strategii NATO

In 2014, at the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine and Russia‘s aggression against this neighboring country, Lithuania became concerned about the strengthening of its military capabilities, augmenting the National Defense System (NDS) budget by almost 50% in two years. This may be considered unprecedented, if seen against the background of the presidential elections and those to the European Parliament, the fiscal discipline, the introduction of euro, as well as Russia‘s economic sanctions, the political decision in the course of 2014 on increasing the defense assignation by 130 million litas and in 2015 the increase by planned additional 356 million litas. This article analyzes two closely related problems of the Lithuanian NDS capabilities. First of all, changes in the NDS financing are explored in the context of permanent agreements of Lithuanian political parties concerning the allocation of 2% of the GDP for defense. This is followed by the discussion of the issues of military personnel staffing and training of the reserve as well as future challenges. This research contributes to the assessment
of the critical NDS financing and staffing not only within academic circles but particularly among politicians and society in general. Additionally, it contributes to the awareness of the problems the
army encountered in seeking to implement the objective set for it: to ensure the military security of the state. In the presence of the emerging threats in the region, this is of particularly great significance
to the demilitarized and pacifist society of Lithuania. The article aims at identifying financing and personnel planning problems throughout a quarter of the century, ranging from the restoration of the Army of the Republic of Lithuania to 2014 inclusively. At the same time, the study encourages a discussion by the academic community on issues of the military security of the Lithuanian State and provides analyses as well as possible development scenarios.

New qualitative research into the history of Lithuanian paramilitarism, covering military organisations which operated in addition to (or as a substitute for) the regular armed forces, and also ideological, military and cultural training and education aimed at the war effort, is not
simply a collection of empirical data, and does not just serve the purpose of nurturing patriotic feelings in Lithuanian society. The historical analysis of paramilitarism and the activities of the
Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union in this monograph is associated with the defence policy that was adopted by the Lithuanian army in 2010. This states that, in the event of war, ‘Lithuania will resist an aggressor by all available means, including military action, guerrilla warfare, civil disobedience, and non-collaboration.’
The authors of the study ask the following questions: What is the role of Lithuania’s defence strategy in the changing space of Europe? What kind of armed forces, and what kind of power, must Lithuania develop, in order to be able to respond to the new challenges faced by Eastern Europe and the Baltic States?
Nato strategy does not require the combination of the armed forces of all member states, except in the standardisation of equipment, decision-making procedures and ensuring effective interoperability in military operations. The member states face different challenges to their
national security, and they have different economic resources, while their geographical and geopolitical situations are also quite different. In Lithuania’s case, the military operations in the Balkans, Chechnya, Georgia and Ukraine should be taken into account, and might be as important as the experience obtained in military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Endeavours to halt the progress of an adversary, to resist and survive are a major goal of the Lithuanian armed forces. The strategy of deterrence, however, remains the main principle. An army always seeks a military victory; but the main objective should be to create circumstances in which an adversary will not attack. In such a context, the factor of large-scale involvement is as important
as the fire power or the manoeuvrability of troops. Large-scale participation by citizens in national defence can be attained through the paramilitary phenomenon, which has been tested by time and historically justified, and which should be used, reconsidered and adapted to the conditions of the 21st century.

Prezenta lucrare are două obective: pe de o parte o analiză a noii Strategii Maritime a Alianței și pe de altă parte un studiu de caz al Operației Actve Endeavor.
Elaboratorul prezentei lucrări consideră că a face o analiză a noii Strategii Maritime a Alinței este absolut necesar în vederea întelegerii Noului Concept Strategic de la Lisabona 2010 dar și pentru a înțelege evoluția singurei Operații de tip articol 5 din istoria Alinaței.
Făcând o foarte succintă analiză privind importanța din punct de vedere strategic al mărilor și oceanelor putem lesne înțelege că NATO în calitatea sa de cea mai importantă instituție de securitate nu putea să ignore faptul că mai bine de 70% din suprafața pamântului este acoperită de ape iar aproape 90% din comerțul mondial se desfășoară pe mare, fără a mai menționa și faptul că 75% din rutele comerțului internațional trec prin câteva puncte vulnerabile de tipul strâmtori și canale, ceea ce conduce la necesitatea abordării securității și din perspectivă maritimă.
Istoria de 63 de ani a Alinței consemnează o singură activare a articolului 5 din Tratatul de la Washington. Articolul 5 este unul dintre pilonii fundamentali ai NATO oferind garanții de securitate într-o manieră în care nici un alt Tratat sau aranjament de securitate nu le-a mai oferit. Credibilitatea construcției nord-atlantice se bazează pe garanțiile de securitate iar activarea articolului 5 a fost și este un reper istoric deosebit de important. Pe cale de consecință operația Active Endeavour se cade a fi analizată și înțeleasă atât din perspectivă istorică cât și din perspectiva evoluției gândirii strategiei maritime a Alianței.

