Security Studies

The contemporary debate in democracies routinely describes online information threats such as misinformation, disinformation and deception as security-issues in need of urgent attention. Despite this pervasive discourse, policymakers often appear incapable of articulating what security means in this context. Turning to EU policy and previous research on cybersecurity, this dissertation empirically unpacks, critically interrogates and theoretically rethinks the meaning of security in relation to online information threats. In so doing, the articles elucidate a new ‘referent object’ implicitly guiding securitization. Contemporary interventions can be seen as grounded in assumptions about the protection of human judgement. Using Hannah Arendt’s writings on ‘political judgement’ as a point of reference for critically evaluating contemporary policy, the dissertation points to several problems with existing approaches to security in a democratic context where free debate constitutes a legitimizing element of political authority. The rethinking of security departs from this problematic and shows that treating human judgement as a ‘referent object’ – if firmly grounded in the interplay between independent human communicating subjects – can better address some problematic questions about legitimate authority and political community currently haunting security interventions in cyberspace.

Security is (or should be) an immune system: it neutralises toxic and infectious organisms. Counterintelligence techniques comprise an important part of hardening that immunity. This contribution will build upon theorised patterns of lone actor radicalisation to inform ways of detecting employees potentially becoming or having been radicalised through behavioural and psychological traits, and what practical use counterintelligence principles are in establishing that kind of situational awareness as well as preventing an insider from causing harm. There will also be attention to the ethical dilemmas and HR implications posed by monitoring employees for possible suspicious behaviour in this way.

Because of its extensive Mediterranean history, France had a particular responsibility when the Arab revolutions broke out in 2011. The strategies defined by Paris in Libya and Syria, implemented through foreign policy, have proved to be less effective than expected. Although distinct, both were pursuing the same aim: the expansion of friendly democratic regimes in the Southern European neighborhood bloc.

Japan’s strategic objective of the Quad Plus is not anti-China coalition-building, but to create an ad-hoc coalition-building device that serves the maintenance and enhancement of the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region. There is no open official discussion or declaration about the “Quad Plus”, and thus, there is no clear definition or fixed membership for such a framework. Rather, it functions as a flexible strategic tool to attract like-minded states and induce their functional and strategic cooperation, depending on their needs and demands of the day. As such, the Quad Plus is an informal cooperative security and non-traditional collective self-defence mechanism, which is not exclusive to any state, including China. At the same time, Japan has two target states to be included into the Quad Plus, the United Kingdom and France, because they are residential powers in the Indo-Pacific region. To this end, Japan has steadily strengthened its bilateral ties with them.

Nederland en België hebben een bijzonder hechte relatie. Zeker op het vlak van defensie en nationale veiligheid, al zijn er zowel gelijkenissen als verschillen zoals in andere domeinen. In deze presentatie worden ontwikkelingen op vlak van inlichtingen en veiligheid in de twee landen door Belgische bril vergeleken. Een historisch perspectief overloopt de groeiende toenadering, na een moeilijk uit elkaar gaan, van twee kleine staten in een precaire positie tussen de oorlogvoerende Fransen en Duitsers (1870, 1914, 1940), maar ook geconfronteerd met andere gemeenschappelijke dreigingen zoals het internationale terrorisme (vanaf het einde van de 19 de eeuw), hoe dat invloed heeft gehad op de benadering van beide over veiligheid en inlichtingen, en uiteindelijk de hechte naoorlogse alliantie. Ook de verschillen en gelijkenissen inzake de hedendaagse veiligheidsuitdagingen en – maatregelen komen aan bod (relaties met de politiek, verband tussen de diensten onderling, het wettelijk kader, werkingsmiddelen, en de publiekswerking) om te zien of sterktes en zwaktes van veiligheidsdiensten typisch zijn aan de landen die ze beschermen of meer gemeenschappelijk zijn dan gedacht, en of daar ook 'veiligheidsculturele' verschillen aan verbonden zijn. Uit deze comparatieve benadering worden dan implicaties geëxtrapoleerd voor wat van elkaar geleerd kan worden en wat toekomstige internationale samenwerking betreft.

