Promises

In this review I critically digest the main themes of Shiffrin's arguments, with a focus on the question of whether her "thinker-based" theory of free speech has different, or more ambivalent, practical implications for free speech policy than she allows.

Psalms of lament characteristically include affirmations of trust and sometimes a vow to praise God in the future. This paper questions the motivation behind such vows by looking carefully at whether future praise is conditional on God's positive response, and what other rhetorical devices are linked to the promise (or vow) he makes.

'Promising and Obligation' criticizes the view, defended by Joseph Raz, John Finnis, David Owens and many others, that one's moral obligation to keep a promise is created by one's expression, through the act of promising, of an intention so to obligate oneself.

The moral obligation to keep promises arises instead out of either of two contrasting aspects of the morality of human nature: from our mutual moral independence, which consists in our natural right to determine for ourselves what we do for others; or from our mutual moral interdependence, which consists in our natural interest in the trustworthiness of others.

The paper opposes David Hume's theory that the moral obligation to keep promises is part of convention-dependent or artificial morality.  Instead the obligation is part of pre-conventional natural morality.

her approach between ethical frameworks that appeal to the preferences of individuals and those that are 'platonic'-that posit objectives independent of desires and choices. However, her reluctance to appeal to preferences is so great-even considered preferences are likely to be distorted, she believes-that her position is hard to distinguish from platonism, with all the problems that this entails. She criticises procedural approaches to social ethics for building into the presuppositions of the procedure assumptions about the capabilities and relationships of participants. But her approach is at least as a priori.

ii Dissertation Abstract Religion and development promise the people of a Mayan-speaking village of Eastern Yucatan, Mexico, regeneration and well-being. Through interrelated regimes of futurity, the implementation of cash transfers and ritual transactions unfold different aspects of reality. Drawing on twenty four months of ethnographic fieldwork, archival research and in-depth interviews with development officials in Yucatan, Mexico city and the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington DC, I explore what gift-giving, in particular, conditional and unconditional Cash Transfers (PROGRESA-OPORTUNIDADES and PROCAMPO) and cargo ritual exchange, contribute to these nested regimes of futurities. These regimes work to determine the sort of economy that should rule human life now, by teaching what should and should not be expected, developing moral anguish, physical endurance, recurrent joy and gratitude. Development prestations support a long-term transition based on personal, moral and intergenerational change while ritual transactions pattern the future in short-term cycles of ontic renewals that support the long-term enduring power of the elderly.

In this article we develop and defend what we call the “Trust View” of promissory obligation, according to which making a promise involves inviting another individual to trust one to do something. In inviting her trust, and having the invitation accepted (or at least not rejected), one incurs an obligation to her not to betray the trust that one has invited. The distinctive wrong involved in breaking a promise is a matter of violating this obligation. We begin by explicating the core notion of “inviting someone to trust one to do something”, suggesting that it involves signaling to the other individual one's recognition of the importance the relevant action has for her, and one’s willingness to license her to have faith or optimism in one's character with regard to the performance of that action. We then turn to a defense of the Trust View, arguing that it has considerable appeal in its own right, that it is distinct from and superior to three similar accounts (T.M. Scanlon's Assurance View, Judith Jarvis Thomson's Reliance View and David Owens' Authority View), and that several objections to it can be answered.

The Introduction of this work provided background, historical, and textual information about Leviticus 26 as well as a detailed outline of this text. This Bible chapter revealed the corporate human responsibility of the chosen nation to obey Yahweh’s covenant and the plan of a Sovereign God in response to their obedience and disobedience.

Chapter 1 provided an exegesis of Lev 26:1–3, 14–15, 34–35, 43, and 46. It also examined the usage of the Hebrew term for the “Sabbath(s)” and the four Hebrew legal terms found in Leviticus 26 throughout the Hebrew Bible.

Chapter 2 presented an exegesis of Lev 26:9–13, 40–45. It also analyzed the conceptual usage of the Hebrew term for “covenant” in the Hebrew Bible. It concluded that covenants always formalize and deepen relationships.

Chapter 3 offered an exegesis of Lev 26:3–13 which stated that the blessings promised to Israel for obedience to the Mosaic covenantal stipulations included life, vitality, fruitfulness, many descendants, a powerful national defense, and extremely prosperous agricultural endeavors. This chapter concluded by comparing the blessings promised in Leviticus 26 with those in Deuteronomy 28.

