Bretton Woods

This article examines the global crisis of commodity glut that came in the wake of the Fall of France and Italy's entry into the Second World War in June 1940, when the extension of the British blockade and shipping problems cut off primary producers around the world from major continental European markets. As a surplus of unmarketable primary commodities piled up in British colonies, as well as in Latin America and French, Dutch, and Belgian colonies, this jeapordized the blockade and threatened political unrest across the British Empire, as well as the spread of Nazi influence in Latin America. This article examines how the British government attempted to respond to this crisis, both unilaterally and in combination with the U.S. government. In doing so, it argues that Anglo-American negotiations over a joint approach to the problem of commodity glut led to some of the earliest attempts to create new international economic organizations for the postwar period. While these plans were transformed as the surplus problem itself changed in late 1941, they nonetheless laid the groundwork for Anglo-American relief planning, contentious negotiations over an international wheat agreement, and international commodity price stabilization schemes.

Esta monografia tem como tema central, a abordagem da evolução do sistema financeiro internacional de meados do séc. XIX até os dias atuais, evidenciando seus principais dilemas e aspectos mais relevantes que permitiram aos anos do padrão ouro, serem a época mais prospera da história econômica mundial. Entretanto, esse sucesso foi cíclico, com fases de apogeu e crises se intercalando, além de rodízio de países como “capitães“ do sistema. A ênfase maior do estudo se concentra na estrutura criada na Conferência de Bretton Woods e no papel dos EUA como nação hegemônica. Assim, o objetivo do estudo é desvendar a dinâmica por trás da engenharia financeira que conhecemos hoje e os rumos seguidos para chegar em tal patamar de complexidade, sempre dando importância aos fatos que influenciaram essa “jornada econômica“. Exatamente por isso, foi detectada uma certa dificuldade em se obter a verdade sobre a complexidade dos
fatos, e chegar em uma conclusão imparcial no estudo, o que nos faz sentir-se mais seduzido pelo contexto apresentado em Tratado de Bretton Woods: A Diplomacia Econômica e os novos rumos da Política Monetária Internacional.

In Workers, Unions, and Global Capitalism: Lessons from India, Rohini Hensman maintains that globalisation has afforded workers new opportunities for confronting capitalist exploitation. Using India as a point of departure, Hensman highlights globalisation as paradoxical, challenging anti-globalisers and the globalisation-as-imperialism thesis, to argue that capital’s toilers are now becoming its gravediggers. This analysis also explains why the World Trade Organization (WTO) is so appealing to Hensman: a quintessence of capitalism’s contradictions. Hensman argues for both transnational solidarity and independent trade unions, embodied in the ‘employees’ unions’ of India, as well as in favour of the WTO’s ‘social clause’ amendment, in which the global exploiter is transformed into an arbiter of workers’ rights. The review maintains that the terms of Hensman’s twin position are impossible to reconcile. It evinces an underlying contradiction between opportunistic statism and a conception of revolutionary strategy predicated on action ‘from below’.

The book presents a framework for defining the natural evolution of economic systems based on the application of the value system framework. Borrowing from the extensive works of Dr. Clare W. Graves and the theory of Spiral Dynamics, the author builds upon his in-depth knowledge of macroeconomics, financial and real estate markets, and his decade-long experience with Graves’ successor, Dr. Don E. Beck (who wrote the forward for the book), to devise a comprehensive macro-memetic-economic model through which he reframes the United States economy through historical, present and future value systems cycles.

It is assumed that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the international developmental financing institutions (IDFIs) recently created in order to support it, are going to challenge the Bretton Woods institutions and, as a consequence, the liberal order, contributing to a global shift in power from the United States to China. The aim of this article is to understand whether this is the case. After introducing the main Chinese financial institutions that are going to support the BRI, the article looks at the key differences between the BRI related IDFIs and the Bretton Woods institutions, focusing in particular on the equality of representation, conditionality and the internationalisation of the renminbi. The paper then looks at how the BRI’s IDFIs fit within the existing international legal order. By comparing the mission and principles of the BRI with those of Bretton Woods, it is argued that the BRI related IDFIs are nested in the current international legal system and that they can contribute to the realisation of some of its objectives. The paper concludes by arguing that, despite the fact that the rise of the BRI’s IFDIs poses new normative questions that in
the long run might challenge the Bretton Woods system, the zero-sum game that characterises much of the literature about them and the BRI, hampers our understanding of these institutions. These should, instead, be understood as Bretton Woods’ healthy competitor in a context of increasing multipolarity. There is no Fukuyama ‘end of history’, neither in its original sense, as the liberal order will be increasingly complemented by other centres of power, nor in an opposing sense, as China’s BRI and its related financing institutions are not only nested in the liberal institutional framework, but are also still far from being capable of replacing it.