The book charts the attempts of Islam's largest missionary movement, the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ), to build Europe's biggest mosque in London – the so-called Mega Mosque. The book follows TJ from its founding in India in 1926, to its establishment in Britain during the 1940s, to its plans for construction of a controversial mosque in London. The book addresses the issues emerging at the forefront of national debates across liberal democracies: the role of Islam in the west, conceptions of changing citizenship and national identities, and how best to integrate increasingly diverse populations. What happens to illiberal and politically disengaged groups that wish to segregate themselves from what they regard as corrupt and immoral wider societies? How do these groups engage with government policy that seeks to define good citizens as those that are actively engaged in the socio-political life of the community? Zacharias Pieri provides context and insight to answer these and other important questions.

La terminologia utilizzata è piuttosto vasta: "small wars", "three block wars", "asimmetric warfare". Una più approfondita trattazione può essere trovata in Pastori G. "L'Occidente in guerra con gli altri: lezioni storiche" in de Leonardis M. e Pastori G. "Le nuove sfide per la forza militare e la diplomazia: il ruolo della NATO", op.cit. pp.46-47 8 Per quanto riguarda il concetto di "security complex" e di "hard security" e "soft security" si veda

في خضم التحولات التي عرفتها وتعرفها المنطقة العربية بعيد ما اصطلح عليه بالربيع العربي، يعاد طرح قضية إصلاح قطاعات الأمن والدفاع بالدول العربية، باعتبارها مسألة مركزية لتجاوز مراحل انتقالية صعبة يفترض بها أن تؤدي إلى إقامة نظم سياسية أكثر ديمقراطية وانفتاحا وقربا من آمال وانتظارات المواطنين. وإذ تبدو مضامين إصلاح الهياكل والسياسات الأمنية العربية مثارا للكثير من التساؤلات المشروعة ومن الحساسيات المتنوعة، فإن ارتباطها وتعلقها بأبعاد استراتيجية وسياسية واجتماعية وثقافية ومؤسساتية وفنية... يجعل منها قضية محفوفة بالكثير من التشابك والتعقيد.
ففي ظل وضع جيوسياسي مضطرب، ثمة ضرورة لأن تراجع الدول العربية نظرتها إلى مصالحها الحيوية وإلى سياساتها الأمنو-عسكرية ضمن إطار يميزه الطابع القومي المشترك. كما أن تململ وتوتر الوضع السياسي والاجتماعي في كثير منها ، قد يمثل فرصة لإعادة هيكلة نظم الأمن والدفاع على أسس جديدة أكثر موضوعية وفعالية. وإلى جانب كل ذلك، ثمة حاجة ملحة لتبني حكامة جديدة في مجال الأمن والدفاع، فيما يشبه القطيعة مع أوضاع سادت في الماضي ووصمت مصالح الأمن والدفاع العربية بالجبروت والاستعلاء والقتامة والارتياب وبسوء السمعة وانتهاك حقوق الإنسان. وعليه، يفترض بالدول العربية أن تتوفر على ما يلزم من إرادة سياسية لاعتماد وإعمال ما أمكن من الممارسات الجيدة ذات الصلة، وتدعيم سبل الشفافية والرقابة المؤسساتية على الهياكل الأمنية، في إطار من ثقافة سياسية جديدة ترنو إلى التغيير نحو الأفضل. إنه أمر يبقى، بلا شك،  رهين توافر الظروف الموضوعية اللازمة لتحقيقه على أرض الواقع.

