hat Karl Marx bereits in seinem „Maschinenfragment“ vor rund 150 Jahren brillant analysiert. Christian Lotz zeigt in seiner Einleitung, wie Marx darin nicht nur die heutigen Widersprüche der kapitalistischen Unterwerfung des geistigen Eigentums, sondern auch der Aneignung von Patenten, Wissen, Informationen und biotechnologischen Entwicklungen, die das Leben selbst vom Kapital abhängig machen, erkannt und analysiert hat.
The main argument of Husserl’s Phenomenology Revisited is developed in three steps: [1] In the fi... more The main argument of Husserl’s Phenomenology Revisited is developed in three steps: [1] In the first part of the book, I present reconsiderations of certain basic terms that Husserl introduces in his philosophy. I first show that phenomenological activity can be re-interpreted in anthropological terms. What Husserl calls his “phenomenological method,” which includes reflection, eidetic variation, and the performance of the epoche, is, I claim, an abstract development of concrete life-world experiences such as imagining, playing and wondering. By discovering the concrete anthropological horizon of central Husserlian methodological terms (which have confused readers from the beginning on), their foundation in certain experiences, and the way in which they can be regarded as abstractions from those experiences, is shown. [2] In the second part of the book, I show how subjectivity, in the phenomenological sense according to which it is an area of investigation, evolves out of the sensual sphere, and that as such, subjectivity should not be analyzed apart from the lived body or apart from world experience, as some commentators have suggested. As I show, affectivity and the “openness of the subject” towards what is other than itself, is tied to the experience of other subjects, to proto-ethical experiences, as well as to the lived body. [3] In the last part of the book, I turn to the experience of the past and future, in order to establish them as the most important features of the self’s constitution. In sum, by proceeding in these three steps I am able to outline (in a non-abstractive way) three of the most important levels of human experience and its phenomenological investigation, from Husserl’s point of view.
This book investigates the topos of a phenomenological ethics by focusing on the practical subjec... more This book investigates the topos of a phenomenological ethics by focusing on the practical subject, its practical experience, and its actions. The author develops this project on two levels, which critically explore the practical implications of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s theories. Special attention is paid to unexplored resources in Husserl’s thought on practical topics. The argumentation is structured through two steps: [i] A first level of practical experience can be found in the actions that we perform within our surrounding world: [ii] A second level can be found in our ontological self-understanding that prepares us to perform self-determined actions. It is extensively argued that Heidegger’s theory is not very helpful in finding an appropriate concept of Umwelt action. The main reason for this can be seen in Heidegger’s lack of a center for these actions. In regard to [ii], however, the author argues that Husserl’s theory fails because his notions of action and decision are too weak. Here it is Heidegger’s thought that reveals the self-understanding through which the possibility for taking action at all is rendered.
Obgleich Heideggers Philosophie und die Kritische Theorie auf den ersten Blick als unvereinbar er... more Obgleich Heideggers Philosophie und die Kritische Theorie auf den ersten Blick als unvereinbar erscheinen, besteht zwischen ihnen eine enge Verwandtschaft. So führt die ontologische Technikanalyse bei Heidegger zu einer Diagnose ihrer Genese durch menschliche Praxis und zu einer pessimistischen Einschätzung der Erkenntnisfähigkeiten des Menschen, während die Kritische Theorie, von einer gesellschaftskritischen Analyse sozialer Praxis ausgehend, zu einem ontologischen Begriff der Verdinglichung gelangt. Sowohl die Technikkritik bei Heidegger als auch die Verdinglichungsthese der Kritischen Theorie bleiben jedoch erläuterungsbedürftig. Aus diesem Grund setzt sich Ding und Verdinglichung mit dem Begriff der Verdinglichung im Zusammenhang mit der Technikphilosophie und der Sozialphilosophie auseinander.
The question of the relation between human and non-human animals in theoretical, ethical and poli... more The question of the relation between human and non-human animals in theoretical, ethical and political regards has become a prominent topic within the philosophical debates of the last two decades. This volume explores in substantial ways how phenomenology can contribute to these debates. It offers specific insights to the description and interpretation of the experience of the non human animal, the relation between phenomenology and anthropology, the relation between phenomenology and psychology, as well as ethical considerations.