In this study we are going to find out the impact of exchange rate system on foreign trade of a country. In this study we will see how foreign exchange volatility impact on a country's Import-Export Policy. We are going to see how India changed to fixed exchange rate to flexible exchange rate in year 1993. International experience has shown that the transition from a fixed to a floating exchange rate regime has unambiguously been accompanied by a rise in exchange rate volatility. We also discussed about how all industrialized countries changed their fixed exchange system to flexible exchange System after collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements. We also discussed India's experience since 1960's. We also talked about Black Market Exchange Rates and Purchasing Power Parity in Emerging Economies. Exchange rate is simply the rate at which one currency is converted into another. Meaning of foreign exchange rate: The price of one currency in terms of another is known as foreign exchange rate. It is the rate at which one unit of a foreign currency is exchanged for domestic currency. e.g. if one unit of US dollar can be got by paying Rs. 40, then foreign exchange rate is 1$= Rs. 40, it is also sometimes called as external value of currency. There are various concepts of exchange rate systems. Its two important types are Fixed Exchanged Rate and Flexible Exchanged Rate.

Kitap bölümü analizi:

Uluslararası İlişkilerin Ekonomi Politiği adlı kitabı ise Türkiye dahil olmak üzere, dünyanın birçok üniversitesinde ders kitabı olarak okutulmaktadır. Kitap, özellikle uluslararası iktisat, politik iktisat, uluslararası ilişkiler ve dünya ekonomisi hakkında bilgi sahibi olmak isteyen okuyuculara önerilir.

Die Vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Ursachen, Wirkung und Folgen der ersten Erdölkrise 1973. Während 1973/74 realisierten die Erdölförderländer des Nahen Ostens mehrfach Preiserhöhungen gegenüber den westlichen Erdölgesellschaften und setzten die Regulierung ihrer Fördermenge zur Durchsetzung politischer Interessen ein. Die Ursachen (Makro-, Mesound Mikro-Ebene) und Folgen (Gesellschaftlich, wirtschaftlich und politisch) sind dabei komplex und in der vorhandenen Literatur teilweise unterschiedlich stark gewichtet. Die Verfasser setzen den Fokus ihrer Analyse auf die Ausarbeitung der zum heutigen Zeitpunkt relevanten Ereignisse und Besonderheiten, um insbesondere die Frage zu beantworten, welche Lehren aus der Krisenbewältigung 1973 gezogen werden können.

Altın Para Sistemi'nin temel özellikleri:  Ulusal paralar arasındaki değişim oranı, ilgili paraların altın değerine göre belirlenmektedir.  Döviz kurlarındaki değişmeler, altının bir ülkeden diğerine gönderilmesi için gerekli masrafların belirlediği altın ithal ve ihraç noktalarıyla sınırlandırılır.  Bu durumda iktisat politikasının temel amacı olan dış denkleşme, otomatik gelir ve fiyat mekanizması aracılığıyla sağlanmaktadır.  Altın Para Standardı gereği olarak ülkeler, bir dış dengesizliğin para arzı üzerindeki otomatik etkilerini önleme (kısırlaştırma) yoluna gidememektedir.

The evolution of money and banking is at the cusp of a paradigm shift in the 21st century.  The introduction of digital currency built on blockchain technology enables a distributed, peer-to-peer payment system ideal for the decentralized economy of the internet age.  The role of central banks in this context necessitates change in order to ensure monetary and financial stability within the established management and purpose of fiat monies.  The model of an interest-bearing central bank digital currency is argued to be a viable and perhaps imperative development that central banks must embrace in order to maintain independence.  The European Central Bank in particular has a pressing need to fulfill this charge given the guidance of completing the economic and monetary union as well as realizing the digital single market strategy.

RESUMEN En el presente trabajo se pretende analizar el actual momento de crisis económica en relación con los límites del ciclo sistémico de acumulación estadounidense (iniciado en 1945) y, concretamente, con los últimos treinta años de globalización financiera. Siguiendo la teoría de análisis de los sistemas-mundo, la hipótesis de este trabajo es que el sistema-mundo actual se encuentra en una etapa de caos sistémico, esto es, un momento en el que las viejas estructuras hegemónicas lideradas por Estados Unidos desde la II Guerra Mundial se encuentran en crisis y no termina de establecerse un nuevo orden hegemónico que permita iniciar un nuevo ciclo sistémico de acumulación.

