Preventing violent extremism

Most people who join radical or extreme groups leave at some stage. In the landscape of violent extremism and radicalisation, the exit phenomenon is not well understood, though it seems there are common elements in the experience of those who leave different types of closed and/or radical groups. In the context of political terrorism, there is an urgent need to better comprehend the factors and processes involved in leaving extreme groups and reintegrating with the wider community. For example, just how easy or hard is it to leave voluntarily? What can be done to minimise further radicalisation if a person is extracted forcibly from a group? What factors promote or hinder reintegration? Issues of identity, belonging and purpose are prevalent in the personal accounts of most ex-members of politically extreme groups. The basic argument of this paper is that social identity mechanisms implicated in radicalisation may also constitute a significant and essential component of disengagement, deradicalisation and reintegrationboth as a cause and as a consequence. Prevention policies and disengagement interventions can only be successful if we understand how and why people leaving violent and extreme groups.

Since Prevent was first rolled out on a national scale in 2007 its implementation has varied markedly across local contexts. The most recent policy statement on Prevent, by a specially commissioned taskforce on radicalisation which reported in December 2013, appears to want to minimize local variation by making delivery of Prevent a legal requirement. Any attempt to bypass local demographic and political variations may, however, prove to be counterproductive or even unworkable in practice.

Climate change is a threat multiplier. Why are there still debates about whether climate change or violent extremism is the globe’s most significant threat? As a matter of fact, climate change and violent extremism are connected. Separating them conceptually sets up a false dichotomy.

https://www.norwich.edu/news/voices-from-the-hill/peace-and-war/3548-weaponizing-the-climate-crisis-the-nexus-of-climate-change-and-violent-extremism

The expression of an Islamic political radicalism in Britain has been one of the most dramatic developments in recent decades. Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics explores the nature of this phenomenon by analysing the origins of Islam and its historical contact with Western Europe and Britain, and the emergence of Islamic political radicalism in the Muslim world and in the West.

Tahir Abbas draws on historical analysis and contemporary case studies to explore the post-war immigration and integration of Muslim groups, the complex relations that exist between a secular liberal Britain and a diverse but multifaceted Islam, and the extent of social and economic inequalities that affect Muslims as individual citizens and in local area communities. He shows how violent extremism among British Muslims is in reality influenced by a range of issues, including the factors of globalisation and contemporary politics, media and culture. Analysing and dissecting public policy, Abbas offers suggestions for tackling the major social, political and economic questions facing British Muslims in the post-7/7 era.

An important contribution to the study of religion, ‘race’ and ethnicity in modern Britain, this accessible work will be of interest to anyone working in the field of Islamic studies, sociology and political radicalism.

Reviews

‘Much of the commentary on Islam today is shrill and one-dimensional which further widens the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims. Because Tahir Abbas’ Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics is reasoned, scholarly and aims to provide historical context it is a powerful corrective. Being both British and Muslim allows him to present us with a truly insider’s account.’ - Professor Akbar Ahmed, Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies, American University

‘In the face of so many superficial denunciations of radical Islam in Britain, Tahir Abbas provides an account that is both broad in its historical coverage and profound in its social analysis. In his sweep of several centuries of South Asian Islamic thinking, Abbas includes the conflicts engendered by British colonialism, and the complex processes of immigration and settlement in Britain. He is especially good in his own speciality, the patterns of inequality in education and in the labour market, through which he shows how the global growth in radical thinking can articulate with domestic social disparities. Here is a distinctive voice entering the debate.’ - John R. Bowen, Washington University in St. Louis.

‘Terrorist incidents have created controversy about Islam and Muslims, and British Muslims have been part of this debate. Media and lay people take a very superficial view and blame Islam and Muslims for radicalisation. This book is an in-depth study of the causes of radicalisation of a section of British Muslims. It is a very useful study indeed and all those who want to understand this complex phenomenon should read the book: Dr Abbas has done a good job!’ - Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer, Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, India

‘A remarkable book, well researched, comprehensive in its coverage and highly relevant to contemporary British political concerns.’ - John Rex, Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology, Warwick University"

The questionnaire YES allows to evaluate a probability of accepting radical ideology as well a probability of violent behavior against some social groups. Conceptually, this technique is based on the psychological characteristics of youth, the authoritarian personality theory T.Adorno and the concept of right-wing authoritarianism  B.Altmayer. There are 11 scales, each of which contributes into the total scale of propensity to extremist behavior.