Chapter 4 provided an exegesis of Lev 26:14–39 which delineated the coming chastisements for Israel’s disloyalty to Yahweh and their violations of the Mosaic covenant. These corrective measures are in five intensifying levels of curses designed to bring Israel to repentance. This chapter compared the curses listed in Leviticus 26 with those in Deuteronomy 28.

Chapter 5 gave an exegesis of Lev 26:40–45 which revealed the future hope for the ethnic people of Israel. This chapter also compared the coming restoration promised in Leviticus 26 with the expanded promises of Deuteronomy 30.

Chapter 6 discussed the use of Historical Theology and analyzed the Baptist tradition regarding the moral law. It also summarized the importance of familiarity with Leviticus 26 for exegeting other Old Testament canonical books. It outlined the dependence of the book of Amos on Leviticus 26.

Leviticus 26 should be studies because it is a critical background text for many of the Former and Latter Prophets who used this text in their inspired writings as covenant enforcers. Therefore, effort should be made to be aware of this prior text when studying later biblical authors who are quoting or alluding to Leviticus 26.

In his famous article “An Essay on Bargaining” (1956), Thomas Schelling introduced the concept of commitment into the game-theoretical framework. Committed behaviour, following Schelling, is a kind of strategic action whose goal is to modify the other players' strategies, through the manipulation of their expectations (Schelling 1960, 122). The two paradigmatic cases of social commitment would be promises and threats. Thus, for a commitment (either a promise or a threat) to be effective, it has to be both believable and believed by the other players. Schelling argues that credibility can be attained by the agent by means of different mechanisms, such as voluntarily ruling out one or more of the available options (either by making some choices impossible or by raising its cost), the power of reputation, and the ability to bargain. Nevertheless, as Schelling points out, credible promises and threats seem to lead to a paradoxical situation: once the commitment has been stated, and having already manipulated the other agent's choices and actions, what's the reason to keep it? Let's imagine, for example, that two agents, Sally and Bob, are playing a public goods game; Sally promises to invest all her tokens into the public good if Bob does the same. Bob believes that Sally's promise is credible, and invests all his tokens. Then, why would Sally keep her promise? From the point of view of narrow strategic rationality, Sally's best option is to free-ride, not only before she made the promise, but also after (and probably she would be more tempted to do so after Bob invested all his tokens in the public good). This problem can be stated as follows: the incentives to cooperate are exactly the same than the incentives to keep a promise or a threat. Nonetheless, experimental results show a significant tendency to act according to one's commitments, as well as a tendency to consider the other's commitments credible (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992; Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland 1994; Kerr et al. 1997; Kurzban et al. 2001; Boadway, Song, and Tremblay 2007; Balliet 2010). It would be unrealistic to state that everyone lives up to their commitments, but the puzzling results do not have to do with the amount of promises and threats that are kept or broken; they are puzzling because, everything else being equal, keeping a commitment is irrational if the behaviour promised is irrational as well—and if it is not irrational, because it is the agent's preferred choice, then the commitment is unnecessary.
This Chapter deals with the strategic problem of commitment, as stated by Schelling.

This contribution compares the recognition of a general concept of unilateral promises binding without acceptance by the promisee in Article 2:107 PECL and Article II.-1:103 DCFR with the recent Scottish experience of its equivalent rule.  The significance of this comparison is that the rule in question is significantly wider than that found in most other European legal systems, which tend to recognise only limited categories of unilateral promises or to impose a requirement of acceptance.  Despite an authoritative restatement of the law by Lord President Gill in Regus (Maxim) Ltd v Bank of Scotland plc [2013] CSIH 12, the Scottish courts have generally approached the concept in a restricted and restrictive way, although at least occasionally allowing it a role even in commercial cases.  The decision of the UK Supreme Court in the Scottish appeal Royal Bank of Scotland v Carlyle [2015] UKSC 13 poses a significant challenge to such caution, while the judges’ self-imposed restrictions are also inconsistent with the DCFR’s approach.  On the other hand, the Scottish experience suggests that the DCFR’s requirement that notice of the promissory statement must reach the promisee to make it effective except when the statement is a public declaration may in turn be too demanding.  It is also suggested, in opposition to a suggestion by Professor Martin Hogg, that from both the DCFR and the Scottish experience the conduct of the recipient after the statement is made may be relevant to the question of whether it can be treated as a binding promise.

