Decision And Game Theory

Some of Law and Economics’ basic claims have come to be criticized as a result of empirical findings that question their viability. Particularly, the premise that agents consistently act rationally and with their self-interest in mind seems problematic. What the consequences of the criticism mean for Law and Economics’ tenability depends largely on the questions whether (1) some elements are unassailable to the alternative’s objections and (2) the alternative is a systematic whole. It is argued that Law and Economics may be salvaged, if it is minimized and its ambitions are tempered. This means focusing on the stable, a priori, elements inherent to it.

We study the e¤ect of changes of players'information on the equilibrium e¤orts and payo¤s of Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain. When the diseconomies of scale in exerting e¤ort increase at a large (small) rate, in contests with symmetric information expected e¤ort decreases (increases) as players become better informed, while in two-player contests with asymmetric information a player with information advantage exerts less (more) e¤ort, in expectation, than his opponent. In classic Tullock contests with symmetric information the equilibrium expected e¤ort and payo¤ are invariant to the information available to the players. And when information is asymmetric, a player's information advantage is rewarded. Moreover, in two-player contests, while both players exert the same expected e¤ort regardless of their information, expected e¤ort is smaller when one player has information advantage than when both players have the same information. Interestingly, the player with information advantage wins the prize less frequently than his opponent.

A critical review of Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' which he wrote in 1950-51 and was first published in 1969. Most of the review is spent presenting a modern framework for philosophy (the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) and positioning the work of Wittgenstein and John Searle in this framework and relative to the work of others. It is suggested that this book can be regarded as the foundation stone of psychology and philosophy as it was the first to describe the two systems of thought and shows how our unshakable grasp of the world derives from our innate axiomatic System 1, and how this interacts with System 2. It was a revolution in epistemology since it showed that our actions rest not on judgements but on innate undoubtable axioms leading directly to action. I situate the work of Wittgenstein and Searle in the framework of the two systems of thought prominent in thinking and decision research, employing a new table of intentionality and new dual syste...

Por meio da compreensão do ativismo de fãs como uma forma de resistência cotidiana cultural, econômica e criativa, o objetivo deste capítulo busca problematizar as relações entre participação, resistência e consumo de fãs do jogo on-line League of Legends (LoL). Enquanto suporte empírico, apresenta-se um mapeamento sobre algumas práticas do ativismo de fãs-jogadores no antigo fórum oficial de LoL no Brasil, a partir de uma triangulação metodológica com destaque para o uso de inspirações etnográficas. Após as reflexões teóricas e as análises, propõe-se uma tipologia das práticas de resistência cotidiana na comunidade de LoL baseada em quatro modos. Os resultados desta abordagem indicam que a diversidade do universo das produções digitais e práticas de parte dos fãs de LoL ressignificam as compreensões sobre resistência e participação, questionando a dualidade existente entre a cidadania e o consumo da cultura pop, agindo como catalizadores que reinterpretam e excedem os limites do fandom.

A discussion of the major claims about the logic of cause, with special attention to the possibility of reducing a cause to a sufficient condition or part thereof. The conclusion is reached that cause is a logically irreducible concept but one which may be usefully analyzed in terms of other causally-contaminated notions. 'contingently' is used (e.g. by Nagel) to mean 'given the other conditions present'. 2 2.4. (a) Causes need not be separated in space or in time from their effects; (b) nor need they be contiguous, logically speaking, whether or not this is viewed as physically necessary in terms of current physical theory; (c) nor need they be non-overlapping. 2.5. Causes need not be logically separable from their effects, i.e. the connection between (descriptions of) cause and effect need not be empirical ('contingent' in another sense). The act of closing a door causes, and its description entails, the door's closing.