Panduan ini digagas oleh C-SAVE melalui kerja sama dengan
Division for Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR), Ichsan
Malik Centre for Peace and Dialog.

Tim Penulis:
1. Fajar Erikha
2. Vici Sofanna Putera
3. Any Rufaedah
4. Dr. phil. Idhamsyah Eka Putra

Saran untuk pengutpan berformat APA:

Erikha, F., Putera, V.S., Rufaedah, A., & Putra, I.E. (2019). Panduan Sistem Deteksi dan Penanganan Dini Ekstremisme Kekerasan Tingkat Desa. Jakarta: C-SAVE

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, there has been greater interest in countering violent extremism. Due to the U.S.-led " War on Terror, " madrassas in Pakistan have received international attention for initiating peace education programs through international NGOs. The motivation to work in madrassas is that erstwhile studies have blamed the madrassa education system for the lack of critical thinking and the vulnerability of madrassa students to extremist ideologies. While peace education interventions in Pakistan have continued for over a decade, there is a scarcity of scholarly assessments. This article aims to bridge that gap by analyzing the causes and consequences of extremism, particularly violent extremism in Pakistan, to make a case for and critically examine the application of peace education.

This Arabic practical guide on Facilitating Community Dialogue to Prevent Violent Extremism is published by UNDP-Tunisia.  It is the product of collaborative effort with the UNDP staff in Tunisia, and my colleagues Chahrazed Al-Nasrawi, Ammar Yasin and Fadoua Amer, in consultation with Sami Belhaj and Mariam Ma'zoul.  We hope that it will be useful to colleagues throughout the Arab world and beyond.  Amr Abdalla

نشر برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي في تونس هذا الدليل العملي باللغة العربية حول تسهيل الحوار المجتمعي لمنع التطرف العنيف. هذا الدليل هو نتاج جهد تعاوني مع موظفي برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي في تونس ، وزملائي شهرزاد النصراوي وعمّار ياسين و فدوى عامر ، بالتشاور مع سامي بلحاج ومريم معزول. نأمل أن يكون الدليل مفيدًا للمختصين  في جميع أنحاء العالم العربي وخارجه.  د. عمرو خيري عبدالله

O presente trabalho de investigação foca-se na prevenção da Radicalização e do Extremismo Violento como forma de prevenção do terrorismo.
A metodologia seguida pautou-se pela análise sistemática de literatura desenvolvida por peritos e pela análise de documentação oficial de Organizações Internacionais no âmbito da prevenção da Radicalização.
Com esta investigação percebeu-se a importância da prevenção da Radicalização como prevenção para o terrorismo bem como o as atuais estratégias e o papel desempenhado pelas forças de segurança e pela comunidade.
Concluiu-se ainda que é necessário a consciencialização dos diversos atores no processo de produção de segurança para a importância da prevenção da Radicalização como forma de prevenção do terrorismo, de forma a erradicar esta grave ameaça à segurança.

Commissioned by the Georgian Centre for Strategy and Development (GCSD) as a component of a four-year multi-tier programme on ‘Enhancing the Capacity of Georgia in Preventing Violent Extremism and Radicalization’ funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway, this Handbook was developed to facilitate Georgia’s ‘Permanent Interagency Commission on Elaboration of the National Counterterrorism Strategy (CNCS)’ Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) policy development and cooperative programming processes.

In a field crowded with documentation and narratives on diverse P/CVE approaches, this Handbook’s objective is to focus the audience’s attention on counter-terrorism and P/CVE best practice at international and European levels. At the same time, the Handbook enables practitioners from state institutions to sustain institutional P/CVE knowledge and to develop capacity to address P/CVE issues across Georgian society. The Handbook can also be used for training purposes, as well as by other stakeholders to develop their own capacity to implement projects aimed at understanding and limiting the threat of violent extremism.