Forze armate dotate di mezzi, sistemi d’arma, capacità operative e livelli d’addestramento adeguati, prontamente impiegabili in ambito NATO nei termini richiesti, per lunghi periodi e al di fuori delle normali aree stanziali. Un dispositivo bellico superefficiente in grado di respingere eventuali aggressioni militari che si dovessero manifestare contro l’Italia e i suoi “interessi vitali”, sempre pronto a “rimuovere le minacce” e contribuire alla “difesa integrata” dei territori dell’Alleanza Atlantica e alla “lotta al terrorismo internazionale”. Sono alcuni degli obiettivi strategici prefigurati dal Libro Bianco per la sicurezza internazionale e la difesa 2015 per quelle che dovranno essere le strutture militari nazionali del prossimo ventennio. Il sogno di un’Italia media potenza internazionale ma sempre più ancorata all’Alleanza Atlantica e al paese leader, gli Stati Uniti d’America.

ın kuzey-doğusunda bulunmaktadır. Evros (Meriç) ile Nestos (Karasu) nehirleri arasında kalan 8.578 kilometre karelik bir alanı kapsamaktadır. Kuzeyi dağlık, güneyi ovalıktır. Batı Trakya doğudan Türkiye, kuzeyden Bulgaristan, batıdan Makedonya ve güneyden Ege denizi ile sınırlıdır. Bölge üç ilden oluşmaktadır. Bu iller doğudan batıya sırasıyla sunlardır: Evros (merkezi Aleksandrupolis, Dedeagaç), Rodopi (merkezi: Komotini, Gümülcine) ve Ksanthi (Merkezi: Ksanthi, skeçe). Batı Trakya'nın günümüzdeki nüfusu Yunan asıllı hıristiyanlardan ve Türk asıllı Müslümanlardan oluşmaktadır. Hatırlanacağı üzere, Lozan Barış Konferansı'nda Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında varılan bir anlaşma gereği iki ülke arasında zorunlu ahali mübadelesi yapılmıştır. Ancak, İstanbul'un Rum nüfusu ile Batı Trakya'nın Türk nüfusu zorunlu mübadelenin dışında tutulmus ve bulundukları ülkedeki devletin güvencesi altında dinsel azınlık konumunda bırakılmıştır. Söz konusu azınlıklara azınlık ve yurttaslık hakları tanınmıştır. Uluslararası hukukta II. Dünya Savaşından sonra azınlık haklarının korunmasında tam anlamıyla farklı bir yaklaşım ortaya çıkmıştır. Öyle ki, azınlıklar artık dil, din, kültür ve gelenek farkına dayalı gruplar ve cemaatler şeklinde değil, bu tür gruplara mensup bireyler olarak koruma altına alınmıştır. II. Dünya Savaşından sonra azınlık haklarının bireysel bazda korunması amacıyla başta BM olmak üzere, Avrupa Konseyi ve AGT çerçevesinde yoğun çalışmalar yapılmış tavsiye kararları ve sözleşmeler kabul edilmiş ve azınlık grubuna mensup bireylerin temel hak ve özgürlüklerin korunması açısından bazı denetim mekanizmaları oluşturulmuştur. Avrupa Birliği üyesi olmak isteyen ülkelere, önkoşul olarak, o ülkelerdeki yaşayan azınlıkların sorunlarının çözümü istenmektedir. Aday ülkelerden, insan ve azınlık haklarına saygı gösterilmesi istenmektedir. Ancak Avrupa Birliği tam üyesi olan bir ülkeden yukarıdaki değerlere saygılı olması istenmiyor. Fakata Avrupa Birliği üyesi Yunanistan'ın kendi çıkarları söz konusu olduğunda azınlık ve insan haklarına saygılı olmadığı görülmektedir. Bu çalışmada Batı Trakya Türklerinin tarihsel gelişimi ve Türk varlığı kısaca inceledikten sonra Lozan Antlaşmasında Batı Trakya Türklerine tanınan

The Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia’s Whole-of-Government Mission Report, commissioned by the Department of Defence, in coordination with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Federal Police, outlines the strengths, good practices and challenges of Australia’s mission in Afghanistan at the whole-of-government level.
While each overseas mission has its own particular circumstances and context, there are important lessons that we can take away from the Afghanistan experience.
This Report highlights 17 such lessons to enhance how we work across government and improve cooperation for complex missions of the future.
Key lessons include:
• Involving all relevant departments and agencies in whole-of-government policy development and planning from the outset;
• Establishing a senior level inter-agency group to oversee policy development and provide a high-level nexus with the National Security Committee of Cabinet and the Secretaries’ Committee on National Security;
• Recognising the value of civil-military co-leadership in the field;
• Agreeing principles and protocols be developed at the outset of the mission to define working relationships and responsibilities between different services and agencies; 
• Undertaking collective mission preparation involving military, civilians and police, including exercises focused on developing cross-agency relationships at the headquarters level;
• Establishing a cross-agency public affairs capability to highlight the whole-of-government nature of the mission;
• Synchronizing posting and deployment cycles for civilian, military and police personnel;
• Tasking the Australian Civil-Military Centre with providing a standing whole-of-government lessons learned capability for overseas missions.

Una delle più micidiali fonti cancerogene e di altre nocività diffuse sul territorio d'Italia (come di altri paesi) è proprio l'apparato militare (basi, depositi, dispositivi ecc.). Da sempre nocivo e devastante, dopo la seconda guerra mondiale questo apparato è diventato sempre più generatore di morte e altre conseguenze negative a causa dell'assoggettamento dell'Italia all'alleato dominante (gli USA) direttamente o attraverso il simulacro della NATO 2. Questa subalternità totale nel campo militare legittima anche l'impegno super esoso nelle cosiddette missioni militari all'estero e la produzione e commercializzazione di armamenti (spesso come subappaltatori degli USA e di alti paesi NATO) sino ai corteggiamenti e sotterfugi per venderli anche a chi alimenta il terrorismo 3. Gli stessi militari e i loro familiari, come la popolazione che abita attorno ai siti della NATO e delle forze armate sono alla mercé di un apparato militare cancerogeno. Tuttavia le autorità hanno sempre fatto di tutto per negare questo danno alla salute e all'ambiente sino al punto di ostinarsi a non voler riconoscere le morti e gli ammalati di cancro a causa dell'uranio impoverito fra gli stessi militari (fa eccezione la Relazione dell'apposita Commissione parlamentare 4. Peggio, ogni volta che la popolazione locale ha cercato di protestare contro le conseguenze nefaste dell'apparato militare la risposta pronta è stata sempre la repressione brutale come se si trattasse di pericolosi sovversivi o addirittura terroristi. Come sempre gli armamenti e gli apparati militari non possono che produrre morte anche quando non sono in azione. E allora cos'è uno stato di diritto e delle autorità politiche e amministrative che fanno finta di ignorare ma autorizzano e sono indiscutibilmente responsabili di un apparato che produce morte fra la popolazione e disastro ambientale e arriva persino a legittimare la repressione brutale di chi protesta per la difesa della vita e del futuro stesso della società? A conferma dell'abituale servilismo delle autorità politiche e amministrative italiane rispetto agli USA, di fronte all'invito a firmare la bozza di trattato per proibire l'arma nucleare votata il 7 luglio a larghissima maggioranza all'ONU, l'Italia non ha ancora firmato dichiarando che non firma perché lo smantellamento va fatto giorno per giorno con i paesi che hanno l'atomica. Questo è l'approccio sempre fallimentare nei passati 30 anni. Intanto l'Italia aumenta la spesa già enorme per gli armamenti, per l'apparato militare, per le missioni militari all'estero e per sostenere la NATO.