Les promesses des technosciences contemporaines s’appuient sur les success stories de celles qui façonnent actuellement l’économie et la société. La Loi de Moore, fonction exponentielle qui décrit et prédit la cadence de miniaturisation et de réduction des coûts des composants électroniques depuis un demi-siècle, constitue un de ces récits. Ce chapitre interroge la Loi de Moore comme matrice historique du régime actuel de l’économie des promesses technoscientifiques. Devenue métaphore du progrès technique en général, la Loi de Moore délimite le périmètre de ce qui, des technosciences, peut être interrogé et discuté. Parce qu’elle trace un cadre temporel pour l’innovation, sa construction même est hors-cadre, et relève du non négociable.En donnant à voir la fabrique de ce récit, ce chapitre entend construire et instruire une position critique générale sur l’économie des promesses technoscientifiques actuelles. Cette critique porte moins sur la faisabilité de ces promesses (sur leur caractère spéculatif, non crédible, non tenable) que sur leur désirabilité. La Loi de Moore montre en effet que ces promesses peuvent devenir crédibles, réalisables, tenables – mais à quel prix ?

Abstract: The present study aims to identify the main theories about promises of rewards, developed in the continental legal systems, and to argue that, under some circumstances, promises of rewards can be defined as conditional promises.

Resumo: O presente estudo visa identificar asprincipais teorias sobre a promessa pública,desenvolvidas nos sistemas jurídicos continentais,e enunciar a possibilidade de perspetivar a promessa pública, atendendo a circunstânciasconcretas, como uma promessa condicionada

All clergy have the special canonical obligation to show reverence and obedience to their ordinary and the pope. They bind themselves to this promise freely and publicly during their diaconal or priestly ordination. The ecclesiastical legislator gave the liturgical ceremony a normative form in can. 273 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. In this paper, the author presents the sources of the canon in question, presents a canonical analysis, places it into canonical context, and defines individual terms according to how the ecclesiastical legislator understood them.

Un essai sur lequel j'ai pu travailler alors que je commençais mes études en théologie.
Il part du récit du jardin d'Éden et donne une perspective peu commune sur l'expulsion d'Adam et Ève du jardin, et développe le thème des promesses de Dieu à l'égard des hommes.
Un essai qui se lit très aisément, et qui reste assez intéressant.

The Introduction of this work provided background, historical, and textual information about Leviticus 26 as well as a detailed outline of this text. This section will show that this Bible chapter revealed the corporate human responsibility of the chosen nation to obey Yahweh’s covenant and the plan of a sovereign God in response to their obedience and disobedience.

Chapter 1 provided an exegesis of Lev 26:1–3, 14–15, 34–35, 43, and 46. It also examined the usage of the Hebrew term for the “Sabbath(s)” and the four Hebrew legal terms found in Leviticus 26 throughout the Hebrew Bible.

Chapter 2 presented an exegesis of Lev 26:9–13, 40–45. It also analyzed the conceptual usage of the Hebrew term for “covenant” in the Hebrew Bible. It concluded that covenants always formalize and deepen relationships.

Chapter 3 offered an exegesis of Lev 26:3–13 which stated that the blessings promised to Israel for obedience to the Mosaic covenantal stipulations included life, vitality, fruitfulness, many descendants, a powerful national defense, and extremely prosperous agricultural endeavors. This chapter concluded by comparing the blessings promised in Leviticus 26 with those in Deuteronomy 28.

Chapter 4 provided an exegesis of Lev 26:14–39 which delineated the coming chastisements for Israel’s disloyalty to Yahweh and their violations of the              Mosaic Covenant. These corrective measures are in five intensifying levels of curses designed to bring Israel to repentance. This chapter compared the curses listed in Leviticus 26 with those in Deuteronomy 28.

Chapter 5 gave an exegesis of Lev 26:40–45 which revealed the future hope for the ethnic people of Israel. This chapter also compared the coming restoration promised in Leviticus 26 with the expanded promises of Deuteronomy 30.

Chapter 6 analyzed the Baptist tradition regarding the moral law and the Sabbath and discussed the use of Historical Theology. It also summarized the importance of familiarity with Leviticus 26 for exegeting other selected Old Testament canonical books. This was illustrated by portraying the dependence of the book of Amos on Leviticus 26.

Leviticus 26 should be studies because it is a critical background text for many of the Former and Latter Prophets who used this text in their inspired writings as covenant enforcers. Therefore, effort should be made to be aware of this prior text when studying later biblical authors who are quoting or alluding to Leviticus 26.