Beginning with an introduction to the evolution of terrorism over the last fifty years, the Handbook outlines the challenges of terrorism to democratic states, and the legal and policy dimensions of effective counter-terrorism and extremism prevention. The Handbook then addresses specific thematic issues, including institutional frameworks for P/CVE, cooperation between state and society, radicalization prevention, the return of foreign terrorist fighters and their families, and broader counter-terrorism and P/CVE communication challenges. Placing an emphasis on developing original material and incorporating a variety of relevant and easily accessible best practice materials, the aim across all seven chapters is to ensure that a ‘Whole-of-Society’ approach to P/CVE issues is emphasised in a user-friendly format.

Against the background of fifty years of terrorism, democratic societies are still exposed to a variety of risks posed by local and strategic terrorism. Although waves of terrorism occur in peaks and troughs, as contested and ungoverned spaces continue to harbour often well-funded and supplied terrorist and insurgent groups, social and technological developments compound the significant risks posed by even small terrorist movements and cells. To counter these threats, the legal and policy framework for counter-terrorism and counter-extremism programming will continue to evolve, not least to disrupt online terrorist recruitment, communication, and radicalization activities, and also to limit the transit of terrorists across international travel networks. In this context, every democratic society faces the dual challenge of maintaining their preparedness to counter terrorist threats, and to adapt their P/CVE approaches to contain new or persistent terrorist threats.

In the interim, Georgia, as with other European democracies, will remain exposed to a variety of counter-terrorism and P/CVE challenges. Limiting Georgia’s exposure to international terrorist networks, creating effective counter-terrorism policy, ensuring effective P/CVE practice, and enhancing Georgia’s cooperative security efforts will require further development of existing P/CVE capacities, particularly in terms of maintaining substantive institutional and multi-stakeholder approaches to terrorist and radicalization threats. In so doing, Georgia will continue to contribute to European and international security.

Harmony with nature, pristine countryside, organic farming, a vegan diet, renewable energy, sustainable development. This imagery tends to be associated with ‘green liberal’ environmentalist movements and more broadly, left-wing political ideologies. However, concern for the environment and warnings about the imminent climate crisis are gaining traction within far-right and white supremacist movements. This article focuses on the revival of white supremacist environmentalism based on a qualitative text analysis of an English-language manifesto published by the violent extremist neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement. Drawing on the concept of axiological cosmologies from Legitimation Code Theory and the Appraisal framework from Systemic Functional Linguistics, this paper shows how an ecofascist ideology is built up through clusters of meanings that reinforce neo-Nazi grievances such as ‘global Zionism’, ‘mass immigration’ and multiculturalism. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of what the promotion of eco-fascist ‘solutions’ to the climate crisis could mean for climate justice from a human rights perspective and preventing violent extremism from an educational perspective.

Radio is a powerful mass medium that informs, educates, is inclusive, preserves the local identity of communities and helps reach out to and empower marginalized sections of society. In developing countries, it can add value in several ways, particularly in areas where information, knowledge and technology come at a cost. It has the potential to fill the gap that exists in schools by providing quality education, vocational and skill training to disadvantaged students. The article begins by tracing the history of radio with a focus on the experiments of radio in education across the globe. This ranges from, the BBC's schools broadcasting services in 1924, and programmes for underprivileged children by AIR Madras, to the educational FM channel Gyan Vani being launched in India in 2011. Steering towards the importance of Community Radio and its potential to reach out to underprivileged communities, the paper highlights the educational initiatives launched with community radios by National Council for Science and Technology Communication (NCSTC) in India. The paper also addresses Interactive Radio Instruction (IRI)-a teaching methodology that makes learning fun and evaluating its success stories in India and abroad. Various local-level efforts that have helped in reaching out to the marginalized sections in lieu of improving education has also been discussed. German playwright and author Bertolt Brecht wrote, "Radio is one sided when it should be two. It is purely an apparatus for distribution, for mere sharing out. So, here is a positive suggestion: change this apparatus over from distribution to communication. The radio would be the finest possible communication apparatus in public life, a vast network of pipes. That is to say, it would be if it knew how to receive as well as transmit, how to let the listener speak as well as hear, how to bring him into a relationship instead of isolating him. On this principle the radio should step out of the supply business and organise its listeners as suppliers (Thomas, 2011). The playwright's words highlight the sole purpose of communication as participatory when radio and all other mediums were treated by the state as a source for distribution of information. Citizens are reduced to passive audiences who lend out their ears to mere propaganda and news about various welfare schemes. Their voices are ultimately absent or get lost. This is exactly what can change if Radio serves as an interactive and collaborative medium for communication-a tool for education. Radio is a powerful mass medium that informs and educates, is inclusive, and preserves the local identities of communities and helps reach out to and empower marginalized sections of society. In particular those, who have missed out on access to opportunities on account of not

