Dignaga

This dissertation examines the theory of perceptual cognition laid out by the 7th century Buddhist scholar, Dharmakīrti, in his magnum opus, the Pramāṇavārttika. Like most theories of perception, both ancient and modern, the sensory cognition of ordinary objects is a topic of primary concern. Unlike other theorists, however, Dharmakīrti advances a technical definition of “perception” as a cognition which is both nonconceptual and non-erroneous. Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception is thereby deliberately inclusive of three additional types of “perceptual” cognition, in addition to veridical sensory awareness: the nonconceptual mental apprehension of an immediately-preceding cognition (“mental perception”), the vivid appearance of soteriologically efficacious objects of contemplative practice (“yogic perception”), and the sheer unmediated presence of the contents of cognition—whatever these might be—to the cognizing mind (“reflexive awareness”). Through the logical examination of what it means to be aware of an object, Dharmakīrti demonstrates that the awareness of an object is just the awareness of a phenomenal form or cognitive image produced by that object. Pursuing this analysis further, however, Dharmakīrti argues that the very notion of an object of cognition that exists “externally” or outside the mind is incoherent. Additionally, Dharmakīrti maintains that the phenomenological structure of subject and object—that is, the “first-personal” sense of one’s own cognitions as pertaining to oneself (“for-me-ness”), together with the inseparably concomitant sense that the objects of cognition exist “out there” in an extramental world—is strictly a form of cognitive error. Therefore, because ordinary sensory cognition is inherently structured by this subject-object duality, ordinary sensory cognition must in the final analysis be understood as erroneous. According to Dharmakīrti, in other words, ultimately only the nondual “luminosity” of reflexive awareness is genuinely perceptual, because only reflexive awareness is undistorted by nature. In this way, Dharmakīrti’s epistemology provides a theoretical foundation for the advanced nondual contemplative practices of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, particularly Mahāmudrā and rDzogs chen.

My aim in this book is to analyse India’s contribution to the study of reason. I seek to discover the active rational principles driving Indian theory, and to use this as a vehicle for disclosing a fabric of conceptual relations in their thinking about language, mind, and the normative. The book is based on courses I have taught and has been used successfully as a textbook for modules on Indian Philosophy within Philosophy curricula in the US and Britain. Unlike other books, I focus on the arguments rather than on merely surveying doctrine.

Jan E.M. Houben, “The Sanskrit Tradition.” In: The Emergence of Semantics in Four Linguistic Tradition (W. van Bekkum, Jan E.M. Houben, Ineke Sluiter, Kees Versteegh), pp. 49-145. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1997.
At an early stage the Sanskrit religious, philosophical and scientific tradition was confronted with problems of meaning, especially with regard to the sacred texts at its root: the Vedas. Here we take 'Semantics' in the general sense of "the study and representation of the meaning of language expressions, and the relationships of meaning among them" (Allan. 1992:394). We identify a number of landmarks in the history of Indian semantic thought: remarkable and significant “watersheds” after which thought is no more the same as before. On some points our study needs to be updated, for instance regarding the relationship between Sanskrit, its several varieties, interrelated dialects and other languages: "Linguistic Paradox and Diglossia: the emergence of Sanskrit and Sanskritic language in Ancient India" www.degruyter.com/view/j/opli.2018.4.issue-1/opli-2018-0001/opli-2018-0001.xml?format=INT
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/opli-2018-0001

Ratnākaraśānti’s commentaries give us insight into the tantric and non-tantric atmosphere of Vikramaśīla during his mid-eleventh century tenure there. Other prior Mādhyamika-oriented Vikramaśīla scholars, such as Bhāvyakīrti, had held the pāramitānaya and mantranaya to differ from one another only in terms of the speed with which they reach the same ultimate goal. Ratnākaraśānti concurred with their notion of tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna methods as equally effective, but he disagreed with them regarding the ultimate goal itself, which they had identified with Prajñāpāramitā. For Ratnākaraśānti, Prajñāpāramitā is not the ultimate goal toward which the pāramitānaya and mantranaya are aimed, but rather the quintessential Mahāyāna path that forms the core of these two methods and gives them their efficacy.

This paper explores Ratnākaraśānti’s Prajñāpāramitā framework, its grounding in conservative Yogācāra “three vehicle” values, and its relationship to his explanation of sexual practice.

