State of Emergency

The author focuses on certain aspects of the role of the President of the Republic in relation to the State of Emergency. After presenting the regulation of the State of Emergency and the President's powers in that area, he concludes that the said regulation is often indeterminate. He furnishes some examples – beginning with the very notion of »State of Emergency« – in order to show why this is a problem. In the central part of the text he presents three possible interpretations of the powers of the President in a State of Emergency, and supports the one he considers to be the most balanced insofar as the principles of efficiency, independency and responsibility (of the President) are concerned. Finally, he addresses the issue of President's responsibility for acts commited during the State of Emergency.

Après une multiplication des écarts à la procédure constitutionnelle durant les deux conflits mondiaux, la Suisse a vu sa population se mobiliser et recourir à un instrument de dé-mocratie directe pour réclamer la sortie de cet état d'exception. En septembre 1949, l'initiative populaire « Retour à la démocratie directe » est ainsi acceptée par le peuple et les Cantons et contribue à mettre fin à l'expérience suisse la plus récente du régime d'exception. Ce cas nous permet-il de réfuter l'hypothèse de l'extension infinie du droit d'exception qui, selon Agamben, témoigne que le « paradigme biopolitique de l'Occident est aujourd'hui le camp et non pas la cité » (Agamben 1997, 179) et d'affirmer qu'il existe une voie de sortie démocratique à la velléité de construction de l'État d'exception permanent ? Dans le présent article, nous montrons que si le droit d'initiative garanti par le modèle démocratique direct suisse obvie à la construction du « camp comme nomos de la modernité » (Agamben 1997, 179), il permet au peuple conçu comme souverain de porter lui-même atteinte aux fondamentaux de la démocratie, introduisant une forme d'« exception démocratique ». Mots-clés : état d'exception, démocratie directe, initiative et référendum, Agamben, Suisse, souveraineté, pleins pouvoirs.

Summary: After the First and Second World War period, during which the constitutional democratic procedure was largely suspended, the Swiss population mobilised and launched direct democratic procedures to put an end to this state of exception. In September 1949, the people and the federal state accepted the popular initiative " Back to direct democracy " (Retour à la démocratie directe), a vote that marked the end of the most recent experience of the state of exception in Switzerland. Does this case allow us to refute Agamben's hypothesis of the infinite extension of the state of exception, according to which " today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West " (Agamben 1998, 102), and to claim that there is a democratic way to stop the production of the permanent state of exception ? In the present article, we show that, if the initiative right granted by the Swiss democratic model can prevent the construction of the " camp as the 'nomos' of the modern " (Agamben 1998, 95), it also introduces the possibility for the sovereign people to infringe basic democratic principles, thus opening the way to forms of 'democratic exception'.

Monografia dotyczy problemu legitymizacji działań władzy publicznej podejmowanych w obliczu zagrożenia, którego skala oraz szybkość eskalacji pozwala na stwierdzenie wystąpienia sytuacji nadzwyczajnej (public emergency). Praca ma odpowiedzieć na pytanie czy aktywność podejmowana w celu jej opanowania powinna zawsze znajdować podstawę w prawie pozytywnym, czy, przynajmniej w niektórych przypadkach, może opierać się na sytuacyjnej konieczności? Dogmatyczne nauki prawne nie dostarczają pełnej odpowiedzi na to pytanie. Traktują one zjawisko public emergency przede wszystkim jako tło dla analiz norm prawa pozytywnego. Niniejsza praca ma wyjaśnić, w jaki sposób reakcja organów państwa na sytuację nadzwyczajną wpisuje się w określoną filozofię prawa, warunkującą procesy jego tworzenia, stosowania i obowiązywania. Autor porusza szereg kwestii o charakterze metaprawnym. Szczególnym zagrożeniom publicznym towarzyszyć mogą kontrowersyjne działania legislacyjne, jak również rozwój aktywizmu sędziowskiego – stanowiącego wyraz współdziałania wymiaru sprawiedliwości z władzą wykonawczą lub, przeciwnie, zmierzającego do zapobieżenia nadużyciom tej władzy w szczególnych okolicznościach. Zmianie ulega sposób argumentacji prawniczej i metody wykładni. Zwiększa się skala występowania tzw. zdarzeń granicznych, które filozofia prawa zna i rozpatruje pod nazwą trudnych przypadków.

Die aktuelle globale Ausnahmesituation unterscheidet sich vom klassischen Verständnis eines politischen oder juridischen »Ausnahmezustands« und entlarvt nicht nur das Konzept der souveränen Entscheidung über den Ausnahmezustand als Illusion, sondern affiziert auch das Verständnis souveräner Macht als solcher. Die Versuche »souveräner Gesten« wie Sie Donald Trump, Boris Johnson oder Jair Bolsonaro an den Tag gelegt haben, erwiesen sich alsbald als lächerlich. Auch Aussagen des österreichischen Kanzlers Sebastian Kurz lassen sich in diesem Kontext strukturell entlarven. Giorgio Agambens nun abgeschlossenes Homo-Sacer-Projekt macht dagegen Kriterien sichtbar für die »destituierende Potenz« einer »kommenden Politik«, die jedoch nicht auf eine chronologisch künftige Zeit verweist, sonder im »Hier-und-Jetzt« wirksam wird.
(Der Text erscheint als Anhang zu einer Einführung in die Begriffe und die Methodik des Agamben'schen Denkens, sowie ein affirmatives Verständnis seiner Hinweise zu einer "kommenden Politik" im Kontext des Homo-Sacer-Projekts.)