The increase in violent conflict in Cameroon has been captured by available literature as an outcome of poor governance, poverty, discrimination, marginalisation and the list continues. Nevertheless, the role of hate speech, which seemingly has become a community to national problems, has not been satisfactorily examined as a major driver of violent conflict in Cameroon. This phenomenon grew from the days of colonialism, to independence and to the birth of democracy and now today. This paper (research work) examines the nexus between hate speech and violent conflict in Cameroon. The secondary data used
for this publication was supplemented with offline and online interviews and survey, as well as focused group discussions with young people, traditional and religious authorities, social media influencers, civil society actors and government officials identified from five regions in the four geo-political regions of Cameroon; South West, Far North, Littoral, Centre and North West regions; and diaspora communities. This work argues that hate speech, which appears in the forms of propaganda, fake news, and disinformation is destroying social cohesion in Cameroon and it is becoming very prevalent among politicians during elections as well as civilians against government or citizens that is fanning violent conflict in Cameroon. This publication presents the contradiction between hate speech and freedom of speech. It further demonstrates the process involved in hate speech leading to violence as well as presents examples of commonly used hate terms and the main authors of hate speech in the country. This work also emphasizes on the prevailing influence of hate speech in fuelling the current crisis in the Far North, Northwest and the Southwest Regions of Cameroon. The work highlights eight positive practices undertaken by young people in Cameroon toward solving hate speech. This work suggests among many recommended solutions that public condemnations of hate speech by government and citizens are not enough. It strongly calls for a legislation to curtail and penalise users of hate speech.

The northeast region of Kenya, which borders Somalia,
has seen a spike in clan-based conflict and violent extremist
activities since 2011. This trend is well illustrated by the
eruption of violence in Mandera County from 2012 to
2014 and by the April 2015 attack on university students
in Garissa County. This report, which is derived from interviews
across the three counties in Kenya’s northeast,
explores the relationships between resilience and risk to
clan violence and to violent extremism in the region.

Identifying The Threat Within is a free, four-part virtual series of 90-minute webinars for police leaders on extremism in their communities.

Homegrown extremists and “lone wolves” remain the greatest domestic threat facing the country today, with the largest mass shootings of the year occurring just last month. These incidents stem from the dynamics of the communities in which these individuals live. The most accessible interventions for local police are communities which, if they do not intervene, become enablers for extremism. This suggests that community policing could have great impact on the community to help to avoid alienation and work to create increased resilience in those that are vulnerable to becoming alienated.

Join us for the series, Identifying the Threat Within, designed for local law enforcement. Learn what this threat really is and how to educate their communities about how vulnerable they are. In this 4-part series you will learn a whole of community approach to identify and address homegrown extremism. Includes are strategies for identifying extremists before they act out, approaches for intervention, and providing the framework for developing your own early warning system. Series dates are June 9th and 16th Domestic Threats. June 23rd and 30th International Threats.

Increasing attention globally is being given to what are broadly termed far-right movements in terms of their potential extremist threat. Amongst these, religious groups occupy a wide range with Christian far-right extremists (CFRE) being one part. Covering a wide spectrum, the extent to which Christianity, in terms of beliefs and doctrines, is central is variable. The marker CFRE may, therefore, hide as much as it reveals in identifying the nature, motivations, and background of particular actors and groups.

