Counter terrorism

The focus of this book is ultimately to present a clear and succinct view of what psychological research has revealed about terrorists and terrorism. The results are often disturbing, sometimes surprising and frequently disheartening. Perhaps most worrying of all, is the extent to which this current level and range of knowledge has repeatedly been ignored and overlooked by those tasked with the responsibility of controlling terrorism. This book aims to provide a clear, intelligent and well-informed account of what psychology has learned in the past thirty years about issues relating to terrorism. It also aims to demonstrate just how one branch of social science can provide a powerful tool for insight and guidance on one of the most challenging problems facing the modern world.

White supremacism and anti-government violent groups in the United States has seen a rapid increase in the last five to ten years, with its rhetoric being brought to the front line of American politics. Despite a decrease in actual major attacks in the last two years, far-right clandestine groups with violent aspirations have proliferated since, approximately 2018 with the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting. The most recent administration shift has seen the fight against terrorism with these foundations set as a priority in the long term to avoid further anti-democratic attacks such as the January 2021 raid on the Capitol which could carry more violent consequences. Despite what seems as an un-organized, multi-focused extremist movement uncapable of carrying out terrorist acts per se, the re-interpretation of their violence or threat of its use may have the same effects or lead to larger and deadlier consequences, thus targeting the core groups and armaments with law enforcement efforts could avoid further expenses and losses for a longer term. The present paper will analyze the level of threat that the different groups pose nowadays, or could pose in the future, to American national security, the actions taken in its regard and their possibilities of success and adequacy.

"Based on a case study of the role of private financial institutions in the fight against terrorist financing, this article examines the rationales for, and actual results of, public-private partnerships in counterterrorism. It shows that there is still a lack of appreciation of the roles that regular private business play, both willingly and
unwillingly, in the fight against terrorism. As profit, rather than security, maximizers, private sector actors may decide to take certain security risks rather than addressing them directly, which in contrast is expected from public agencies. As a consequence,
public-private partnerships have not been the silver bullet that the representatives of public agencies had hoped for since 9/11. In fact, to many private sector representatives, they are more akin to public-private dictatorships."

This paper presents new findings about individual disengagement from violent extremism in a Western context. Despite enormous investment of the last two decades in responses to terrorism, the exit and reintegration processes of extremists back into the community are not well understood. Whilst most extremists struggle with the transition back into society, most eventually move on with their lives, becoming citizens again. Most do so unassisted. Therefore, studying the phenomenon of natural disengagement is a critical avenue to understanding why people choose to leave, how they leave, how they reconnect and what areas of their lives undergo change in doing so. Fifteen themes emerged directly from the transcripts of 22 interviews with former extremists from a range of different ideological backgrounds. These themes clustered into five domains which collectively represent the phenomenological essence of disengagement from extremism, including subsequent re-engagement with society. A key finding is that sustained disengagement is actually about the proactive, holistic and harmonious engagement the person has with wider society afterwards. Building on existing empirical research, this paper proposes a tentative five-domain, three-level model of disengagement called the Pro-Integration Model.

While recognizing the need for intelligence gathering and acknowledging that gathering such intelligence may require the adoption of extraordinary measures and approaches, international human rights law ascribes limits to how such extraordinary measures can be used. First and foremost, intelligence collection, by its very nature, is likely to infringe aspects of the right to privacy that all individuals enjoy under international human rights law. However, there are six accepted grounds in international law under which it may be acceptable to interfere with an individual’s or group’s privacy: National security, public safety, the economic wellbeing of the country, the prevention of disorder or crime, protection of public health or morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. All but public health and morals fall squarely within an intelligence service’s purview. While there is a growing body of jurisprudence on the use of so-called Special Investigation Techniques by law enforcement and domestic security agencies – for instance, telephone intercepts, eavesdropping devices, surveillance tools, undercover operations and human source recruitment – there is far less jurisprudence that touches upon the collection of foreign intelligence although perhaps some basic principles can be inferred from court rulings, as well as other international bodies.