Security is a multidimensional concept, with many meanings, practising domains and heterogeneous occupations. Therefore it is difficult to define security as a singular, although understanding may be achieved by its applied context in presenting a domicile body of knowledge. There have been studies that have presented a number of corporate security bodies of knowledge; however, there is still restricted consensus. From these past body of knowledge studies and supported by multidimensional scaling knowledge mapping, a body of knowledge framework is put forward, integrating core and allied knowledge categories. The core knowledge categories include practise areas such as risk management, business continuity, personnel and physical security, and security technology. Nevertheless, corporate security also has interrelationship with criminology, facility management, safety and law. Such a framework provides clear boundaries for the practising domain of corporate security, better reflects the security experts’ view of their practising domain, allows directed tertiary pedagogy and presents what could be considered the scholarly area of Security Science.

The purpose of this quantitative data analysis was to examine the relationship between industry type and information security risk-level among businesses in the United States.  This paper took into account collected business related data from 36 industry types.  Pattern recognition, bivariate linear regression analysis, and a one-sample t-test were performed to test the industry type and information security risk-level relationship of the selected business.  Test results indicated that there is a significant predictive relationship between industry type and risk-level rates among United States businesses.  Moreover, the one-sample t-test results indicated that United States businesses classified as a particular industry type are more likely to have a higher information security risk-level than the midpoint level of United States businesses.

“Power is war, the continuation of war by other means”: Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz’s formula has become a staple of critical theory — but it remains highly problematic on a conceptual level. Elaborated during Foucault’s 1976 lectures (“Society Must Be Defended”), this work-hypothesis theorises “basic warfare” [la guerre fondamentale] as the teleological horizon of socio-political relations. Following Boulainvilliers, Foucault champions this polemological approach, conceived as a purely descriptive discourse on “real” politics and war, against the philosophico-juridical conceptuality attached to liberal society (Hobbes’s Leviathan being here the prime example).
However, in doing so, Foucault did not interrogate the conceptual validity of notions such as power and war, therefore interlinking them without questioning their ontological status. This problematic conflation was partly rectified in 1982, as Foucault proposed a more dynamic definition of power relations: “actions over potential actions”.
I argue, somewhat polemically, that Foucault’s hermeneutics of power still involves a teleological violence, dependent on a polemological representation of human relations as essentially instrumental: this resembles what Derrida names, in “Heidegger’s Ear”, an “anthropolemology”. However, I show that all conceptualisation of power implies its self-deconstruction. This self-deconstructive (or autoimmune) structure supposes an archi-originary unpower prior to power: power presupposes an excess within power, an excessive force, another violence making it both possible and impossible. There is something within power located “beyond the power principle” (Derrida). This (self-)excess signifies a limitless resistantiality co-extensive with power-relationality. It also allows the reversal of pólemos into its opposite, as unpower opens politics and warfare to the messianic call of a pre-political, pre-ontological disruption: the archi-originary force of différance. This force, unconditional, challenges Foucault’s conceptualisations of power, suggesting an originary performativity located before or beyond hermeneutics of power-knowledge, disrupting theoreticity as well as empiricity by pointing to their ontological complicity.
The bulk of this essay is dedicated to sketching the theoretical implications of this deconstructive reading of Foucault with respect to the methodology and conceptuality of political science and social theory.

Á  e theory of regional security complexes developed by B. Buzan and O.“Weaver
describes the Middle Eastern regional security complex as a“standard one, with
a“polarity determined by regional powers. It is also considered to be a“typical
con´ ict formation in terms of amity and enmity, where the politics of security is
shaped mainly by interrelations between the regional powers1. At the same time,
because of its global importance as a“world leading oil and gas supplier as well as
its geostrategic location, Middle East constantly draws great attention from main
international actors including all of the global and great powers. Á  e security of
the region is also characterized by much greater, than in most other regions, dy-
namics and variability of the main issues of con´ ict.
Á  is is clearly seen when one looks at the main sources of instability in the
region and reasons for con´ icts in the Middle Eastern states during last few de-
cades. Since the end of the Second World War and during an era of decoloni-
zation the Israeli-Arab con´ ict rose as a“central security issue. In the following
years, it has to a“certain degree absorbed and overshadowed all the other secu-
rity issues. Since the decade of 1970. it became, however, less intense and impor-
tant. Á  e Israeli-Arab con´ ict has been substituted by the Israeli-Palestinian one,
which has a“completely diÄ erent character and its actual position in the hierarchy
of regional security issues is incomparably lower. Much greater importance shall
now be paid to such problems and threats as the Islamic fundamentalism and
extremism as well as a“growing activity of armed and terrorist groups that base
those ideologies. Other central issues include sectarian and ethnic violence, in-
stability of political regimes and weakness of state structures, internal economic
and social problems in numerous countries, the regional arms race, or growing
con´ icts for resources and raw materials.