This study is a synthesis of a baseline survey on the threat of violence, conflict, radicalisation and extremism in Benue and Kogi States. The broad aim of this study was to uncover dynamics in local communities that could inform critical interventions in building and strengthening community resilience against violent conflicts and extremism. Its specific objectives were to: determine the trends and patterns of violence and conflicts in the focal communities in the states; Assess the potential threat of youth radicalisation and violent extremism in the focal communities; and identify possible “resilience infrastructure” for discouraging and preventing violent extremism. The study utilized qualitative and quantitative research methods to generate vital information on violence, conflict, radicalization and extremism. It conducted a desk review of secondary materials such as media reports, government publications, and academic literature, and a field survey, using questionnaires, in-depth key informant interviews and focus group discussions. It found that high prevalence of violence in communities heightened the fear of victimisation, and that low public confidence in the Police fuelled community support for vigilante groups. Also, the youth were mostly responsible for communal violence and were more vulnerable to extremist recruitment. The study found that the drivers of violent extremism are complex and context-specific, and that endemic poverty and unemployment made youths susceptible to criminal activities or extremist ideology.

The threat posed by violent extrem- ism, from groups such as Daesh1 and al-Qaeda affiliates as well as right wing extremists in the West, requires a multi- pronged and sustainable response. Both types of extremist groups desire a world divided into existential fault lines. Both have inflicted thousands of casualties and caused senseless deaths. Prevention of violent extremism (PVE) needs to move beyond military and aggressive security measures. Unless the root causes of violent extremism are adequately addressed, violent ide- ologies will continue to metastasize via online and offline networks. A long-term solution requires a complex approach that addresses violent extremism in all its forms.
Despite territorial losses in Iraq and Syria, Daesh continues to evolve its tactical and propaganda strategies to draw recruits and to further its political agenda. Through its innovative and media-savvy techniques, Daesh has offered youths an outlet for their grievances and dreams. Existing PVE programming has failed because of its one-size-fits-all approach
and overemphasis on ideology. Effective programs must be community-led and designed to respond to the strengths and challenges of local circumstances. Policies to prevent violent extremism should anchor women as frontline decision makers and youths as active
Policies to prevent violent extremism should anchor women as frontline decision makers and youths as active partners in peacebuilding.
partners in peacebuilding. From a com- munication perspective, policy makers must reduce the emotional and rational appeals of all violent extremist groups. Based on Daesh recruitment propa- ganda analysis and extensive fieldwork in Morocco, this policy brief enriches established understandings of PVE and outlines recommendations and les- sons learned for PVE practitioners and grassroots leaders on future programs seeking effective community approaches to peacebuilding in the region.

Violent extremism has become a dominant problem in the Sahel-Sahara region in the last couple of years. An increasing array of nonstate actors are threatening the state and the safety of populations while at the same time taking on a transnational character and increasing ties and affiliations with actors beyond the francophone space. Despite the urgency of this critical threat, current responses of states in the region seem to be uncoordinated and inadequate.

This meeting note, written in French with an English summary included as an annex, aims to contribute toward better mutual understanding of violent extremism in the Sahel-Sahara region and its underlying causes. It also outlines a number of potential regional, national, and community responses.

The report stems from a seminar IPI organized in Tunis, Tunisia, from December 7 to 8, 2015, in partnership with the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) and the Centre for Strategies and Security for the Sahel Sahara (Centre 4S, Nouakchott, Mauritania).

The following are among the recommendations that emerged from the seminar’s discussions:

1. Analyze, Disseminate, and Communicate: Local actors could benefit from greater access to research, analysis, and lessons learned from other contexts. In addition, local researchers could be supported in developing their own knowledge and narratives, and media could be encouraged to adopt a more positive and analytical approach to covering violent extremism.

2. Promote a Culture of Dialogue and a Dialogue of Cultures: A culture of dialogue must be promoted both between and within different cultures and religions, as well as between the state and religious actors. This dialogue should extend to the regional level.

3. Rethink State-Society Relations: Increased space for dialogue among different actors in society is needed to help the state engage in more long-term preventive solutions. Such solutions could include reaching out to youth and preventing the manipulation of religious discourse.
Invest in Prevention: Regional integration could help find common preventive strategies for the francophone space. This integration should not be limited to cooperation among states.