This essay will focus on assessing the axioms, or rather postulates as they are called, of Savage's (1954) representation theorem for the Subjective Expected Utility theory. What his representation theorem achieves is to prove the existence of an expected utility representation of the preferences of a rational agent. Getting clear about the status of 1 In the course of this essay we will use the notions of axiom, postulate and principle interchangeably. 2 In more mathematical terms, a representation theorem for a specific class of mathematical 0

The current study uses data from the reality television show Survivor to determine whether contestants discriminate against other contestants on the basis of sex. In Survivor, contestants initially compete in teams, and are strategically incentivised to eliminate weaker contestants to boost the performance of their team. Later in the season, teams are merged and the contestants compete individually. Stronger players then become a threat, and so strategic incentives encourage contestants to eliminate stronger players. Voting patterns allowed inferences to be made about taste-based and information-based theories of discrimination. Taste-based discrimination predicted that targeted groups would receive high mean votes both before teams are merged and post-merge. Likewise, a preference for in-group members would result in voters voting for members of the opposite sex both pre- and post-merge. Neither sex showed a tendency to vote consistently for contestants of the opposite sex. Information-based discrimination predicted high mean votes pre-merge and low mean-votes post-merge, and both sexes showed voting behaviour consistent with information-based discrimination against female contestants.

The principal purpose of this study has been to investigate the impact of an asset disposal strategy, often coupled with share repurchase programs, by international hotel companies on financial performance, earnings stability and share values. Utilising ratio analysis, stock returns and risk-adjusted measures, the study analyses the differences in performance, stability and market valuations between asset light and more capital intensive hotel companies. The findings of the study indicate negligible differences in most accounting measures of earnings growth and stability between asset light hotel companies and traditional hotel companies with significant holdings of owned or leased property. Drawing on game theory, we conclude that international hotel companies dispose of their assets in an effort to manipulate financial markets and make their stocks more attractive to investors and traders. Notwithstanding the absence of significant differentiation in accounting measures of performance fundamentals, market based measures show that hotel groups failed in the aim of manipulating financial markets. This study recommends avoiding playing this game as dual asset light/share repurchase strategy generated superior risk-weighted returns to that of more capital intensive traditional hotel companies across the period of the study.

Recent theorizing on the role of morality in media entertainment suggests morality serves as a guiding force in audience reactions to content. Using moral foundations theory as a base, research has found significant associations between moral salience and audience preferences for and responses to film and television varying in their presentations of morality. Our study extends this work by testing the same relationship in video games. Because a distinguishing factor between video games and traditional media is interactivity, our study focuses on how moral salience predicts decisions made in a video game. We find that increased moral salience led to a decreased probability of moral violations, while decreased moral salience led to an observed random (50%) distribution of violations. This finding was largely stable across different morality subcultures (German, United States) and age groups (adolescents and elderly), with deviations from this pattern explained by theory. We interpret this as evidence for a gut or game explanation of decision making in video games. When users encounter virtual scenarios that prime their moral sensitivities, they rely on their moral intuitions; otherwise, they make satisficing decisions not as an indication of moral corruption but merely as a continuation of the virtual experience.

This article explores how research conducted in the emerging discipline of Game Studies may be used to develop tools for teaching videogames in the English and Literacy classroom. The article argues, by drawing on the debate between ‘narratologists’ and ‘ludologists’ that acknowledging and marking out the key differences between videogame play and the ‘reading’ or ‘consumption’ of other media texts is integral to the successful uptake and development of videogame- based and videogame-centred curriculum.

ABSTRACT. This paper critically reviews Ken Binmore's non-utilitarian and game theoretic solution to the Arrow problem. Binmore's solution belongs to the same family as Rawls' maximin criterion and requires the use of Nash bargaining theory, empathetic preferences, and results in ...

This book is about the three identities of the videogame, the gamer, and Game Studies. I write that there are no definitive truths but rather discourses and constructions; ideas, actions, beliefs, and practices related to videogames are discourses that merge and shape our perception of videogames as an area of study of its own right. These discursive responses meet and clash creating what we call truths, which are temporary and negotiable.

This perspective is inspired by Foucauldian ideas and present few questions about videogame-related identities in and outside of academe. Does Game Studies have a conceptual core? What makes game studies difficult to be disciplined in academe? What do we learn from the scholarly and popular discourses on videogames that would help understand the identity questions related to games?