Modern biotechnologies are among the reasons explaining the new focus on the idea of human dignity in public, political and scientific discourses. Topics being debated range from assisted reproduction, cloning, genetic diagnostics and genetic intervention, neuroprosthetics, cyborgs or artificial life all the way to visions of 'transhumanism' or 'posthumanity'. With their potential for bringing about radical transformations, advanced biotechnologies are forcing the notion and boundaries of what is human to be revisited. The biological foundations of humankind are more and more accessible , can be modified in a targeted way, and thus become the object of decisions. Naturalistic self-descriptions are being questioned and replaced by forms of description which are explicitly culturally constructed. We have to rethink the very question of what it means to be human and how we are to construct human boundaries or the difference between human beings and their environment. This creates a new background for the nor-mative concepts of human rights, rights of the individual and human dignity. Through reference to the dignity of a human being and to the idea of dignity, the concept of human dignity implies notions attached to what constitutes being human. This fundamental meaning is supported by the multifarious traditions of human dignity, by its function as a key concept in interdisciplinary debates and not least by its prominent status in legal texts and discourses. Views of the role of human dignity, though, could not be more divergent. The conviction that dignity is an essential norma-tive concept is juxtaposed with criticism that it is useless, nebulous, incoherent or even reactionary.

This presentation captures the historical adaptation of medieval warriors’ methods for security and thwarts toward adversarial attacks on fortifications for protective areas. History can often be a good teacher for modern day designers for security protection because the evolution of human beings has not changed since the beginning of time. Applicable lessons are applied to all aspects of security to include physical, technical, personnel, information and operational security. The article provides examples of the original concept of access controls, vaulted areas, chemical warfare, and the origins of physical security.

TÜRK KAMU SEKTÖRÜNDE BİLGİ VE BİLİŞİM GÜVENLİĞİ
ÖZ

Bu çalışmanın ana amacı, Türk kamu sektöründe bilgi ve bilişim güvenliğinin mevcut durum tespitini yaparak, buradan hareketle birtakım analiz, değerlendirme ve önerilerde bulunmaktır. Belirtilen amaca varmak için öncelikle siber güvenlik kavramı başta olmak üzere, Türkiye’de bilgi ve bilişim güvenliğiyle ilintili kurum ve kuruluşlara yer verilmiştir. Aynı zamanda bu kurum ve kuruluşların sorumlulukları ve görev alanları değerlendirilmiştir. Daha sonra içeriden ve dışarıdan, rekabete ve saldırılara karşı koyabilecek bir bilgi ve bilişim sektörüne sahip olmamız için neler yapılması gerektiği açıklanmıştır. Çalışmanın verileri, ikincil kaynaklara ve ilgili güncel literatüre dayanmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, çalışma için gereksinim duyulan veriler, özellikle alanda faaliyet gösteren yetkili ve sorumlu kamu kurumlarından -Ulaştırma ve Altyapı Bakanlığı (UAB), Bilişim Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu (BTK), Siber Güvenlik Kurulu (SGK), Ulusal Siber Olaylara Müdahale Merkezi (USOM), Ulusal Kamu Entegre Veri Merkezi (KEVM), Cumhurbaşkanlığı Dijital Dönüşüm Ofisi (CB-DDO) vb.- web sayfaları, yasal mevzuat, raporlar ile alanda yapılmış akademik yayınlardan derlenmiş ve daha sonra çalışmanın amaçları doğrultusunda analiz edilerek kullanılmıştır. Çalışma, bu alanda ülkemizde önemli adımlar atılmış olmakla birlikte, özellikle ileri düzeyde karşı koymalara hazırlıklı olunması gerektiğini tespit etmiş ve bu konuda hem ilgili profesyonellerde ve hem de toplumda bir farkındalık yaratmanın gerekliliği sonucuna varmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bilgi, Bilişim, Güvenlik, Bilgi ve Bilişim Güvenliği, Siber Güvenlik, Türkiye