The topic of violent extremism has increasingly become a part of policy discussions among domestic officials, international actors, academic researchers and civic activists in South East Europe over the past several years. This study, commissioned by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), is aimed at better understanding of the situation regarding violent extremism, and related planned and on-going governmental and non-governmental activities in preventing and countering radicalization and violent extremism leading to terrorism in SEE (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro, Serbia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey). The research also aims to identify gaps and unnecessary overlap, and contains conclusions and recommendations.

Political violence is everywhere. But how does it emerge and what can be done about it? This book addresses the diversity of violence in South Asia, South East Asia and Western Europe. It examines the various forms of ideological backgrounds, structural conditions, relations and aims of non-state actors who are involved in violence in these regions and certain countries. Thereby, this book presents a similar diversity of theoretical and disciplinary approaches towards explaining the same phenomenon: violence. The rationale behind this collection of approaches and case studies is to identify communalities on the one hand, and to counter simple, unidimensional explanations of why non-state actors resort to violence on the other. Finally, it provides policy recommendations on how to counter violence. With contributions by Greg Barton, D. Suba Chandran, Aurel Croissant, Rohan Gunaratna, Kevin McDonald, Subrata K. Mitra, Khuram Iqbal, Serina Rahman, La Toya Waha and Christian Echle

A review of Humanities Literature that at the time was infrequently consulted by policymakers. The report provides an analytical framework within which to think through issues of radicalisation and the move to violence, the 'sacralised' worldview of terrorist actors, extensive discussions of Islam which set Muslim communities in the global and postcolonial as well as the British context and the concept of fundamentalism.

In January 2016, late in his term as secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon introduced a Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE). The approach promised to bring balance to multilateral counter-terrorism by adding much-needed focus on the drivers of mobilization into violence. Highly arguable in theory and with great potential against the online recruitment efforts of groups such as Islamic State, the PVE agenda has nonetheless found enemies at the UN, both among member-states and within the secretariat. Errors committed in the Plan of Action's roll-out made the new approach hostage to the very limitations and tensions that it was intended to resolve. PVE also rests on a shaky conceptual foundation and has been further stultified by the intensely political setting in which it was to be implemented. The future of this well-intended approach therefore looks at risk, even bleak. This article traces and explains the rise and likely fall of PVE at the United Nations, bringing to light a number of sobering insight into the possibilities and limits of multilateral counter-terrorism.

The goal of the paper is to identify the Islamic Community’s methods of preventing religious radicalization in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The roots of radicalism and extremism are explained by examining “Islamic revival” and studied within the Bosnian context. Although BiH appears in many international reports as a potential “cradle of terrorism”, the situation on the ground is quite different and there are many instances of combined efforts by the government and religious institutions in preventing religious radicalization in BiH. The analysis focuses on the Islamic community’s efforts to contend the spread of illegal mosques that sometimes promote radical Islam in BiH. Although there are radical individuals with different and sometimes radical understanding of Islam, the majority of Bosnian Muslims oppose any form of religious radicalization. The Islamic Community plays the most important role in preventing the spread of radical Islam in BiH, and this paper analyzes its efforts to homogenize Bosnian Muslims and prevent radicalization.

As today's tragic events in Barcelona underscore, efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE) must remain a top priority for the United States. However, the Trump administration’s mixed approach to violent extremism to date is cause for concern. On the one hand, the president’s campaign and early policies were packed with vilifying rhetoric about Islam and Muslims and included an ill-considered travel ban on the citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries. At the same time, the administration has made significant outreach to key leaders in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt. However, this outreach has not included a demand for greater responsibility or concrete actions from those leaders that could reduce extremism.

Through the examination of current efforts to reduce extremism in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia, this report recommends that the Trump administration take the following four actions to succeed in defeating violent extremism in the Middle East and arrest negative trends:
1. Make the case to partner countries that repressive policies are counterproductive, and encourage leaders to support basic freedoms and respect for pluralism and inclusivity.
2. Support the adoption of national CVE strategies, prioritize monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and promote research to identify local drivers of violent extremism.
3. Invest in multilateral organizations and initiatives such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), Hedayah, and the Ideological War Center.
4. Abandon Islamophobic and inflammatory rhetoric.