I go on to describe what makes the videogame identity according to game studies: aesthetics, fictions, meaning-making, performance, transformation, etc. and what makes it difficult for game studies being an open market of ideas and an academic "un-discipline". This leads me to the gamer's identity: an aficionado first, and a connoisseur of fictional worlds.

According to classic economic theory, the market agents are fully rational Bayesian optimizers who can easily calculate the best strategy to be played with respect to the strategies of the others. However, such an idealized model does not match the real market conditions where agents do not behave according to the supposed norm of rationality giving rise to far from equilibrium phenomena. This chapter discusses algorithmic simulations, evolutionary models study the dynamic of interaction among agents endowed with null cognitive capacities to show how conventional organizations can emerge spontaneously without being rationally anticipated or planned. However, such computational predictions of agents’ behavior are used to introduce deviant second order strategies which produce disparity of chances and increased uncertainty.

The growth of complexity of the business environment in which firms operate, calls for more effective tools, able to consider the effect of the strategic choices of the actors of the market and to supply information useful for managerial decision process. Game theory seems to be an ideal candidate for this scope. Nevertheless, because of its axiomatic approach, its validity to highlight and define marketing issues has many critics. This paper analyses the main literature about the use of game theory for marketing management decisions and highlights its limits in this field in order to answer to the question: Can game  theory be an effective marketing tool?

بسياري از استانداردهاي شبكههاي بيسيم شامل ويژگيهاي كيفيت سرويس (QoS)  در لايه MAC هستند. اين ويژگيها، به گره‌هايي كه ترافيك real-time مانند صدا و ويدئو را انتقال ميدهند، امكان ميدهد كه مقدم بر گرههايي كه ترافيك  best-effort حمل ميكنند، به كانال دسترسي داشته باشند. موفقيت اين مكانيسمهاي QoS نيازمند اين است كه گرهها درستكار باشند و صادقانه گروه QoS برنامه كاربردي خود را گزارش دهند. اگرچه كه گرههاي منطقي اين كار را انجام ميدهند، اما اگر بتوانند، براي حداكثر كردن بهرهوري خود، از يك مشخصات استاندارد تعدي ميكنند. واسطهاي شبكه روز به روز بيشتر قابلبرنامهريزي ميشوند و اين به گرهها امكان ميدهد كه براي افزايش گذردهي خود، بهطور غلط ترافيك best-effort خود را بهجاي ترافيك real-time جا بزنند. در اين مقاله، يك ساختار MAC شبيه slotted Aloha كه در بسياري از موارد، از لايه MAC IEEE 802.11e استفاده ميكند، با استفاده از تئوري بازي تحليل ميشود. مدل MAC ما به ترافيك اجازه ميدهد كه به دو صورت با اولويت بالا  (HP) يا با اولويت پايين  (LP) دستهبندي شود و به دو صورت دسترسي تصادفي  (رقابتي ) و دسترسي بهروش سركشي  (غيررقابتي) ميتواند كانال را در اختيار بگيرد. دليل استفاده از روش بدون درگيري به عنوان يك مكانيسم كارا اين است كه كاربران كم اولويت را تشويق ميكند كه درستكارانه عمل كنند. در اين مقاله در باره تابع‌هاي مطلوبيت براي ترافيكهاي LP و HP بحث ميكند و بازدهي سيستم را با استفاده از مفهوم راهحل دادي و ستد نش  (NBS ) در تئوري بازيهاي مشاركتي  تحليل ميكنيم. از مفهوم NBS براي يافتن يك نقطه عملياتي منصفانه و بهينه پارتو  براي سيستم استفاده خواهيم كرد. از آنجا كه كاربران بهطور استراتژيك عمل ميكنند، از چهارچوب تئوري بازيهاي غيرمشاركتي براي يافتن مجموعهاي از تعادل نش  استفاده ميشود. در ادامه، از اين مساله كه نقطه عملياتي NBS يك تعادل نش است، درخواهيم يافت كه استراتژي ما در اين مساله كارا و strategy-proof است.