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This work is a beguiling prospect for anyone who has been involved in South Asia or has an interest in the region. The idea of analysing so many distinct insurgencies and counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns within the covers of a single book is both ambitious and tantalising. Unfortunately, and in spite of occasional good moments, this book provides few of the answers. It has a clunky structure, is peppered with editorial and factual errors and unsupported statements. The British General Templer in Malaya argued that COIN should only be 25% shooting. The remainder should be winning "hearts and minds". Sadly this has all too rarely been the case in South Asia where many of the COIN campaigns have been heavy-handed and brutal. Partly this is a function of capability; effective COIN needs excellent intelligence and highly trained and equipped Special Forces. Yet it is interesting to reflect that two "successful" COIN operations of recent years; the Indian defeat of the Khalistan movement and President Rajapaksa's suppression of the Tamil Tigers owed little to Templer or the proponents of minimum force

Existing literature on terrorism and counterterrorism (CT) has overwhelmingly focused on the strategic and operational policies of major Western states such as the USA and the UK. It is predominantly based upon theoretical reflections, which draw on both International Relations and other disciplines, and empirical analyses, which offer up case studies and regional overviews. Alex P. Schmid, a leading expert on terrorism studies, has identified, in Perspectives on Terrorism, that the CT policies of states and groups of states have received relatively little attention by experts in all fields.

It is for this reason that this edited book has been assembled. There has been little concentration on how terrorism has been a truly global phenomenon and how others have responded to this threat. The majority of titles, especially those about CT policies in the post-9/11 period, show that there is a compelling need for a multifaceted and comprehensive investigation of all aspects of CT, in which equal attention is given to state and non-state perspectives and approaches in all regions of the world.

Right-wing violence and terrorism have slowly gained more academic and public attention in recent years, with an increase in anti-immigration and anti-government organised violence from the extreme right in most Western countries. Some evidence exists that right-wing extremists have attempted to infiltrate the military in their home countries to gain access to tactical training, weapons, and to recruit highly skilled new members. Research about the extent and impact of extreme right-wing links to the military is, however, scarce. In addition to the lack of insight into potential right-wing (or other forms of) extremism problems in the military, most armed forces have not developed effective countering violent extremism (CVE) tools. In this way, the incorporation of CVE in the military lags far behind the use of CVE in other aspects of counter-terrorism in the West. As the military, next to the police and intelligence, is a critical part of a country’s security infrastructure, it must also include specially designed mechanisms to protect it from infiltration and abuse from violent extremists and those planning terrorist activities. This Policy Brief will discuss available knowledge about extreme right-wing links to the military in Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. It will conclude by formulating concrete recommendations for handling this potential threat.

Türkiye, uzun yıllardan beridir çeşitli ideolojilerde ve yapılarda terör örgütleriyle çeşitli yoğunluklarda mücadele etmiş ve etmeye devam eden bir ülkedir. Kürdistan İşçi Partisinin de (PKK- Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê) bu terör örgütlerinin başında geldiği bilinmektedir. Ayrıca ülkeye maddi ve manevi anlamda verdiği zararlar çok büyük boyutlara ulaşmıştır. Bir terör örgütü olarak PKK, eylemlerinde silahlı yöntemlerin yanı sıra bu eylemleri ge-niş kitlelere ulaştırma, meşruiyet iddiasını sağlamlaştırma ve ele-man temini amacıyla yoğun biçimde propaganda faaliyetleri de yürütmektedir. Özellikle XXI. yüzyıl bağlamında terör örgütleri-nin propagandayı bir mücadele yöntemi olarak benimseme eğili-minin gün geçtikçe artış göstermesiyle PKK da propaganda uygu-lamalarını sürekli genişletmiş ve çeşitlendirmiştir.
Çalışmanın sonucunda hem Türkiye‟nin
hem de PKK‟nın propaganda dili, söylemi ve uygulamalarının
2000‟li yıllarda değişim gösterdiği, propagandanın giderek iki taraf
için de önem kazandığı savlanmaktadır. Son olarak da çalışmada,
Türkiye‟nin terörle mücadelede benimsediği propaganda yöntemleri
ve uygulamalarıyla PKK‟nın propaganda uygulamaları karşılaştırılmakta,
tespit ve önerilere yer verilmektedir.