ABSTRACT In the present work it is to analyze the current economic crisis in relation to the limits of US systemic accumulation cycle, which began in 1945 and, specifically, with the last thirty years of financial globalization. Following the theory of analysis of world-systems, the hypothesis of this paper is that the current world-system is in a stage of systemic chaos, that is, a time when the old hegemonic structures led by the United States since the World War II are in crisis and a new hegemonic order allowing start a new systemic cycle of accumulation ends not established.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has caused a shift in the debate on international trade issues and is questioning the basic topdown strategy. Never before has such resistance occurred concerning trade issues. So far, hundreds of other FTAs have been negotiated by the EU and U.S. with economically weaker states and (before the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009) by EU member states, without considerable resistance by the people at large. In this paper, using the argumentative discourse analysis, I will attempt to explain the intensive debate on the current negotiated TTIP
located against the contextual backdrop of trade policy and its key benchmarks.
While I will focus on the debate about the TTIP in Germany as one of the most influential countries in Europe, I argue that opponents have managed to make a
substantial influence on the path of negotiations and consequently on the topdown process of TTIP. Hence, I speak of an early failure of the top-downprolicy which has increasingly transformed into a bottom-up process, influenced by civil society organizations. Finally, it was the public which took
the leading role in the TTIP-debate by making demands for a forward-looking global policy that does not foster the destruction of environment and which is ultimately geared to accounting for and fulfilling the needs of the people.

Dinamika Ekonomi Politik Internasional terjadi akibat dua hal yakni interaksi antara market  dan kondisi lingkungan. Sehingga banyak regulasi-regulasi yang muncul sebagai kontruksi baru karena menyesuaikan kebutuhan tiap-tiap market. Interaksi antar market ini terjadi pada level internasional yang tidak jarang membahas tentang hubungan pasar dan negara yang berkaitan. Sehingga melalui sistem pasar EPI menciptakan order. Order created  apabila dipasar adalah hal yang sangat dibebaskan, karena melalui pasar tersebut negara dapat memperbaiki dan meningkatkan GDP. Dengan adanya kenaikan GPD tiap negara diharapkan akan muncul adanya keseimbangan dalam kegiatan perekonomian. Melalui dinamika yang ada, perspektif yang ada pada EPI dielaborasikan kembali dengan bagaimana prospek negara kedepannya. Melalui perspektif EPI sendiri akan terjawab bagaimana hubungan antar negara, interaksi antar pasar, faktor internal dan eksternal yang menyebabkan perubahan pada pasar. Hal tersebut yang memunculkan adanya pandangan kontemporer pada EPI sebagai turunan dari ketiga pendekatan utama. dengan demikian diharapkan perspektif tersebut dapat menjadi tools untuk menganalisis dan menjelaskan berbagaimacam dinamika struktur ekonomi global yang terjadi pada masa kontemporer.

a d a m t o o z e a n d j a m i e m a r t i n The entanglement between war and economics revealed by the First World War was to become one of the defining features of the first half of the twentieth century. Never before had war been so resource-intensive, never before were economies so self-consciously reorganized around the needs of war. The war economies of the First World War were novel and unanticipated improvisations, experiments in organization. In 1914 the sense of a break was dramatic and shocking, but it had the virtue of clarity. There had been peace and then there was war. After the First World War the victorious powers struggled to restore the clarity of this boundary between war and peace. The new self-conscious ideology of peacefulness that was such a characteristic feature of international relations in the 1920s had its counterpart in the effort to restore the international economy. 1 The relationship between economic restoration and pacification was reciprocal. Curbing arms expenditure and restoring the 'knave proof' discipline of the international gold standard were conjoined aims. Perhaps this nexus was best exemplified by the British 'ten year rule' adopted in 1919. To create the conditions necessary for fiscal consolidation and a return to the gold standard, this mandated that military budgeting should proceed on the assumption that no major war should be expected within ten years. In 1928 Churchill had it made self-perpetuating.

This dissertation aims to analyse the validity and nature of the Bretton Woods Institutions’ (BWIs) narrative of development. The main reason behind this is that for decades, the BWIs lauded Ghana as a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) success story which seemingly validated their neoliberal ideology; however, majority of Ghanaians were living in poverty during this time. The BWIs claim that neoliberal policies, especially privatisation, are beneficial for development; however, this will be challenged. This is to determine whether or not privatisation, and neoliberal policies in general, can contribute to socio- economic development in Ghana. This is essential because the BWIs are powerful and influential institutions, and their policies and ideologies are often accepted without question, yet they have a considerable influence over the lives of citizens.

This dissertation will expose not only that the BWIs are wrong to claim that privatisation is beneficial for development, but that their policies are not neutral, and neither are the institutions themselves. The major result of this dissertation will be that the BWIs’ optimistic narrative of privatisation is an ill-founded misrepresentation based on quantitative economic data that has been biased through selectivity and manipulation. Furthermore, it will be established that the BWIs are not neutral, and that their policies serve the interest of the former colonial states, especially the United States of America (USA).

