Papers by Miyuki Nakasuka
Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 2022
Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 2020
インド学チベット学研究 Journal of Indian and Tibetan Studies, 2019
The Buddhist pramāṇa theory having been founded by Dignāga was developed by his successors commen... more The Buddhist pramāṇa theory having been founded by Dignāga was developed by his successors commencing with Dharmakīrti. It is commonly accepted that Dharmottara innovated the theory by introducing the division of the object of pramāṇa into the grasped (grāhya) and the judged (adhyavaseya). However, the purpose of his introduction and the historical development of the concepts of grāhya and adhyavaseya have not been fully elucidated.
This paper clarifies the following. Dharmottara introduced the concepts in order to integrate Dignāga's theory and Dharmakīrti's on the object of pramāṇa. For Dharmottara the judged of both perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) is a particular (svalakṣaṇa) that is continuous (santāna), whereas for Jñānaśrīmitra the judged of perception is a universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and that of inference is a particular. Jñānaśrīmitra's view is inherited by Ratnakīrti and Mokṣākaragupta. The conflict between Dharmottara and Jñānaśrīmitra is seen not only concerning the judged of perception but also concerning the grasped of inference. For Dharmottara the universal that is the grasped of inference belongs to the third domain, neither internal nor external, whereas for Jñānaśrīmitra, who rejects the domain, it belongs to the internal domain.
哲學, 2019
In Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS) 1.5, Dignāga claims that “an attribute-holder (dharmin) endowed with mul... more In Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS) 1.5, Dignāga claims that “an attribute-holder (dharmin) endowed with multiple essences cannot be wholly apprehended through a sensory organ.” What he intends here is the following things. Each sensory perception cognizes only one of the attributes (dharma), color/form, sound, smell, taste, and tactile sensation, which are the five sensory objects; hence, it does not wholly cognize the attribute-holder. What cognizes the attribute-holder is conceptual cognition that combines the five sensory objects into one. However, Dharmakīrti interprets PS 1.5 in a sense contrary to Dignāga’s original intention. According to Dharmakīrti, the attribute-holder is an entity that is single and partless, so there is no contradiction in saying that perception cognizes it wholly. On the other hand, inference and perceptual judgment, which are known as determinate cognition (niścaya), cognize it partially through exclusion of superimposition. This contrast between whole perception and partial determination is not found in Dignāga’s view.
This paper clarifies the difference between Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception. The following questions are to be investigated: Does perception cognize its object wholly or partially? Is the object of perception an attribute or an attribute-holder?
南アジア古典学 South Asian Classical Studies, 2019
ダルマキールテイの言語論におけるn iv e śa 中須賀美幸 〇 問題の所在 ダルマキールティの言語論には、バルトリハリに由来するn iv e śa という表現がしばしば登 場する。 これはデ... more ダルマキールテイの言語論におけるn iv e śa 中須賀美幸 〇 問題の所在 ダルマキールティの言語論には、バルトリハリに由来するn iv e śa という表現がしばしば登 場する。 これはディダナーガにはみられなかった表現である。バルトリハリは、n iv eša をパ タンジャリの用法を拡張したかたちで使用しており、特に、1 ■ヴァーキヤ• パディーヤ•ヴリツ ティj (V5句/ 以 下 VPV) における彼の用法とダルマキ一ルティのそれの間には 高い類似性が確認できる。 このことは、ダルマキールティが自らの言語論を組み立てる際に、 ディダナーガにはなかった認識論的視点からの分析を、バルトリハリのV P V から着想を得て 行っていたということを示唆する。ダルマキールティの著作のなかで、n iv e ša という表現は r ブラマーナ• ヴァールティ力j (Pram āņavār^A ja)の 第 1 章 「 自己のための推理」章およ び そ の 自 註 ( 以下、P V ( S V ) ) と第3 章 「 知覚j 章 ( 以下、 PV I I I ) に集中してみられ、それ 以 外 に は rサンバンダ* パリークシヤーj (5aņiband7ia； p a r^Ā ) に一例だけみられる。 そこで、本稿では、PV (SV )， PV I I I におけるダルマキールテイのn iv e śa という表現の用 例を検討し、認識論的視点からの彼の言語論を明らかにすると共に、そこにみられるバルトリ ハリからの影響を検証する。 1 従 来 の n iv e ś a の用法 ダルマキールティのniv eśa の用例の検討に入る前に、 まず、n iv e śa という表現は従来、 ど のような意味で使用されてきたのかを確認しておこう。 1 .
比較論理学研究 Annals of the Research Project Center for the Comparative Study of Logic, 2019
The apoha theory is introduced by Dignāga as a linguistic theory of the Buddhist logico-epistemol... more The apoha theory is introduced by Dignāga as a linguistic theory of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school. Dharmakīrti, who takes over the theory from Dignāga, gives an ontological interpretation to it by calling a particular's difference from others "exclusion'' (apoha). For Dharmakīrti, it is the difference that is the foundation for conceptual construction. Conceptual cognitions and words, not connected to external entities themselves, are connected to the concepts constructed on the entities, so that they rest on the entities indirectly. Thus, the four items, namely, 1) entities, 2) differences, 3) concepts, and 4) conceptual cognitions/words are closely related.