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to determine the current situation of information and informatics security in the Turkish public sector. In order to achieve the aim, firstly, starting with the concept of cyber security, the main institutions which are in charge of information and informatics security are defined and explained. Later, it is discussed that how Turkey can challenge and confront the cyber competitions and attacks come from both inside and outside. The data needed were gathered from the secondary data related to these intsitutions, mainly the institutions which are in charge of the information and informatics security, i.e., Ministry of Transportation and Infra-structure (UAB), The Institution of Informatics Technologies and Communication (BTK), Cyber Security Board (SGK), National Center for Counteracting to Security Attacks (USOM), National Public Data Integrated Center (KEVM), Presidency Digital Transformation Office (CB-DDO) and their web sites, and reports. The collected data are evaluated and analysed in order to achieve the aims of study. The study is concluded that although there are important improvements, the informatics security in Turkey still does need further and counter works to be done, and also to create an awareness for both institutional professionals and citizens in society.

Keywords: Information, Informatics, Security, Information and Informatics Security, Cyber Security, Turkey.

This paper is concerned with two interrelated problems in the Copenhagen School’s (CS) securitization theory. The first is the challenge non-exceptional security polices pose to the theory, which starts from the assumption that securitization is ‘successful’ only when extraordinary emergency measures are adopted. The second arises not from what factors define securitization’s ‘success’, but rather from who does so. Securitization theory suffers from a constructivist deficit because the criterion for the ‘success’ of securitization is set by scholars, when a more ‘radically constructivist [theory] regarding security’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 204) would require practitioners to be in charge of defining the ‘success’ of securitization. The paper offers a solution to both of these problems by suggesting that securitization is ‘successful’ only when (1) the identification of a threat that justifies a response (securitizing move) is followed by (2) a change of behaviour (action) by a relevant agent (that is, the securitizing actor or someone instructed by the same), and also (3) the action taken is justified by the securitizing actor with reference to the threat he/she identified and declared in the securitizing move. It goes on to reject the ideas of a sanctioning audience and of the insistence on existential threats as also set by the CS.

In this chapter I identify and explain the critical junctures at which events in Ukraine could have taken a different turn depending on the choices (actions and reactions) of the main conflict parties. I argue that at the very beginning of the conflict escalation all sides made incorrect assumptions about one another’s intentions, resources and potential. As a result, competition between Ukrainian elite groups has transformed into full-scale war. Due to the ‘zero-sum’ strategy to which every side adheres, the confrontation has evolved from peaceful protest through violent protest and low-intensity conflict to open warfare with the employment of tanks, heavy artillery, multiple rocket systems, and airpower. This chapter demonstrates that we have witnessed the employment by Russia of a novel form of warfare that combines destabilisation with ‘creeping’ indirect occupation (hard power) and effective propaganda (soft power). In the meantime, the crisis in Ukraine has been moving along a scenario of protracted conflict. Any delay in its settlement favours the continuation of tensions.