In diesem Aufsatzband sind philosophische Relektüren und Reinterpretationen einschlägiger Positio... more In diesem Aufsatzband sind philosophische Relektüren und Reinterpretationen einschlägiger Positionen zum Thema „Erinnerung“ versammelt. Die lange Traditionslinie von Platon, über John Locke und Friedrich Nietzsche, bis hin zu Henri Bergson und Ludwig Wittgenstein wird mit systematischen Perspektiven hinsichtlich der kognitiven und ethischen Bedeutung des Erinnerns verknüpft. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird dabei den aktuellen Debatten um die Medialisierung und Politisierung von Erinnern und Vergessen gewidmet. Sowohl der Zusammenhang zwischen neuro- und kognitionswissenschaftlicher Theoriebildung und medialer Technologisierung als auch die wechselseitige Beeinflussung natur- und kulturwissenschaftlicher Fragestellungen lassen es nämlich als zweifelhaft erscheinen, ob es sich bei diesem komplexen Problemfeld überhaupt um ein einheitliches Phänomen handelt. In jedem Fall bedarf es aber bei der gegenwärtigen Konjunktur der Erinnerung in wissenschaftlichen und öffentlichen Diskussionen einer Reflexion auf den Zusammenhang von Zeit und Geschichte, Identität und Kultur.
Der vorliegende Band versammelt Beiträge von Philosophen und Philosophinnen innerhalb der phänome... more Der vorliegende Band versammelt Beiträge von Philosophen und Philosophinnen innerhalb der phänomenologischen Forschung, speziell derjenigen Husserls. Die Beiträge zeichnen sich durch ihre innovative Kraft aus, da sie Neuland betreten und der phänomenologischen Forschung neue Wege eröffnen. Die Beiträge repräsentieren den gegenwärtigen Forschungsstand auf internationalem Niveau. Forscher und Forscherinnen aus Österreich, Deutschland, Dänemark, Japan, Taiwan, Italien und den USA sind versammelt. Dieser Band enthält fünf Beiträge in englischer Sprache.
Die Aufarbeitung der Philosophiegeschichte gehört zu den wichtigen Aufgaben der Philosophie. Denn... more Die Aufarbeitung der Philosophiegeschichte gehört zu den wichtigen Aufgaben der Philosophie. Dennoch läuft man bei zu einseitiger Ausrichtung auf diesen Zweig der Wissenschaft Gefahr, das Philosophieren selbst zu vernachlässigen. ,Transzendentalphilosophie’ kann – ihrem eigenen Anspruch nach – nicht ausschließlich als bloß historische Position verstanden werden. Transzendentalphilosophisches Denken und Argumentieren ist vielmehr auch eine Methode, ein Denkwerkzeug, mittels dessen weitergedacht werden kann und muß, und zwar sowohl ethische, erkenntnistheoretische als auch ästhetische Probleme betreffend. So sollen in diesem Band grundlegende Probleme der menschlichen Existenz in einem historischen Umfeld verfolgt sowie in einen aktuellen Diskussionshorizont gehoben werden. Damit kann gezeigt werden, daß transzendentalphilosopische Denk- und Argumentationsweisen ihre Relevanz nicht verloren haben. Die vorliegende Aufsatzsammlung ist daher dem Bestreben verpflichtet, welches, die Herkunft nicht verleugnend, das Philosophieren lebendig erhalten will.
Critical Theory/Marxism by Christian Lotz
Money does not play a central role in the major writings of Frankfurt School thinkers, with the e... more Money does not play a central role in the major writings of Frankfurt School thinkers, with the exception of Theodor W. Adorno, and Friedrich Pollock during the 30s, and then again in Habermas’s theory of communicative action. Though Adorno rarely addresses money in his writings, it becomes clear that he analyzes the synthetic force of money as a constitutive element of capitalist social relations under what is for the Adorno central concept of “exchange principle,” which he developed in light of Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s concept of “real abstraction.” By “exchange society” Adorno refers to capitalism as a social form in which human life becomes universally commodified. Whereas Pollock’s take on money seems to be important for the further development of critical theory, Pollock remains focused on Marx. In contradistinction, Habermas moves away from Marx by no longer conceptualizing money as a universally important element for the constitution of society juxtaposing it with the normative reproduction of society that takes place in the lifeworld. More recently, Nancy Fraser, returning to Polanyi, and Werner Bonefeld, returning to Adorno and Marx, have paid renewed attention to the concept of money, partly based on their dissatisfaction with the dismissal of political economy and a theory of capitalism in contemporary critical theory. Generally, all Frankfurt School critical theorists who deal with the issue of money start from the following assumptions: [1] money is not a “thing” on its own; rather, it is a moment of a larger (dialectical) theory of society, and [2] money is not simply a means of payment, given that even in Habermas’ theory of money as a “medium,” money plays a larger social role for societal developments. Critical theorists therefore all agree that money cannot be neutral and they thereby refuse positivist and economist approaches to money.