The epilogue presents some evidence that Ratnākaraśānti’s Prajñāpāramitā framework had an impact on Vikramaśīla’s monastic education on the ground, in that its hierarchy, according to the rNam thar lam yig, was structured around the orthopraxy, rather than the philosophical debate prowess, of four tantric siddha-scholar-monks, namely  Ratnākaraśānti, Vidyākokila, Vīravajra, and Nāropā, whose disciples appear to have recited Prajñāpāramitā-hṛdaya-sūtra together daily within the context of tantric group practice.

Dignāga, one of the most innovative and influential philosophers in Indian Buddhism, flourished in the early sixth century when India began to enter the early medieval era. In this transition period, the systematization of dialectics was increasingly needed among Buddhist and Brahmanical schools as a result of the intensification of their competition for social influence. Having deeply studied dialectics in addition to the Yogācāra theory of consciousness and the Sautrāntika theory of nominalism, Dignāga investigated how a human being acquires knowledge through perception, inference, and language. Examining these cognitive faculties possessed by ordinary people, he paid special attention to the function of conception (vikalpa), which had been evaluated in traditional Buddhism only as an inferior faculty of discrimination that tends to induce one's desires.

DRAFT ONLY, criticisms and comments are welcome!

Thie article examines the Buddhist opponents found in the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedāntin Veṅkaṭanātha (also known as Vedānta Deśika, 1269--1370) and adds some conclusions about what texts where available in the 13th c. South India and on Veṅkaṭanātha's motivations.
This article has been discussed in an online session, and I would like to express my gratitude to its participants, whose suggestions led to several improvements and to further ideas. These are: Jean-Luc Chevillard, Eugen Ciurtin, Whitney Cox, Alastair Gornall, Petra Kieffer-Pülz, Shaji George Kochuthara, Marco Lauri, Dan Lusthaus, Elena Mucciarelli and Péter Dániel Szántó.
Comments are still welcome!

Dignāga’s theory of semantics called the “theory of apoha (exclusion)” has been criticized by those who state that it may lead to a circular argument wherein “exclusion of others” (anyāpoha) is understood as mere double negation. Dignāga, however, does not intend mere double negation by anyāpoha. In his view, the word “cow” for instance, excludes those that do not have the set of features such as a dewlap, horns, and so on, by applying the semantic method called componential analysis. The present paper aims to prove this by referring to the fragments quoted by Jinendrabuddhi and Siddhasenagaṇi. Dignāga logically proves that the denotation of the referent Q by the word “P” cannot be derived from the joint presence (anvaya) of “P” with Q. Instead, he derives it from the joint absence (vyatireka) of “P” with the nonexistence of Q. Anyāpoha is nothing but verbal vyatireka. Componential analysis is used for describing what is to be excluded. Dignāga draws taxonomic hierarchies of words based on their customary use, and assumes componential analysis to operate in the background of the hierarchies formed in semantic fields, stating that a general term is restricted to having the same reference with one of its specific terms insofar as the former is connected (yukta) with the characteristics of the latter’s referent. Moreover, he states that a proper name also denotes its referent by excluding those that do not have the cluster of a certain number of qualities.

keywords: Dignāga, apoha, word, description, componential analysis, semantic field.

結論 參考文獻 導論 《觀所緣緣論》 (Ālambanaparīkṣā)是六世紀印度哲學家陳那(Dignāga) 的著作，全論由八頌及長行所構成的哲學小論，以認識對象(所緣)的探討為全 論的主題。該論在印度有護法(Dharmapāla，六世紀) 、調伏天(Vinītadeva， 七世紀)的註疏，在七、十七、二十世紀的中國，以及十八、十九世紀的日本與 西藏，分別出現講論註疏的熱潮，成為陳那哲學在印度之外最受矚目的論典之一。 陳那晚年造《集量論》 (Pramāṇasamuccaya) ， 「所緣」成為其中的子題，從《集 量論》的角度解讀《觀所緣緣論》 ，可以是合法的讀法。然而，該論在歷史上更 多地從瑜伽行唯識學的角度來解讀。若從唯識學派和阿毗達磨教義的關係來看， 二者之間關於知識論的爭議則有明顯的承繼關係。雖然該論著重於破斥外境實在 論，形上學旨趣濃厚，然而整體來看，其知識論旨趣和形上學旨趣乃一體之二面： 試圖透過知識論的分析以解決形上學的爭論。不僅如此，如同所有的古代印度哲