The Balkans have become an important region
with historical and geopolitical factors. Both the
ethnic and religion-based problems inherited
in the region, and the strategies of global and
regional actors in the area have always made the
Balkans remarkable in terms of security issues. The
Balkans were the actual area of two major wars in
the 20th Century, and a region that experienced
the effects of inter-block competitions in the
Cold War period. After the Cold War, although
the international community dreamed of “global
security” and “global peace” because of the end of
the long-lasting bipolarity, the disintegration of
Yugoslavia brought the Balkans back to war. The
international community was sometimes silent
and sometimes had to intervene in these conflicts,
which dated back to the genocide, sometimes with
controversial legitimacy, in the Balkans towards the
end of 20th Century.
The Balkans has a sociological structure
with a very strong social and historical memory
and formed by different ethnic and religious
communities. Therefore, countries have uniquely
different security problems and interests. In today’s
globalization process where inter-communal
interactions and interdependence are increasing,
there is no institutional mechanism by which
Balkan countries can ensure their common
security interests. However, even in times when
globalization and mutual interactions were not as
intense as today, institutional cooperation among
Balkan countries was possible. The 1934 Balkan
Pact, established in line with the security interests
of the countries in the region, and the 1954
Balkan Alliance, which was established under the
containment policy of the USA (The United States
of America), are historical examples of institutional
mechanisms

This book explores the political process behind the construction of cyber-threats as one of the quintessential security threats of modern times in the US.

Myriam Dunn Cavelty posits that cyber-threats are definable by their unsubstantiated nature. Despite this, they have been propelled to the forefront of the political agenda. Using an innovative theoretical approach, this book examines how, under what conditions, by whom, for what reasons, and with what impact cyber-threats have been moved on to the political agenda. In particular, it analyses how governments have used threat frames, specific interpretive schemata about what counts as a threat or risk and how to respond to this threat. By approaching this subject from a security studies angle, this book closes a gap between practical and theoretical academic approaches. It also contributes to the more general debate about changing practices of national security and their implications for the international community.

This chapter looks at why cyber-security is considered one of the key national security issues of our times. The first section provides the necessary technical background information. The second unravels three different, but interrelated ways to look at cyber-security: the first discourse has a technical focus and is about viruses and worms. The second looks at the interrelationship between the phenomenon of cyber-crime and cyber-espionage. The third turns to a military and civil defence-driven discourse about the double-edged sword of fighting wars in the information domain and the need for critical infrastructure protection. Based on this, the third section looks at selected protection concepts from each of the three discourses. The final section sets the threat into perspective: despite heightened media attention and a general feeling of impending cyber-doom in some government circles, the level of cyber-risk is generally overstated

Patterns of Nationhood and Saving the State in Turkey tackles a  theoretical puzzle in understanding the state policy changes toward minorities and  nationhood, first by placing the state in the historical context of the international system and second by unpacking the state through analysis of intra-elite competition in relation to the counter-discourses by minority groups within the context of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.
What explains the persistence and change in state policies toward  minorities and nationhood? Under what conditions do states change their policies toward minorities? Why do the state elites reconsider the state- minority relations and change government policies toward nationhood? Adopting a comparative-historical analysis, the book unpacks these  research questions and builds a theoretical framework by looking at three paradigmatic policy changes: Ottomanism in the mid-19th century, Turkish nationalism in the early 1920s, and multiculturalism in Turkey in the early 2000s. While the book reveals the role of international context, intrastate elite competition, and non-state actors in such policy changes, it argues that state elites adopt either exclusionary or inclusionary policies based on the idea of “survival of the state.”

This dissertation seeks to map, compare, and interrogate the concept of desecuritization, as it has been developed in normative-political and empirical literatures, both within and beyond the Copenhagen School. Departing from the ordering question: “Why has ‘desecuritization’ been theorised in such diverse and inconsistent ways, how does it operate politically, and does it warrant the Copenhagen School’s political-ethical preference for it as a generally positive solution to the ‘problem’ of securitization?”, this argument will engage with a range of past and present debates, synthesizing the political-theoretical- and empirical literatures in order to re-read the political-normative implications, merits and problems of a number of proposed desecuritizing strategies. On this basis it will seek to
interrogate the theoretical limits of these strategies as it attempts to explore the move’s analytical complexity, in order to ultimately reflect on what this reveals about three critical, unarticulated tensions—theoretical, political, normative— in the inconsistent ways ‘normal politics’ has been understood and used; between two opposed normative-political principles underpinning the Copenhagen School’s normative program; and between the way de-securitization works in general, and its general preference for desecuritization in particular.