*Winner of the 2017 IALT Kevin Boyle Book Prize for Outstanding Legal Scholarship*

What does it mean to say we live in a permanent state of emergency? What are the juridical, political and social underpinnings of that framing? Has international law played a role in producing or challenging the paradigm of normalised emergency? How should we understand the relationship between imperialism, race and emergency legal regimes? In addressing such questions, this book situates emergency doctrine in historical context. The book has three main aims, broadly mirrored by the three parts into which it is structured. First, it seeks to illustrate some of the particular colonial lineages that have helped shape the concept of the state of emergency, and to emphasise that contemporary formations of emergency governance are often better understood not as new or exceptional, but as part of an ongoing historical constellation of emergency politics. Second, it demonstrates the direct influence of colonial legal traditions on the normative content of contemporary international law in relation to emergency doctrine and human rights derogation provisions. Third, it appraises the continuing legacy of these colonial legal traditions through contemporary settler colonial contexts where emergency powers are deployed in a racialised fashion. With such emergency interventionism facilitated by international law’s doctrine, and unsanctioned by its institutions, we are forced to reckon with fundamental questions about the nature of law and its relation to physical and structural violence.

. By "impasse," I point to the ideological loop that paternalistic authority resorts to in the name of governance, where a repressive, corrupt, and/or un-democratic governmental apparatus is blamed for the underdeveloped political rationality of its citizens. For the very same reason, sovereignty as domination is justified in order to protect these masses from their own unruly nature, that is, from becoming members of crowds as opposed to proper citizens. Examining the humor surrounding the electronic circulation of an identification document, amidst attempts to roll out a national ID card during the Emergency, I draw attention to the limits of the non-ancestral mode of political power that attempted to interpellate a new kind of citizen. My analysis of a photograph, that was later censored, of a man kicking an official in military uniform suggests that the crowd forms the always-threatening backdrop against which a range of individual and collective identities of the citizen are articulated. On an analytical level, I develop a theory of "picture-thinking" as a key function of sovereignty. I take the formulation from William Mazzarella who, following G. W. F. Hegel and Gustave Le Bon, historicizes the purported opposition between so-called rational

RESUMEN: Desde las tradiciones de la criminología crítica y los planteamientos de Agamben y Mbembe se intenta hacer unas reflexiones iniciales sobre los operativos policiales, la militarización de la seguridad ciudadana, el uso de la fuerza y el derecho a la vida en la Venezuela post-Chávez. La idea central es que el incremento de la violencia institucional durante las casi dos décadas de gobiernos del chavismo, más que presentar rupturas con los gobiernos anteriores, constituye parte de un continuo proceso de precariedad y deterioro de las instituciones cuya función manifiesta es la reducción y contención de la violencia. Paradójicamente la operatividad de estas instituciones termina potenciando la violencia en beneficio de los actores que coyunturalmente las dirigen. Palabras claves: Operativos policiales, militarización, uso de la fuerza, derecho a la vida, estado de excepción, necropolítica, Venezuela.

ABSTRACT: From the traditions of critical criminology and the approaches of Agamben and Mbembe, I tried to make some initial reflections about police operations, the militarization of citizen security, the use of force and the right to life in post-Chávez Venezuela. The main purpose of this paper is based on the idea that the increase of institutional violence during the almost two decades of chavism governments, more than ruptures with the previous governments, is part of a continuous process of precariousness and deterioration of the institutions of Venezuela. Although the manifest function of the aforementioned institutions

In 2016, Donald Trump was elected US President. Many across the globe are concerned he plans to institute a dictatorship, which is supposedly contrary to liberal–democratic values. Yet, despite current public opinion, republics like the US regularly resort to dictatorship, while a need for dictatorship has been recognized by prominent republican thinkers. This study presents the ‘hidden history’ of dictatorship, analyzes justifications for dictatorship, and proposes a theory of the institution. You will read a paradoxical tale, describing how the quest for absolute freedom is also bound up with bouts of tyranny.

This article examines the relation between emergency legal doctrine and racial sovereignty in the context of Palestine. It theorises Israel's multifarious emergency modalities in a colonial present paradigm where traditional territorial colonisation is fused with modern security biopolitics. The Israeli juridical-security apparatus mimics European liberal legalism in presenting itself as generally accepting of human rights obligations, save in circumstances where particular illiberal measures are necessitated on security grounds. These measures, however, comprise a pervasive patchwork of emergency modalities that have penetrated all spheres of Palestinian political, economic and cultural life. The retention and application of the British Mandate-era Defence Emergency Regulations as well as the constitutional state of emergency have produced an emergency marked by longevity and racialisation. Furthermore, Israel has invoked the emergency derogation option under international treaties to claim the legality of measures such as mass internment without trial. I articulate these dynamics of legality, emergency and sovereignty in terms of "repressive inclusion": a racially contingent inclusion within – and repression by – the juridical order. This evokes the suffocating hold of racialised emergency legal structures. The consequences for lives and bodies have been severe; the alienation of land and fragmentation of territory have been acute.

