Dharmakirti

This dissertation examines the theory of perceptual cognition laid out by the 7th century Buddhist scholar, Dharmakīrti, in his magnum opus, the Pramāṇavārttika. Like most theories of perception, both ancient and modern, the sensory cognition of ordinary objects is a topic of primary concern. Unlike other theorists, however, Dharmakīrti advances a technical definition of “perception” as a cognition which is both nonconceptual and non-erroneous. Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception is thereby deliberately inclusive of three additional types of “perceptual” cognition, in addition to veridical sensory awareness: the nonconceptual mental apprehension of an immediately-preceding cognition (“mental perception”), the vivid appearance of soteriologically efficacious objects of contemplative practice (“yogic perception”), and the sheer unmediated presence of the contents of cognition—whatever these might be—to the cognizing mind (“reflexive awareness”). Through the logical examination of what it means to be aware of an object, Dharmakīrti demonstrates that the awareness of an object is just the awareness of a phenomenal form or cognitive image produced by that object. Pursuing this analysis further, however, Dharmakīrti argues that the very notion of an object of cognition that exists “externally” or outside the mind is incoherent. Additionally, Dharmakīrti maintains that the phenomenological structure of subject and object—that is, the “first-personal” sense of one’s own cognitions as pertaining to oneself (“for-me-ness”), together with the inseparably concomitant sense that the objects of cognition exist “out there” in an extramental world—is strictly a form of cognitive error. Therefore, because ordinary sensory cognition is inherently structured by this subject-object duality, ordinary sensory cognition must in the final analysis be understood as erroneous. According to Dharmakīrti, in other words, ultimately only the nondual “luminosity” of reflexive awareness is genuinely perceptual, because only reflexive awareness is undistorted by nature. In this way, Dharmakīrti’s epistemology provides a theoretical foundation for the advanced nondual contemplative practices of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, particularly Mahāmudrā and rDzogs chen.

Il s'agit de la première traduction en français de l’œuvre fondatrice de la philosophie de la Reconnaissance (pratyabhijñā).
Au Xème siècle de notre ère, au Cachemire, des philosophes ont défendu la thèse ­– inouïe – selon laquelle la conscience est Dieu au motif qu’elle est, comme lui, omnisciente et toute-puissante. S’ignorant elle-même, la conscience s’est aliénée dans le monde et dans les textes religieux dont elle est pourtant la source. En redécouvrant la conscience comme étant Dieu lui-même, l’homme peut se délivrer de toutes ses fausses identités et recouvrer sa toute-puissance native.

The paper gives an account of Rāmakaṇṭha's (950-1000) contribution to the Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical debate about the existence or non-existence of a self, by demonstrating how he carves out middle ground between the two protagonists in that debate. First three points of divergence between the Brāhmaṅical (specifically Naiyāyika) and the Buddhist conceptions of subjectivity are identified. These take the form of Buddhist denials of, or re-explanations of (1) the self as the unitary essence of the individual, (2) the self as the substance to which mental properties belong, (3) the self as the agent of both physical actions and cognitions. The difference of Rāmakaṇṭha's position from both Nyāya and Buddhism is then elaborated. He posits a self, but not one that is an eternally unchanging substance, nor one that is anything other than consciousness. Hence his difference from Nyāya. He falls with Buddhism in holding that consciousness does not require anything other than itself to inhere in, but departs from Buddhism in holding that consciousness is not momentary but enduring. The guiding metaphor here is light, but light considered as a dynamic, qualitatively unchanging repetition of the action of illumination.

Focusing attention on the logical chain of this proof, that is, between the Buddhaʼs teaching (upadeśa) as the premise and his knowledge (jñāna) and compassion (karuṇā) as the conclusion – his teaching presents itself to us as a form of scripture, while his knowledge and compassion are concealed in the black box of an ancient personʼs mind and are therefore only to be inferred. We can simplify the proof as follows:

This is chapter 8 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It argues for a realist (rather than idealist) interpretation of Yogācāra, and discusses relativism/​perspectivism in Yogācāra and Tiantai/Tendai. Based mostly on ideas by the Yogācāra philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, but with some help from Donald Davidson, this chapter develops a perspectival realist metaphysics that in important respects agrees with Zhiyi’s Tiantai.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949

Dharmakīrti's theory of the relationship between reflexive awareness and external objects, to the effect that, even if external objects exist, their ascertainment is an experience with the nature of reflexive awareness (tadrūpo hy arthaniścayaḥ)

If we distinguish phenomenal effects from their noumenal causes, the former being our conceptual(ized) experiences, the latter their grounds or causes in reality ‘as it is’ independent of our experience, then two contradictory positions with regards to the relationship between these two can be distinguished: either phenomena are identical with their noumenal causes, or they are not. Davidson is among the most influential modern defenders of the former position, metaphysical non-dualism. Dharmakīrti’s strict distinction between ultimate and conventional reality, on the other hand, may be one of the most rigorously elaborated theories of the opposite position, metaphysical dualism. Despite this fundamental difference, their theories about the connection between phenomena and their noumenal causes are surprisingly similar in important respects. Both Dharmakīrti in his theory of ‘apoha’ and Davidson in his theory of ‘triangulation’ argued that the content of words or concepts depends on a process involving at least two communicating beings and shared noumenal stimuli. The main point of divergence is the nature of classification, but ultimately Dharmakīrti’s and Davidson’s conclusions on he noumenal - phenomenal relationship turn out to complementary more than contradictory, and an integrative reconstruction suggests a ‘middle path’ between dualism and non-dualism.

Following Dharmakīrti's interpretation, Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.9ab has been understood as stating a view common to both Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, i.e. a view that self-awareness (svasaṃvitti) is the result (phala) of a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa). It has also been understood that Dignāga  (in 1.8cd and 1.9) accepts two different views attributed to Sautrāntikas with regard to pramāṇaphala: in PS(V) ad 1.8cd he regards the understanding of an external object (arthādhigati) as the result; in PS(V) ad 1.9ab-cd he alternatively presents another view that self-awareness is the result. Dignāga's text, however, does not support these interpretations. Rather it contradicts them. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation forcibly tries to impose Dharmakīrti's idea on Dignāga and thus, against Jinendrabuddhi's intention, reveals itself as a totally impossible interpretation. In this way Jinendrabuddhi's commentary rather demonstrates that Dharmakīrti's interpretation is not what Dignāga originally intended. In fact Dignāga (in 1.8cd and 1.9cd) presupposes a single view, and not two, attributed to Sautrāntikas, a view that the understanding of an external object (arthādhigati) is the result. In 1.9ab (svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vātra) he is presenting an alternative view that is attributed only to Yogācāras, i.e. a view that is not common to Sautrāntikas.

Dharmakīrti’s theory that reflexive awareness is the result (phala) even when the image of the object is the pramāṇa, as when the existence of external objects is accepted; and therefore, the awareness of the object is nothing other than the reflexive awareness of the object-cognition (viṣayābhāsataivāsya pramāṇaṃ tena mīyate).