I provide a characterization of weakly pseudo-rationalizable choice functions---that is, choice functions rationalizable by a set of acyclic relations---in terms of hyper-relations satisfying certain properties. For those hyper-relations Nehring calls extended preference relations , the central characterizing condition is weaker than (hyper-relation) transitivity but stronger than (hyper-relation) acyclicity. Furthermore, the relevant type of hyper-relation can be represented as the intersection of a certain class of its extensions. These results generalize known, analogous results for path independent choice functions.

Answer: Seems plausible so long as we rule out externalities (external effects of C on A and B; similarly, external effects of x on A). b. Provide an example of a preference relation that (i) Satisfies the two properties. (ii) Satisfies the first but not the second property. (iii) Satisfies the second but not the first property.

A second pressing issue regarding DSS tools is the degree to which the data, knowledge, sensors, and results of their integration represent a limitation on individual freedoms or an invasion of privacy. DSS tools based on expert-systems approaches actively monitor every credit card transaction made. Semiautomatic face recognition systems are widespread. Radio-frequency identification tags built into price tags on consumer goods allow consumer behavior to be monitored in real time. Cell-phone records provide information about not only whom a person was speaking to, but where they were at the time. DSS tools for national security, market research, and strategic planning integrate information, apply rules, and inform decisions that affect human freedom and privacy every day.

The objective of this paper is to design the radio resource management (RRM) policies for support-ing the effective delivery of multicast service in LTE-A (Long Term Evolution -Advanced) systems. Specifically, we propose multicast subgrouping based solutions to maximize the system efficiency in terms of throughput under the constraints that: (i) all UEs are served, and (ii) the fairness among the activated multicast subgroups is guaranteed to avoid users' dissatisfaction. These results are obtained by modeling the multicast subgroup formation problem through a bargaining game. Moreover, an algorithm, which achieves the optimal fairness-efficiency tradeoff, is proposed to support the system in selecting the most appropriate solution in terms of: (i) subgroups activated over each system carrier, and (ii) resource allocated to them.

Benchmark theory (BT), introduced by Ralph Wedgwood, departs from decision theories of pure expectation maximization like evidential decision theory (EDT) and causal decision theory (CDT) and instead ranks actions according to the desirability of an outcome they produce in some state of affairs compared to a standard—a benchmark—for that state of affairs. Wedgwood motivates BT through what he terms Gandalf’s principle, that the merits of an action in a given state should be evaluated relative only to the performances of other actions in that state, and not to their performances in other states. Although BT succeeds in selecting intuitively rational actions in a number of cases—including some in which EDT or CDT seem to go wrong—it places constraints on rational decision-making that either lack motivation or are untenable. Specifically, I argue that as it stands BT is committed both to endorsing and rejecting the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Furthermore its requirement that weakly dominated actions be excluded from consideration of rational action lacks motivation and threatens to collide with traditional game theory. In the final section of the paper, I construct a counterexample to BT.

Sociology of Mafias Assignment submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Sociology at the University of Oxford.

Trust and reputation are essential control mechanisms for the Mafia to exist and operate; criminal organizations share remarkably similar rules on mutual help and obedience as well as responsibility for the collective reputation of the organization, “a reputation that can be improved or harmed by the behaviour of its members” (Varese, 2018, p.29). Distrust in state’s institutions and demand for protection—“a poor and costly substitute of trust” (Gambetta, 1993, p.2)—stand out as key elements for the emergence of Mafiosi’s Families (Gambetta,1993). Trust is key to foster cooperation, however, it bears high costs to implement, hence Mafiosi wish to reduce these expenses by exploiting a reputation for violence, which in turn coerces collaborative attitudes. While trust serves for the effectiveness of these criminal networks, their reputation of men of honour certifies quality, status and guarantees their business operations. In the lives of Mafias, trust and reputation intertwine as they constitute fundamental principles for their internal functioning and thus for the interdependence of their members, whilst also counting as valuable assets for their work and establishment in the underworld.