Die wachsende Gleichgültigkeit der Bevölkerung „gegenüber der bürgerschaftlichen Teilnahme an Pol... more Die wachsende Gleichgültigkeit der Bevölkerung „gegenüber der bürgerschaftlichen Teilnahme an Politik“, d.h. die weitere Abkoppelung von politischem Überbau und Zivilgesellschaft und damit, Hegelsch gesprochen, der weitere Zerfall demokratischer Sittlichkeit, wird von konservativen wie progressiven Beobachtern mit Sorge beobachtet. Herfried Münklers Beobachtung, „dass die Demokratie für die Lebensführung und -gestaltung der meisten Menschen zunehmend an Bedeutung verliert“ ist Ausdruck dieses Auseinanderfallens. Der Begriff von Demokratie als Lebensführung und der gegenwärtig zu beobachtende geringe Wille, die demokratische Grundordnung zu verteidigen, spielt auch bei Lukács eine zentrale Rolle. Im Gegensatz zu Philosophen und Theoretiker, die Demokratie als verfassungsrechtlichen Rahmen einer Gesellschaft verstehen, versteht Lukács Demokratie als eine Form von Sittlichkeit. In diesem Beitrag geht e mir nicht darum, Lukács in seinem eigenen historisch-biografischen Kontext zu betrachten, sondern eher darum, den Gehalt seines Hauptgedankens herauszuschälen.
Arendt's and Luxemburg's concepts of freedom stand opposed to a certain modern tradition, running... more Arendt's and Luxemburg's concepts of freedom stand opposed to a certain modern tradition, running from Hobbes to Schmitt, which claims that the political realm and political freedom are founded upon sovereignty. In contrast, most visible in Luxemburg’s opposition to Lenin and Arendt’s essays on freedom, political action is only possible if sovereignty, which for Arendt can only be achieved in the labor and the private realms, is bracketed when entering the political sphere. Due to the pluralist “spontaneity of the others” (Arendt) that we encounter in public, we have to accept that we are unable to directly rule over others, unless we replace politics with the implementation of violent means. Ruling over and power as will-power, Arendt argues, are only possible in private affairs related to social life, and every identification of the political with the social, despite its strong conservative undertones, leads to unfreedom and distortions. As Arendt puts it, “Where men, whether as individuals or in organized groups, wish to be sovereign, they must abolish freedom. But if they wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce.” Given this background, in this paper I present central aspects of an Arendtian reading of Luxemburg's most famous writings on the Russian revolution, and in so doing I refuse Frigga Haug's Marxist rejection of Arendt's appropriation of Luxemburg as “aristocratic thinking” that stands opposed to the true social-revolutionary motives of Luxemburg. Rejecting Haug’s arguments allows me to more properly point to selected Arendtian motives in Luxemburg
Wer den Wahrheitsanspruch des Marxismus (im Verständnis von Lukács) gerecht werden will, muss ihn... more Wer den Wahrheitsanspruch des Marxismus (im Verständnis von Lukács) gerecht werden will, muss ihn als Methode verstehen. Aber was heißt das genau? Wieso Methode? Was sind die Kernelemente dieser Methode? Und warum ist der Gedanke einer Theorie der Gesellschaft, die sich als Methode versteht, nicht nur ein Vergangenes? In meinem Beitrag gehe ich diesen Fragen zumindest im Ansatz nach und betrachte den Kerngehalt von Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein genauer, der sich meiner Meinung nach eben nicht einfach im Verdinglichungsbegriff oder in einer Kritik am a-historischen bürgerlichen Dualismus zwischen Sein und Sollen oder zwischen Theorie und Praxis erschöpft, sondern – Lukács selbst ernst nehmend – in dem methodischen Verständnis der Sozialtheorie besteht. Diese Fragestellung verorte ich im Lichte gegenwärtiger Debatten, und zwar im Kontext des sogenannten „Jenaer Ansatzes“ in der Kritischen Theorie, die von Hartmut Rosa seit einiger Zeit zu Recht mit viel Erfolg verfolgt wird.