This paper discusses a limited number of metaphysical topics discussed by the four main schools of Buddhist thought (Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, and epistemological-logical school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti), focusing on issues that are particularly characteristic of each school or that have a close connection with problems raised in the contemporary philosophical debate. These are the relation between part and whole and the theory of momentariness for Abhidharma, notions of ultimate and conventional truth, causation, and property-instantiation for Madhyamaka, the question whether everything is mental for Yogācāra, and the rejection of universals and its semantic consequences for the school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

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─ 1229 ─ 0. In the SaSTitantra, the fundamental text of the SAGkhya school before the time of the SAGkhyakArikA, two modes of reasoning for proving invisible things such as the existence of primordial matter (pradhAna) etc. are explained, i.e., vIta and AvIta. Of these two, AvIta reasoning is formulated after vIta reasoning in order to support the same conclusion drawn by the vIta reasoning through a reductio ad absurdum-style argument (prasaGga) .

TRANSLATION Part 1 [0 Introduction] [Jayanta:] Surely Bhaṭṭa [Kumārila] has [already] rained down an immense shower of criticisms on to the [Buddhist] view that apoha is the meaning of a word. 3 i [1 The Support of Apoha] For to explain further: This thing called apoha is taught [by you Buddhists] to be an exclusion, [i.e.] an absence. 4 Now an absence cannot be known as something 3 The whole of the rest of Part 1 is a summary, with some small changes of details, of a few of the arguments in the apoha chapter of Kumārila's Ślokavārttika. Our understanding of that chapter has been shaped by the translation of it being prepared by John Taber and Kei Kataoka. 4 Dignāga did not, to our knowledge, explicitly assert that apoha is an absence (abhāva). He was interpreted that way, though, by Siṃhasūri (Nyāyāgmānusāriṇī 733,17-18, cited and translated by PIND 2009: 268, note 451): nāpi bhedānavasthānād anabhidhanadoṣaḥ. kasmāt? abhedāt. na hy arthāntarāpoho bhedeṣu bhidyate, abhāvāt. tanmātraṃ ca śabdenocyate, na bhedāḥ . 'Nor does the fact that particulars are infinite lead to the problem that [words] would be incapable of denoting. Why? Because [exclusion] is not divided. For exclusion of other referents (arthāntarāpoha) is not divided among the particulars, because it is non-existence (abhāva); and this [exclusion] alone -not the particulars -is denoted by a word.' What Dignāga does state is that apoha is adravya (insubstantial, not really existent): avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo 'pi nāsti, arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvāt, adravyatvāc ca (Pramāṇasamuccayavrṛtti ad 5:36c, PIND 2009: A14). 'And the fault that [apoha] is not [capable of functioning as] a universal, which might [be thought to] follow from it not being 4 independent, in the way that pots and the like [can be perceived as independent things]. 5 Therefore, this [apoha] must be grasped as being supported by something else. 6 And what this support is of the [apoha] needs to be considered.

I discuss two critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology, one from Candrakīrti and another from Jayarāśi.  I argue that they are two versions of what I call the core problem: if the content of Dignāga’s epistemology were correct, two fundamental beliefs within this epistemological theory could not be established or known to be true, as Dignāga claims they are.  In response to objections found within the classical Indian tradition as well as several plausible contemporary objections, I then argue that the core problem remains a serious issue with which those sympathetic to Dignāga ought to contend.

Light is the most important (if not the only) analogy for the Vijñānavādin in proving self-awareness (svasam : vedana), namely the cognition that cognizes itself. Recent studies show that two opponents of the doctrine of self-awareness, Kumārila (ca. 530-600) and Bhaṫt˙a Jayanta (ca. 850-910) alleged that the Vijñā-navādin has also used light as an analogy for the view that cognition must be perceived before the object is perceived. However, this is a modification of the actual view of the Vijñānavāda that cognition must be perceived in order for it to perceive its object. Based on Kumārila's such modified restatement, Taber argues that "Kumārila's Buddhist" fails to establish the light as a valid analogy in their theory. Taber's argument is subsequently referred to by Watson and Kataoka in their works, in which they defend Vijñānavāda's light-analogy against Taber. However, their defence is also based on a similarly modified restatement by Jayanta and the defence is set out in the view of Naiyāyika philosophy. This paper examines all these arguments and shows that Watson's and Kataoka's thought of the light-analogy might still be problematic. It also goes back to the original view of the Vijñānavāda and observes to what extent the light-analogy serves as a strong support for the establishment of the self-awareness.