Grade: 68

ABOUT THE SERIES: Innovation is the generation and application of new ideas and skills to produce new products, processes, and services that improve economic and social prosperity. This new book series aims to cover important issues in the burgeoning field of innovation management and computing, from an overview of the field to its current and future contributions. The volumes will be of value and interest to computer and cognitive scientists, economists, engineers, managers, mathematicians, programmers, and engineers. Click here for additional information.

Many decisions are interactive; the outcome of one party depends not only on its decisions or on acts of nature but also on the decisions of others. Standard game theory assumes that individuals are rational, self-interested decision makers—that is, decision makers are selfish, perfect calculators, and flawless executors of their strategies. A myriad of studies shows that these assumptions are problematic, at least when examining decisions made by individuals. In this article, we review the literature of the last 25 years on decision making by groups. Researchers have compared the strategic behavior of groups and individuals in many games: prisoner's dilemma, dictator, ultimatum, trust, centipede and principal–agent games, among others. Our review suggests that results are quite consistent in revealing that group decisions are closer to the game-theoretic assumption of rationality than individual decisions. Given that many real-world decisions are made by groups, it is possible to argue that standard game theory is a better descriptive model than previously believed by experimental researchers. We conclude by discussing future research avenues in this area.

This is a case study analysis of Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson’s decisions during the 2008 financial crisis. Using insights gleaned from a comprehensive study of decision theory, a conceptual framework has been constructed to test the hypothesis that Paulson’s key decisions taken during the crisis were fundamentally guided by intuition. Particular examples of the 2008 crisis are analysed to test the viability of the hypothesis, including: Bear Stearns takeover by JP Morgan, the “shadow bailout” of financial institutions, the U.S. Treasury’s regulatory Blueprint strategy, Lehman’s bankruptcy, the nationalisation of AIG and subsequent $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP) used by the central authorities to shore up a rapidly deteriorating financial system which faced the greatest liquidity crisis since the 1930’s Great Depression. The origins of the subprime crisis and the operation of the securitisation industry are explored in some detail; both of which are essential pre-requisites if Paulson’s decisions are to be properly understood. After careful scrutiny of all available evidence, in line with decision theory, the conclusion is formed that ultimately there are sufficient grounds for supporting the hypothesis. It is hoped that the findings of this study will successfully identify new ways of understanding Paulson’s role in the crisis, as well as filling a noticeable gap in the literature by specifically focusing on Paulson’s role. Future research areas for academics are also identified.

Keywords: decision theory,Bear Stearns,Lehman Brothers,TARP,Hank Paulson,Tim Geithner,Ben Bernanke,prospect theory,heuristics,bias,intuition,George Soros,Joseph Stiglitz,Reinhart & Rogoff,reflexive theory,shadow-bailout,2008 global financial crisis,Glass-Steagal,Alan Greenspan,Federal Reserve,U.S. Treasury,collateralised debt obligation,CDO,"originate and distribute",structured investment vehicle,SIV,LIBOR,"discount window",bounded awareness,organisational risk,LTCM,Government Sponsored Enterpirses,GSE,FDIC,credit default swap,CDS,risk analysis,cognitive bias,decision analysis,bounded rationality,group decision-making processes,groupthink,behavioural theory of decision-making,prescriptive model(s)/theory(ies)of decision-making & leadership

Phronetic organizational research is an approach to the study of management and organizations focusing on ethics and power. It is based on a contemporary interpretation of the Aristotelian concept phronesis, usually as ‘prudence’. Phronesis is the ability to think and act in relation to values, to deliberate about ‘things that are good or bad for humans’ in the words of Aristotle (1976:1140a24–b12). Phronetic organizational research effectively provides answers to the following four value-rational questions, for specific problematics in management and organization studies: 1. Where are we going with this specific management problematic? 2. Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power? 3. Is this development desirable? 4. What, if anything, should we do about it?