The aim of this dissertation will be achieved mainly through the comparison between the narrative of the BWIs regarding privatisation and the actual experience Ghana went through with the privatisation of its gold mining industry. It will mainly utilise qualitative data in order to portray the underrepresented aspect of the impacts of privatisation.

The relevance of this dissertation is rooted in the fact that a “recent study of IMF conditionality through 2014 concluded that the advertised organizational changes represent window-dressing, with few
departures from the IMF’s standard neoliberal policy advice” (Babb and Kentikelenis, 2018, p.21).

Furthermore, while this topic has been subject to debate within academic literature, there is a lack of an
explicit analysis of private sector activities on poverty levels, employment, and inequality (Obeng- Odoom, 2012, p. 86).

he article explores the interconnections between the rise of modern monetary theory, deglobalisation and the international monetary system. It discusses the evolution of the international monetary system from Bretton Woods One to Bretton Woods Three, and how this transition is linked to globalisation, and deglobalisation, or the shifts in global imbalances. Finally, it makes an evaluation of the impact of these developments on the role played by the dollar in the international monetary system and its possible future trajectory.

A ECONOMIA MUNDIAL EM PERSPECTIVA HISTÓRICA
Artigo-resenha
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Publicado na Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional
(vol. 39, n. 2, julho-dezembro 1996, p. 136-151). Relação de Publicados n. 199.


David Hackett Fischer:
The Great Wave: price revolutions and the rhythm of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 536 p.)

Charles P. Kindleberger:
World Economic Primacy: 1500 to 1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 270 p.)

Harold James:
International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods (Washington: International Monetary Fund/New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 742 p.)

Jacob A. Frenkel e Morris Goldstein (eds):
International Financial Policy: essays in honor of Jacques J. Polak (Washington: International Monetary Fund/Nederlandsche Bank, 1991, 508 p.)

Brad Roberts (ed):
New Forces in the World Economy (Cambridge: Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996, 438 p.)

Craig N. Murphy:
International Organization and Industrial Change: global governance since 1850 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 338 p.)

Daniel Verdier:
Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France and the United States, 1860-1990 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994, 388 p.)


Todos os livros aqui resenhados tratam, em função de prazos mais ou menos longos, da história do desenvolvimento econômico capitalista visto na perspectiva da longue durée. As exceções parciais são o trabalho de James e os  ensaios coletados em Frenkel-Goldstein sobre o primeiro meio século de vida do FMI e do sistema financeiro internacional e, de modo mais afirmado, a obra coletiva editada por Roberts que, constituindo uma coletânea de artigos contemporâneos, previamente publicados na revista de relações internacionais da Universidade de Washington, The Washington Quarterly, refere-se mais bem à “economia política internacional atual”, discutindo assim questões diversas do novo ordenamento econômico mundial no contexto dos anos 90.
Os demais trabalhos, contudo, abordam, segundo ênfases temáticas, cortes geográficos e contextos diacrônicos que lhes são próprios, a emergência original, a afirmação progressiva, o desenvolvimento e a própria restruturação atual das grandes forças econômicas, políticas, monetárias e sociais que, atuando conjuntamente (ainda que não de forma coordenada), moldaram esse mesmo ordenamento mundial, a partir da época das grandes descobertas dos séculos XV-XVI — ou mesmo antes, no caso do livro de Fischer — até a crise e esgotamento do mundo de Bretton Woods, que epitomiza a própria essência do sistema liberal-capitalista no último meio século. Esses livros condensam o que de melhor o pensamento acadêmico anglo-saxão produziu recentemente em termos de pesquisa comparada e de síntese  de boa qualidade de história econômica, suscetível de acolher diferentes abordagens metodológicas na iluminação do itinerário econômico da sociedade capitalista através de vastos períodos de tempo. Em espírito e motivação, eles também inovam substancialmente em relação àquela “velha” vertente eclética da história econômica universitária, de inspiração sobretudo britânica, ao estilo de um Eli Heckscher, de um Robert Tawney, ou da Economic History Review, na qual um “liberal” como Charles Wilson, de Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance e de Economic History and the Historian, digladiava intelectualmente com os “marxistas” Maurice Dobb, de Studies in the Development of Capitalism, Edward Thompson, de The Formation the English Working Class, Christopher Hill de The Century of Revolution e Reformation to Industrial Revolution ou, ainda, Eric Hobsbawm de Industry and Empire.
Não se trata tanto, nestes livros, de história das “ideias” econômicas — à la Hobson, Sombart ou Schumpeter —, de análise de processos e tendências “fundacionais” — do tipo Capitalism and the Decline of Religion de Tawney, ou o seu contrário, Religion and the Decline of Capitalism de Canon Demant —, menos ainda de grandes “sínteses” de história econômica mundial — tais como as produzidas por Rostow, Rondo Cameron ou Herman van der Wee —, ou de ensaios de tipo “estrutural” — a exemplo de Simon Kuznets e Alexander Gerschenkron — ou, ainda, de “new economic history” — tal como produzida por cliometristas como Robert Fogel ou institucionalistas como Douglass North — mas, mais propriamente, de estudos comparados ou singulares sobre desenvolvimentos econômicos globais — os ensaios de amplo escopo histórico de Fischer e de Kindleberger —, de interpretações inovadoras sobre a emergência e evolução de organizações internacionais e de políticas nacionais — os livros de James, de Murphy e de Verdier — e de artigos de acadêmicos e de “policy-makers” sobre os elementos dinâmicos da economia mundial em transformação — as compilações de Roberts e de Frenkel-Goldstein. Vejamos cada um deles em particular.
(...)