*NOTE: final, published version is "'Master Metaphor': Environmental Apocalypse and the Settler States of Emergency" (in _Resilience_ 8, 1, 2021, 60-81).
which can be found here: https://www.academia.edu/45569872/_Master_Metaphor_Environmental_Apocalypse_and_the_Settler_States_of_Emergency

Apocalypse can be a framework for lived experience that a genealogy of the literary genre can help us understand. Indeed, we know from Patrick Wolfe that settler-colonialism is not an event, but a structure taking land as its primary object, and Kyle Powys Whyte’s work reminds us that the structure of settler colonialism is a reality of past and ongoing apocalypse. The literary genre, however,  typically regards the unsettling end of a (white) world. Yet, a genealogy of the literary genre shows that the genre has the potential for rupturing the exceptionalism inherent to its narrative emergency structure once situated in the context of the lived structural realities of settler colonialism. Moreover, a genealogy of American apocalypse helps us articulate the stakes of using the genre of apocalypse to narrate environmental crisis and the systems of violence coterminous with climate change.

The subject of the article is the problem of public burdens in the form of personal and in-kind contributions in the event of a state of natural disaster. The state of natural disaster justifies the need for the legislator to refer to the idea of a special sacrifice for the public interest, which is expressed in the activation of the mechanism of constitutional public contributions, both personal and in-kind contributions.

El artículo es un estudio de caso que evalúa el estado de emergencia recientemente instaurado y prorrogado de manera sucesiva en la Provincia Constitucional de El Callao (Perú), para enfrentar un problema de inseguridad ciudadana provocado por la delincuencia común y el crimen organizado. Revisa ciertos aspectos de la aplicación del instituto de excepción constitucional en la práctica, y en particular examina dos problemas centrales: de un lado, el de si la amenaza definida por el Ejecutivo supone una afectación a la vida de la nación y, de otro lado, el de si se respeta el principio de temporalidad; ambas, exigencias establecidas por la Constitución peruana y por el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos. El artículo concluye que no está justificado y es, más bien, ilegítimo el mantenimiento del estado de emergencia en El Callao, a la luz de la Constitución peruana y de los estándares del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos.

In this essay, we explore what is at stake for Kurdish theatre artists who develop their theatre praxis in a permanent state of emergency imposed by the Turkish government, and why it matters to act, both in the general sense and in the theatrical one, in a language that is neither the accepted one of the nation nor of the majority culture. This essay discusses interviews with five prominent Kurdish theatre artists, some based in Turkey and others currently in exile in Europe. The respondents included costume designer Ismail Oyur Tezcanli (based in Turkey), playwright Yusuf Unay (in Turkey), actor and director Mîrza Metin (currently in Germany), instructor and director Rezan Aksoy (in Germany), and director Celil Toksöz (in the Netherlands, though not in exile).

Military and humanitarian interventions have become common- place in recent years, provoking some to suggest that the right to intervene in the face of an emergency has become a new global norm. Emergencies and interventions pose unique challenges for political and legal theories of sovereignty, legitimacy, and democracy. Political anthropologists and other social scientists have focused on critiques of sovereign power and military and humanitarian interventions, but more attention to the cultural aspects of how emergencies operate and to the positive and negative effects they might have on political and social life is needed.

The paper looks at the decision adopted by the Turkish authorities to suspend the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) in the wake of the attempted military putsch of July 2016. Derogations from some - but not all - human rights are permissible under Article 15 of the ECHR when a state party is faced with a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation. Extraordinary measures can thus be adopted to address the situation in the attempt to restore normalcy. However, substantial as well as procedural obligations must be complied with while implementing emergency measures. The note will first address whether the situation prevailing in Turkey falls within the scope of Article 15. It will then examine if the emergency measures adopted are compatible with the substantial requirements imposed by the provision. Finally, it will assess whether the decision to derogate was notified in accordance with the procedures set out in Article 15. The analysis will be based on a perusal of Article 15 as interpreted by the European Court and European Commission of Human Rights. The note concludes that, while resort to the derogation clause is probably warranted, some of the measures adopted by the Turkish authorities are difficult to justify, as they seem to go beyond what is strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.

The article discusses an issue of the church autocephaly in the perspective of inter-Orthodox relations through the glasses of the Carl Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty. The author starts from the premise that the concept of autocephaly is synonymous with sovereignty in the area of the inter-Orthodox relations. He uses the Carl Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty-as-exception as an analytical tool. A proclamation of autocephaly by the local church becomes a decision introducing a state of emergency (exception), from which, in turn, sovereignty is born. As an example, the article considers the history of the Russian autocephaly proclamation. The article also introduces the distinction between sovereignty and its limited version, which arises in situations when church-mother grants autocephaly to her part. The author emphasizes the self-proclamation of the autocephaly and the unity of the church jurisdiction on the territory, which proclaimed autocephaly, as characteristics of the “sovereign autocephaly”. Also he describes an alternative model which gives the Church of Constantinople sovereignty in the Pan-Orthodox scale on the basis of her primacy of honour in the Orthodox diptychs. The article considers the conditions of the organization of Pan-Orthodox council as over- autocephalous institution that has the supreme authority in the Orthodox Church. The author concludes that the council as the supreme hierarchical institution operates when the autocephalous churches voluntarily limit their own sovereignty.