Which biblical promises are for Christians? God's promises play a vital role in helping believers grow in sanctification and suffer with hope, but should we claim all OT promises as our own, seeing as God gave them to a different people and under a different covenant? This article considers why and how every promise is "Yes" in Christ and seeks to empower believers to faithfully appropriate OT promises without abusing them. In the process it supplies five foundational principles that clarify the Christian's relationship to OT promises, and then it gives three guidelines for hoping in OT promises through Christ.

Is/Ought survey article, presupposing a little more logical sophistication that the above paper for Philosophy Now. For the Academia version  I have added footnotes  referencing the papers in which I argue at length for my more contentious claims.

For papers which expand on  the historical Hume and the implications of No-Ought-From-Is for contemporary Meta-Ethics, see below  'Letter from a Gentleman' and 'Snare's Puzzle/Hume's Purpose'

Cet article porte sur une forme de jurement en usage chez les Mitsogo du Gabon. Ses contextes d’usage vont du serment à la promesse en passant par la menace et la malédiction. Ce jurement, qui associe la parole et le geste, ajoute une force illocutoire décisive aux propos tenus. N’importe qui n’est cependant pas apte à jurer, promettre ou maudire. Les conditions de félicité de ces actes de parole s’enracinent dans une compétence rituelle associée au statut d’homme initié. Cette compétence s’appuie sur un épisode crucial du rite initiatique : un serment secret qui fonde la prétention des hommes à exprimer une parole efficace. L’initiation constitue en ce sens une procédure d’assermentation de la parole masculine. Cet exemple ethnographique du jurement est l’occasion de revenir sur la théorie des actes de parole et la critique sociologique que lui a adressée Pierre Bourdieu.

This thesis addresses philosophical problems concerning improper
assertions. The first part considers the issue of defining lying: here,
against a standard view, I argue that a lie need not intend to deceive
the hearer. I define lying as an insincere assertion, and then resort
to speech act theory to develop a detailed account of what an
assertion is, and what can make it insincere.
Even a sincere assertion, however, can be improper (e.g., it can be
false, or unwarranted): in the second part of the thesis, I consider
these kinds of impropriety. An influential hypothesis maintains that
proper assertions must meet a precise epistemic standard, and
several philosophers have tried to identify this standard. After
reviewing some difficulties for this approach, I provide an innovative
solution to some known puzzles concerning this issue. In my view,
assertions purport to aim at truth, but they are not subject to a norm
that requires speakers to assert a proposition only if it is true.

Strategic commitments, such as promises and threats, pose several problems to the standard model of economic rationality: first, they can only arise when there is an incentive to free‑ride; second, they need to be credible in order to manipulate the others' behaviour; third, once the commitment has succeeded, it is no longer in the agent's self‑interest to fulfil her commitment. Why, then, do people keep their promises (and threats)? This paper reviews the literature concerning the problem of commitment within the scope of pro-sociality and cooperation, and examines two mechanisms that enable credibility and trust: reputation and social emotions.

Brands are widely regarded as a constellation of shared associations surrounding a company and its offerings. On the traditional view of brands, these associations are regarded as perceptions and attitudes in consumers' minds in relation to a company. We argue that this traditional framing of brands faces an explanatory problem: the inability to satisfactorily explain why certain branding activism initiatives elicit the moralized reactive attitudes that are paradigmatic responses to wrongdoing. In this paper, we argue for a reframing of brands that calls for viewing brands as a series of normatively binding expectations that are ethically akin to promises. Our promissory framing of brands avoids the explanatory problem, illuminates a number of ethical requirements on branding, and reconceptualizes the role of brand managers.

