Russian Foreign Policy

Even though Russia will most likely remain the largest gas exporter to Europe for the foreseeable future, it is clear that Gazprom can no longer retain its monopoly over much of the European gas market that had heretofore allowed it to impose its will and dictate terms to Central and Eastern European customers. With the cost of the Nord Stream Two and TurkStream projects totaling almost $20 billion, it also remains questionable whether Putin’s current gas strategies will ever prove profitable for Russia.

Short of the war, the destruction, and the massive loss of life, Ukraine is in many ways similar to the Gulf crisis in which the UAE, together with Saudi Arabia, led a 3.5-year-long economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar that, like the Russian invasion, was designed to hollow out the sovereignty of a neighbouring state.

This series consists of works emanating from the foremost French researchers from Sciences Po, Paris. Sciences Po was founded in 1872 and is today one of the most prestigious universities for teaching and research in social sciences in France, recognized worldwide.

Celem niniejszego opracowania jest poszerzenie wiedzy na temat uwarunkowań, priorytetów i efektywności polskiej polityki zagranicznej prowadzonej wobec Federacji Rosyjskiej. Po 2014 r. politykę tę charakteryzuje klasyczny dylemat bezpieczeństwa, w którym kontynuacja agresywnej polityki Rosji na Ukrainie wywoływała potrzebę zwiększenia potencjału obronnego państwa polskiego. Aneksja Krymu przez Federację Rosyjską w marcu 2014 r. przyczyniła się do zmian w polskiej polityce bezpieczeństwa, polityce gospodarczej (w tym w energetyce) oraz w zakresie kontaktów społecznych ukierunkowanych na ograniczenie relacji z Rosją.

Baha’u’llah’s Bishārāt (Glad-Tidings):
A Proclamation to Scholars and Statesmen
Christopher Buck and Youli A. Ioannesyan
Baha’i Studies Review 16 (2010): 3–28.

This article is a historical and textual study of the one of the major writings of Baha’u’llah: the Lawḥ-i Bishārāt (‘Tablet of Glad-Tidings’), revealed circa 1891, and advances new theories as to its provenance and purpose. The ‘Tablet of Glad-Tidings’ is a selective compendium of Baha’u’llah’s laws and principles, sequentially presented in a series of fifteen ‘Glad-Tidings.’ As the Arabic term, bishārāt, suggests, these ‘Glad-Tidings’ were a public announcement of some of the essential teachings of the new Baha’i religion. The ‘Glad-Tidings’ is the most extensive of several ‘Tablets’ by Baha’u’llah that present key teachings in a numbered structure. The Glad-Tidings may, in part, be regarded as serially articulated ‘world reforms’ intermixed with religious reforms emanating from Baha’u’llah in his professed role as ‘World Reformer.’ The ‘Glad-Tidings’ also functioned analogously (albeit anachronistically) to a press release, serving not only as a public proclamation, but to rectify the inaccuracies and gross misrepresentations that had previously circulated in print. Intended for widespread translation and publication, the Glad-Tidings was sent to scholars — notably Russian orientalist, Baron Viktor Rosen (1849–1908) and Cambridge Orientalist, Edward Granville Browne (1862–1926) — and possibly pre-revolutionary Russian statesmen as well. As a ‘Proclamatory Aqdas,’ the Tablet of Glad-Tidings was part of a much broader proclamation by Baha’u’llah, who proclaimed his mission to the political and religious leaders of the world. This study will argue that the Baha’u’llah may have revealed the Tablet of Glad-Tidings for E.G. Browne — or rather through him, since Baha’u’llah evidently intended that Browne should translate and publish the Bishārāt in order to make the nature of the Baha'i teachings more widely known. This would then correct the distortions that had previously been published regarding Baha’u’llah's purpose and the nature of the religion that he founded, thereby, promoting a public awareness that a new world religion was on the horizon of modernity.

Slovakia’s relations with the states of Eastern Europe not only have a bilateral impact, but contain geopolitical, security and economic dimensions as well. This article analyzes the domestic, bilateral and multilateral aspects of relations between Slovakia and Russia before and after the parliamentary elections of 1998, when Slovakia adopted a pro-Western course aimed at EU and NATO membership. The article also focuses on bilateral relations with Ukraine, where Slovakia is among the most active supporters of Ukraine’s future EU membership. The final sections analyze the Eastern policy of Slovakia – particularly within the framework of the EU’s Eastern Partnership and the Visegrad Group – as well as Slovakia’s relations with the new Eastern European partners, such as Belarus, Moldova and Georgia, as target countries of Slovakia’s “soft power.”