Questa tesi propone un’indagine storiografica del ruolo centrale della valuta statunitense nella
politica monetaria internazionale e nel commercio globale di petrolio allo scopo di mettere in
evidenza come le relazioni e le interazioni tra questi due ambiti abbiano contribuito a forgiare
uno stato di egemonia economica unipolare da parte degli Stati Uniti. Allo stesso tempo, questa
tesi vuole mettere in risalto quei cambiamenti recenti del panorama economico globale che
mettono in forte discussione il sistema attuale e preconfigurano la fine dell’egemonia unipolare
e le basi di una comunità internazionale a guida multipolare.

other. Moreover, the two benefited from one another both technically and organizationally because of the fact that both countries were located at the same economic level of development, that is, in the second phase of industrialization. It was exactly here—in addition to the issue of the world's financial system—that the stark contrast with the British–American economic relationship can be found. After all, the British were not as dependent as Germany on the import of commodities from the US because of their Commonwealth. The fact that this and other key factors have not been taken into account—such as the very different currency policies of Germany and Great Britain during the period under examination—means that Berghahn's description of the three countries' economic relationships amounts to a partial account of the overall picture. This, however, does nothing to take away from the fact that his study is highly stimulating, not least because of its comparative approach and its consideration of the perceptions of contemporary actors, all of which allows an entirely new perspective on foreign economic relationships between the US and western Europe.

Con la pretensión de analizar con perspectiva crítica las grandes transformaciones de la economía mundial desde la segunda mitad del siglo pasado, se examinarán las trasformaciones del sistema de Bretton Woods y su significado en los países centrales durante la llamada “edad de oro” del capitalismo. Los cambios en las formas de acumulación desde mediados de la década de 1960 muestran transformaciones en el ámbito real – de las formas de producir e intercambiar -  en el camino hacia el neoliberalismo y en el aspecto ficticio de la hegemonía del capital financiero, hasta su crisis gestada durante la primera década del siglo XXI pasando por una nueva división internacional del trabajo y cambios en las categorías centro-periferia.

The fall of the Bretton Woods international monetary system, in 1971, has often been interpreted as a defeat of politics – namely the choices of United States – on the part of economic forces. The documents of the Nixon presidency (1969-74), declassified at the National Archives of the United States, allow the adoption of a different perspective. The monetary instability of the second half of the 1960's, made it possible for the new republican administration to develop, since 1969, lines of thought and policies, aimed at abandoning the “embedded liberalism”of Bretton Woods, in the name of a return to more traditional laissez faire practices. Influenced by important foreign policy considerations as well, the neo-liberal international economic choices of the Nixon administration anticipated by a decade those of Ronald Reagan, and contributed to pave them the way. The contents of this essay have been analyzed in greater detail in the monograph "Il governo del dollaro. Interdipendenza economica e potere statunitense negli anni di Richard Nixon" (Firenze, 2006).

Based on an array of primary sources from the Nixon administration, this chapter argues that the divergence in the respective interests of the US and the West Europeans was not a consequence of the end of Bretton Woods but, rather, one of its main causes. Diverging economic and foreign policy interests and priorities among the allies, coupled with the inability to reconcile such differences by cooperative means, eventually led to Nixon acting unilaterally to rescind the gold-dollar link. The idealistic expectations of the previous decades, symbolised by the many references to an imagined Atlantic Community, gave way to more rational calculations about the mutual advantages and disadvantages of the security relationship, punctuated with a greater awareness of potential economic conflicts. The contents of this essay have been analyzed in greater detail in the monograph "Il governo del dollaro. Interdipendenza economica e potere statunitense negli anni di Richard Nixon" (Firenze, 2006).

