Papers & Books by Brad Hooker
Journal of Ethics, 2024
Mental states (beliefs, emotions, moods, desires, etc.) towards things can fit or fail to fit tho... more Mental states (beliefs, emotions, moods, desires, etc.) towards things can fit or fail to fit those things. Perhaps actions can fit or fail to fit the situations in which they are done. This paper explores whether having fitting mental states and doing fitting actions can constitute additions to a person's well-being. The paper first discusses the desire-fulfilment theory of well-being. Then the paper considers hedonistic theories of well-being and criticises the recent proposal from Rossi and Tappolet that well-being consists only in fitting happiness. Then the paper turns to the objective list theory of well-being and Badhwar's Aristotelian theory. In this context, the paper considers Bruno-Niño's recent argument for fitting attitudes as a part of well-being. Finally, the paper explores whether, on the objective list theory and Badhwar's theory, doing fitting actions constitutes an element of well-being. The upshots are that fittingness is not an element of well-being according to some theories of well-being and that it is an element of well-being either contingently or necessarily according to other theories of well-being.
Wittgenstein and Beyond, 2022
H.-J. Glock has made important contributions to discussions of rationality, reasons, and rules. T... more H.-J. Glock has made important contributions to discussions of rationality, reasons, and rules. This chapter addresses four conceptions of rationality that Glock identifies. One of these conceptions of rationality is that rationality consists in responsiveness to reasons. This chapter goes on to consider the idea that reasons became prominent in normative ethics because of their usefulness in articulating moral pluralism. The final section of the chapter connects reasons and rules and contends that both are ineliminable.
Ratio, 2022
Roger Crisp's (2018) contained arguments that seemed to imply that having deep personal relations... more Roger Crisp's (2018) contained arguments that seemed to imply that having deep personal relationships does not constitute an element of well-being. Hooker (2021) argued that the lesson to draw from Crisp (2018) is that one's having a deep personal relationship does constitute an element of one's well-being on condition that one's affection for the other person is merited.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2022
Roger Crisp, in his book Reasons and Goodness, argues in favour of demoralizing our philosophical... more Roger Crisp, in his book Reasons and Goodness, argues in favour of demoralizing our philosophical reflection on ethics. This paper begins by explaining what 'de-moralizing' means. Then the paper assesses Crisp's argument for demoralizing and puts forward arguments against demoralizing .
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 2021
Deep personal relationships involve deep mutual understanding and strong mutual affection. This p... more Deep personal relationships involve deep mutual understanding and strong mutual affection. This paper focuses on whether having deep personal relationships are one of the elements of well-being. Roger Crisp put forward thought experiments which might be taken to suggest that having deep personal relationships have only instrumental value as means to other elements of well-being. The different conclusion this paper draws is that having deep personal relationships is an element of well-being if but only if the other people involved have qualities that merit affection for these people.
Parfit's Final Arguments in Normative Ethics, 2021
D. W. Portmore (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism, 2020
After preliminaries concerning different accounts of the good and the distinction between actual-... more After preliminaries concerning different accounts of the good and the distinction between actual-consequence consequentialism and expected-value consequentialism, this paper explains why consequentialists should prescribe a moral decision procedure dominated by rules. But act-consequentialists deny rules have a role in the criterion of moral rightness. Prescribing a decision procedure dominated by rules and then denying rules a role in the criterion of rightness can be problematic. Rule-consequentialism gives rules roles first in the decision procedure agents should use and second in the criterion of moral rightness. But giving rules this second role has attracted objections, some of which are outlined and answered here. The final section of the paper considers some recent developments.
Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, 2018
The chapter juxtaposes the fairly quick and automatic thinking and decision making that constitut... more The chapter juxtaposes the fairly quick and automatic thinking and decision making that constitutes everyday moral thought and action with the slower, more complicated, and more reflective thinking that steps beyond everyday moral thought. When everyday moral thought runs into difficulties, we are led to thinking about moral principles. Even when everyday moral thought does not run into difficulties, it can be challenged by repeated “why?” questions. Pushed far enough, such questions have to be answered either by admitting ignorance or by pointing to theses about whatever ultimately makes acts morally required, permissible, or prohibited. Such theses are moral theories. The paper ends by pointing out a respect in which everyday moral thought is more like rule-consequentialism, contractualism, foundational pluralism, and virtue ethics than everyday moral thought is like traditional act-consequentialism.
Journal of Political Theory and Philosophy, 2017
What distinguishes moral judgements from judgements of other kinds? In addressing this question, ... more What distinguishes moral judgements from judgements of other kinds? In addressing this question, this paper tries to remain as neutral as possible about which moral judgments are correct. The paper addresses objections to thinking that the defining feature of moral judgements is their other-regarding grounds, or their social function, or their motivational force, or their connection to reactive attitudes such as guilt, indignation, and resentment. The proposal this paper makes is that a judgment is a moral judgment if and only if this judgment is a member of a group of judgments of which some do carry commitment to the appropriateness of such reactive attitudes.
her approach between ethical frameworks that appeal to the preferences of individuals and those t... more her approach between ethical frameworks that appeal to the preferences of individuals and those that are 'platonic'-that posit objectives independent of desires and choices. However, her reluctance to appeal to preferences is so great-even considered preferences are likely to be distorted, she believes-that her position is hard to distinguish from platonism, with all the problems that this entails. She criticises procedural approaches to social ethics for building into the presuppositions of the procedure assumptions about the capabilities and relationships of participants. But her approach is at least as a priori.
