Natural Law

The article aims to analyse the concept of normativity in the philosophy of weak thought developed by Gianni Vattimo. Weak thought refers to the theory of a weakening of being in an era of the end of metaphysics, as well as a challenge to the Cartesian concept of the subject. Such a philosophical theory does not entirely abandon normativity in the moral dimension. Vattimo proposes a weak notion of normativity, i.e. persuasion, without claims to universal applicability. Weak normativity derives from dialogue and respect for tradition, it recommends compliance with specific moral principles, but it does not acknowledge universal ethical obligations. This version of normativity is grounded in cultural heritage, agreement and social contract.

Counterfactual conditionals are used extensively in causal reasoning. This observation has motivated a philosophical tradition that aims to provide a counterfactual analysis of causation. However, such analyses have come under pressure from a proliferation of counterexamples and from evidence that suggests that the truth-conditions of counterfactuals are themselves causal. I offer an alternative account of the role of counterfactuals in causal thought that is consistent with these data: counterfactuals are used in a common method of causal reasoning related to John Stuart Mill's method of difference. The method uses background beliefs about causal relationships, history, and the natural laws to establish a new causal claim. Counterfactuals serve as a convenient tool for stating certain intermediate conclusions in this reasoning procedure, and that is part of what makes counterfactuals useful. This account yields a functional explanation of why our language contains a construction with the truth-conditions of counterfactuals. 3 For an interesting alternative explanation of the connection between causation and counterfactuals, see Maudlin (2004). 4 I do not claim that that is the only function of counterfactual conditionals. They clearly also serve other purposes, e.g. in making practical decisions.

Two prominent scholars on the history of natural rights disagree sharply on many issues, but they agree in opining that Aquinas did not have such a doctrine: Michel Villey, La formation de la pensée juridique moderne: cours d'histoire de la philosophie du droit (Paris: Montcrestien

This was a research paper for a course entitled Feminist and Multicultural Theologies. I unpack what gender complementarianism is, examine its history, and compare it to how Scripture and earlier Christian Tradition understood gender. This allows me to establish that gender complementarianism is a recent innovation in secular and Christian thinking about gender, and that it can be described as a "trajectory" from Scripture and Tradition on gender, influenced by social, ideological, and intellectual developments in secular societies. I then pursue a critique of gender complementarianism, arguing that it is an "unsatisfactory trajectory" because it has troubling implications for orthodox theology, is not borne out by empirical experience and observation, and has harmful effects on human beings and societies and on ethical development.

"Weimar Cumhuriyeti’nin çarpıcı bir özelliği, dönemin yetkin kamu hukukçularının, karşılaştıkları güncel sorunlara yoğun bir ilgi göstermeleri ve bu çerçevede kapsamlı tartışmalar yürütmeleridir. Kelsen ve Schmitt arasındaki tartışmayı özel kılan, kamu hukukunun pek çok temel kavramına dair iki farklı görüşü içermesidir. Her şeyden önce, korunacak olan anayasanın anlamı, bir koruyucu arayışına yol açan tehlikenin kaynağı, koruyucunun kim olacağı ve tüm bu sorunların arka planında yer alan başlıca mesele olarak demokrasi kavramı... Fakat tartışma konuları ve karşıtlıklar bunlarla da sınırlı kalmaz; devletin niteliği, kuvvetler ayrılığının anlamı, parlamentarizmin özellikleri ve sorunları, siyasi partilerin işlevi, yargısal kararın ayırt edici özellikleri ve tabii Rousseau’nun demokrasi kuramının yorumu konusunda da aynı keskinlikle devam eder."

Weimar döneminde yaşanan bir kamu hukuku tartışmasının bugün bir güncelliği var mıdır? Dünyanın popülist sağ siyasetlerin eksenine kaydığı, anayasanın ve kamu tarifinin “kişisel ihtiyaçlara” göre sündürüldüğü, demokrasinin pekâlâ siyasal “mugalata” olarak ele alınabildiği bir dönemde kuşkusuz bu sorunun yanıtı “evet”tir! Berke Özenç Demokrasiyi ve Anayasayı Korumak’ta içinde yaşadığımız çağın siyasal tartışma başlıklarından -belki de- en önemlisini, Weimar döneminin ışığında kapsamlı bir şekilde ele alıyor.

Yayına Hazırlayan: Eren OKUR Bilge Strateji Dergisi ulusal hakemli bir dergidir. Bilge Strateji Dergisi yılda iki sayı olmak üzere Bahar ve Güz dönemlerinde yayınlanır. Bilge Strateji Dergisi'nin tüm hakları saklıdır. İzinsiz yayınlanamaz. Kaynak gösterilerek alıntı yapılabilir.

