Dignaga

Dignāga’s theory of semantics called the “theory of apoha (exclusion)” has been criticized by those who state that it may lead to a circular argument wherein “exclusion of others” (anyāpoha) is understood as mere double negation. Dignāga, however, does not intend mere double negation by anyāpoha. In his view, the word “cow” for instance, excludes those that do not have the set of features such as a dewlap, horns, and so on, by applying the semantic method called componential analysis. The present paper aims to prove this by referring to the fragments quoted by Jinendrabuddhi and Siddhasenagaṇi. Dignāga logically proves that the denotation of the referent Q by the word “P” cannot be derived from the joint presence (anvaya) of “P” with Q. Instead, he derives it from the joint absence (vyatireka) of “P” with the nonexistence of Q. Anyāpoha is nothing but verbal vyatireka. Componential analysis is used for describing what is to be excluded. Dignāga draws taxonomic hierarchies of words based on their customary use, and assumes componential analysis to operate in the background of the hierarchies formed in semantic fields, stating that a general term is restricted to having the same reference with one of its specific terms insofar as the former is connected (yukta) with the characteristics of the latter’s referent. Moreover, he states that a proper name also denotes its referent by excluding those that do not have the cluster of a certain number of qualities.

keywords: Dignāga, apoha, word, description, componential analysis, semantic field.

I discuss two critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology, one from Candrakīrti and another from Jayarāśi.  I argue that they are two versions of what I call the core problem: if the content of Dignāga’s epistemology were correct, two fundamental beliefs within this epistemological theory could not be established or known to be true, as Dignāga claims they are.  In response to objections found within the classical Indian tradition as well as several plausible contemporary objections, I then argue that the core problem remains a serious issue with which those sympathetic to Dignāga ought to contend.

My aim in this book is to analyse India’s contribution to the study of reason. I seek to discover the active rational principles driving Indian theory, and to use this as a vehicle for disclosing a fabric of conceptual relations in their thinking about language, mind, and the normative. The book is based on courses I have taught and has been used successfully as a textbook for modules on Indian Philosophy within Philosophy curricula in the US and Britain. Unlike other books, I focus on the arguments rather than on merely surveying doctrine.

Dignāga, one of the most innovative and influential philosophers in Indian Buddhism, flourished in the early sixth century when India began to enter the early medieval era. In this transition period, the systematization of dialectics was increasingly needed among Buddhist and Brahmanical schools as a result of the intensification of their competition for social influence. Having deeply studied dialectics in addition to the Yogācāra theory of consciousness and the Sautrāntika theory of nominalism, Dignāga investigated how a human being acquires knowledge through perception, inference, and language. Examining these cognitive faculties possessed by ordinary people, he paid special attention to the function of conception (vikalpa), which had been evaluated in traditional Buddhism only as an inferior faculty of discrimination that tends to induce one's desires.

This paper discusses a limited number of metaphysical topics discussed by the four main schools of Buddhist thought (Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, and epistemological-logical school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti), focusing on issues that are particularly characteristic of each school or that have a close connection with problems raised in the contemporary philosophical debate. These are the relation between part and whole and the theory of momentariness for Abhidharma, notions of ultimate and conventional truth, causation, and property-instantiation for Madhyamaka, the question whether everything is mental for Yogācāra, and the rejection of universals and its semantic consequences for the school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

If we distinguish phenomenal effects from their noumenal causes, the former being our conceptual(ized) experiences, the latter their grounds or causes in reality ‘as it is’ independent of our experience, then two contradictory positions with regards to the relationship between these two can be distinguished: either phenomena are identical with their noumenal causes, or they are not. Davidson is among the most influential modern defenders of the former position, metaphysical non-dualism. Dharmakīrti’s strict distinction between ultimate and conventional reality, on the other hand, may be one of the most rigorously elaborated theories of the opposite position, metaphysical dualism. Despite this fundamental difference, their theories about the connection between phenomena and their noumenal causes are surprisingly similar in important respects. Both Dharmakīrti in his theory of ‘apoha’ and Davidson in his theory of ‘triangulation’ argued that the content of words or concepts depends on a process involving at least two communicating beings and shared noumenal stimuli. The main point of divergence is the nature of classification, but ultimately Dharmakīrti’s and Davidson’s conclusions on he noumenal - phenomenal relationship turn out to complementary more than contradictory, and an integrative reconstruction suggests a ‘middle path’ between dualism and non-dualism.