The New Global Politics of the Asia Pacific: Conflict and Cooperation in the Asian Century, 3rd Edition
©2017 Routledge: London & New York. 341pp. + x. Link: https://www.routledge.com/The-New-Global-Politics-of-the-Asia-Pacific-Conflict-and-Cooperation-in/Connors-Davison-Dosch/p/book/9781138647022

Now in its new and fully updated third edition, The New Global Politics of the Asia Pacific continues to provide a compelling analysis of a region undergoing dramatic changes. Based on new research and offering fresh interpretation, this edition evaluates the prospects for continuing US dominance in the ‘Asian Century’. Whilst presenting evidence for a multifaceted ‘Beijing Strategy’, which aims to counter the US by building an alternative regional order, it also explains Japan’s definitive departure from its limited military role. Key content includes:
- Intra-regional conflicts in the South China Sea and the Korean peninsula,
- The different responses within the Asia Pacific to globalisation and western ideas of democracy and political economy,
- The underappreciated success of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in building a regional identity
- The European Union’s soft power in the region.
A highly topical account, which offers an overview of the main actors, institutions and contemporary issues in the Asia Pacific, the book will be essential reading for students of Asian Studies, International Politics, and anyone interested in the region.

Michael K. Connors teaches at the University of Nottingham, Malaysia Campus and is a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University. He is the co-editor of Thai Politics in Translation: Monarchy, Democracy, Constitution (forthcoming).
Remy Davison holds the Jean Monnet Chair in Politics and Economics at Monash University. He is the author of The Political Economy of Single Market Europe (2011).
Jörn Dosch is Professor of International Politics and Development Cooperation at the University of Rostock, Germany, and Adjunct Professor at Monash University Malaysia. His recent publications include Malaysia Post-Mahathir: A Decade of Change (2015).

At the beginning of 2019, Russia was quite confident it would be able to either redirect its gas transit to the EU away from Ukraine before the expiration of the transit contract or renew the deal on Moscow’s own terms. But despite Gazprom’s (i.e., the Kremlin’s) transit diversification strategy, the new five-year deal shows that the Ukrainian transit corridor still remains of paramount importance for Russia

Özellikle IŞİD ve PKK’nın terör eylemlerinin giderek şiddetlendiği bir dönemde, Türkiye’nin bu iki örgüte karşı Suriye’de sınır ötesi askeri tedbirler alabilmesi için Rusya’yla ilişkilerini normalleştirmesi zorunlu hale
gelmiştir. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın Haziran ayı sonunda Putin’e yazdığı ve ilişkilerin normalleşmesine vesile olan mektubu ile başlayan
süreç, 9 Ağustos’ta St. Petersburg’da gerçekleşen Putin-Erdoğan görüşmesiyle önemli bir ivme kazanmıştır. 15 Temmuz darbe girişimi
sonrasında Türkiye’nin AB ve ABD ile ilişkilerinin sorgulandığı bir dönemde gerçekleşen Putin-Erdoğan zirvesi, iki ülke arasında yeni bir sayfanın açılmasını sağlamıştır. Bu zirvenin en önemli sonuçlarından birisi ise Rusya’nın Türkiye’nin Suriye’de iki hafta sonra başlattığı Fırat Kalkanı harekâtına ikna edilmesidir.

Should Russia become part of the West, or follow an Eastern path? This has been a centuries-old discussion among Russian intellectuals. For Westernizers in Russia, the " West " symbolized progress, freedom, democracy, civil society, normality, and a nation-state. Their opponents saw the West as representing moral decadence in the beginning and later capitalist exploitation. This paper attempts to lay out the foundations and the evolution of the 200-year-old discussion of Russia's place in the world. It briefly examines the period of Muscovite Russia, where the foundations of the authoritarian state tradition were laid and further strengthened. The paper then focuses on the period of Peter the Great's reign, in which educated Russians became increasingly acquainted with Western European culture and started having doubts about Russia's status in the face of perceived European superiority. Trying to summarize how the international and internal developments of the 1800s and 1900s have affected the debate about Russia's place between East and West, the paper then examines the current state of discussions in Russia under Putin's leadership and finally attempts to make predictions for the future.

The Syrian war will allow Russia to recover its naval presence in the Mediterranean. The Russian Navy will have more facilities at the same time that the Chinese Navy will appear in this scenario. This new situation will give us a new world order; this period we call "Tens Calm". Something similar happened after Bismarck Era, the period called "Armed Peace" (1890-1914), when the global balance was broken. This pre-war environment in the media could have been avoided. Russia today tries to recover its old deployment in the Mediterranean to become a global power.