Contrary to rational Expected Monetary Value (EMV) predictions that no money will be transferred in Trust Games, in experiments players make positive transfers. Theorists have proposed modifying the Sender’s utility function while retaining utility- maximization assumptions to account for this behavior. Such accounts assume that Senders can grasp the possible outcomes of their choices, their probabilities, and utilities. In reality, however, Senders’ choices are unexpectedly complex, and the assumption that they approximate expected utility maximization is highly implausible. Instead, we suggest that Senders are guided by general propensities to trust others. Two experiments examine the effect of inducing consequential thought on Sender behavior. One induced consequential thought directly; the other did so indirectly. The amount sent was significantly reduced following either manipulation. This suggests that models of Sender behavior in Complex Trust Games should not assume that participants routinely engage in consequential thinking (CT) of the depth that would be required for utility maximization.

In his famous article “An Essay on Bargaining” (1956), Thomas Schelling introduced the concept of commitment into the game-theoretical framework. Committed behaviour, following Schelling, is a kind of strategic action whose goal is to modify the other players' strategies, through the manipulation of their expectations (Schelling 1960, 122). The two paradigmatic cases of social commitment would be promises and threats. Thus, for a commitment (either a promise or a threat) to be effective, it has to be both believable and believed by the other players. Schelling argues that credibility can be attained by the agent by means of different mechanisms, such as voluntarily ruling out one or more of the available options (either by making some choices impossible or by raising its cost), the power of reputation, and the ability to bargain. Nevertheless, as Schelling points out, credible promises and threats seem to lead to a paradoxical situation: once the commitment has been stated, and having already manipulated the other agent's choices and actions, what's the reason to keep it? Let's imagine, for example, that two agents, Sally and Bob, are playing a public goods game; Sally promises to invest all her tokens into the public good if Bob does the same. Bob believes that Sally's promise is credible, and invests all his tokens. Then, why would Sally keep her promise? From the point of view of narrow strategic rationality, Sally's best option is to free-ride, not only before she made the promise, but also after (and probably she would be more tempted to do so after Bob invested all his tokens in the public good). This problem can be stated as follows: the incentives to cooperate are exactly the same than the incentives to keep a promise or a threat. Nonetheless, experimental results show a significant tendency to act according to one's commitments, as well as a tendency to consider the other's commitments credible (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992; Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland 1994; Kerr et al. 1997; Kurzban et al. 2001; Boadway, Song, and Tremblay 2007; Balliet 2010). It would be unrealistic to state that everyone lives up to their commitments, but the puzzling results do not have to do with the amount of promises and threats that are kept or broken; they are puzzling because, everything else being equal, keeping a commitment is irrational if the behaviour promised is irrational as well—and if it is not irrational, because it is the agent's preferred choice, then the commitment is unnecessary.
This Chapter deals with the strategic problem of commitment, as stated by Schelling.

A segurança pública é certamente um dos grandes desafios de eficiência e eficácia dos governos contemporâneos, seja por sua importância visceral, seja pelo seu protagonismo nas sociedades democráticas. Nesta abordagem original, o autor propõe o estudo e o delineamento de estratégias relativas à segurança pública por meio do instrumental típico da teoria dos jogos. Assim, o livro começa com dois capítulos que dizem respeito à própria teoria (com a abordagem dos principais modelos oferecidos e estratégias deles decorrentes), para, em seguida, voltar-se especificamente à problemática da segurança pública, o que ocorre em três movimentos: o terceiro capítulo trata da teoria dos jogos como um recurso para compreender o fenômeno criminoso e combatê-lo; o quarto capítulo envolve duas modelizações da gestão de polícia no nível tático-operacional (tratando o problema do furto de veículos e as crises que envolvem tomadas de reféns) e, finalmente, o quinto capítulo aborda dois modelos do nível estratégico da gestão de polícia (o combate ao tráfico de entorpecentes e a gestão de crises de imagem). Uma verdadeira contribuição para a compreensão teórica deste importante tema.

O objetivo deste breve trabalho é fazer algumas reflexões acerca da possibilidade de aplicar-se, a partir da obra de Claude Lévi-Strauss, uma analise estruturalista a jogos. Para isto faremos uma breve discussão teórica de alguns conceitos como jogo, rito, estrutura, inconsciente, e em seguida, faremos um exercício de análise estrutural aprofundada de dois jogos: pedra-papel-tesoura (diversas variações) e campo minado.