Este capítulo busca analizar la situación económica y política de la banca de desarrollo en México. Para lo cual, realiza un estudio de caso, donde la idea principal es demostrar cómo el arreglo institucional pos Bretton Woods limita, por una especie de “desperfecto en el diseño original”, la intervención efectiva de la FND, pues le impone una apretada restricción de corto plazo, que disminuye drásticamente el financiamiento público y modifica la centralidad que este tipo de instituciones solían tener en la creación-dirección de los mercados.

Se hace una revisión crítica del Premio Nobel de Economía, con una recopilación del papel de Yanus Varoufakis en las negociaciones con la Unión Europea en 2015, con el apoyo de Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman y Thomas Piketty, a partir de una crítica realizada por el economista colombiano Guillermo Maya Muñoz, en el que se muestra la farsa, que hay tras el Nobel de Economía.

This year marks the 70 th anniversary of the epoch-making Bretton Woods institution. The breakdown of its crafted quasi-gold standard took place in crucial events which include America's unilateral suspension of the dollar's gold convertibility and a transition from a state-led to a market-oriented economy. Against the backdrop of continued global monetary disorder, for the first time in history, a national fiat currency replaced gold which once was the world's major reserve asset. This effectively renders the dollar as the de facto reserve currency. However, the principal flaw inherent in the dollarcentred world manifests itself in an increasing incidence of credit-induced crises which imperils global economic stability. This essay will discuss why the dollar has gained dominance and how it has affected and shaped the global economy. Its challenges will also be examined. Lastly, the trajectory of reforming the international monetary architecture will be evaluated.

L'articolo discute, sulla base di documenti declassificati dell'amministrazione statunitense di Richard Nixon (1969-74), le multiple ragioni che condussero Nixon a decretare la fine del sistema monetario di Bretton Woods, con particolare riferimento al ruolo dell'Europa occidentale nei disegni della politica estera statunitense. I temi trattati nell'articolo sono stati approfonditi nel volume monografico "Il governo del dollaro. Interdipendenza economica e potere statunitense negli anni di Richard Nixon" (Firenze, 2006).

Məqalədə beynəlxalq valyuta sistemlərinin aparıcı elementlərindən olan likvidlik təminatı məsələsinin problematikliyi, xüsusilə Bretton-Vuds mərhələsinin timsalında tədqiq edilmişdir. Araşdırmalar göstərir ki, iqtisadi kateqoriya kimi “qlobal likvidlik” hələ də özündə müəyyən terminoloji qeyri-müəyyənlikləri ehtiva etməklə yanaşı, bu anlayışın əhatə dairəsi qlobal iqtisadi tsikllərin təsiri altında son 40-50 il ərzində əhəmiyyətli şəkildə genişlənmişdir. Bretton-Vuds mərhələsində qlobal likvidlik məsələsi sistemik dizayn prosesinin aparıcı müddəalarından biri olmuşdur. Lakin onun formalaşma xüsusiyyətləri artıq Bretton-Vudsun ilkin dövrlərin etibarən bir sıra çatışmazlıqlar nümayiş etdirmişdir. Qlobal miqyasda iqtisadi siyasət əməkdaşlığının səmərəsizliyi və dollar əsaslı rezerv sisteminin çatışmazlıqları 1960-cı illərin ikinci yarısından etibarən qlobal likvidlik təminatı problemlərinin böyüməsinə və daha sonra 70-ci illərin əvvəllərində Bretton-Vuds sisteminin dağılmasına rəvac vermişdir.

A COMPARISON OF FEDERAL RESERVE AND
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK


A Comparison of the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank: Independence, accountability along with transparency and other responsibilities are the concepts that are first considered when a central bank’s structure and evolution are considered. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve (Fed) are one of the most important central banks. Because of the ‘district’ structure of the Fed and the composition of the ECB by several national central banks (NCBs), at first glance both institutions are considered to have similar properties. Although basically these institutions are independent and have a decentralized structure and almost use same monetary tools, they have significant differences. In this context, this paper will compare the Fed and the ECB in terms of their organization, independence, accountability, transparency and their responsibilities in bank supervision.

On the afternoon of Friday, Aug. 13, 1971, high-ranking White House and Treasury Department officials gathered secretly in President Richard Nixon's lodge at Camp David. Treasury Secretary John Connally, on the job for just seven months, was seated to Nixon's right. During that momentous afternoon, however, newcomer Connally was front and center, put there by a solicitous president. Nixon, gossiped his staff, was smitten by the big, self-confident Texan whom the president had charged with bringing order into his administration's bumbling economic policies.