Türkiye, 21 Temmuz 2016 tarihinde Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Sekreterine yaptığı bildirimle, 1966 tarihli Birleşmiş Milletler Kişisel ve Siyasal Haklar Sözleşmesi (KHSHUS) m. 4/3’e dayanarak birçok madde açısından “derogation” hakkını kullandığını açıklamıştır . Türkiye’nin beyanında hangi önlemlerin alınacağı veya önlemlerin hangi maddeyi ne şekilde etkileyeceği hususunda somutlaştırmaya gidilmemiş; genel olarak, yukarıda sayılan maddelerde öngörülen yükümlülüklere aykırı düşebilecek önlemlerin “alınabileceği” bildirilmiştir.
Aynı tarihte Türkiye’nin Daimi Temsilcisi tarafından Avrupa Konseyi’ne yapılan bildirimle, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi m. 15’e dayanarak Türkiye’nin “derogation” hakkını kullandığı bildirilmiştir . BM’ye yapılan bildirimden farklı olarak, bu sefer, alınacak tedbirlerden etkilenecek maddeler soyut olarak dâhi gösterilmemiş; dilde de biraz farklılık ile, Sözleşme’nin 15. maddesine dayanarak, OHAL kapsamında alınacak tedbirlerin AİHS’ten doğan yükümlülüklere aykırı düşebileceği belirtilmiştir.
Belirtmek gerekir ki, tartışmaya açık bu yöntemin aynısını, 24 Kasım 2015 tarihli askıya alma beyanında Fransa da kullanmıştır. Hatta Türkiye’nin genel olarak Fransa’yı “taklit” ettiği söylenebilir zira Fransa’nın BM’ye yaptığı bildirim, aynen bizimki gibi, bazı maddelerin sayılması yöntemini izlemiştir. Ancak Fransa, BM KSHUS açısından sadece 3 maddeyi (9, 12, 17) saymışken, Türkiye’nin beyanının kapsamı çok geniştir .
Tebliğimin konusu AİHS ile sınırlı olduğundan, BM KSHUS açısından detaylı değerlendirme yapmayacağım. Ancak AİHS m. 15 hükmünün dayanağının aslında BM Sözleşmesindeki 4. madde hükmü olduğunu vurgulamak isterim . Bu açıdan, KSHUS m. 4 hükmüne ilişkin İnsan Hakları Komitesi içtihadını ve özellikle de 29 no.lu Genel Yorumu  dikkate almanın gerekli olduğunu belirtmek gerekir.

On 15th June of 2016, a coup attempt produced violent clashes between a faction of the army and citizens in Turkey. The Turkish parliament was bombed, thereupon 248 citizens were killed and 2196 citizens were injured. The reaction of the government was very excessive. A state of emergency, which is still in effect now, was declared. In that process, more than 50,000 people including journalists and judges have been arrested and 150,000 people including academics were suspended from employment and many media outlets and associations were dissolved. Additionally, a large number of statutes have been amended. All of those were implemented by means of emergency decrees having the force of statutes. So much so that Turkey has been governed through emergency decrees for the past year and half. In this paper, I will explain the emergency decree system in which the executive power is entitled to issue any decree without authorization of the parliament and analyse the " de-constitutionalization " caused by this system. Those issues will be described under two titles. Under the first title, the provisions of the Turkish Constitution being in concordance with the international minimum standards for regimes of exception and the objective appearance of the system will be presented. Afterwards it will be described how those guarantees stay just on paper and how the constitutional reality emerges. In this context, firstly, the constitutional gaps creating obstacle for political control of the Parliament and review of the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) on the emergency decrees will be set forth. By doing so, the need in Turkey for institutions such as " unconstitutionality through omission " and " Organstreit " will be emphasized. The main argument of the first title is that some of the guarantees concerning the state of emergency in Turkey have the characteristics of " lex imperfecta " , in the Kelsenian sense of the term. Under the second title, focus will be given to the consequences resulting from a lack of any check and control system. In this regard, the concrete instances which could be considered a " perforation of the Constitution " (Verfassungsdurchbrechung), in the Schmittian sense of the term, will be presented. The main argument of the second title is that the lack of control on emergency law of either the parliament or the TCC Court to certain paradoxical consequences, i.e. transformation of " emergency decrees having the force of statute " into

Over the last twenty years, the political situation and the overall framework for democracy and human rights in Algeria has experienced contrasting trends. Following a short period of political liberalization induced by the popular uprising of October 1988, the country went through a bloody civil war that deeply marked Algerian society. Paradoxically, it was during this “black decade” that civil society activism thrived and the number of civil society formations grew at an unprecedented rate. The constitutional framework and its enforcement mechanisms suggest that the conditions for the development of civil society organizations are met. Algeria’s 1989 constitution (revised in 1996) guarantees freedom of expression, association and assembly to all citizens. In reality, however, and in spite of Algerian legislation’s apparent conformity with international human rights principles, freedom of association remains subject to arbitrary
Government policies, and citizens’ right to assemble, demonstrate and publicly express themselves is contravened by the state of emergency that has been illegally maintained
for several years (and lifted in 2011).
Thus, any study on the status of Algerian civil society must first address the aftermath of the Civil War (1991-2000).