In this study, the evolution of the NATO-EU relationship from the Cold War years to present day is examined and this relationship is comprehensively analysed politically, economically and militarily. This analysis consists fundamentally of major problems like the Libya crisis, which enhanced tensions among the EU, NATO, the USA and Turkey. Furthermore, the question of EU’s autonomy from NATO, NATO allies military spendings, NATO’s “Smart Defence” initiative and Turkey’s role in the NATO-EU strategic partnership are examined. The study begins with a historical overview that brings attention to new opportunities and risks in transatlantic relations in the next part. In the last analysis,
emphasis is given to targets which the EU want to reach in world politics in the future including Europe’s military reform, the limits of NATO-EU relations and the search for a new balance of power in the Euro-Atlantic security chain. The article concludes that searching for a balance between “NATO’s primacy against the EU” and “EU autonomy” in the Euro-Atlantic partnership continue and the Cyprus issue is not the only obstacle which limits NATO-EU relations.
Keywords:
USA, France, NATO, Military Intervention, EU, Turkey

1 Jednocześnie nie jest tak, że tożsamość jest czymś na tyle zmiennym, że aż chimerycznym. Edmund Husserl określał to pojęcie jako "świadomość trwania" -mimo zmian zachodzących w otoczeniu oraz ewolucji samego podmiotu, przez cały okres funkcjonowania zdaje on sobie sprawę z istnienia własnego "ja". M. Malicka, Ja -to znaczy kto?,

NATO's consistent and transformative identity made it sustainable for a period of seventy years. During this time interval, NATO had to cope with various threats which tested its durability. Throughout its historical voyage NATO has managed to reconstruct itself continuously; its security architecture, its strategic thinking, its institutional structuring, and its functions. Current issues within NATO notwithstanding, Turkey has consistently shown great commitment to the material and nonmaterial requirements, goals, and identity of the Alliance. Turkey's policy of fostering cohesion within the alliance has helped it overcome past and current obstacles; Turkey's historical commitment to NATO remains valid and should not be underestimated.

None of these six scenarios is reassuring. The first option,  preservation of the current grey zone, is by far the most likely. It remains unclear, however, whether mere cooperation, adaptation and association, within this scenario, can replace, or compensate for, proper institutional integration into a defense coalition. While material, technical and financial help for Ukraine is forthcoming, such piecemeal support could remain eventually insufficient to fundamentally improve the security of Ukraine. Even the concurrent and resolute application of a large and varied battery of mutually re-enforcing legal, military, economic, technical and other instruments strengthening Ukraine’s international embeddedness will not make a new treaty on East European security unnecessary.

Acest volum își propune să umple acest gol de cunoaștere și să ofere un instrument de dezbateri și analize, care să ducă la optimizarea activității instituțiilor de securitate națională. Volumul este util atât cercetătorilor români interesați de procesul de elaborare a strategiilor de securitate națională în spațiul euroatlantic cât și experților, analiștilor sau politicienilor care vor elabora viitoarele strategii de securitate națională sau legislația de organizare și funcționare a sistemului de securitate națională.

Az elmúlt kevesebb mint egy évtized alatt jelentősen romlott Európa biztonsági környezete. Ez a multipolarizálódó világrendben az Európát érő keleti és déli kihívások felerősödésében és hatásaiban öltött testet. Keleti kihívásként a 2014-es ukrán válságban játszott orosz szerepvállalás eredményeképpen mélypontjára került a NATO–orosz kapcsolatrendszer, eközben a felemelkedő Kína is – főleg amerikai nyomásra – a NATO napirendjére került.
2015-től Európában példátlan migrációs válság kezdődött, aminek részeként a terrorizmus is felerősödött. A migrációs politika terén is megmutatkozott az EU válsága, ami politikai és cselekvési egység hiányában a kérdéskörben markáns álláspontot képviselő Magyarországgal is konfliktusokhoz vezetett. A Brexit, az európai eladósodás, a negatív demográfiai mutatók, a vártnál gyengébb gazdasági teljesítmény megmutatták, hogy hazánk növekvő mértékben kell, hogy építsen a regionális együttműködésre és nem utolsósorban nemzeti önerőnkre.
A NATO-nak alkalmazkodnia kellett az új biztonsági környezethez, a Szövetség adaptációja pedig hazánkra is hatást gyakorolt.