Dimulai dari fase dimana Perang Dunia II membawa kehancuran total, terutama pada negara-negara di wilayah Eropa. Lumpuhnya industri-industri besar, kehancuran kota-kota hingga banyaknya korban jiwa akibat Perang Dunia. Pada akhirnya, sebagian besar sumberdaya diarahkan untuk keperluan perang. Kehancuran ini membawa dunia pada krisis. Pada akhirnya diupayakanlah pembaruan kembali dunia dan tatanan ekonomi yang hancur Hal ini kemudian dijawab melalui hadirnya konferesi yang diselenggarakan di Bretton Woods, pertemuan dengan maksud membicarakan sistem perekonomian dunia pasca perand Dunia hingga pada kesepakatan bahwa hal yang dapat mewujudkan perdamaian di dunia secara Internasional adalah kerjasama Ekonomi Internasional, yang tentu saja berlandaskan pada satu pasar global.

Nel 1971, con la fine del gold-exchange standard - il regime monetario definito nella conferenza di Bretton Woods nel 1944, in cui si definì un regime di cambi fissi tra le principali divise mondiali e il dollaro Usa e la convertibilità del dollaro in oro alla quotazione fissa di 35$/oncia - per non perdere lo status e i privilegi di divisa di riserva del mondo, il presidente Nixon si accordò con l'Arabia Saudita promettendo protezione militare in cambio dell'ancoraggio degli scambi di petrolio al dollaro Usa: nacque così il cosiddetto "petrodollaro". Il dollaro aveva perso la copertura dell'oro ma aveva acquisito la copertura del petrolio e delle materie prime, scambiate in tutto il mondo in termini di dollaro Usa. La Cina sta ora tentando di agganciare la sua valuta nazionale, lo yuan, al mercato petrolifero, sfidando gli Usa sul loro stesso terreno. Il "petroyuan" per ora non costituisce una minaccia, ma potrebbe accelerare un processo di de-dollarizzazione, che comprometterebbe la supremazia statunitense comportando rischi di frammentazione anche a livello geopolitico.

On the surface, through the “One Belt, One Road” and the BRICS’ New Development Bank, China is promoting a transformative vision of international order based on equality among states, fairness in international institutions and trade and development without conditionality requirements as the engine of economic growth and peace. By deploying the concept of Market State as developed by Patterson and Afilalo in their work on the global trade order, this article aims to show that the nature of China’s contribution to global governance appears to be much less transformative and future-oriented than declared once we place it in the broader context of a world society and changes in the capacities of states.

Despite the undeniable importance of Germany’s political economy in the global landscape, catalogued in an ever-expanding bibliography in a variety of fields, it is not very often that one encounters a study that can be described as a groundbreaking achievement. This is, however, the case with Julian Germann’s new book, Unwitting Architect: German Primacy and the Origins of Neoliberalism. A captivating and well-structured book, Unwitting Architect does not merely offer valuable insights into the field of neoliberalism studies. It is also a penetrating commentary on existing methodological and theoretical approaches (and their blind spots), forcing an engaging rethink of key historical conjunctures and a sharp proposal for historicising the role and policymaking framework of contemporary Germany.

Multilateralism has its roots in modern European history. It evolved as a pragmatic mechanism to avoid mutually assured destruction of multiple militarily matched states. From the twentieth century multilateralism and globalization have fed off each other. Global peace and prosperity have been the major spinoffs. Both were weakened during interludes of heightened nationalism. These dynamics are at work to this day. There have been two major phases of multilateral cooperation. The first was dominated by political cooperation, beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia-Munster and followed by the Concert of Europe. The political dimension of multilateralism dominated the first phase. Economic cooperation dominated the second phase, as its range expanded beyond Europe to encompass the globe. This cooperation began with the reconstruction of war-ravaged economies, to repair the International Monetary System and to revive international trade. It was later extended to address anthropomorphic climate change through the UNFCCC. The Bretton Woods system focus also shifted from advanced to developing countries. The postwar crisis of multilateralism can be traced to the slowing of growth in advanced economies as growth in Asia, particularly China, accelerated. Advanced economies were increasingly disenchanted with globalization, after having once being its strongest advocate. The failure of the Bretton Woods institutions to adjust to shifting weights in the global economy made them lose relevance and legitimacy. Multilateral trade and climate negotiations reached a standstill as AEs were loathe to extend special carveouts negotiated by developing countries prior to their rise. The weakening of multilateralism elicited two opposing responses: first the rise of plurilateralism, and second an attempt to revive multilateral economic cooperation through the G 20 in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. After its initial promise the G 20 appears to be becoming dysfunctional as suboptimal plurilateral alternatives gather steam. Looking ahead, there is no getting away from globalization, despite short-term retreats, that is slowly but surely undermining the Westphalian notion of Nation-State. The future of multilateralism is likely to be shaped by the resolution of four frictions, namely the harmonization of pressure groups within the G 20 so that globalization is seen to be working for all major stakeholders; the accommodation of China in global governance; how basic ideological differences are harmonized in the process of such accommodation; and multi-stakeholder multilateralism that goes beyond the Westphalian notion of sovereignty based on the Nation State.