Kuramsal tartışmalar, neyin şiddet olduğuna ve şiddetin etik veya siyasi meşruluk ekseninde nasıl kavranması gerektiğine ilişkin net bir yaklaşım ortaya koyamamışlarsa da devlet ve şiddet arasında karşılıklı bir zorunluluk ilişkisi vardır. Bu bağlamda birçok modern ulus-devlet gibi Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihini de “şiddet” üzerinden okumak mümkündür. Zira modern devletlerin kurulma süreçlerinde olduğu gibi tahkim edilme süreçlerinde de şiddet, merkezî bir konumda yer almıştır. Bu noktada özellikle Türkiye’de, devletin politik şiddet mekanizmalarını devreye sokma biçimleri açısından 90’lar özel bir yer tutar. Çünkü bu dönem, devlet şiddetinin en ciddi boyutlarda yaşandığı bir aralığa tekabül eder. Devlet şiddetinin sürekliliğini ele almamızla ilişkili olarak birçok örnekleme rastlayacağımız bu dönem üzerinden hareketle, ulus-devlet formuna sıkıştırılmış Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin şiddet üzerinden -şiddete ilişkin kuramsal verilerden de faydalanarak- bir kritiği yapılacak olup şiddet ile devlet arasındaki zorunluluk ilişkisi ele alınacaktır. Öte yandan bugün Kürt illeri özelinde 90’ları mümkün kılan siyasal ve toplumsal koşulların, kısmi dönüşümler geçirse de öz itibariyle sürmekte olduğu savunulacaktır.

Konflikty zbrojne stanowi¹ce widmo dla bezpieczeñstwa pañstwa, dzisiaj nie s¹ postrzegane jako g³ówne zagro¿enie dla ³adu w pañstwie. Coraz wiêkszego znaczenia na-bieraj¹ zagro¿enia o charakterze niemilitarnym, które stanowi¹ nowe wyzwanie dla bezpieczeñstwa. Globalizacja przynios³a wiele dobrego, ale równie¿ wiele niebezpieczeñstw, które powinny na sta³e pojawiae siê w oewiadomooeci ka¿dego cz³owieka. Ta sama globalizacja, która u³atwia nam podró¿owanie, poszerza mo¿liwooeci prowadzenia miêdzynarodowego biznesu b¹dŸ sprzyja wymianie informacji, u³atwia równie¿ rozprzestrzenianie siê chorób, handel ludŸmi, ale tak¿e sprawia, ¿e procesy, które kiedyoe przebiega³y w znacznie wolniejszym tempie, dzisiaj zintensyfikowa³y siê, co nie w ka¿dym przypadku jest korzystne. Wspó³czesny cz³owiek wykorzystuj¹c mo¿liwooeci jakie przyniós³ mu rozwój nowych technologii, coraz intensywniej ingeruje w oewiat natury. Dokonuje siê eksperymentów, które kiedyoe nie mia³y racji bytu, wysy³a rakiety i statki kosmiczne w kosmos, ale przede wszystkim zanieczyszcza oerodowisko znacznie intensywniej ni¿ kilka lat wczeoeniej. W efekcie zniszczeniu ulega warstwa ozonowa chroni¹ca ziemiê przed promieniami s³onecznymi. Cz³owiek, zw³aszcza emituj¹c gazy cieplarniane przyczynia siê do zmian w klimacie 1 , topniej¹ lodowce, podnosi siê poziom wody w oceanach, zwiêkszy³a siê czêstotliwooeae i si³a, a tak¿e zakres obszarów wystêpowania ekstremalnych zjawisk pogodowych. Ocieplenie klimatu nie jest jednak równomierne. Czêoeae oewiata cierpi bardziej, ni¿ pozostali. W najtrudniejszej sytuacji znajduj¹ siê biedne pañstwa, które z jednej strony w najmniejszym stopniu przyczy-niaj¹ siê do zmian w klimacie, a które z drugiej strony nie dysponuj¹ oerodkami pozwa-laj¹cymi im za³agodziae efektów globalnego ocieplenia, s¹ to pañstwa które uzale¿nione s¹ w du¿ym stopniu od pomocy z zewn¹trz 2 . Jednym z groŸniejszych zjawisk, jakie s¹ efektem zmian w klimacie s¹ huragany. Pozostaje pytanie, dlaczego ich ilooeae i si³a za-le¿¹ od zmian w klimacie. By powsta³ huragan, jednym z niezbêdnych warunków jest wzrost temperatury wody w oceanach 3 , a zatem ocieplenie klimatu sprzyja ich krystalizowaniu siê. Dodatkowo wzrastaj¹cy poziom wody w oceanach, co jest efektem top-niej¹cych lodowców i wiecznej zmarzliny jedynie wzmaga ich si³ê. Zjawisko nie jest novum, jednak zauwa¿yae mo¿na, ¿e czêstotliwooeae i si³a wystêpuj¹cych huraganów wzros³y. Tym samym sta³y siê one nowym wyzwaniem dla bezpieczeñstwa pañstwa. 1 H. Welzer, Wojny klimatyczne, Warszawa 2010, s. 52-53. 2 Ibidem, s. 54-55. 3 TVN24, Zobacz jak rodzi siê huragan, http://www.tvn24.pl/pogoda,7/zobacz-jak-rodzi-sie-huragan,57414.html, 10.01.2014.