The major goal of the article is to present political and economic effects of NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan for neighboring Pakistan. In vital political interest of Islamabad is to have as friendly government in Kabul as it is possible. Present one is not like that. President Ghani and chief executive Abdullah are seen as pro Indian politicians as well as their political supporters form the former Northern Alliance and their predecessor Hamid Karzai. There are strong evidences for New Dehli's high involvement in Afghanistan (e.g. National Army Training, investment in iron ore mines, and building strategic road to connect Afghanistan with Iranian harbor omitting Pakistan). It makes serious concerns among Pakistani politicians and the army high-brass. Islamabad is trying to build friendly relations with Russia for the first time in its history, to counterbalance US-India close-up politics which has been started in 2008 by signing nuclear cooperation accord. Such cooperation will supplement close relations between Pakistan and China called usually as "all-weather friendship".

Ни один из этих шести сценариев не обнадеживает. Первый, сохранение «серой зоны», сегодня кажется наиболее вероятным. Но он, возможно, с учетом известного прошлого опыта, в конечном счете – тупиковый. Остается неясным, может ли даже более сильная чем сегодня ассоциация с Западом, адаптация к новым вызовам после 2014-го года и консолидация постмайдановского украинского государства в рамках этого сценария заменить или компенсировать официальную и устойчивую институциональную интеграцию Украины, Грузии и Молдовы в более или менее значимую международную коалицию до такой степени, что безопасность этих трех стран существенно усилится. Остальные пять сценариев, напротив, дают некоторые международно-правовые механизмы серьезного обеспечения безопасности в сегодняшней «серой зоне». Они бы принципиально поменяли всю геополитику Восточной Европы путем подписания разного рода новых больших договоров. Но эти сценарии, которые в тех или иных аспектах выгодны Украине, Грузии и, частично, Молдове, сегодня мало реалистичны, если не фантастичны. Тем не менее, эти пять сценариев в той или иной мере могут стать возможными в будущем, если произойдут существенные изменения во внутренней или внешней политике тех или иных вовлеченных в восточноевропейский регион стран и организаций.

This report is about how NATO might adapt to a shifting strategic environment. The strategic environment that is currently unfolding seems likely to be characterized by
complexity and increased diversity in both power and principle. The report focuses on how the Alliance needs to respond to the on-going changes by moving forward at the upcoming Warsaw Summit from the decisions taken at the September 2014 summit in Wales. The report starts from the premise that, although the decisions taken in Wales were important and long overdue, they are not sufficient to facilitate NATO’s continued adaptation to a fundamentally changed strategic environment. The challenge for NATO in the future will be to find a way to contribute to European and global security in a strategic environment in which the Alliance and ‘the West’ have a
diminished role among new and (re)-emerging actors and in which liberal values and Western principles for order-making can no longer be assumed to be universal. The report suggests that NATO should assume the development of a future strategic
environment that can best be described as a ‘multi-order world’. NATO should prepare for such a multi-order world by collective defence initiatives from the Wales Summit and by revitalizing NATO’s partnership policy. The report suggests that ‘going back to basics’ by concentrating on collective defense would be an inappropriate response, as the new strategic environment requires the Alliance to undertake change in all of its three core tasks if it is to remain relevant in a ‘multi-order world’.