В 1996 р. Чеська Республіка вступила до НАТО, а ще через шість років – до Євросоюзу. Ці два головні чинники привели до формування у чехів враження, ніби вони живуть в цілком безпечному просторі, що їхню свободу та демократію вже не спіткають значні виклики. Проте Росія не відкликала своїх агентів, навпаки, за останні роки російський вплив лише збільшився. Російські спецслужби створюють чеськомовні ЗМІ, що стають рупорами пропутінської пропаганди, підкупляють чи шантажують чеських політиків, і все це – через імперські амбіції. І все це для того, щоб підірвати ще нетверду чеську демократію, яка продовжує формуватися, внести безлад, загальмувати інтеграцію Чехії до оборонних та політичних структур Заходу – аби ця центральноєвропейська країна якомога довше залишалася в цупких обіймах скутої санкціями недоімперії.
Відомий чеський журналіст Одржей Кундра в кількох нарисах розповідає про діяльність російських спецслужб в Чехії та Європі взагалі.

Bilge Strateji dergisi yılda iki kere Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (BİLGESAM) tarafından yayınlanan hakemli bir dergidir. EBSCOhost, CIAO ve ASOS tarafından taranmakta ve dizinlenmektedir. Dergide ifade edilen görüş ve fikirler yalnızca yazarlara aittir, BİLGESAM'ın düşünce ve politikasını yansıtan metinler olarak değerlendirilemez. Bilge Strateji Dergisi'nin tüm hakları saklıdır. İzinsiz yayımlanamaz. Kaynak gösterilerek alıntı yapılabilir. BILGESAM's Wise Strategy Journal is a peer-reviewed journal published on a biannual basis.

The evolution of Caspian Sea basin energy transmission networks is entering a crucial phase. Azerbaijan is the crucible where questions concerning the future structure of geo-economic relations in Eurasia (and also therefore crucial aspects of the general geopolitical structure of world politics) are today being resolved. Azerbaijan’s significance arises both from the volume of its natural energy resources and from its irreplaceable role as a bridge from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea basin to the Black Sea basin and Europe. Most recently, this significance has only been underlined by the implementation of a multi-vectored energy export strategy. Long-term and short-term historical perspectives put into relief the significance of the expanding geo-economic energy relations between Greater Central Asia and Greater Southwest Asia.

One of the most significant questions surrounding Russian foreign policy is whether or not Russian president Vladimir Putin has an overarching strategy. This white paper argues that Putin, in fact, is a serious strategist and that he has a grand strategy for Russia and, indeed, the world. It summarizes the debate over whether or not Putin has a grand strategy before examining the key interests driving it. Finally, it examines the threat Russia's strategy poses to vital US national interests. These assertions can be summarized in the points below. • Russian President Vladimir Putin has a grand strategy that he is following. • The threads of this strategy can be seen at the theater/operational level and join together at the grand strategic level. • Russia seeks a veto power over its near abroad and considers the area part of its exclusive sphere of influence. • Russia has entered into a strong alliance with China, one that is mutually beneficial. • Russian recidivism is a threat to US national interests, particularly to NATO and its new members.

In an age where nothing seems clear-cut it is wonderful to have a hero and an even clearer villain. Putin is the new Hitler, an obsessive maniac with no respect for human life. The Ukrainians, by contrast, remind us of our parents and grandparents and their pluck during World War II, when Britain stood alone. But, of course, nothing is ever quite so simple. So, at this stage in the war, what is the balance of the good, the bad and the ugly?

Covid-19 brought to the surface many structural vulnerabilities in the Western Balkans, a European periphery marked by its weak economies and inefficient and underfinanced healthcare and social welfare systems. There has been a pressing need for external support and several external actors (such as the EU, China, Russia and Turkey) have stepped in to provide assistance. Under normal circumstances, the prompt response of a plurality of actors should have been a very positive development for the region. However, this is not entirely the case. External actors have been in direct competition in a fierce race for geopolitical influence and preeminence, striving to position themselves ahead of the others for the challenges and opportunities of the post-pandemic period. The EU distinguishes itself from the other external actors for its comprehensive pandemic-related assistance to the region, which has exceeded €3.3 billion. Its concerns cover a range of priorities, from supporting national healthcare systems to stimulating socioeconomic recovery. The EU has also donated more than 23 million pieces of personal protective equipment, as well as dozens of ambulances, ventilators and intensive care monitors. Moreover, Brussels has given €70 million for the procurement of EU-approved vaccines; promised to provide 651,000 vaccine doses until August 2021; and said it would also deliver more than 1.1 million vaccine doses until June 1 www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/covid-support-western-balkans-health-vaccines/.