This is chapter 8 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It argues for a realist (rather than idealist) interpretation of Yogācāra, and discusses relativism/​perspectivism in Yogācāra and Tiantai/Tendai. Based mostly on ideas by the Yogācāra philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, but with some help from Donald Davidson, this chapter develops a perspectival realist metaphysics that in important respects agrees with Zhiyi’s Tiantai.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949

In Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS) 1.5, Dignāga claims that “an attribute-holder (dharmin) endowed with multiple essences cannot be wholly apprehended through a sensory organ.” What he intends here is the following things. Each sensory perception cognizes only one of the attributes (dharma), color/form, sound, smell, taste, and tactile sensation, which are the five sensory objects; hence, it does not wholly cognize the attribute-holder. What cognizes the attribute-holder is conceptual cognition that combines the five sensory objects into one. However, Dharmakīrti interprets PS 1.5 in a sense contrary to Dignāga’s original intention. According to Dharmakīrti, the attribute-holder is an entity that is single and partless, so there is no contradiction in saying that perception cognizes it wholly. On the other hand, inference and perceptual judgment, which are known as determinate cognition (niścaya), cognize it partially through exclusion of superimposition. This contrast between whole perception and partial determination is not found in Dignāga’s view.

This paper clarifies the difference between Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception. The following questions are to be investigated: Does perception cognize its object wholly or partially? Is the object of perception an attribute or an attribute-holder?

In studies of Indian theories of meaning it has been standard procedure to examine their relevance to the ontological issues between Brahmin realism about universals and Buddhist nominalism (or conceptualism). It is true that Kumārila makes efforts to secure the real existence of a generic property (jāti) denoted by a word by criticizing Dignāga, who declares that the real world consists of absolutely unique individuals (svalaks : an : a). The present paper, however, concentrates on the linguistic approaches Dignāga and Kumārila adopt to deny or to prove the existence of universals. It turns out that in spite of adopting contrasting approaches they equally distinguish between the semantic denotation of a word and its pragmatic reference to a thing in the physical world. From a purely semantic viewpoint, Dignāga considers the exclusion (apoha) of others by a word as the result of a conceptual accumulation of the sense-components accepted in the totality of worldly discourse. Among the three characteristics Dignāga held must be met by universals, Kumārila attaches special importance to their entire inherence in each individual (pratyekaparisamāpti / pratyekasamavāya). This is because he pragmatically pays attention to the use of a word in the discourse given in a particular context (prakaran : a) by analyzing a sentence into a topic and a comment.

A cikkben bemutatom Dignága egyik tanítványának, a hatodik század derekán alkotó Sankaraszváminnak egyetlen ismert művét, a Njája-pravésát (Bevezetés a logikába). Ezt a rövid, tömör értekezést vélhetően diákok használták. Segítségével elsajátíthatták a buddhista logika alapjait, megismerkedhettek a helyes érveléssel és az érvelés során elkövethető különféle hibákkal. A cikk tartalmazza a mű teljes fordítását, valamint kitér a mű szerzőségét illető vitára.

This paper presents the Nyāya-praveśa (Introduction to Logic), a work by Dignāga’s pupil, Śaṅkarasvāmin, who lived in the middle of the sixth century AD. The Nyāya-praveśa is a brief treatise on Buddhist logic perhaps written for beginner students. With its help they could learn the fundamentals of reasoning and the different fallacies one can make in reasoning. The article contains a full Hungarian translation and an introduction with some remarks on the question of authorship.

If we distinguish phenomenal effects from their noumenal causes, the former being our conceptual(ized) experiences, the latter their grounds or causes in reality ‘as it is’ independent of our experience, then two contradictory positions with regards to the relationship between these two can be distinguished: either phenomena are identical with their noumenal causes, or they are not. Davidson is among the most influential modern defenders of the former position, metaphysical non-dualism. Dharmakīrti’s strict distinction between ultimate and conventional reality, on the other hand, may be one of the most rigorously elaborated theories of the opposite position, metaphysical dualism. Despite this fundamental difference, their theories about the connection between phenomena and their noumenal causes are surprisingly similar in important respects. Both Dharmakīrti in his theory of ‘apoha’ and Davidson in his theory of ‘triangulation’ argued that the content of words or concepts depends on a process involving at least two communicating beings and shared noumenal stimuli. The main point of divergence is the nature of classification, but ultimately Dharmakīrti’s and Davidson’s conclusions on he noumenal - phenomenal relationship turn out to complementary more than contradictory, and an integrative reconstruction suggests a ‘middle path’ between dualism and non-dualism.