Published by:

Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)

Title:

Countering the myths of IS: How to counter the IS narrative online? The case of Albanian speaking countries

Authors:

Rudine Jakupi and Vese Kelmendi

Date:

13th of March 2019

This report will seek to answer why strategic communication, primarily its counter-messaging facet, is crucial to every strategy that aims to counter radicalization and violent extremism and to minimize the appeal of terrorist organizations among vulnerable groups.

KEY FINDINGS:

●The report identifies three major themes weaved in the violent extremist narrative of the “Islamic State” as delivered to audiences in Kosovo and other Albanian-speaking countries. They are: political, religious and gender power relations

● The report finds that government agencies have not put forth a strategic communication effort to counter violent extremism despite the centrality that they accorded  to it in the Strategy. No consistent counter-narrative sponsored by public institutions or NGOs that continually are implementing projects to prevent violent extremism at the local level and central level Kosovo has been found.

● The Islamic Community of Kosovo (BIK), the body that regulates the religious affairs for the Muslim followers in Kosovo, lacks a coordinated, unison platform to provide with counter – narratives against extremist groups.

● Several imams of BIK have independently published their sermons and lectures on their personal social media platforms that could serve as counter – narratives.

● An effective counter message to the violent extremist narrative identified through this research is the narrative that can be provided by the jaded returned former fighters of the “Islamic State” and their family members.

● The report finds that platforms such as Fol Tash, a counter-narrative portal run by a group of community imams and Not in My Name, a social media endeavor of Radio Free Europe, did not gain traction in the websites and chat groups that continue to promote propaganda and advocate support for the “Islamic State.”

● As part of this study researchers tracked the habits of violent extremist sympathizers on social media. Out of 80 profiles and 100 pages of extremist groups monitored on Facebook neither “like” or “follow” or “share” any of the videos, texts or photos from the two counter - narrative sites. This signals that while these platforms may act as a preventative measure with the general public, they have failed to reach the supporters of extremist groups that continue to generate and spread extremist content in social media.



This report is published in the framework of the project  "Youth in Action – Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Kosovo" supported by the Embassy of the Netherlands in Kosovo. The views expressed in this research are those of Kosovar Centre for Security Studies and do not necessarily represent those of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Kosovo.

This special issue encourages a greater integration of gender-sensitive approaches to studies of violent extremism and terrorism. It seeks to create and inspire a dialogue by suggesting the necessity of incorporating gender analysis to fill gaps within, and further enhance, our understanding of political violence. In this introductory essay, I argue that there have traditionally been four approaches to understanding the interplay between gender and terrorism– positivist or “gender-as-a-variable”, instrumentalist, gendered motivations, and gender-based analysis and/or feminist methodology. Terrorism, Gender and Women: Toward an Integrated Research Agenda intends to advance a discussion of new ways in understanding how women and men can be affected by terrorism and violent extremism differently, and how involvement can often be influenced by highly gendered experiences and considerations.

The assessment aims to gather new perspectives and understanding identified factors that act as drivers of radicalisation in Kosovo – especially at the local level. The research has the explicit aim of assessing (1) perceptions of radicalisation at the community-level across Kosovo, (2) the perceived role of peers, educational institutions, religious leaders, teachers and communities, as well as (3) the perceived role and impact of media, the internet, and social media on recruitment and radicalisation in Kosovo. Its goal is to provide insights that could further complement Kosovo’s national strategy and its institutions in countering violent extremism.

The United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation in Mali (MINUSMA) has become among the deadliest in UN history, suffering from attacks by violent extremists and terrorists. There are strong calls to give UN peacekeeping operations more robust mandates and equip them with the necessary capabilities, guidelines and training to be able to take on limited stabilisation and counter-terrorism tasks. This article conceptually develops UN counter-terrorism operations as a heuristic device, and compares this with the mandate and practices of MINUSMA. It examines the related implications of this development, and concludes that while there may be good practical as well as short-term political reasons for moving in this direction, the shift towards UN counter-terrorism operations will undermine the UN’s international legitimacy, its role as an impartial conflict arbiter, and its tools in the peace and security toolbox more broadly, such as UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