This Article seeks to develop a frame of reference for comprehending legitimacy structures in emerging global economic governance regimes. To that end, it provides, in contradistinction from positivist and pragmatist approaches, an alternative normative justificatory framework for soft law. As its very name suggests, soft law is a law-like phenomenon, distinct from classical notions of law, yet no less significant, and hence worthy of receiving systematic moral analysis. It is therefore reasonable to draw upon philosophy of law as an intellectual resource for undertaking such a conceptual endeavor. Accordingly, this Article examines philosophical justifications for evolving soft law syndicates that profess to impose obligations on business enterprises and other participants dealing with human rights and sustainability matters. The Article concludes that a naturalistic cosmopolitan jurisprudence that embraces the intrinsic value of rule of law and human rights provides a vital intell...

The period when corporate social responsibility (CSR) only referred to corporate philanthropic donations has passed. Present day CSR is intimately intertwined with sustainable development, and its growth in the last several decades has been evident in Canada. The recent appearance of “hybrid” corporate legal structures on the international stage marks a growing trend toward enabling the dual pursuit of economic and social mandates for businesses. It suggests that the next significant stage in the CSR movement will be in the reformation and creation of corporate legal models that not only enable, but require, CSR concepts to be embodied within corporate governance practices.

While the US shareholder primacy model is often presumed to be the model that is dominant in modern Canadian corporations, this presumption is flawed. This article identifies some of the fundamental legal features that set Canada apart from US shareholder primacy, and attempts to demarcate a path for Canada to attain transformational corporate governance through its laws. The term “transformational” is borrowed from the business sector to help identify a tangible goal for corporate governance reform in Canada. Highlights include having a sustainable purpose, long term vision, and multi-stakeholder collaboration. Canada is poised to become a leader in corporate governance reform on two fronts: through the reformation of its existing laws regulating mainstream corporate governance practices, and in the creation of hybrid laws that can meet growing demands to legally house and govern social purpose businesses and enterprises.

There has been much fanfare surrounding the possible implementation of a hybrid similar to the US “benefit corporation” in Canada in order to address growing for-profit sector needs to pursue social value in addition to profit-making. However, some of the fundamental legal characteristics within the benefit corporation actually parallel existing common laws in Canada regarding mainstream corporate governance practices. Canada does not need to adopt American solutions to American problems. During these formative years of Canada’s corporate legal development, it is critical that the nation’s progressive legal stance is properly understood and taken into account when establishing hybrid laws so as not to confuse and/or jeopardize that stance. An ongoing stream of thoughtful and intelligent commentary is needed to address and advance Canadian corporate legal needs for social progress, as well as the establishment of innovative new hybrid laws that can bridge the gap between for-profit and non-profit sectors.

In Hegel’s idea there are three main constituent step to establish a state which are family, civil society and state. People first become together in a family, and then they build a civil society, and finally they establish a state. Hegel attached a step to these stages which is existence of civil society, but in this issue the most important part of the differences between Hegel and Thomas is about what people can do when the state act wrong for people. In Thomas’s theory, when the government makes something that community disagrees, community can only pray for the government to find the God’s true way, but for Hegel, the state can’t do anything wrong, because the state is already coming from the society to supply the common benefits and the state takes it as the community’s duty. The source of this differences is about why they made law. For Thomas, people made the law and set up rules because of the God’s wishes. It is apparent that religion, law and other social institutions can be positive for Hegel in that they are maintained by force or manipulation. In short, these institutions are no longer genuine , so for Hegel, people establish law to ensure their common benefits.

В диссертационном исследовании раскрыто понятие юридической догматики и определены функции, выполняемые ею в рамках правовой системы; выявлены социокультурные основания традиции романо-германской юридической догматики; произведена историческая реконструкция генезиса догматической юриспруденции в романо-германском правовом семействе; установлены факторы, способствовавшие ее воспроизводству и развитию; рассмотрено значение романо-германской юридической догматики для общей теории права.

The Euthyphro objection is often perceived, rightly or wrongly, as the king objection to theistic meta-ethics. This paper proposes a response that hasn't been much explored within the contemporary literature, based on the metaphysics of dispositions and natural law theory. The paper will first contend that there is a parallel between ways theists conceptualise God's role in creating laws of nature and the ways God creates goods. Drawing upon these parallels I propose a possible response to the dilemma, where this response parallels the dispositionalist response as to how God creates laws of nature. I do this by first explicating a natural law theory of goodness, then I suggest how the ontology of dispositions can be used in a novel way to account for goods, and finally I explain how this all relates to the dilemma. I conclude the paper by posing some objections to myself and providing some replies.