People abused by angry discipline as children, may tend to abuse or overly punish other people or themselves for perceived wrongs in their adult life. In some individuals, aggressive personality traits may be genetically inherited. The aggressive personality may feel weakened by having guidelines or boundaries for anger. Anger is a normal human emotion, and these guidelines can help express anger in a healthy way.

El perfilado puede ser definido como una técnica que <<consiste en el tratamiento de los datos personales para analizar o predecir los elementos en relación a una persona>>» .
Los avances tecnológicos en esta materia pueden incitar a los gobiernos a utilizar las técnicas de perfilado con el fin de combatir el terrorismo de una manera más eficiente. Además de la técnica aquí descrita, otras técnicas en desarrollo, son capaces de “predecir” los ataques terroristas con una gran precisión .
Dicho desarrollo, necesita una colecta de datos personales. Sin embargo, el grupo europeo de protección de datos se opone a la colecta abusiva de datos personales. La utilización de estas técnicas puede plantear problemas en cuanto al respecto de las exigencias de la Carta de los derechos fundamentales, concretamente, a la luz de su artículo 8 .La directiva 2016/680 del 27 de abril de 2016 relativa a la protección de las personas físicas en lo que respecta al tratamiento de datos personales en materia penal prevé en su artículo 16 el “derecho al olvido” como un derecho a la supresión de datos personales.
El objeto de la presente contribución consiste en analizar el alcance del derecho a la supresión de datos personales (“derecho al olvido”) previsto en dicha directiva en relación a los condenados por terrorismo y a la luz de los avances tecnológicos.

In this paper we follow our earlier work on the mathematical and computational modeling of biological warfare and its potential extensions to nuclear terrorism. In particular
we review Dr. Parnell’s earlier critique of the proper and improper use of probabilities, scenarios and the emergent properties of terrorism undertaken in conjunction with the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineers and the National Institute of Health. As indicated in the earlier report published by the National Academies Press
(http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12206&page=3) we extend the argument that:
―The DHS (2006) report and DHS presentations of its content use inconsistent, imprecise technical language and do not define many key terms.

The impact of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), with its emphasis on preemptive military force, is a matter of considerable debate. This timely book employs a time series intervention approach to evaluate the extent to which the onset of the GWOT (beginning with the invasion of Afghanistan) and related events (the invasion of Iraq, the capture of Saddam Hussein, and the release of photos from Abu Ghraib) are associated with changes in transnational terrorist activity.

Utilizing an extremely sophisticated statistical analysis of longitudinal data exploring the relationship between the U.S. "Global War on Terror" (GWOT) and the frequency and lethality of acts of transnational terrorism, this study has produced some counterintuitive findings which are now compatible with official thinking.

Highly readable with a rich quantitative analysis of the largest ever terrorism database constructed for the period 1992-2004, the results of the study are fascinating and have important implications for current U.S. foreign policy in the Global War on Terrorism. The author has painstakingly examined, with precise numbers, the impact of the use of preemptive force in the War on Terrorism in a way that has never been done before.

This is the first publication showcasing compelling data on the impact of the current war on terrorism on the level, lethality and frequency of transnational terrorist activity around the globe. With extremely current data, When Terrorism and Counterterrorism Clash is a critical reference to all in the fields of international relations and political science.

Accounts of the relationships between states and terrorist organizations in the Cold War era have long been shaped by speculation, a lack of primary sources and even conspiracy theories. In the last few years, however, things have evolved rapidly. Using a wide range of case studies including the KGB's Abduction Program, Polish Military Intelligence and North Korea's 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism', this book sheds new light on the relations between state and terrorist actors, allowing for a fresh and much more insightful assessment of the contacts, dealings, agreements and collusion with terrorist organizations undertaken by state actors on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

This book presents the current state of research and provides an assessment of the nature, motives, effects, and major historical shifts of the relations between individual states and terrorist organizations. The articles collected demonstrate that these state-terrorism relationships were not only much more ambiguous than much of the older literature had suggested but are, in fact, crucial for the understanding of global political history in the Cold War era.