The East European region has always created a space of interaction between the great powers of the Eastern and Western Europe of the different epochs in European history. Not just a contact and an interaction region between Europe, Asia and the Middle East (Africa), but also a pivot of the European security environment, most often forming a real axis on which this scene of confrontation between powers can bend into one or the other part. We can say that the Eastern European region has formed hundreds of years ago (with the emergence of Ottoman power and its pressure on the Western powers, the emergence of the Tsarist and later Soviet power) a pivotal axis which determined the geopolitical configuration of the world and led successively to the advancement or decay of an empire or another. Indeed, the balance between Western powers and the Ottoman Empire, and later between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Eastern Powers, such as the Ottoman Empire and the Tsarist Empire, has been established for several hundred years right in this pivotal axis of Eastern Europe. For this reason, the political and military situation of the territories covered by the pivotal axis have always been a special one. This pivotal axis of Europe started from the Baltic Sea and was generally disposed over the continental strip where today are countries like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, a part of Poland (Pomerania and a part of Silesia), the Czech Republic, the western part of today Romania and a part of Serbia. This geographical positioning of the pivotal axis has led to a permanent political turmoil and change of borders in the mentioned regions. Referring exclusively to the manner in which this pivot axis intersected the current territory of Romania, we observe that in its passage from north to south it included Satu Mare, Oradea, Arad, Timişoara and Reşita. Oradea has always played an important role in Central-Eastern Europe, NATO recognizing the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence (HCOE) as a strategical organization with a remarkable contribution to the development of the Human Intelligence capability within the Alliance.
GOLEA Daniela Georgiana

De-a lungul istoriei, zona de est a Europei a creat întotdeauna un spațiu de interacțiune între marile puteri din est si vest, între Europa, Asia și Orientul Mijlociu (Africa), fiind un pivot al mediului de securitate european, cel mai adesea formând un adevărat ax pe care această scenă de confruntare înclinând în favoarea uneia dintre pǎrţi. Putem spune că regiunea est-europeană s-a format acum sute de ani (odată cu apariția puterii otomane și presiunea acesteia asupra puterilor occidentale, apariția puterii țariste și ulterior a puterii sovietice) ca axă pivotantă care a determinat configurația geopolitică a lumii și a dus succesiv la înaintarea sau degradarea unui imperiu sau a altuia. Într-adevăr, echilibrul dintre puterile occidentale și Imperiul Otoman, și mai târziu între Imperiul Austro-Ungar și Puterile de Est sau Imperiul Otoman și Imperiul Țarist, a fost stabilit timp de câteva secole chiar în această axă a Europei de Est. Din acest motiv, situația politică și militară a teritoriilor acoperite de axa pivot a fost întotdeauna una specială, pornind de la Marea Baltică fiind dispusă în general pe fâșia continentală, în care astăzi se află țări precum Estonia, Letonia și Lituania, o parte a Poloniei , Cehia, partea de vest a astăzi România și o parte din Serbia. Această poziționare geografică a axei pivot a dus la o tulburare politică permanentă și schimbarea granițelor în regiunile menționate. Referindu-ne exclusiv la modul în care această axă pivot a intersectat teritoriul actual al României, observăm că, în trecerea sa de la nord la sud, a cuprins Satu Mare, Oradea, Arad, Timișoara și Reșita. Oradea a jucat întotdeauna un rol important în Europa Centrală de Est, NATO recunoscând Centrul de Excelență al NATO HUMINT (HCOE) ca organizație strategică cu o contribuție remarcabilă la dezvoltarea capacității de Informații Umane în cadrul Alianței.

Montenegro’s recent accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sent an important political message to Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors: NATO’s door remains open to new members no matter the security environment. This signal will likely propel many post-Soviet countries to revitalize their relationships with the Alliance. In particular, it will likely trigger the reinvigoration of discussions over Georgia’s almost two decades-long bid for NATO membership.
Since 2002, close strategic cooperation with the United States and a determined pursuit of NATO membership have comprised the key pillars of Georgia’s security policy. With Alliance membership constituting a top priority objective, Tbilisi’s NATO aspirations have become a critical instrument in its foreign policy decision making. Notably, these aspirations serve as a framework for Tbilisi’s regional relationships: Georgia has cultivated good, neighborly relations with Alliance member Turkey and NATO partners, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Conversely, Russia’s vocal antagonism toward NATO enlargement has contributed to Georgia’s hostile relations with its large neighbor to the north.

Помимо продолжения сегодняшнего состояния невключенности в значимые международные структуры безопасности, у Украины есть пять альтернативных сценариев: «финляндизация», вступление в ЕС, присоединение к НАТО, отдельный договор с США, создание коалиции «Междуморья».