The article attempts a comprehensive review of the human security concept in order to question its utility for both research and policy-making. It notes the term’s interdisciplinary and extensively normative content that have facilitated its evolution into a successful security discourse. On the other hand, human security’s wide appeal has as a side-effect an extended conceptual polysemy inhibiting the cumulation of knowledge and the development of a relevant theory. Absence of conceptual clarity has also complicated its policy implementation. The article attempts to break the deadlock and move the debate forward by using the work of John Gerring and Paul A. Barresi on concept formation as an organizing device.

“Human beings do the actions, and the results come according to the law of nature – the Lord has nothing to do with it. So when people are in trouble, they say: “Oh God, what have You done to me? What put this into Your mind?” But the fact is that Náráyańa, God, has done nothing, and had nothing in His mind. You have done something and are suffering the consequences. You are in trouble and you are crying out. Many people are like this. But Náráyańa has done nothing. As you have sown, so you now reap. This is the plain truth,” explains Shrii Shrii Ánandamúrti. “So before doing anything you should think carefully, because the action is in your hand, but not the result – that is in the hand of Prakrti (God’s Cosmic Operative Principle – the law of nature). Náráyańa neither performs the action nor administers the results. He simply gives Prakrti the opportunity to work within Her own limited sphere; Prakrti does Her duty accordingly. She does not aim to satisfy either your mind or the mind of anyone else. She only aims to please the mind of Náráyańa. Whatever work Náráyańa has given Her the right to do, that is what She does. She has no right to do more than that.” Shrii Shrii Ánandamúrti (1921-1990) was a Tantric guru in the tradition of Shiva and Krishna. He introduced the empowered universal spiritual mantra “Baba Nam Kevalam”, composed a collection of 5018 spiritual songs called Prabháta Saḿgiita, and founded the socio-spiritual movement Ananda Marga (“the Path of Bliss”).  –  Richard Gauthier, Department of Chemistry and Physics, Santa Rosa Junior College, Santa Rosa, California, USA, August 6, 2021.

Constitutional liberal practices are capable of being normatively grounded by a number of different metaphysical positions. Kant provides one such grounding, in terms of the autonomously derived moral law. I argue that the work of Edmund Burke provides a resource for an alternative construal of constitutional liberalism, compatible with, and illumined by, a broadly Thomistic natural law worldview. I contrast Burke's treatment of the relationship between truth and cognition, prudence and rights, with that of his contemporary, Kant. We find that in each case where Kant's system is constructed from the first principle of autonomy, Burke's thought is oriented toward an end that is not of our making. Readings of Burke as a natural law thinker are currently out of fashion among Burke commentators; without relying, for the main thesis, on historical claims about Burke's “Thomism,” I nonetheless explore and challenge some of the assumptions that underlie the current orthodoxy.

The Lutheran tradition places a pronounced emphasis on the universal aspects of theological ethics. The present article draws attention to particular aspects of the theological ethics of Martin Luther, which support the existence of a Christian ethics in several meanings of this concept. It argues that a Christian ethics exists in the sense that it presupposes Christian faith, is only for Christians, is realized as a consequence of receiving the Christian faith, is shaped by the Christian faith, and leads to a distinct way of life. Moreover, it concludes that there exists a remarkable convergence between natural law and what is identified as a Christian ethics in the theology of Luther. But it is still possible to argue that, according to Luther, something special is demanded of Christians: They must be willing to endure suffering and persecution because of their Christian faith.

In Plato’s Gorgias one of Socrates interlocutors, Callicles, exposes a philosoph-ical theory based upon the supremacy of the stronger over the weaker and in therefusal to accept a moral system created by these in order to restrain the powerful. Immediately, this theory reminds Nietzsche’s moral critique. The figure of Socratesserves as a counterpoint in the confrontation of both theories, because Callicles, inthe platonic text, as well as Nietzsche in his works stand in clear opposition to him.Then, we must compare both controversies in order to find out the proximity or dis-tance between Callicles’ and Nietzsche’s positions.