Since Prevent was first rolled out on a national scale in 2007 its implementation has varied markedly across local contexts. The most recent policy statement on Prevent, by a specially commissioned taskforce on radicalisation which reported in December 2013, appears to want to minimize local variation by making delivery of Prevent a legal requirement. Any attempt to bypass local demographic and political variations may, however, prove to be counterproductive or even unworkable in practice.

This chapter examines some of the most widely researched trends and developments within the phenomenon of modern international terrorism, providing policy recommendations on how to counter its emerging threats – particularly that of the Global Jihad movement and “homegrown” terrorism. The magnitude of the modern terrorist threat was demonstrated by the attacks of September 11, and ever since, the field has experienced a renewal of sorts, attracting unprecedented attention by both scholars and the mainstream public. This chapter will introduce readers to the main schools of thoughts within the academic field that explain terrorism. It will also present the many disciplines applicable to the study of terrorism, demonstrating that the phenomenon is multifaceted in nature, requiring a cohesive international and broad-based response. In covering a number of dilemmas facing terrorism experts, the chapter explores the debate over a definition of terrorism, providing a proposed definition that distinguishes acts of terrorism from criminal acts. The chapter continues on to explore the phenomenon of modern terrorism, the role of traditional crime within the terror sphere, and the growing threat of Global Jihadi terrorism – including terror networks and homegrown cells and activists who have emerged as a result of the spread of radical Islamic ideology. The role of terrorism in democratic states and the economic ramifications of terrorism are also explored. Finally, the chapter ends with recommendations on how governments should effectively respond to terrorism and discuses room for further research.

The killing of Mahmoud al-Mabhou reportedly by agents of Israel‟s Mossad service in Dubai a year ago1 serves as a quick reminder that extrajudicial executions, assassinations and other targeted killing operations are taking place and are part of a modern democracy‟s arsenal of antiterrorism and counter-terrorism means. Targeted Killing Operations reportedly form part of NATO‟s operational practice: depending on the circumstances they represent just another option of the lawful use of force in an armed conflict or assimilated situations. Consequently, it is argued that International Law does not impose an explicit ban on the lethal neutralization of certain persons in an armed conflict scenario. This opinion provides a provocative view on possible justifications using targeted killing as an actual means of present day security operations – which must not be confused with traditional methods of domestic „policing‟ in a democratic state.

This report analyses the situation in member and observer states of the Council of Europe and their different legal approaches to the phenomenon of the public expression of praise, justification and other forms of support for terrorism and terrorists, referred to in this study as "apologie du terrorisme" and "incitement to terrorism".

Addressing radicalization and recruitment of youth in violent extremism (VE) has become a principal aim of the policy and programs of what is known as countering violent extremism (CVE). Yet, much of the CVE programs have taken a curative approach with a main focus on addressing consequences of radicalization and extremism once extremist violence is erupted. A preventive approach, which could be cost effective and function as a "threat minimizer," has received less attention by academics and practitioners alike. By understanding the process of radicalization and recruitment of youth into violent extremism as an evolutionary process, preventive mechanisms could be developed and implemented such as community-based early warning and early response systems by engaging local people who bear the brunt of radicalization and extremism in the first place.

On March 2014, in an Islamic-State-sponsored prisoner swap, Mohammed Haydar Zammar, the al-Qaeda operative jailed in Syria in 2001, was freed in exchange for Syrian army officers held by the IS.

News articles that covered the prisoner exchange did not bother to explain why the IS would go to such trouble to gain his release. However, analysts familiar with the history of Islamist movements knew why...