يسعي المقال إلي تحليل الكيفية التي أدارت بها مصر العلاقة مع الحلف الأطلسي‮ "‬الناتو‮"‬،‮ ‬في ضوء تزايد دوره في الفترة التالية علي الربيع العربي‮. ‬ويتطرق إلي التحديات التي واجهتها مصر،‮ ‬وكيفية‮ "‬تحييد‮" ‬تأثير التحولات التي حدثت بعد ثورات وانتفاضات 2011.
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NATO’s consistent and transformative identity made it sustainable for a
period of seventy years. During this time interval, NATO had to cope with
various threats which tested its durability. During its historical voyage NATO has managed to reconstruct itself continuously; its security architecture, its strategic thinking, its institutional structuring, and its functions. Current issues within NATO notwithstanding, Turkey has consistently shown great commitment to the material and nonmaterial requirements, goals, and identity of the Alliance. Turkey’s policy of fostering cohesion within the alliance has helped it overcome past and current obstacles; Turkey’s historical commitment to NATO remains valid and should not be underestimated.

Armenia—Russia’s closest ally in the South Caucasus—appears intent on revitalizing its partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This agenda turned explicit on February 27–28, when Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan paid a visit to Brussels. Besides holding several important meetings with high-level European Union officials, including EU President Donald Tusk and High Representative Federica Mogherini, Sargsyan spoke in person with the North Atlantic Alliance’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.

The East European region has always created a space of interaction between the great powers of the Eastern and Western Europe of the different epochs in European history. Not just a contact and an interaction region between Europe, Asia and the Middle East (Africa), but also a pivot of the European security environment, most often forming a real axis on which this scene of confrontation between powers can bend into one or the other part. We can say that the Eastern European region has formed hundreds of years ago (with the emergence of Ottoman power and its pressure on the Western powers, the emergence of the Tsarist and later Soviet power) a pivotal axis which determined the geopolitical configuration of the world and led successively to the advancement or decay of an empire or another. Indeed, the balance between Western powers and the Ottoman Empire, and later between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Eastern Powers, such as the Ottoman Empire and the Tsarist Empire, has been established for several hundred years right in this pivotal axis of Eastern Europe. For this reason, the political and military situation of the territories covered by the pivotal axis have always been a special one. This pivotal axis of Europe started from the Baltic Sea and was generally disposed over the continental strip where today are countries like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, a part of Poland (Pomerania and a part of Silesia), the Czech Republic, the western part of today Romania and a part of Serbia. This geographical positioning of the pivotal axis has led to a permanent political turmoil and change of borders in the mentioned regions. Referring exclusively to the manner in which this pivot axis intersected the current territory of Romania, we observe that in its passage from north to south it included Satu Mare, Oradea, Arad, Timişoara and Reşita. Oradea has always played an important role in Central-Eastern Europe, NATO recognizing the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence (HCOE) as a strategical organization with a remarkable contribution to the development of the Human Intelligence capability within the Alliance.

This report is about how NATO might adapt to a shifting strategic environment. The strategic environment that is currently unfolding seems likely to be characterized by complexity and increased diversity in both power and principle. The report focuses on how the Alliance needs to respond to the on-going changes by moving forward at the upcoming Warsaw Summit from the decisions taken at the September 2014 summit in Wales. The report starts from the premise that, although the decisions taken in Wales were important and long overdue, they are not sufficient to facilitate NATO’s continued adaptation to a fundamentally changed strategic environment. The challenge for NATO in the future will be to find a way to contribute to European and global security in a strategic environment in which the Alliance and ‘the West’ have a diminished role among new and (re)-emerging actors and in which liberal values and Western principles for order-making can no longer be assumed to be universal. The rep...

On June 18-20, 2015, NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly held the 89th Rose-Roth seminar in Armenia’s capital Yerevan. It mainly covered the current status of the Armenia-NATO partnership,
security issues and challenges that recently emerged in the post-Soviet region and the Middle East. It was declared that the seminar would be unprecedented and firmly reflect positive developments in contrast to the setback in Armenia’s EU integration. The three-day meeting brought together a range of
experts, representatives of alliance members and officials from different states, but was conducted against the backdrop of Armenia’s consistent albeit implicit “vassalization” by Russia.