Esta obra tiene por objetivo determinar cuál es el fundamento de la fuerza obligatoria de los contratos, consagrada en el artículo 1545 del Código Civil. Aun cuando pudiere estimarse como una cuestión básica, en la dogmática civil nacional prácticamente no existen aproximaciones sobre este problema. De acuerdo al principio contractual del pacta sunt servanda, sabemos que al celebrar un contrato generamos relaciones obligatorias, mas desconocemos por qué este obliga de la forma intensa en que vincula a los contratantes, es decir, de manera incondicionada y sin excepciones. Tradicionalmente se ha pensado que la justificación normativa de la obligatoriedad del contrato reside en el valor de la voluntad en la constitución de las relaciones jurídicas. Sin embargo, las condiciones sociológicas de contratación han variado sustantivamente desde inicios del siglo XX, desafiando la pertinencia de la voluntad para fundamentar las relaciones contractuales. ¿Por qué seguir pensando en ella si ha extraviado su decimonónico protagonismo? El autor articula una propuesta de justificación de la fuerza vinculante del contrato bajo las coordenadas que ha arrojado la filosofía contemporánea del derecho privado. Es sugerida la pertinencia explicativa de la autonomía personal, diferenciándola de la voluntad en que se han centrado los estudios de derecho privado. Se presta atención al significado que posee la fuerza obligatoria del contrato para los contratantes, en términos del aseguramiento de su despliegue autónomo en las relaciones jurídicas. Su valor es conjugado a partir de la estructura interna y las reglas secundarias que conforman el derecho privado.

The aim of this Chapter is to analyse the capacity of social commitments to create normative expectations. When an agent is requested, commanded, or has promised to do φ, the creditor, to whom the commitment is made, normatively expects that the debtor does φ. In fact, I will argue, a social commitment entails an agreement on the claim that “the debtor ought to do φ” (§4.2). But first I will address a closely related problem: the source of the normative expectations created by social commitments. I will analyse three solutions to the so called problem of promising, which can be generalised to other kinds of social commitments: how can one put oneself under the obligation of doing something merely by promising? This problem dates back to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature ([1739] 2007), and  is still a source of debate. Section 4.1 explores three possible solutions to this problem: practice‑based, expectation‑based and reasons‑based accounts. In Section 4.2, I develop a reasons‑based approach to the problem of the normativity of social commitments.

La promessa è un'istituzione necessaria alla sopravvivenza delle società umane? Possiamo considerarla parte di una sorta di "contenuto minimale" del diritto naturale? H.L.A. Hart si è occupato di questi problemi nel suo libro The Concept of Law. In tale lavoro, il filosofo britannico sostiene che: la riflessione su alcune ovvie generalizzazioni -verità che nessuno metterebbe in discussioneriguardanti la natura umana e il mondo in cui gli uomini vivono, mostra che fintanto che queste rimangono vere, esistono alcune regole di condotta che qualsiasi organizzazione sociale dovrebbe contenere per essere realizzabile. Tali regole costituiscono di fatto un elemento comune nel diritto e nella morale convenzionale di tutte le società che sono progredite fino al punto da distinguerle come forme di controllo sociale. Con esse si trovano, sia nel diritto sia nella morale, molte cose che sono peculiari di una società particolare o che sembrano arbitrarie o mere questioni di scelta. Tali principi di condotta universalmente riconosciuti, che si basano su verità elementari riguardanti gli esseri umani, il loro ambiente naturale e i loro fini, possono essere considerati il contenuto minimo del diritto naturale, in contrasto con le costruzioni più grandiose e più discutibili che sono state presentate con quel nome 1 . Secondo Hart, la connessione tra queste ovvie generalizzazioni a proposito della natura umana e il contenuto minimo del diritto naturale non sarebbe soltanto in grado di spiegare la sopravvivenza delle comunità i cui sistemi giuridici contengono le prescrizioni richieste. Lo scopo principale di Hart non è quello di fornire una spiegazione del notevole livello di sovrapposizione dei sistemi giuridici delle comunità a noi note. La sua tesi è piuttosto che la consapevolezza di questi fatti riguardanti la natura umana dovrebbe fornirci ragioni per accettare le regole che soddisfano i requisiti che sono imposti dal contenuto minimo del diritto naturale.

Martinus Becanus, On the Duty to Keep Faith With Heretics (ed., transl. I. Buhre, introd. T. Dienst, Chr. Strohm) (Sources in Early Modern Economics, Ethics, and Law. Second Series), Grand Rapids, MI: CLP Academic, 2019, 180p.

This work offers an extraordinary perspective on the early modern debates about toleration and the binding force of private agreements and international treaties between people of different Christian faiths. Drawing on principles of contract law developed by jurists and theologians from the School of Salamanca, the Jesuit controversialist Martinus Becanus (1563–1624) argues in favor of the duty to honor promises beyond confessional boundaries. Although hostile to religious freedom as a matter of principle, he acknowledges that a prince may have good reasons to grant exceptions. In particular circumstances the toleration of religious diversity may not only prevent greater evil, but also advance the greater good, especially by stimulating a kind of pious competition between confessional communities. This first English translation of Becanus’s De fide haereticis servanda allows modern scholars to discover a major work of one of the most prominent advocates of a permission concept of tolerance in the early modern period.