Light is the most important (if not the only) analogy for the Vijñānavādin in proving self-awareness (svasam : vedana), namely the cognition that cognizes itself. Recent studies show that two opponents of the doctrine of self-awareness, Kumārila (ca. 530-600) and Bhaṫt˙a Jayanta (ca. 850-910) alleged that the Vijñā-navādin has also used light as an analogy for the view that cognition must be perceived before the object is perceived. However, this is a modification of the actual view of the Vijñānavāda that cognition must be perceived in order for it to perceive its object. Based on Kumārila's such modified restatement, Taber argues that "Kumārila's Buddhist" fails to establish the light as a valid analogy in their theory. Taber's argument is subsequently referred to by Watson and Kataoka in their works, in which they defend Vijñānavāda's light-analogy against Taber. However, their defence is also based on a similarly modified restatement by Jayanta and the defence is set out in the view of Naiyāyika philosophy. This paper examines all these arguments and shows that Watson's and Kataoka's thought of the light-analogy might still be problematic. It also goes back to the original view of the Vijñānavāda and observes to what extent the light-analogy serves as a strong support for the establishment of the self-awareness.

Dignāga claims that the semantic theory of “something having a universal” (jātimat) cannot explain co-referential expressions such as “existent pot” (san ghaṭaḥ), because in this theory the word “existent” does not include (vyāpti) or imply (ākṣepa) a pot. Dignāga’s own theory of “something having exclusion” (apohavat), on the other hand, can explain it, because given his presuppositions the word “existent” does include and imply a pot. The former theory presupposes “strong” connections between words and meanings. Only something existent (sat) is positively (anvayadvāreṇa) connected with the word “existent.” Therefore, a pot is not connected with the word “existent.” The latter theory, on the other hand, presupposes “weak” connections learned through co-absence (vyatireka): The word “existent” has never been seen applied to something which is not existent. The meaning of “existent” is whatever remains after excluding non-existent things. In this negative learning a pot is not excluded (anapohana, apratikṣepa). Therefore, the co-referential expression “existent pot” (or “a pot is existent”) is justified. This is also due to the characteristic feature of exclusion (apoha) which is precisely non-existent (abhāva) and a non-entity (adravya). Exclusion does not intervene (vyavadhāna) between words and their meanings. The word “existent” can directly mean (sākṣādvṛtti) something existent without exclusion intervening. Thus, the theory of apohavat has no fault of dependency (pāratantrya) which jātimat theory has. In the latter theory a real universal such as existence (sattā) intervenes between the word “existent” and its meaning, i.e., something existent.

According to Dignāga, the word “cow” makes one understand a cow in a general form by excluding non-cows. How then can one understand non-cows to be excluded? Hattori and Akamatsu regard the absence of a dewlap, etc. as the cause for excluding non-cows. Tanizawa criticises Akamatsu by pointing out that accepting positive criteria such as a dewlap does not make sense in the apoha theory. The source text to be investigated is PS(V) V 41, where Dignāga replies to his Sāṃkhya opponent Mādhava. A close examination of PS(V) and Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary on it indicates that Tanizawa is basically right. The view that one understands “cow” by observing a dewlap, etc. (sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayaḥ) is to be assigned to Mādhava. Dignāga does refer to this view as an example to support his thesis. Mādhava critically points out that accepting the Sāṃkhya view on the cause of the cognition “cow” contradicts Dignāga’s own view (svamataviruddhaḥ) and amounts to giving up what he has accepted (abhyupetahāniḥ). Dignāga wards off Mādhava’s criticism stating that he refers to the Sāṃkhya view only by tentatively accepting it (abhyupagamya). Mādhava’s view that a cow is precisely the collection of dewlap, etc. (sāsnādisamūha eva gauḥ) is indeed incompatible with Dignāga’s own view that X is precisely the nonexistence of non-X (ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇi). A cow, for Dignāga, is precisely the nonexistence of non-cows. As Dignāga himself explicitly states, a cognition of a cow excluded from non-cows (agonivṛttagopratyayaḥ) cannot be based on the observation of a dewlap, etc. (sāsnādidarśananimittaḥ). Dignāga’s main thesis that one cognises “X” by observing the nonexistence of non-X is consistent. Considering Dignāga’s own view, the understanding of the apoha theory by Hattori and Akamatsu is inappropriate.