Sistemul național de securitate este un ansamblu de instituții cu caracter legislativ, executiv și judecătoresc și organizații ce contribuie la realizarea, protejarea ori afirmarea valorilor și intereselor de securitate . Securitatea „în sens obiectiv, măsoară absenţa ameninţărilor la adresa valorilor dobândite, iar într-un sens subiectiv, absenţa temerii că asemenea valori vor fi atacate” (Arnold Wolfers); Securitatea naţională  reprezintă ansamblul măsurilor politico-diplomatice, economice, militare, ecologice şi de altă natură care asigură statului independenţa şi suveranitatea naţională, integritatea teritorială, ordinea internă constituţională şi propriul sistem de valori.
Din punct de vedere strategic, întreaga activitate de asigurare a securității naționale este coordonată de către Consiliul Suprem de Apărare a Țării (CSAT)

Επιβλέπουσα Καθηγήτρια: ΝΑΣΚΟΥ-ΠΕΡΡΑΚΗ Παρασκευή Τηλ.: 2310 891499 Email: [email protected] Β΄ Μέλος Εξεταστικής Επιτροπής: ΜΠΕΛΛΟΥ ΦωτεινήΤηλ.: 2310 891479 Email: [email protected]
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Λέξεις Κλειδιά:

ασφάλεια, ειρήνη, τάξη, σταθερότητα, ισχύς, συνεργασία, συγκρούσεις, περιπτωσιολογικές μελέτες, φάσμα, εκκρεμές, πλαίσιο, πρίσμα, νομιμότητα, νομιμοποίηση, δόγμα, στρατηγική αντίληψη, σύστημα, ηγεμονία, αρχή, επέμβαση, ευθύνη, προστασία"

Συμπέρανα ότι, το ΝΑΤΟ μετεξελίσσεται σε οργανισμό που έχει τα χαρακτηριστικά ενός διεθνούς περιφερειακού οργανισμού, σε παγκόσμια όμως διάσταση, όπου με βάση το δόγμα "Ευθύνη Προστασίας" (Responsibility to Protect), αναλαμβάνει ρόλο χωροφύλακα, που επιδιώκει τη διασφάλιση της διεθνούς ασφάλειας και του εσωτερικού τομέα ασφαλείας, σε οριακές συγκρούσεις ανά την υφήλιο, πχ Βοσνία, Κόσσοβο, Λιβύη και προσεχώς Συρία."

Göğüs Göğüse Muharebe (GGM) ya da Yakın Dövüş (YD) askeri ve kurumsal-resmi güvenlik alanında tarihsel kökleri bulunan bir savunma disiplini olmakla beraber çağdaş kent ortamının gerektirdiği önlemler üzerine sivil alanda da farklı versiyonlarıyla yayılmıştır. Batı’daki askeri çalışmalar kapsamında bugün devam eden Göğüs Göğüse Muharebe’nin 20. Yüzyıldaki kökleri 2. Dünya Savaşı’na ve William E. Fairbairn, Rex Applegate, Bill Underwood gibi isimlere dayanır. Avrupa’da bir savunma sistemi olarak geliştirilen Krav Maga ve Rusya’nın hala kullanılmaya devam eden kişisel savunma disiplini Sistema da GGM modelleri arasında kaydedilebilir. 21. Yüzyıla gelindiğinde farklı ülkelerin ve kültürlerin askeri, polis ve güvenlik ekollerinden gelen Yakın Dövüş modelleri, geleneksel savaş sanatları ya da modern savunma sistemleriyle harmanlanarak çağdaş güvenlik uygulamalarında çok geniş bir çeşitlilik yelpazesi sunmaktadır.