On August 15th, 1971, the then-president of the United States, Richard Nixon, made an eighteen-minute speech to the country whose effects impacted the world. Among other subjects, he announced the end of the dollar-gold parity, which was a shock.

Los Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido protagonizaron la negociación principal en el seno de los Aliados para consensuar el nuevo orden monetario internacional de Posguerra. Aunque sus planes compartían la necesidad de crear una institución multilateral, presentaban diferencias respecto de las funciones que debía tener. La creación del Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) como encargado de promover la cooperación monetaria mundial, reflejó los acuerdos y las diferencias entre esos planes.
Con el fin de comprender el sentido histórico del surgimiento del FMI, en el presente trabajo se analizan, desde una perspectiva de historia económica, las características de los planes estadounidense y británico, considerando los intereses económicos que defendían. Asimismo, se analiza la opinión de Raúl Prebisch acerca de los planes, y el impacto que -a su juicio- tendrían sobre la periferia. Se observa que EE.UU., país emisor de la moneda de reserva mundial y principal exportador, priorizaba la libre movilidad de capitales y proponía la creación de un organismo con reducida capacidad de financiamiento; el Reino Unido, en cambio, interesado en la reconstrucción de su economía, promovía mayor flexibilidad cambiaria, la conformación de un organismo con mayor capacidad de financiamiento y la división por partes iguales de la responsabilidad de reducir los desequilibrios externos entre países deudores y acreedores. Asimismo, se destaca la recomendación de Prebisch para los países periféricos de no resignar su autonomía sobre la política cambiaria, hasta tanto no existiera un compromiso de los EE.UU. de financiar al resto del mundo, y así resolver estructuralmente el déficit internacional de divisas.

The nature of the contemporary American-led order itself-often called the "liberal international order"-has never been more controversial than it is today. On one side are those who believe this liberal order is exceptional-meaning it is unique when compared to typical orders of the pastas well as weighty, meaning it has had significant effects on important international outcomes. Its advocates argue that it was crafted by the United States with precisely these considerations in mind, and above all for the purpose of realizing a more peaceful, just, and prosperous world. On the other side are those who decry all the attention and praise heaped upon the liberal order, which they posit is largely illusionary. To argue otherwise, these skeptics say, is to promote a narrative of postwar American foreign policy that is not grounded in reality.

In moving the debate forward, I take a middle ground between these opposing perspectives. We can identify a distinct and intentional set of principles that constitutes a "liberal order," and thus its advocates have a point. In addition, this order has paid tangible dividends to the United States and its Western allies, thus affecting important international outcomes.

On the other hand, the skeptics tell a more convincing story about American motives surrounding the liberal order's origins. Furthermore, this story more closely aligns with broader patterns of great power order building throughout history. Contrary to the conventional thinking, this historical record reveals that order building has often in fact been a strategic and deeply exclusionary practice. And contrary to the narrative supported by the liberal order’s advocates, the United States fits comfortably within this historical record rather than transcending it. Viewing the life and times of the liberal international order through a broader historical lens, I argue, can help us understand why this order was so successful for decades but is under increasing strain today.

This study addresses the following puzzle: why did states in the largest emerging economies (EMEs) in Latin America and Asia not use formal institutions to cope with the 2008 crisis? During the 1990s, these economies used and established regional and multilateral monetary arrangements, but in 2008 they turned to ad hoc bilateral swap agreements as a first line of defence. My argument is that to understand this change in monetary responses one needs to consider demand as well as supply factors. Previous studies have predominantly focused on supply factors, i.e. the presence of willing and able international lenders of last resort. However, these studies have neglected the perspective of EMEs in this arrangement. I argue that their preferences were shaped both by past experience (leading to a political stigma against multilateral institutions) and the growing autonomy and economic importance of their central banks. The paper examines a sample of Latin American and Asian countries (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, South Korea and Indonesia), analysing how the new patterns of monetary cooperation appeared in two phases: 2008 crisis management (which demonstrated a preference for ad hoc currency swaps) and the post-crisis aftermath (which formalized these swaps into regional arrangements based on networks of bilateral currency swaps). The institutional design of international monetary cooperation is changing towards a more fragmented and multi-currency system.