According to Dignāga, the word “cow” makes one understand a cow in a general form by excluding non-cows. How then can one understand non-cows to be excluded? Hattori and Akamatsu regard the absence of a dewlap, etc. as the cause for excluding non-cows. Tanizawa criticises Akamatsu by pointing out that accepting positive criteria such as a dewlap does not make sense in the apoha theory. The source text to be investigated is PS(V) V 41, where Dignāga replies to his Sāṃkhya opponent Mādhava. A close examination of PS(V) and Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary on it indicates that Tanizawa is basically right. The view that one understands “cow” by observing a dewlap, etc. (sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayaḥ) is to be assigned to Mādhava. Dignāga does refer to this view as an example to support his thesis. Mādhava critically points out that accepting the Sāṃkhya view on the cause of the cognition “cow” contradicts Dignāga’s own view (svamataviruddhaḥ) and amounts to giving up what he has accepted (abhyupetahāniḥ). Dignāga wards off Mādhava’s criticism stating that he refers to the Sāṃkhya view only by tentatively accepting it (abhyupagamya). Mādhava’s view that a cow is precisely the collection of dewlap, etc. (sāsnādisamūha eva gauḥ) is indeed incompatible with Dignāga’s own view that X is precisely the nonexistence of non-X (ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇi). A cow, for Dignāga, is precisely the nonexistence of non-cows. As Dignāga himself explicitly states, a cognition of a cow excluded from non-cows (agonivṛttagopratyayaḥ) cannot be based on the observation of a dewlap, etc. (sāsnādidarśananimittaḥ). Dignāga’s main thesis that one cognises “X” by observing the nonexistence of non-X is consistent. Considering Dignāga’s own view, the understanding of the apoha theory by Hattori and Akamatsu is inappropriate.

In his commentary on the Heart sūtra (abbr. PHT), Vimalamitra criticizes Dignāga’s theory about the authenticity/reliability of the first reciter (saṃgītikartṛ), according to which a reciter is regarded as reliable if he expresses the four items: 1. teacher, 2. audiences as witnesses, 3. time, and 4. place. Among the two elements of criticism by Vimalamitra about this theory, the first is that the witness cannot fulfill his role because those who cannot visit the witness cannot obtain his testimony. A similar argument is also found in his commentary on the Perfection of Wisdom in 700 Stanzas (abbr. SPT). Atiśa’s commentary on the Heart Sūtra, which is a kind of sub-commentary to PHT, also includes this argument. However, one sentence therein seems to have a textual problem. While comparing the PHT and SPT, I tried to emend the text and read the sentence clearly. As such, this paper is the first to point out that the abovementioned dispute is cited in Jñānavajra’s commentary on the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, which is on the one hand a valid counter-criticism to Vimalamitra/Atiśa and on the other hand will serve as a support to my emendation of Atiśa’s text.

This paper discusses a limited number of metaphysical topics discussed by the four main schools of Buddhist thought (Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, and epistemological-logical school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti), focusing on issues that are particularly characteristic of each school or that have a close connection with problems raised in the contemporary philosophical debate. These are the relation between part and whole and the theory of momentariness for Abhidharma, notions of ultimate and conventional truth, causation, and property-instantiation for Madhyamaka, the question whether everything is mental for Yogācāra, and the rejection of universals and its semantic consequences for the school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

Following Dharmakīrti's interpretation, Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.9ab has been understood as stating a view common to both Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, i.e. a view that self-awareness (svasaṃvitti) is the result (phala) of a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa). It has also been understood that Dignāga  (in 1.8cd and 1.9) accepts two different views attributed to Sautrāntikas with regard to pramāṇaphala: in PS(V) ad 1.8cd he regards the understanding of an external object (arthādhigati) as the result; in PS(V) ad 1.9ab-cd he alternatively presents another view that self-awareness is the result. Dignāga's text, however, does not support these interpretations. Rather it contradicts them. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation forcibly tries to impose Dharmakīrti's idea on Dignāga and thus, against Jinendrabuddhi's intention, reveals itself as a totally impossible interpretation. In this way Jinendrabuddhi's commentary rather demonstrates that Dharmakīrti's interpretation is not what Dignāga originally intended. In fact Dignāga (in 1.8cd and 1.9cd) presupposes a single view, and not two, attributed to Sautrāntikas, a view that the understanding of an external object (arthādhigati) is the result. In 1.9ab (svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vātra) he is presenting an alternative view that is attributed only to Yogācāras, i.e. a view that is not common to Sautrāntikas.