L'article de John Rawls, intitulé « Deux concepts de règle » (« Two Concepts of Rules »), dont nous proposons dans ce numéro une traduction intégrale et inédite, est paru en janvier 1955 dans la prestigieuse Philosophical Review. Le contexte oxonien et l'émulation intellectuelle qui lui est propre à cette époque, notamment autour de la philosophie dite du langage ordinaire, eut une certaine part dans l'élaboration de « Deux concepts de règle ». L'intuition méthodologique selon laquelle une distinction conceptuelle suffirait à mettre un terme à certains problèmes réputés jusque-là difficilement solubles est ainsi à l'origine de l'article de Rawls, comme l'indique explicitement son titre. Lire « Deux concepts de règle » en partie à cette aune nous permettra d'éviter certaines erreurs d'interprétation à son sujet.

This essay advances the practice theory of promises, a conventionalist theory of promises and agreements.  Its basic thesis is that promises bind if and only if they are part of a decent social practice of promising. The essay is divided into four parts. In Part I, I review existing conventionalist views. In Part II, I examine four prominent objections to conventionalist views in order to establish what any new conventionalist view must do to advance the discussion. In Part III, I present the practice view of promising and the basic arguments in its favor. Finally, in Part IV, I explain how the practice theory resolves the objections raised in Part II as well as others.

The normative mechanics of promising seem complex. The strength and content of promissory obligations, and the residual duties they entail upon being violated, have various surprising features. We give an account to explain these features. Promises have a point. The point of a promise to φ is a promise-independent reason to φ for the promisee's sake. A promise turns this reason into a duty. This explains the mechanics of promises. And it grounds a nuanced picture of immoral promises, an argument against promissory bare wrongings, and a constraint on theories of why we have promissory obligations in the first place.

This paper aims to reflect on homiletics and Christian preaching as a voice of promise in a paradoxical context such as the Brazilian and Latin Amer-ican. Initially it will reflect upon three characteristic types of relationship between preaching and promise: the eschatological and transcendentalist preaching that locates the promise in an afterlife or the end of times; the humanistic and liberating preaching that places the promise in the dimension of the socio-political struggle for transformation in the present; the individualistic and prosperity oriented preaching that projects promise as material achievement and hedonistic satisfaction. Finally, faced with this reality, we seek ways in literature (Two Words, by Isabel Allende) and in popular culture (Central do Brasil, a movie by Walter Salles) to help us in creating a sermon that announces the promise amid the paradoxes of life in order to contribute not merely to individual, ecclesial or ideological satisfaction, but to point to human and cultural transformations. Zusammenfassung: Der Aufsatz behandelt Homiletik und christliche Predigt als Formen der Zusage in einem Kontext voller Paradoxien, nämlich dem brasilia-nischen und lateinamerikanischen. Er stellt drei Arten des Verhältnisses von Predigt und Zusage vor: eine eschatologische Predigtweise mit Versprechen für das Jenseits; eine befreiungsorientierte Predigtweise mit Versprechen für soziale und politische Umformungen der Gegenwart; eine individualistische und wohl-standsorientierte Predigtweise mit dem Versprechen materieller und hedonis-tischer Erfüllung. Die Autoren greifen abschließend auf Literatur und Popkultur zurück, um Impulse für eine Predigt zur gewinnen, die nicht lediglich indivi-duelle, kirchliche oder ideologische Bedürfnisse erfüllt, sondern Transformatio-nen von Menschen und Kultur fokussiert.

Prophetic texts are difficult to preach from. The stern warnings, calls to repentance, promises, tears and threats of the Biblical prophets that once moved the nation of Israel, now often seem irrelevant or simply odd, extreme, or fanatical to modern day listeners. The vitality and urgency with which the prophets spoke and pleaded with the people on behalf of their God, simply do not communicate easily to people far removed from those situations. The problem is amplified when one considers the church’s task to continue to preach prophetically into situations of today. Can there still be a new prophetic word, after the final Word of God, spoken in these last days, through the Son (Heb.1:1)? What is the relationship between the threatened judgements of God that we find in the prophetic texts and the new context of the church that is founded on the Good News of salvation through Jesus? How can the preacher apply the prophetic word from God within the radically different socio, cultural, political, historical and theological contexts of today?