In the vast literature on terrorism the choice of weapons has received relatively limited attention, despite the importance and visibility of this topic. Building on the literature on innovation in terrorism, the article first proposes a multi-level analytical framework that helps study terrorist weapon selection. It then investigates the use of weapons in jihadist attacks in Europe from 2014, with the rise of the so-called Islamic State, until 2020, based on an original database. The empirical analysis shows that the two traditional types of weapon of modern terrorism, firearms and explosives, were largely replaced by more primitive tools like melee weapons. In fact, in recent years jihadist terrorists in Europe have become less technologically advanced. Based on the original analytical framework, the article examines the reasons of this evolution, paying special attention to the use of the most common type of weapon in the database, bladed weapons, and the most lethal type, firearms.

A great deal has been written on the subject of Muslims and extremism, for a number of decades. In Western Europe, the Rushdie Affair and the impact of the Bosnian war created further considerations for analysts, policymakers, social scientists and activists attempting to understand the nature of this phenomenon. However, the events of 9/11 and the subsequent acts of terrorism on European soil during the 2000s generated increased interest in this area, but while doing so it also conflated matters as a result of neoconservative ideological and political perspectives of dominant groups seeking to explicate the subject.

Published by Think Defence, 2014 https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2014/02/experimental-stabilisation-manoeuvre-brigades-conceptoperations/ Stabilisation and Humanitarian Response are likely to remain core functions for HMG and NATO in the near future. While developing a successful stabilisation strategy proved elusive in the counter-insurgency environments of Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan, it has been very successful where the majority of the population were more permissive of international intervention -Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Kosovo are good examples -Libya and Mali may also be regarded as qualified successes. This paper takes some of the lessons learned during recent stabilisation operations and proposes a new concept of operations and an experimental stabilisation manoeuvre brigade to develop these ideas within the British Army and NATO.

Kulisy bliskiej współpracy komunistycznych służb z międzynarodowymi ugrupowaniami terrorystycznymi przez wiele lat należały do najpilniej strzeżonych sekretów PRL. Radykałowie z Bliskiego Wschodu oraz skrajnie lewicowi ekstremiści z Europy Zachodniej traktowali Polskę jako sprawdzonego sojusznika i bezpieczną przystań, gdzie można było skutecznie ukrywać się przed agentami służb zachodnich i w spokoju przygotowywać kolejne zamachy. Dzięki tajnym układom z peerelowskimi służbami cywilnymi i wojskowymi, terroryści czuli się w Polsce bezpiecznie. Omijali procedury wizowe, przysyłali rannych bojowników na odpoczynek, otrzymywali stypendia, otwierali własne firmy, handlowali bronią, a na nielegalnych interesach z państwowymi przedsiębiorstwami zarabiali miliony dolarów. Abu Nidal, Monzer Al-Kassar, Abu Dawud i Abu Abbas to tylko niektórzy z czołówki najgroźniejszych światowych terrorystów ostatniej dekady zimnej wojny, którzy nie tylko korzystali z gościny peerelowskich służb, ale traktowali Polskę jako ważne ogniwo przestępczej działalności. Dzięki drobiazgowym poszukiwaniom archiwalnym Autorowi udało się zrekonstruować najważniejsze siatki terrorystyczne operujące na terenie komunistycznej Polski oraz naświetlić okoliczności ich sekretnych powiązań z funkcjonariuszami aparatu bezpieczeństwa PRL.
https://ksiegarnia.pwn.pl/Zabojcze-uklady,713077485,p.html

Met de weerzinwekkende aanslagen op de luchthaven van Zaventem en het metrostation van Maalbeek werd België in een nieuw tijdperk geloodst. Europa reageerde – zeer begrijpelijk – met onbegrip, angst, ongeloof en woede. Indien men zulke aanslagen in de toekomst wenst te vermijden, mag het echter niet bij gevoelens en emoties blijven. Er moeten serieuze vragen gesteld worden en duidelijke antwoorden voorgelegd worden door mensen die een grondige kennis van de islam, de Europese getto’s en de moslimwereld bezitten. In deze reeks vraag-en-antwoorden wordt een oplossing geboden voor het bestrijden van radicalisme binnen de moslimgemeenschap.