According to Dignāga, the word “cow” makes one understand all cows in a general form by excluding non-cows. However, how does one understand the non-cows to be excluded? Hattori (Buddhist Thought and Civilization: Essays in Honor of Herbert V. Guenther on His Sixtieth Birthday, 1977, p. 48) answers as follows: “On perceiving the particular which is endowed with dewlap, horns, a hump on the back, and so forth, one understands that it is not a non-cow, because one knows that a non-cow (e.g., a horse, an elephant, or the like) is not endowed with these attributes.” Hattori regards observation of a dewlap, etc. as the cause of excluding non-cows. Akamatsu (Tetsugaku Kenkyu, 540, 87–115, 1980) presents a view similar to Hattori’s. Tanizawa (Shinshu Daigaku Jinbungakubu Jinbun Kagaku Ronshu Ningenjoho gakka hen 32:3–19, 1998), however, criticises Akamatsu by pointing out that then the apohavādin would have accepted positive elements such as a dewlap as defining characteristics of a cow. Stating that X is not a cow because it is not endowed with a dewlap, etc., amounts to accepting that the dewlap, etc. are the defining characteristics of a cow. Instead of a real universal cowness the apohavādin would have accepted a dewlap, etc. Akamatsu’s understanding of apoha, if it was correct, implies Tanizawa, would destroy the essence of the Buddhist theory of apoha. Continuing the view of Hattori and Akamatsu, Yoshimizu recently published two articles on Dignāga’s theory of apoha. He claims that “the word “cow” excludes all horses by virtue of the fact that horns are never seen on them.” Thus, “the word “cow” can exclude all of them collectively by virtue of the fact that none of them has all the members of the set of characteristics that form the worldly definition of “cow”.” Horns, one of the characteristic features of cows, are indeed mentioned by Dignāga in PS(V) 5:43. Yoshimizu understands Dignāga’s semantics as being parallel to the modern semantics of componential analysis. A question arises: what does Dignāga, the founder of the Buddhist theory of apoha, really think regarding this issue? The present article sheds light on the incompatibility of the two interpretations by investigating the relevant source texts. It further shows that the issue Tanizawa deals with was already discussed by Dignāga. Examining Dignāga’s discussions shows that Tanizawa is right in his understanding of apoha. The interpretation by Hattori and other scholars is not supported by Dignāga’s text. The present conclusion is also supported by Mādhava, Uddyotakara and Kumārila. None of them assumes Dignāga’s theory to be as Hattori, etc. take it.

Dignāga claims that the semantic theory of “something having a universal” (jātimat) cannot explain co-referential expressions such as “existent pot” (san ghaṭaḥ), because in this theory the word “existent” does not include (vyāpti) or imply (ākṣepa) a pot. Dignāga’s own theory of “something having exclusion” (apohavat), on the other hand, can explain it, because given his presuppositions the word “existent” does include and imply a pot. The former theory presupposes “strong” connections between words and meanings. Only something existent (sat) is positively (anvayadvāreṇa) connected with the word “existent.” Therefore, a pot is not connected with the word “existent.” The latter theory, on the other hand, presupposes “weak” connections learned through co-absence (vyatireka): The word “existent” has never been seen applied to something which is not existent. The meaning of “existent” is whatever remains after excluding non-existent things. In this negative learning a pot is not excluded (anapohana, apratikṣepa). Therefore, the co-referential expression “existent pot” (or “a pot is existent”) is justified. This is also due to the characteristic feature of exclusion (apoha) which is precisely non-existent (abhāva) and a non-entity (adravya). Exclusion does not intervene (vyavadhāna) between words and their meanings. The word “existent” can directly mean (sākṣādvṛtti) something existent without exclusion intervening. Thus, the theory of apohavat has no fault of dependency (pāratantrya) which jātimat theory has. In the latter theory a real universal such as existence (sattā) intervenes between the word “existent” and its meaning, i.e., something existent.