El artículo muestra que el empleo del estado de emergencia se halla "normalizado" en Perú. Analiza las deficiencias de la legislación sobre la materia, en particular su carácter fragmentario, incompleto y carente de sistematicidad, como también la insuficiencia de la jurisprudencia constitucional. Propone un cambio en la Constitución que regule tres modalidades de régimen de excepción, en vez de dos, de suerte de incorporar como modalidad autónoma el estado de alarma observable en otros ordenamientos constitucionales. Plantea introducir controles más eficaces sobre el modelo de autoinvestidura para la proclamación del estado de emergencia y la asunción de los poderes excepcionales por el Ejecutivo. Defiende una lectura de las causales de emergencia constitucional, a la luz del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, de manera de exigir siempre que exista una situación de afectación de la vida nacional (una "amenaza existencial"). Y procura un cumplimiento estricto del principio de temporalidad, mediante una adaptación del principio de "escala creciente de mayorías" sostenido por Bruce Ackerman.

During the past years it has become fashionable to declare state of humanitarian emergency in case of migratory movements, perceived by the country of destination as an extraordinary event, in order to justify the introduction of heavy securitizing measures or to avert the burden of responsibility to the fellow member states or to the EU. The state of emergency rhetoric was used by Italy on several occasions when dealing with great migratory waves from the late 90s’onwards. The current refugee/migration crisis revived the state of emergency rhetoric used by various EU and non-EU countries, such as Greece, Hungary, Italy or Macedonia. The declarations of state of emergency enabled various state leaders to elaborate measures which under normal conditions wouldn’t be allowed, varying from the closure of Schengen borders, to the building of technical fences and the deployment of the national army etc. These measures subscribe within a successful act of securitization as elaborated by the representatives of the Copenhagen School. Accordingly, this study aims to investigate the existing link between the use of the state of emergency rhetoric during the current refugee/migration crisis in Hungary and the elaborated governing processes, translated through the implementation of certain extraordinary policy measures. Concerning the theoretical pillar of the research we propose to implement Giorgio Agamben’s state of exception paradigm.

This paper uses Giorgio Agamben’s “State of Exception” as a theoretical approach that allows us to see how Emergency laws and legislations operate in the region as mechanisms of control, relying on Egypt as a case study. In 2011 the toppling of Hosni Mubarak ended 44 years of Emergency Legislation, one of the core grievances behind the Uprisings. However, seven years later Egypt is still under an Emergency Status, which seriously restricts the political space and allows for the continuous breach of human rights. This paper traces Emergency Rule in Egypt from the final days of the Mubarak regime to October 2017, using the ‘State of Exception’ as a means to track power dynamics throughout the country’s turbulent recent history. The paper traces the development and implications of different Emergency Laws being imposed on Egypt, leading to the permanent suspension of human rights and political spaces. In doing this, we aim to provide an analysis of the legal structures that shaped Egyptian politics after Tahrir Square, while also adding to debates on the State of Exception, particularly on its application in the non-Western world.

This submission challenges the UK government's proposals of a presumption to derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) for the actions of its armed forces overseas. A fundamental difficulty with this proposal is the requirement that a state of emergency under Article 15 ECHR must be declared in response to a 'threat to the life of the nation'. The overseas armed conflicts which the UK has been involved in to date to not satisfy this requirement.
Moreover, the proposal for presumptive derogations in British law may damage the legitimacy of the Convention and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) by challenging the value of human rights norms and by placing the ECtHR in a position whereby it may have to pronounce on politically sensitive issues in order to vindicate these rights. This, in turn, may be utilised by other Contracting Parties to undermine the human rights obligations in their respective jurisdictions and further damage the legitimacy of the ECtHR.

Abstract
As an ideology of modern age, militarism is the dominance of values, norms and mentalities pertaining to the army and military to all areas of social life by being canonized. Manifesting itself by the fact that violent-based sensation and way of understanding takes whole civilian field of life under control, militarism brings an understanding of interventionist ruling where the tools of enforcement of the state is brought forward instead of a deliberative democratic politics for the resolution of any kind of problems. The fact that any kind of public opposition is criminalized with the mentality of warfare state under the guidance of reason of economics as of the 1980s globally has also caused that the modern state has transformed into a paramilitary police state at the end of the 20th century. Militarist mentality was mobilized again and civilian field is encircled with this mentality to ensure that field of democratic politics is occupied by the warfare state.  Holding the militarist mentality as articulated to the reason of the state from the day of its establishment in its reserve, Turkish Republic has responded to the Kurdish Problem, which emerged in early 1980s, with the reflexes of a warfare state. Especially, for about ten years from the early 1990s, reason of state based on militarist post-politics has played a significant role in Turkey. While the Process of Resolution, started to be executed from mid-2009 by JDP (AKP) governments, seemed to downgrade the militarist essence in the social texture, militarist essence was enlivened again after the elections in 07 June 2015. We have discussed militarism as a practice of power, problematized it based on the atmosphere of conflict that occurred after the elections in 07 June 2015 and tried to assess how and to what extent it does criminalize/terrorize the field of democratic politics by examining the militarist discourse in the first pages of newspapers.