In this paper, I first argue that Lucien Goldmann’s attempt to confront Heidegger and Lukács, tho... more In this paper, I first argue that Lucien Goldmann’s attempt to confront Heidegger and Lukács, though it deserves to be revitalized, remains ultimately insufficient. Second, I propose that a more fruitful reading of Heidegger and Lukács should be based on three aspects: first, Lukács’ concept of social totality should be related to Heidegger’s concept of world. Second, the more meaningful way to confront Lukács and Heidegger on the level of praxis is not the everyday dealings with ready to- hand things (as Goldmann argues), but, instead, the second division of Being and Time in which a political concept of subjectivity and action comes to the forefront. Third, a proper approach to Heidegger’s and Lukács’ philosophies should be based on their respective appropriation of the concept of categories.
In this chapter I focus on a few selected building blocks that will pave the way for a renewed, t... more In this chapter I focus on a few selected building blocks that will pave the way for a renewed, thorough, and sober phenomenological reading of Marx’s philosophy. I intend to show here that this can be done best through 1) moving Marx away from a Hegelian framework, 2) understanding the concept of critique as an attempt to de-naturalize social phenomena and as disclosure, and 3) showing that Marx’s concept of philosophy, his method, as well as his understanding of technology, are forms of “disclosure.” This, in turn, should point us away from a dialectical understanding of Marx and open up new venues for a phenomenologically inspired critique of political economy.
Most commentary on Marx and Heidegger has focused on their respective early philosophies, partic... more Most commentary on Marx and Heidegger has focused on their respective early philosophies, particularly on their views of the relation between labor, reification, and how these issues are related to Being and Time, as well as on Heidegger’s sparse comments on Marx in his Letter on Humanism. In my contribution, I will go beyond this horizon and open up new venues for confronting Heidegger’s later philosophy and Marx’s later thought. I will briefly review Heidegger’s understanding of Marx as an anthropological philosopher who follows a subjectivist metaphysics and argue that Heidegger’s “version” of Marx remains shortsighted, insofar as Marx’s philosophy should be understood not only as a critique of labor but also a theory that is based on the claim that “the” human as an abstraction is an effect of the capitalist mode of production. I will then outline how we can read Marx and Heidegger together, on one level, by focusing on real abstractions, such a value, labor power and energy, which leads to the conclusion that Heidegger’s concept of enframing or positionality [Gestell] in the context of his concept of technology can be more properly grasped if we relate it to value and capital as an epoch.
Although Negri (and Hardt) are usually identified as a “non-dogmatic” version of Post-Marxism, th... more Although Negri (and Hardt) are usually identified as a “non-dogmatic” version of Post-Marxism, their position can be identified with the attempt to offering a contemporary vision of Marxist thought that, at least to some extent, remains true to its basis, namely, the connection between Marxist social theory and political philosophy. Accordingly, political thought can for them only be defined in connection with a theory of subjectivity and labor defined by recent developments in global capitalism. In contradistinction, and seen from the problem of how to combine social theory, political economy, and political thought, Badiou is furthest away from a Marxian base (broadly defined), given that one of his central claims is that politics needs to be re-thought as a “true” politics, which he conceives of as independent from questions of social form and social-economic structure. As I argue in this chapter, Negri’s concept of the political in connection with the social, even if one might disagree with his concrete analysis of contemporary forms of labor and subjectivity, is far superior to Badiou’s regressive concept of communist politics, insofar as it takes the social into account as constitutive for the political and does not lead to the consequence that we need to wait for some “truth event” that turns individuals into spiritual soldiers.
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Books by Christian Lotz
Critical Theory/Marxism by Christian Lotz