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

Madrid, 27, 28 y 29 de Mayo de 2015 INSTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO GENERAL GUTIÉRREZ MELLADO Madrid 2015 ACTAS VII JORNADAS DE ESTUDIOS DE SEGURIDAD El IUGM aplica a sus procesos de producción editorial los criterios de calidad establecidos por la ANECA, la CNEAI y la ANEP. La política y la gestión editorial del IUGM garantizan un riguroso proceso de selección y evaluación de los trabajos recibidos © Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado de Investigación sobre la Paz,

The crisis in Ukraine, which began in 2013, has had significant implications for European security. Cristian Nitoiu identifies three perceived security threats implied by developments in Ukraine and how these threats may develop in future years: the threat of so called 'hybrid warfare' spilling over from the standoff between Ukraine and Russia; the threat posed by nuclear weapons; and the threat posed by more conventional forms of warfare. Perceptions of security threats are arguably more salient than actual threats, most times having a deep influence on the actions of states and other international actors. Hence, they play a key role in the way the EU, Kyiv and Moscow will shape their policies towards each other in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. While Russia can employ a wide range of capabilities, the EU and Ukraine have very few instruments to tackle security threats, be they traditional or non­traditional. In the case of Ukraine, but also more broadly the post­Soviet space, EU­Russia/Ukraine relations are affected by the perception of three types of security threats: so called 'hybrid warfare', nuclear threats and traditional military threats (i.e. territorial invasion). Hybrid warfare In the West and Ukraine the perception of the threat posed by hybrid war has recently increased sharply. The annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine have put the spotlight on the way states engage in conflict by using a series of (sometimes innovative) tools and strategies. Hybrid war combines the use of conventional and non­conventional capabilities, the use of irregular troops, cyber­attacks, support for terrorist, rebel and criminal groups, or the use of the media and civil society for propaganda purposes. In eastern Ukraine in particular we have witnessed a combination of the use of both state and non­state actors by all the sides involved. States tend to use parts of this toolkit even in times of peace, however in such situations these instruments are not combined in order to pursue certain assertive foreign policy goals.

Highlights:
- Quelles sont les dynamiques de pouvoir dans une institution supposée posséder le monopole de la violence légitime ? Quelles relations et perceptions entretiennent les militaires vis-à-vis du pouvoir politique ?
- S’il est d’usage d’associer militaires et violence (politique) dans le cas de la Guinée, peu d’analyses ont été proposées sur les conceptions du pouvoir internes à l’armée.
- Il s’agit ici d’interroger ce qu’est une institution d’État, qui échappe à cet État à certains moments, s’y confond à d’autres et qui repose sur des modes de gouvernement ambigus et complexes.
- L’armée possède ses propres logiques organisationnelles d’abord au niveau du camp, considéré comme un espace-ressource en soi.
- Il existe aussi des opportunités de gain pour les militaires hors des camps, en particulier la participation aux opérations dans le cadre de la MINUSMA et la sécurisation des terrains miniers industriels. Dans ces deux cas, il s’agit donc d’activités financées de l’extérieur, par une institution internationale d’abord (les Nations unies), puis par des compagnies privées (les industries minières).
- À partir de l’analyse de ces différents canaux d’enrichissement, j’interrogerai les rapports que les militaires entretiennent avec le pouvoir politique et surtout, comment ils le perçoivent.
- Sans prétendre être représentatif de la situation de l’armée guinéenne en général, cet article montre en quoi le pouvoir dans l’armée se structure autour de la gestion et du contrôle des ressources, entraînant des fragmentations internes, souvent compétitives.

Security challenges arising from hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, HT&HW, are today high on the security agenda not only in Sweden but across the globe. Despite the attention and the growing body of studies on the subject, there is a lack of research bringing attention to how these challenges can be addressed. This article contributes to such an approach by sharing the findings of a project that brings together practitioners and scholarly perspectives on this subject spanning the threats themselves as well as the tools and means to counter them. The article outlines the Western response to hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. It is argued that there is no single response to HT&HW, nor to building resilience. HT&HW needs to be addressed through a comprehensive, all-inclusive approach. Finally, the article outlines how we address these challenges in practice.