Keywords:  Militarist language, friend-enemy relationship, conspirational understanding, warfare state, militarist post-politics, state of exception/state of emergency, constant crisis state, permanent state of emergency.

Özet
Modern çağın bir ideolojisi olarak militarizm, ordu ve askerliğe dair değer, norm ve zihniyetin yüceltilerek toplumsal yaşamın her alanına egemen olmasıdır. Şiddet temelli duygu halinin ve olayları kavrayış biçiminin sivil yaşam alanını bütünüyle kontrol altına almasıyla kendini gösteren militarizm, her türlü sorunun çözümünde müzakereci demokratik siyasetin yerine devletin zor aygıtlarının ön plana çıktığı müdahaleci bir yönetim anlayışını getirmektedir. Küresel anlamda 80’lerden itibaren her türlü toplumsal muhalefetin ekonomik aklın güdümünde güvenlikçi devlet zihniyeti ile kriminalize edilmesi, 20. yüzyılın sonunda modern devletin paramiliter bir polis devletine doğru dönüşmesinin de yolunu açmıştır. Demokratik siyaset alanının güvenlikçi devlet tarafından işgal edilebilmesi adına militarist zihniyet yeniden tedavüle sokulmuş ve sivil alan bu zihniyetle kuşatılmıştır.  Kuruluş anından itibaren devlet aklına eklemlenmiş olan militarist zihniyeti sürekli yedeğinde tutan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti de, 80’lerin başında ortaya çıkan Kürt sorununa, güvenlikçi devlet refleksi ile karşılık vermiştir. Özelikle 90’ların başından itibaren yaklaşık on yıl boyunca militarist post-politikaya dayalı devlet aklı Türkiye’de etkin bir rol oynamıştır. AKP iktidarlarının 2009 yılı ortalarından itibaren yürütmeye başladığı Çözüm Süreci, toplumsal dokudaki militarist özü kısmen geriletmiş gözükse de 7 Haziran 2015 seçimleri sonrasında militarist öz yeniden canlanmıştır. Bu çalışmada bir iktidar pratiği olarak ele alınan militarizm, 7 Haziran 2015 seçimleri sonrasında yaşanan çatışma ortamı üzerinden sorunsallaştırılmış ve demokratik siyaset alanını nasıl ve ne derece krimanilize/terörize ettiği gazete ana sayfalarındaki militarist söylem analitik olarak incelenerek değerlendirilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Militarist dil, dost-düşman ilişkisi, komplocu kavrayış, güvenlikçi devlet, militarist post-politika, istisna hali/olağanüstü hal, daimi kriz devleti, kalıcı olağanüstü hal.

[Life or Survival, What Comes First? An Analysis of the Slovak Parliamentary Discourse on the Surveillance of Cell Phone Locations during the COVID-19 Pandemic]

Táto kapitola reaguje na výzvu (nielen) pre štúdiá sledovania, aby sa aktívne zapojili do analýzy existujúcej rýchlo sa meniacej situácie (French a Monahan 2020, 8), a to aj pri rizikách, že niektoré jej závery sa v horizonte najbližších rokov ukážu ako prekonané a že obmedzený časový priestor na akademickú reflexiu limituje aj zdroje dát, o ktoré sa analýza opiera. Cieľom kapitoly je preskúmať mechanizmy sledovania polohy mobilných telefónov z hľadiska rámcov, ktoré vzišli z parlamentnej rozpravy o jej spustení, ako aj konkrétnych udalostí smerujúcich k jej nasadeniu. Skúmanie je zasadené do kontextu širšieho spektra rozhodnutí slovenských štátnych orgánov vo vzťahu k pandémii, predovšetkým ochoty marginalizovať význam zákonodarného zboru a v menšej miere aj exekutívy pri vynášaní určujúcich rozhodnutí pre individuálne práva a slobody. Teoretickým rámcom na analýzu je chápanie stavu výnimky ako kľúčového momentu politickej zmeny: ako ukazuje prehľad niektorých popredných právno-politických mysliteľov, ktorí sa stavom výnimky zaoberali, práve tieto momenty sú testom kvality demokratického režimu.

Analýza ukazuje, že parlamentná diskusia o návrhoch sledovania polohy mobilných telefónov bola snahou čeliť netransparentným mechanizmom výnimky, ktoré charakterizovali prijatie mechanizmu povinnej štátnej karantény po návrate zo zahraničia bez zapojenia parlamentu. Legislatívne „odobrenie“ mechanizmu síce indikuje nízku mieru obáv zo zneužitia (v pomere k obavám z chýbajúceho zodpovedajúceho mechanizmu), ale minimálne nepodporuje model „administratívnej diktatúry“ (pozri podkapitolu Sledovanie a stav výnimky). Sledovací mechanizmus bol teda zavedený v súlade s etablovanými procesmi, hoci zo strany demokratických aktérov bolo možné pozorovať bagatelizovanie jeho vplyvov na citlivosť voči ochrane základných práv a slobôd. Tento trend zníženej citlivosti má potenciál preniesť sa na verejnosť o to viac, že primárnym adresátom obmedzení bola špecificky vymedzená menšina obyvateľstva (navrátilci zo zahraničia), s ktorých právami sa veľká časť občianok a občanov nemusela stotožniť vzhľadom na špecifickosť okolností a nízky vplyv obmedzení na väčšinu. Snaha o sledovanie polohy mobilných telefónov ilustruje nízku odolnosť voči podkopaniu ľudskoprávnych štandardov v čase výnimočnej situácie.