Journal of Business Ethics, 2017
In his important recent book, Ethics and the Global Financial Crisis: Why Incompetence is Worse t... more In his important recent book, Ethics and the Global Financial Crisis: Why Incompetence is Worse than Greed (2015), Boudewijn de Bruin argues that a key element of the global financial crisis of 2007-8 was a failure of epistemic (i.e. knowledge-based) virtue. To improve matters, de Bruin argues we need to focus on the acquisition and exercise of epistemic virtues, rather than to focus on a more ethical culture for banking per se. While it is very plausible that an increased focus on proper knowledge-related behaviour will be part of a solution, we are sceptical both about de Bruin's overarching theoretical claims and about his practical suggestions for change. Instead we argue that change in this sector is best promoted by reconceiving of the relationship between financial institutions and the societies they serve, and that this is fundamentally not an epistemic but a moral issue.
Etica & Politica, Apr 13, 2016
This paper takes issue with three elements of Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer's book, ... more This paper takes issue with three elements of Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer's book, The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics. The paper attacks Lazari-Radek's and Singer's account of wrongness as equivalent to whatever decisive practical reasons condemn. The paper then attacks their evolutionary debunking arguments against both egoism and parts of common-sense morality. The paper then turns to de Lazari-Radek's and Singer's concession that rules should constitute our moral decision procedure and our public morality. This paper argues that, if no one should be blamed for complying with the optimal decision procedure and optimal public rules, there are strong reasons to accept that these same rules distinguish what is morally permissible from what is morally wrong.
Ratio, 2010
The ‘publicity requirement on moral rules’ refers to the idea that moral rules must be suitable f... more The ‘publicity requirement on moral rules’ refers to the idea that moral rules must be suitable for public acknowledgement and acceptance. The idea is that moral rules must be suitable for being ‘widely known and explicitly recognized’, suitable for teaching as part of moral education, suitable for guiding behaviour and reactions to behaviour, and thus suitable for justifying one’s behaviour to others. *Ideal Code, Real World*, my book defending rule-consequentialism, accepted the publicity requirement. In *Ratio* in 2010, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer attacked the publicity requirement. Here is my reply to them.
This is an encyclopaedia article on rule consequentialism. This is the most comprehensive discuss... more This is an encyclopaedia article on rule consequentialism. This is the most comprehensive discussion of this topic that I've written. The 3rd revision was published Jan. 15th, 2023.
Journal of Practical Ethics, Jun 2015
This essay contends that the constitutive elements of well-being are plural, partly objective, an... more This essay contends that the constitutive elements of well-being are plural, partly objective, and separable. The essay argues that these elements are pleasure, friendship, significant achievement, important knowledge, and autonomy, but not either the appreciation of beauty or the living of a morally good life. The essay goes on to attack the view that elements of well-being must be combined in order for well-being to be enhanced. The final section argues against the view that, because anything important to say about well-being could be reduced to assertions about these separable elements, the concept of well-being or personal good is ultimately unimportant. I've attached below a link to a podcast on the article.
'The Meaningful Life: Subjectivism, Objectivism, and Divine Support', 2008
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, 2014, Dec 2014
Derek Parfit’s *On What Matters* endorses Kantian Contractualism, the normative theory that every... more Derek Parfit’s *On What Matters* endorses Kantian Contractualism, the normative theory that everyone ought to follow the rules that everyone could rationally will that everyone accept. This paper explores Parfit’s argument that Kantian Contractualism converges with rule-consequentialism. A pivotal concept in Parfit’s argument is the concept of impartiality, which he seems to equate agent-neutrality. This paper argues that equating impartiality and agent-neutrality is insufficient, since some agent-neutral considerations are silly and some are not impartial. Perhaps more importantly, there is little realistic prospect of Kantian Contractualism converging with rule -consequentialism unless the same impartial reasons drive rule selection in the two theories.
in R. Crisp (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics*, OUP, Jan 13, 2013
This chapter deals with psychological egoism, act ethical egoism, moral self/other asymmetry and ... more This chapter deals with psychological egoism, act ethical egoism, moral self/other asymmetry and the prerogative to give one’s own good less weight than the good of others when one is deciding what to do, rule ethical egoism, rational egoism, agent-relative partiality, agent-neutral partiality, degrees of permissible partiality, impartiality in the application of rules, Bernard Gert’s account of impartial treatment, and agent-neutral impartiality in the justification of rules, including utilitarian, Golden Rule, and contractualist forms of impartial justification. The chapter closes by outlining the reasons that utilitarian and contractualist foundational impartiality might allow and even require forms of agent-relative partiality in day-to-day decision making.
in Brian Feltham and John Cottingham (eds), *Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World*, 2010
This paper distinguishes three levels for the application of impartiality: (1) in the application... more This paper distinguishes three levels for the application of impartiality: (1) in the application of first-order moral rules, (2) impartial benevolence (conceived along consequentialist lines) as a first-order moral rule, and (3) the impartial assessment of first-order moral rules. The paper argues that impartiality is always appropriate in the application of *good* moral rules and that, other things being equal, if moral rules are impartially justified, that is a mark in favour of them. The paper also argues that impartial benevolence at the first-order level is only sometimes appropriate, since often a partial concern for ourselves can be permitted and sometimes a partial concern for others to whom we stand in certain special relations is required.
Think, 2005
This short paper outlines different ways to interpret the Golden Rule.
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Papers & Books by Brad Hooker
This dialogue assesses the doctrine that what morality requires can be defined only as what a virtuous person would characteristically feel or do.