This paper investigates human interest in simulated, mediated and real violence, especially in the context of terrorism, by following a synthetic-transdisciplinary approach bridging research findings on aggression and violence from areas such as philosophy, religious studies, art theory, cultural critique, psychology, anthropology and ethology. The findings suggest that certain acts of superlative destruction, e.g. the 9/11 terror attacks, can be rendered as numinous acts and as imitatio dei. The paper claims that the fascination for superlative destruction (FSD) is an anthropological datum. Depending on the circumstances, the distanced experience of simulated, mediated or real violence may lead to an experience of catharsis, a discharge of particular suppressed emotions. But the relation of violence and catharsis is delicate due to the potential and evidenced risk of copy-cat effects regarding such aggression.

This article explores the development of Saudi Arabia during King Fahd's era through research which highlights the challenges and reasons behind the decline in achieving five year plans. Saudi Arabia is one of those Middle Eastern countries, based on a traditional Islamic Law system, where the process of innovation is extremely slow. The purpose of the study was to focus on the policy implementations and improvements effected during the era of King Fahd and how they changed the economy of the Kingdom. The study also uncovered some of the achievements and limitations of the initiative to educate women in their chosen fields. The impact of the innovative development plans were explored, with education, industrial development, and trade identified as core focuses during the King Fahd era. The focus on these three aspects essentially resulted in the development of Saudi Arabia's economic processes, although some failures suggested the need for further improvements through the application of new strategies. Moreover, there was a need for developmental procedures in education, industry and trade areas that ultimately affected the economy of the Kingdom.

Recent terrorist attacks on European soil, shows that there is some shifting of the course of perpetrating terrorist attacks modus operandi. Unlike previous terrorist attacks carried out by terrorist cells, nowadays more prevalent are so-called “lone wolf” terrorists with a relatively changed modus operandi. This is due to the increased security measures in European countries, making it more difficult to act in a group or cell, to get to explosives or materials needed for making improvised explosive devices. The successful counter terrorism measures against Islamist terrorist networks leads to increasing of the terrorist propaganda which suggests the supporters to take solo actions without waiting for instructions. This is adding up on calls to attack the West that were made prior to Ramadan by ISIS spokesman, Abu Mohammed al Adnani, which included using a vehicle to run over innocent civilians or slaughter the “infidels” with a knife. Exactly this was modus operandi in the latest terrorist attacks. Through case studies of these terrorist attacks perpetrated on Western European soil will show a recent change of tactics in carrying out terrorist attacks. The change in the modus operandi of “lone wolf” terrorists calls into question the effectiveness of standard counter-terrorist techniques of security agencies. This suggests the need to change the approach of security agencies to this phenomenon, and thus be able to prevent such terrorist attacks.

Inevitably many terrorists and violent extremists end up in prison where they can pose formidable challenges.  Such prisoners are unusual and distinctive. As a consequence, their management can pose exceptionally difficult problems in prison and probation settings. However, our knowledge of managing and intervening with violent extremists in prison settings is very limited.  On many issues we currently have almost no published research, and much of what does exist is of poor quality. This deficiency unquestionably represents one of the most serious obstacles to developing effective strategies for promoting and facilitating disengagement from terrorism. This chapter provides an introduction to the problems and issues raised by terrorist and extremist offenders in prison settings. Critical issues around management strategies, radicalisation and deradicalisation, reform, risk assessment, as well as post-release experiences, are all explored.

This 2nd edition of the internationally acclaimed guide to forensic stable isotope analysis uses real-world examples to bridge discussions of the basic science, instrumentation and analytical techniques underlying forensic isotope profiling and its various technical applications. Case studies describe an array of applications, many of which were developed by the author himself. They include cases in which isotope profiling was used in murder, and drugs-related crime investigations, as well as for pharmaceutical and food authenticity control studies.

Updated with coverage of exciting advances occurring in the field since the publication of the 1st edition, this 2nd edition explores innovative new techniques and applications in forensic isotope profiling, as well as key findings from original research. More than a simple update, though, this edition has been significantly revised in order to address serious problems that can arise from non-comparable and unfit-for-purpose stable isotope data. To that end, Part II has been virtually rewritten with greater emphasis now being placed on important quality control issues in stable isotope analysis in general and forensic stable isotope analysis in particular.