On March 30, the Hungarian parliament adopted legislation providing for "emergency powers" to better respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. The international reaction has been quite predictable, with critics of Prime Minister Orbán calling it a "power grab." As often happens during times of crisis (in this case, a pandemic) people are in the grip of intense emotions-so it behooves us to stand up for the truth.

Recent political and legal developments within the Arab region have resurrected previously dormant historical debates and endowed them with a new life and vitality. The theory of exceptionality has been prominent within these debates, being repeatedly reasserted in different constitutional drafts, and even celebrated, as a means through which political authority maintain and secure ‘the public order’. Over the course of the 20th century, the debates about the state of emergency being a ‘profoundly elusive and ambivalent concept’  have been analyzed in as an act of political governance. Egypt long lasting rule relying on an emergency context has provided a worthy manifestation of how emergency rule had been installed in political and legal settings; and become presented as an only way to govern. The emergency rule had been incorporated in different constitutions and manifested into a political exercise. we argue in this matter that to why post-revolutionary regimes have failed to deliver a meaningful transformative constitutionalism that is based upon the principle of the rule of Law and continued to rely on the emergency status as module of governance. In this matter, we try to feature that this failure is related to three arguments; the first is that the exceptional ruling has been institutionalized in most of the political and legal settings since Nasserism; in which the revolution wasn’t able to change, nor did new constitutions introduce substantive changes to these dynamics. Second, that post-revolution regime used the exceptional status as way to legitimize their ruling through the political rhetoric of securitization, and thirdly the state of exception became normalized in the everyday political and legal settings.

One of the crucial challenges the European community faces today is the abusive practices of introducing and constitutionalising state emergency powers. In the last few years two European Union Members States, France and Hungary, have declared a state of emergency and proposed to amend constitutionally delegated powers to deal with emergencies. The paper asserts that these changes are not identical since there is a difference in the way contemporary France and Hungary regulate, declare, prolong and justify extraordinary measures. The difference lies in the regime applying these emergency measures. Certainly, there are disagreements even within the democratic world on many questions concerning emergency powers. The reason behind this controversy is the fact that Kantians and Lockeans think differently on how the rule of law can control politics in abnormal times. However, despite this controversy, there is a consensus within the democratic world that the main purpose of declaring a state of emergency is to restore the democratic legal order and the full enjoyment of human rights. The fate of the 2015 French constitutional amendment bill may illustrate how and to what extent emergency affects the quality of democracy. By contrast, in an authoritative regime, emergency creates special power. Following Carl Schmitt, authoritarians emphasise that the rule of law cannot govern an absolute state of exception. The law in such a situation is based solely on the decision of the sovereign. The recent Hungarian practice of declaring and prolonging a “state of crisis caused by the mass migration” is an example of the abuse of executive power by fabricating friends and enemies of the state. The constitutional amendment on declaring a “state of terrorist threat” also follows the Schmittian tradition: it institutionalises, and what is more, constitutionalises a strong, arbitrary executive power unhampered by legal constraints.

This paper engages the instabilities of the category of 'asylum' looking at Arab Uprisings' mobility to Italy and highlighting the contested encounter between governmental practices to manage asylum seekers and the embodied experiences of mobility from Libya and Tunisia to Italy in 2011-12. Focusing on asylum application processing, our analysis tackles its sorting rationalities (asylum seekers versus irregular migrants, country of birth versus country of refuge), its produced spatialities (processing centers and 'humanitarian emergency zones'), and its moral predicaments (how vulnerability and protection are put to work). Our aim is to contribute to a political epistemology of asylum whereby asylum's normative instabilities are mobilized to trouble its exclusionary boundaries and the profiling of the refugee as the alter ego figure of the citizen. The paper revolves around four episodes: it opens attending to an epistemological challenge; it stages a critical engagement with the Italian 'North Africa Emergency' in the second and third section; finally, it puts this analysis to work on the terrain of a 2 political struggle to demand a right to presence for Libyan war evacuees.

Although the post-War movement for the protection of universal human rights heralded progress in transcending international law’s traditional power structures, colonial interests and legal philosophies nonetheless retained an influence on the framing of certain aspects of human rights discourse. This essay explores the extent to which the particular conception of the ‘state of emergency’ that was distilled into the normative framework of international human rights law at its inception stemmed specifically from Britain’s traditions of colonial governance and legislation in the empire. The evolution of the state of emergency is traced from martial law in England and the ‘first empire’, through British emergency legislative codes in Ireland in the nineteenth century and beyond in the early twentieth century, to the wholesale use of emergency powers in British colonies as the empire receded. The genesis of the derogations/state of emergency provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and European Convention on Human Rights is appraised in the light of the colonial emergency context that formed the backdrop to the drafting of the conventions. The essay argues that the accommodation of colonial interests at that point codified a hegemonic legal tool that remains ripe for exploitation by regimes of all stripes inclined to repress opposition and dissent in the ‘post-colonial’ era. Examining the state of emergency in the colonial shadow from which it emerged suggests that it is ultimately grounded in dynamics of power and hegemonic control, rather than a universal rule of law.