Naturrecht AUFSATZSAMMLUNG 19-3 Leibniz und das Naturrecht / hrsg. von Luca Basso.-Stuttgart : Steiner, 2019.-201 S. ; 24 cm.-(Studia Leibnitiana : Sonder-hefte ; 54).-ISBN 978-3-515-12288-7 : EUR 44.00 [#6467] Die Geschichte des Naturrechts ist lang, und in der Frühen Neuzeit machte diese Denkfigur grundlegende Änderungen durch. Immer aber blieb das Na-turrecht als eine Herausforderung bestehen, an der man sich rechtsphi-lophisch, politiktheoretisch oder auch theologisch abarbeiten mußte. Daher kann es nicht verwundern, daß viele Denker in einem mehr oder weniger engen Bezug zum naturrechtlichen Denken stehen, so eben auch Leibniz, dem der vorliegende Band 1-er geht auf einen Kongreß in Padua 2016 zu-rück-in der verdienstvollen Reihe der Sonderhefte der Studia Leibnitiana nachgeht. 2 Dabei stehen auch manche anderen Denker zur Diskussion, zu denen sich Leibniz in ein kritisches Verhältnis setzen mußte. So wird er denn auch hier im Zusammenhang mit dem Naturrecht konfrontiert mit Aristoteles, Augusti-1 Inhaltsverzeichnis: https://d-nb.info/1176674730/04 2 Zuletzt wurden besprochen: Leibniz and the European encounter with China : 300 years of "Discours sur la théologie naturelle des Chinois" / Wenchao Li (Hg.).-Stuttgart : Steiner, 2017.-295 S. ; 24 cm.-(Studia Leibnitiana : Sonderhefte ; 52).-ISBN 978-3-515-11733-3 : EUR 56.00 [#5645].-Rez.: IFB 18-2 http://informationsmittel-fuer-bibliotheken.de/showfile.php?id=9011-Leibniz im Lichte der Theologien / Wenchao Li ; Hartmut Rudolph (Hg.).-Stuttgart : Stei-ner, 2017.-345 S. ; 25 cm.-(Studia Leibnitiana : Supplementa ; 40).-ISBN 978-3-515-11465-3 : EUR 62.00 [#5215].-Rez.: IFB 18-2 http://informationsmittel-fuer-bibliotheken.de/showfile.php?id=9010-Leibniz in Latenz : Überlieferungsbildung als Rezeption (1716-1740) / Nora Gädeke ; Wenchao Li (Hg.).-Stuttgart : Stei-ner, 2017.-262 S. : Faks., Diagramme ; 24 cm.-(Studia Leibnitiana : Sonderhefte ; 50).-ISBN 978-3-515-11474-5 : EUR 46.00 [#5484],. Rez.: IFB 17-4 http://informationsmittel-fuer-bibliotheken.de/showfile.php?id=8729-Leibniz et Bayle : confrontation et dialogue / éd. par Christian Leduc ...-Stuttgart : Steiner, 2015.-452 S. ; 24 cm.-(Studia Leibnitiana : Sonderhefte ; 43).

The radical ideas of the French Revolution are generally regarded as the offspring of the theory of social contract. However, even though the Revolutionaries cherished Rousseau’s legacy, the period was not without instances in which this legacy could be subject to variation and the notion of social contract could be attributed, in a decidedly negative tone, less to Rousseau than to Hobbes. In this context, the present study of Jean-Baptiste Salaville’s L’Homme et la société, ou nouvelle théorie de la nature humaine et de l’état social (1799) demonstrates that the idea of natural sociability could provide an opportunity to elaborate a radical republican future without the notion of social contract. Salaville’s political vision, built on the tradition of natural jurisprudence, posited a new idea of the general will and empiricist legislation in the last days of the French Revolution.

In this essay I argue that religion, understood as harmony with the transcendent source of existence and meaning, is a good that practical reason grasps as an objective, distinct and important aspect of human well-being, one which reasonably takes pride of place among the various aspects of a good human life due to its architectonic role in structuring and adding a transcendent meaning to all of the other goods that we pursue. On the basis of this view of religion, I go on to suggest that religious belief and practice deserve special protection in law, above and beyond mere preferences and even other conscientious commitments. I develop this view through a dialectical engagement with Dworkin, Barry, Eisgruber and Sager.

NATURAL LAW THEORY AND THE ―IS‖—―OUGHT‖ PROBLEM: A CRITIQUE OF FOUR SOLUTIONS Shalina Stilley, B.A., M.Th., M.A. Marquette University, 2010 This dissertation explores the ―Is‖—―Ought‖ problem (IOP) as it relates to natural law theory (NLT). It begins with a brief analysis of the type of ―ought‖ precepts upheld by traditional natural law theorists as well as a consideration of the precise nature of the IOP. Chapter two considers the attempts of Searle and Gewirth at establishing that it is possible validly to derive an ―ought‖ conclusion from ―is‖ premises and asks whether their attempts can be imitated successfully by those who wish to uphold the basic claims of NLT. Chapter three considers whether it is possible to bypass the IOP by beginning with premises concerning the de facto desires of human agents. Chapter four consists of an analysis of Geach, Veatch, McInerny, MacIntyre, and Lisska who put forth the solution of returning to the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of the te...