The goal of this chapter is to apply political economy metaphors to examine the EU’s measures to contain and defeat terrorism. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 considers the ‘political economy of terrorism’ to depict the public policies that aim to integrate both counter-terrorist (supply-side) and prevention efforts (demand-side) into a coherent response. According to this approach an effective response to terrorism needs to involve the arrest and prosecution of those actively involved in acts of violence against civilians but also the development of an effective counter-recruitment strategy that deals with the driving forces of terrorism, also known as ‘root causes’, and prevents rank and file replenishing. Societies affected by terrorism need to engage with the social, political, religious, economic and ethnic ‘grievances’ motivating terrorists and do something about them. Section 3 discusses the EU’s counter-terrorist response to the ongoing threat of Salafi jihadism, particularly since 2014 when Islamic State started to claim responsibility for a number of high-profile attacks outside Iraq and Syria. The European ambition is to integrate both ‘hard’ counter-terrorist measures and ‘soft’ preventive measures designed to stop vulnerable individuals from becoming radicalised, joining extremist groups and carrying out acts of violence. The integration of supply- and demand-side approaches is far from perfect but it is providing fruitful responses in the fight against Salafi jihadism, perhaps even a blueprint that could be implemented in a variety of contexts experiencing the threat of both home-grown terrorists as well as returnees from combat zones. Section 4 pays special attention to the so-called ‘radicalisation agenda’ and the prevention of violent extremism, which includes measures such as the dissemination of counter-narratives to bring about attitudinal and behavioural change. The goal of prevention strategies is to delegitimise the use of violence means for political purposes and isolate the violent radicals from their supporters and sympathisers. Terrorist cells often hide in neighbourhoods where relative deprivation and criminality are rife and where their criminal activities go undetected. Ultimately, the goal of preventive strategies is to make it difficult for European jihadists to continue disguising themselves within communities of immigrants and diasporas. Section 5 discusses whether counter-terrorism and prevention efforts can be successfully integrated into a single strategy, for example at city level. As many as 75% of European citizens live in urban centres and existing evidence indicates that attacks on cities may continue in the future. Thus, cities have been at the forefront of a comprehensive strategy to integrate counter-terrorist and preventive strategies at the municipal level in order to stop terrorist attacks against civilians. Cities are obvious settings in which to implement the motto “think globally and act locally”. Finally, section 6 provides a set of concluding remarks and directions for future research.

Quelques milliers d’Européens sont partis faire le djihad en Syrie et en Irak. Plusieurs centaines d’entre eux sont déjà revenus. Pour faire face à ce phénomène, certains pays ont développé des programmes de prévention de la radicalisation et de déradicalisation. Si l’efficacité de ces programmes est difficile à évaluer, les exemples allemand, britannique et danois permettent néanmoins de tirer certaines leçons qui pourraient s’avérer utiles en France.

The CVE concept has been intensively promoted since 2015 and counters the process of radicalization through various stakeholders within the civil society intending to raise awareness and build resilience among vulnerable target groups. The UN since 2006 has recognized the important role of civil society in the implementation of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism. Civil society has many advantages in CVE, especially through answering grievances in society; improving societal inclusion, and facilitation of government-citizen relations. Civil society in the Western Balkans has been actively engaged in CVE since 2015 with the exaggerating problem of radicalization and recruitment in the Syrian context. Public awareness about the radicalization and terrorism phenomena within the society, promotion of the CVE concept, research on the local specifics of radicalization, organization of conferences and workshops, and inter-sectoral cooperation were the main response of the civil society. The example from Albania is presented through the efforts of the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) and their project based on a research study serving as a basis for public awareness activities in different municipalities, especially within schools as well as representatives of different state institutions. The example from Kosovo is presented through the work of the Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS) as a leader in the field. KCSS has been active in several CVE areas of activities such as research on various aspects of the radicalization phenomena, public awareness, emphasizing the role of different stakeholders within society, specialized training for target groups, and organization of workshops, conferences, and roundtables. From the extensive KCSS CVE program, selected project examples at the municipal level are presented that illustrate public awareness campaigns, especially among students and inter-sectoral cooperation and coordination. The example of Serbia is presented through the "whole of community" approach by Cultural Center "DamaD" focused on Sandzak area, especially the activities related to the referral mechanism for preventing extremism and radicalism, sensibilization of different stakeholders from the central and local government, development fo training packages and related activities for strengthening community's resilience