The security policy of the Russian Federation has long involved elements of threat to neighbouring countries and forcing the hand of its political partners. In the last decade, Russia has used hybrid modes of warfare to instigate conflicts and instability in its neighbouring countries, while remaining below a certain threshold of violence, allowing it to dodge retaliatory consequences. The authors of the article indicate that the objective of the use of hybrid modes of warfare in Ukraine consists in blurring motives and actors in order to obfuscate a decisive and efficient response. This article argues further that these tactics, if used against a member of the Atlantic Alliance, would effectively allow such an attack to remain below the Article 5 applicability threshold, thereby making it difficult for alliance members to reach consensus on the characterisation of the attack. Even though the member states of NATO and the EU have not been direct targets of Russian actions, former republics of the Soviet Union can be considered to be in the danger zone, based on Russian political statements and its hybrid activities in these countries.

Hai-Nyzhnyk P., Chupriy L., Fihurnyi Y., Krasnodemska I., Chyrkov O. (2018). Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine: ethnonational dimension and civilizational confrontation. Saarbrucken (Germany): LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. 229 p.

The expert-analytical study analyzes the preconditions, course and contemporary socio-political consequences of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation, which has signs of not only direct and covert, but also inter-state conflict and even civilizational confrontation.

In this article for Just Security, the authors explain how the EU institutions (European Commission and External Action Service) and the US are pressing forward with a package assembled by Enlargement Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi, which not only continues their pursuit of electoral law and constitutional changes which would reinforce the power and unaccountability of Bosnia and Herzegovina's political elites, but also put huge swathes of BiH land up for natural asset stripping. In addition, genocide denial and war crimes glorification criminal sanctions imposed by High Representative Valentin Inzko would be on the chopping block. These moves reward allied politicians Milorad Dodik and Dragan Covic, who have jointly driven the ongoing crisis in BiH.

While Eurasianism as a political ideology has made a remarkable comeback to the Russian political scene following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, it has also attracted considerable interest among Turkish political and intellectual circles since the early 1990s. Yet, Eurasianism in the Turkish context has acquired different ideological meanings in time. In this regard, it is possible to highlight two main strands of Eurasianism in Turkey: one focusing on the prospects for advanced integration between Turkey and the Turkic republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and other concentrating on Turkey's strategic cooperation with Russia and China as an alternative to its long-standing ties with the West. While the first approach mainly appeals to nationalistconservative groups in Turkey, the second is supported by the so-called national-patriotic groups. The article aims to discuss Turkey's role in two Eurasia-based international organizations-the Organization of Turkic States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization-as they respectively correspond to the two versions of Eurasianism in Turkey. By analyzing the Turkish governments' policies towards these two organizations, it would also be possible to reveal the influence of Eurasianism as an ideology on Ankara's official approach to the idea of Eurasian integration, in which pragmatic political and economic concerns play an equally important role.

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

Abstract: The security of demand for fossil fuels (crude oil, oil products, natural gas and coal) in the wider Central Europe is determined by energy intensity of economies, economic activity, access to maritime trade and availability of substitutes. Assuming that the Western Balkan countries are (collectively) potential providers of access to maritime trade and specific substitutes, their collective and individual governance (including cross border cooperation, use of infrastructure, urban planning, etc.) determines the actual use of that potential. If the quality of governance is not adequate, it represents an effective barrier to access for overseas traders (to use existing infrastructure), Central European traders (to trade substitutes) and investors into new
infrastructure. The introduction of inadequate governance is a device at disposal of incumbent suppliers to ensure the security of demand. The use of this device remains cost-effective as long as the costs are low, and the resource rents are high. Incumbent suppliers need a certain degree of coordination and coercive capacity of the state to avoid free riders and increase the cost-effectiveness of the device. Such barriers to trade tend to simultaneously increase the costs and risks of supplying energy to some EU consumers and the political risks for the EU as a whole. In the context of climate change, these barriers to access limit policy options and increase the social and political costs of transition to sustainable energy. The countries of the Western Balkan collectively refrain from utilising existing infrastructure and are maximising demand for boondoggle investments in new infrastructure, resource rents and financial liquidity. The likelihood of poverty reduction remains negligible low, while the risks to development aid providers are maximised.