This paper examines the function of the differences which connect concepts with entities. Conceptual cognitions/words do not numerically correspond to entities since in some cases there arises a conceptual cognition or a word concerning plural entities, or, conversely, there arise plural conceptual cognitions or words concerning an entity. These cases become explicable when the item 2) differences is put between 1) entities and 3) concepts. In explaining the relationship between conceptual cognitions and entities, Dignāga classifies the nominal entities (prajñaptisat) into three kinds: a) a spatially extended entity (samūha); b) a temporally extended entity (saṃtāna); and c) a particular state of an entity (avasthāviśeṣa). In his Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti Dharmakīrti accepts this classification to explain the relationship between words and entities, putting the differences between entities and concepts, and in his Vādanyāya develops the classification into a more sophisticated form.
南アジア古典学, 2018
apoha sāmānyalaks . an . a nis . t . hā adhyavasāya ( )
哲学, 2015
Śākyabuddhi develops the theory of truth in the Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā on Pramāṇasiddhi chapter (PV ... more Śākyabuddhi develops the theory of truth in the Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā on Pramāṇasiddhi chapter (PV II) of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika. Devendrabuddhi is the first to introduce the theory into the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition under the influence of the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila in his Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā on PV II 1abc and 4d—5a. Śākyabuddhi strengthened the theory. According to him, a perceptual cognition is divided into two types: one followed by a dubious cognition and the other followed by a perceptual judgment and the latter type of perceptual cognition is intrinsically valid. In my opinion, this idea that a perceptual cognition followed by a perceptual judgment is intrinsically valid is owed to Dharmakīrti's theory of niścaya 'determinate cognition' that an inference and a perceptual judgment are to be distinguished from an erroneous cognition in that they performs the function of determining an object. The aim of this paper is to make clear this point.
Conference Presentations by Miyuki Nakasuka
3. What is the object of a conceptual cognition and a word?
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Papers by Miyuki Nakasuka
This paper clarifies the following. Dharmottara introduced the concepts in order to integrate Dignāga's theory and Dharmakīrti's on the object of pramāṇa. For Dharmottara the judged of both perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) is a particular (svalakṣaṇa) that is continuous (santāna), whereas for Jñānaśrīmitra the judged of perception is a universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and that of inference is a particular. Jñānaśrīmitra's view is inherited by Ratnakīrti and Mokṣākaragupta. The conflict between Dharmottara and Jñānaśrīmitra is seen not only concerning the judged of perception but also concerning the grasped of inference. For Dharmottara the universal that is the grasped of inference belongs to the third domain, neither internal nor external, whereas for Jñānaśrīmitra, who rejects the domain, it belongs to the internal domain.
This paper clarifies the difference between Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception. The following questions are to be investigated: Does perception cognize its object wholly or partially? Is the object of perception an attribute or an attribute-holder?
This paper examines the function of the differences which connect concepts with entities. Conceptual cognitions/words do not numerically correspond to entities since in some cases there arises a conceptual cognition or a word concerning plural entities, or, conversely, there arise plural conceptual cognitions or words concerning an entity. These cases become explicable when the item 2) differences is put between 1) entities and 3) concepts. In explaining the relationship between conceptual cognitions and entities, Dignāga classifies the nominal entities (prajñaptisat) into three kinds: a) a spatially extended entity (samūha); b) a temporally extended entity (saṃtāna); and c) a particular state of an entity (avasthāviśeṣa). In his Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti Dharmakīrti accepts this classification to explain the relationship between words and entities, putting the differences between entities and concepts, and in his Vādanyāya develops the classification into a more sophisticated form.
Conference Presentations by Miyuki Nakasuka
This paper clarifies the following. Dharmottara introduced the concepts in order to integrate Dignāga's theory and Dharmakīrti's on the object of pramāṇa. For Dharmottara the judged of both perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) is a particular (svalakṣaṇa) that is continuous (santāna), whereas for Jñānaśrīmitra the judged of perception is a universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and that of inference is a particular. Jñānaśrīmitra's view is inherited by Ratnakīrti and Mokṣākaragupta. The conflict between Dharmottara and Jñānaśrīmitra is seen not only concerning the judged of perception but also concerning the grasped of inference. For Dharmottara the universal that is the grasped of inference belongs to the third domain, neither internal nor external, whereas for Jñānaśrīmitra, who rejects the domain, it belongs to the internal domain.
This paper clarifies the difference between Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception. The following questions are to be investigated: Does perception cognize its object wholly or partially? Is the object of perception an attribute or an attribute-holder?
This paper examines the function of the differences which connect concepts with entities. Conceptual cognitions/words do not numerically correspond to entities since in some cases there arises a conceptual cognition or a word concerning plural entities, or, conversely, there arise plural conceptual cognitions or words concerning an entity. These cases become explicable when the item 2) differences is put between 1) entities and 3) concepts. In explaining the relationship between conceptual cognitions and entities, Dignāga classifies the nominal entities (prajñaptisat) into three kinds: a) a spatially extended entity (samūha); b) a temporally extended entity (saṃtāna); and c) a particular state of an entity (avasthāviśeṣa). In his Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti Dharmakīrti accepts this classification to explain the relationship between words and entities, putting the differences between entities and concepts, and in his Vādanyāya develops the classification into a more sophisticated form.