Following Dharmakīrti's interpretation, Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.9ab has been understood as stating a view common to both Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, i.e. a view that self-awareness (svasaṃvitti) is the result (phala) of a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa). It has also been understood that Dignāga  (in 1.8cd and 1.9) accepts two different views attributed to Sautrāntikas with regard to pramāṇaphala: in PS(V) ad 1.8cd he regards the understanding of an external object (arthādhigati) as the result; in PS(V) ad 1.9ab-cd he alternatively presents another view that self-awareness is the result. Dignāga's text, however, does not support these interpretations. Rather it contradicts them. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation forcibly tries to impose Dharmakīrti's idea on Dignāga and thus, against Jinendrabuddhi's intention, reveals itself as a totally impossible interpretation. In this way Jinendrabuddhi's commentary rather demonstrates that Dharmakīrti's interpretation is not what Dignāga originally intended. In fact Dignāga (in 1.8cd and 1.9cd) presupposes a single view, and not two, attributed to Sautrāntikas, a view that the understanding of an external object (arthādhigati) is the result. In 1.9ab (svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vātra) he is presenting an alternative view that is attributed only to Yogācāras, i.e. a view that is not common to Sautrāntikas.

TRANSLATION Part 1 [0 Introduction] [Jayanta:] Surely Bhaṭṭa [Kumārila] has [already] rained down an immense shower of criticisms on to the [Buddhist] view that apoha is the meaning of a word. 3 i [1 The Support of Apoha] For to explain further: This thing called apoha is taught [by you Buddhists] to be an exclusion, [i.e.] an absence. 4 Now an absence cannot be known as something 3 The whole of the rest of Part 1 is a summary, with some small changes of details, of a few of the arguments in the apoha chapter of Kumārila's Ślokavārttika. Our understanding of that chapter has been shaped by the translation of it being prepared by John Taber and Kei Kataoka. 4 Dignāga did not, to our knowledge, explicitly assert that apoha is an absence (abhāva). He was interpreted that way, though, by Siṃhasūri (Nyāyāgmānusāriṇī 733,17-18, cited and translated by PIND 2009: 268, note 451): nāpi bhedānavasthānād anabhidhanadoṣaḥ. kasmāt? abhedāt. na hy arthāntarāpoho bhedeṣu bhidyate, abhāvāt. tanmātraṃ ca śabdenocyate, na bhedāḥ . 'Nor does the fact that particulars are infinite lead to the problem that [words] would be incapable of denoting. Why? Because [exclusion] is not divided. For exclusion of other referents (arthāntarāpoha) is not divided among the particulars, because it is non-existence (abhāva); and this [exclusion] alone -not the particulars -is denoted by a word.' What Dignāga does state is that apoha is adravya (insubstantial, not really existent): avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo 'pi nāsti, arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvāt, adravyatvāc ca (Pramāṇasamuccayavrṛtti ad 5:36c, PIND 2009: A14). 'And the fault that [apoha] is not [capable of functioning as] a universal, which might [be thought to] follow from it not being 4 independent, in the way that pots and the like [can be perceived as independent things]. 5 Therefore, this [apoha] must be grasped as being supported by something else. 6 And what this support is of the [apoha] needs to be considered.