The crisis in Ukraine, which began in 2013, has had significant implications for European security. Cristian Nitoiu identifies three perceived security threats implied by developments in Ukraine and how these threats may develop in future years: the threat of so called 'hybrid warfare' spilling over from the standoff between Ukraine and Russia; the threat posed by nuclear weapons; and the threat posed by more conventional forms of warfare. Perceptions of security threats are arguably more salient than actual threats, most times having a deep influence on the actions of states and other international actors. Hence, they play a key role in the way the EU, Kyiv and Moscow will shape their policies towards each other in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. While Russia can employ a wide range of capabilities, the EU and Ukraine have very few instruments to tackle security threats, be they traditional or non­traditional. In the case of Ukraine, but also more broadly the post­Soviet space, EU­Russia/Ukraine relations are affected by the perception of three types of security threats: so called 'hybrid warfare', nuclear threats and traditional military threats (i.e. territorial invasion). Hybrid warfare In the West and Ukraine the perception of the threat posed by hybrid war has recently increased sharply. The annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine have put the spotlight on the way states engage in conflict by using a series of (sometimes innovative) tools and strategies. Hybrid war combines the use of conventional and non­conventional capabilities, the use of irregular troops, cyber­attacks, support for terrorist, rebel and criminal groups, or the use of the media and civil society for propaganda purposes. In eastern Ukraine in particular we have witnessed a combination of the use of both state and non­state actors by all the sides involved. States tend to use parts of this toolkit even in times of peace, however in such situations these instruments are not combined in order to pursue certain assertive foreign policy goals.

Security challenges arising from hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, HT&HW, are today high on the security agenda not only in Sweden but across the globe. Despite the attention and the growing body of studies on the subject, there is a lack of research bringing attention to how these challenges can be addressed. This article contributes to such an approach by sharing the findings of a project that brings together practitioners and scholarly perspectives on this subject spanning the threats themselves as well as the tools and means to counter them. The article outlines the Western response to hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. It is argued that there is no single response to HT&HW, nor to building resilience. HT&HW needs to be addressed through a comprehensive, all-inclusive approach. Finally, the article outlines how we address these challenges in practice.

del 1991 è stato spesso sottovalutato in Russia. La tesi uffi ciale di Mosca è anzi che "in Ucraina sia in atto una sistematica operazione antirussa, iniziata con "rivoluzione arancione" del 2004, ripresa con la rivolta di Maidan del 2013, preparata e pilotata da agenti segreti occidentali (Usa)". Mentre dagli Usa, Brzesinksi -"il più accanito russofobo occidentale" -sostiene che le ambizioni neoimperiali della Russia non possono realizzarsi senza l'Ucraina e dunque è qui che si deve agire per impedirle. In risposta al quale Korovin, allievo del geopolitico Dugin, già dal 2008 proponeva la "linea di Stalin", ossia una spartizione dell'Ucraina che trascenda l'annessione della Crimea del 2014.

since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russian leaders (especially Gorbachev and Yeltsin) have struggled to be part of the international community as a great power. Facing a reluctance — if not isolation — caused by a Cold-War paradigm which takes the form of Atlanticism, the Russian Federation had to shift from Western integration to the re-establishment of regional influence. This shift has several justifications aside from Russian international exclusion: first, when Putin was elected, Russia was slowly recovering from its collapse, thus had more leverage to initiate regional influence. Moreover, and to counter Atlanticist exclusion, Putin headed towards regional influence to set up Russia for the upcoming multi-polar world — by opposition with the ‘New World Order’ presented by the United States at the end of the Cold War. The question whether Russia is a normal great power or a hegemon implies different implications: first, considering the West-oriented current world order, is an objective assessment of both terms and both terms applied to Russia objective? Does Russia meet the criterions for being called a great power? Does it tend to be a hegemon?
As a matter of fact, the answer can vary according to one’s view but also and essentially according to one’s perspective. Consequently, I will first attempt to contextualise the tensions between the West and Russia which led the latter to oppose the former and thus to tend toward hegemonism. Second, one will have a look at the differences between a great power and a hegemon as an attempt to apply as objectively as possible the different criterions on Russia to determine whether it is an hegemon. Moreover,  Russia’s heritage provides a comprehensive explanation for its foreign policy choices. The final point will be that by becoming a regional hegemon, Russia can pretend to a normal great power status as it is the contemporary requirement for playing the role to which it aspire to in international affairs.

On January 27th 2015, in the case of Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decided, by five votes to two, that a child born by surrogacy abroad and those who ordered him enjoy protection of the right to family life even though the child was obtained fraudulently, against payment, without genetic link and after a very short period of cohabitation. The Court concluded that Italy could refuse to recognise the filiation established in Russia, but that taking the child away from the sponsors infringed their right to private and family life.