“I myself,” stated C. S. Lewis to his fellows during his inaugural address at Cambridge University, “belong far more to that Old Western order than to yours.”  In the same speech, Lewis went further to identify himself as a “dinosaur” and “an Old Western Man.” Prima facie these comments seem straightforward enough, but under close scrutiny, does Lewis’ identification of himself as an “Old Western Man” mean anything, and if so, what?

'Promising and Obligation' criticizes the view, defended by Joseph Raz, John Finnis, David Owens and many others, that one's moral obligation to keep a promise is created by one's expression, through the act of promising, of an intention so to obligate oneself.

The moral obligation to keep promises arises instead out of either of two contrasting aspects of the morality of human nature: from our mutual moral independence, which consists in our natural right to determine for ourselves what we do for others; or from our mutual moral interdependence, which consists in our natural interest in the trustworthiness of others.

The paper opposes David Hume's theory that the moral obligation to keep promises is part of convention-dependent or artificial morality.  Instead the obligation is part of pre-conventional natural morality.

The 1648 Peace of Westphalia typifies the “modern” starting point of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention within conventional historical treatments of International Relations (IR) theory. The treaties ending the Thirty Years’ War signaled the dawn of an international society after medieval Latin Christendom with new diplomatic arrangements that assigned legitimate autonomy to specific European states independent of Roman imperial and papal authorities. The ideological archetypes of Westphalia for IR theory during the twentieth century were contemporaries Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) the realist and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) the rationalist. Each of them powerfully envisioned a modern form of international relations: Hobbes accented sovereign political independence and international anarchy between states whereas Grotius affirmed a worldwide association of states absent a global authority yet still regulated by norms of universal law to justify war and intervention. Hobbesian sovereignty and Grotian international law produce the dynamic tension and terms of modern international relations. Yet the turn to the global history of international law has challenged the conceptual parameters of the IR Westphalian narrative focused on intra-European relations between sovereign states. In particular, attention to the constitutive role of imperial expansion and colonial settlement outside Europe offers a richer scope for analyzing the development of “modern” international relations and its legal-political concepts such as the state of nature, the law of occupation, and the law of nations.

Father Thomas Crean and Alan Fimister have produced a comprehensive yet concise treatise on classical political and legal philosophy in Integralism: A Manual of Political Philosophy. As the title implies the hallmark of their approach is that jurisprudence, political philosophy, moral philosophy, and theology are not separate disciplines but integrally related. Their exposition and arguments move seamlessly among theology, philosophy, and jurisprudence. The second characteristic of Crean and Fimister’s work is how they interweave within a classical reading of Aristotle and St. Thomas several intriguing developments of the classical principles. They advance interesting distinctions and developments with respect to: whether civil nations can be perfect societies; the role of the Church in declaring a human law null and void under natural law; the removal of tyrants and usurpers; the classification of constitutional regimes, and separation of powers.

The Theses LVI belong to a series of hitherto unpublished early manuscripts of the Dutch humanist and jurisconsult Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) that were acquired by the University of Leiden in 1864. It is not certain when the Theses were written, but preliminary research on the physical manuscript and the sources cited indicate two possible windows. The first is around 1602-1605, that is roughly at a time when Grotius was also working on his Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (De Iure Praedae Commentarius). The second dating places the genesis of the manuscrbipt around 1613-1615.
In the context of Grotius’ writings, the Theses LVI assume an important position for several reasons: They raise questions about state formation, the duty of citizens to the state and the right of political resistance in far greater detail than in any other work of the celebrated Dutch humanist. The Theses LVI also feature important reading notes that yield priceless insights into the sources that Grotius directly consulted and their influence on his ideas. The manuscript grants modern scholars a unique glimpse into the working mind of its author. Evidence points not only to the ferocious haste with which Grotius wrote his works, but also the occasional sloppiness of his reading and research habits."""

This article analyzes the shifting concepts of law in Western law and thought in early modern times and today. It first shows how the modern movement of interdisciplinary legal studies emerged as a corrective to the narrow positivist concepts of law that prevailed before the 1960s. It then shows how, in anticipation of modern methods, earlier Protestant legal thinkers had already worked hard to reconcile biblical and human laws, natural and positive laws, canon and civil laws, cases and legal codes in pursuit of a more integrated jurisprudence.