Pakistani Taliban

Sam Harris, in his book The Moral Landscape, argues that “science can determine human values.” Against this view, I argue that while secular moral philosophy can certainly help us to determine our values, science—at least as that word is commonly understood—must play a subservient role. To the extent that science can “determine” what we ought to do, it is only by providing us with empirical information, which can then be slotted into a chain of deductive (moral) reasoning. The premises of such reasoning, however, can in no way be derived from the scientific method: they come, instead, from philosophy—and common sense.

The US strategy lacked that burning fire to beat the enemy. While US strategists rightly saw China as consolidating Pakistan as its western corridor to Gulf oil and mineral resources of West Asia their support to secessionists in Pakistani Balochistan was weak and instead of strengthening Baloch nationalism has actually weakened Baloch secessionism. Similarly US attempts to destabilize Pakistans Northern Area also lack serious strategic resolve. The US 2008 plan to establish civilian supremacy in Pakistan was also a strategic failure and has destabilized Pakistan rather than stabilizing Pakistans civil military equilibrium. The US strategists lacked the long term vision to create new states which could have stabilized the region which they had destabilized i.e Iraq and Afghanistan.Thus Iraq was shamelessly abandoned to become a haven of terrorism , whereas Iraqs division into Kurd , Sunni and Shia regions would have stabilized it and restrained and checked Iranian ambitions. Similarly US failure to divide Afghanistan will again go a long way to destabilize the whole region with a new Afghan Civil war. US failure to utilize its unique central position in Afghanistan to deal with Iran was also a failure and the US leaves the region greatly destabilized than it was on eve of October 2001. The report card for the US strategists is FAIL and FAIL in both Afghanistan and Iraq while in case of Pakistan again it was a grand failure. The US as it leaves the region in 2014 , leaves it with a feather in its cap of having created greater instability than was the case in 2001.

The aim of the paper is to ascertain whether it is practical for Pakistan to apply the Sri Lankan COIN (Counterinsurgency) Model against its primary insurgent group-Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Initially, the paper highlights the characteristics adopted in the Sri Lankan Model that was used successfully against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or Tamil Tigers. The paper then critically analyses whether Pakistan should reproduce the Sri Lankan Model by taking into consideration both countries', and especially Pakistan's, local, regional and global environment; kind of insurgency threat; and the politics and capability of the armed forces. After analysis it becomes evident that due to differences and intricacies in both countries' scenarios, environments and insurgencies, it is simplistic to state that Pakistan should completely copy the Sri Lankan modus operandi. However, the paper does suggest that there are some caveats and takeaways that need to be appreciated and applied from the Sri Lankan experience. It is concluded that Pakistan continue its successful Zarb e Azb Operation, learn the relevant lessons from the Sri Lankan example, and create a "Pakistani Model" that takes the country's own needs and environment into account.

Two UK-based specialists on terrorism in Pakistan use empirical evidence to document and analyze the Pakistani Taliban's (Tehrik-e-Taliban) practice of targeting spaces of public interaction for terrorism intended to suppress expressions of public unity and restrict venues for open discussion. In tracing the rise of the Taliban in Pakistan, the authors review the country's history of state and civil society formation , its relations with Afghanistan, and U.S. and Western policy in the region. The authors present timely information and insights that enhance understanding of the recent surge in terrorist attacks on civilians in Pakistan and its ties to the eastward spread of conflict from neighboring Afghanistan. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: F520, F540, O180, Z000. 3 figures, 1 table, 83 references.

Countries in South Asia being religiously, ethnically and culturally diverse are naturally prone to intrastate conflicts and tensions. The inability of their ruling elites to neither grant nor guard the political and economic rights of minority groups cause discontent and conflicts. India being a powerful country and occupying central position in the region could help its neighbours to overcome their problems. Conversely, it can exploit them to its advantage in order to extract various concessions and impose its dictates on them. This article discusses the case of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan and finds that India chose the latter course and used support of terrorism as a tool of its foreign policy to advance its interests in the region.

This is a fact that the beauty of the Swat valley was disfigured by her own people through their barbaric actions to demolish the social, financial, and – more than all – the religious sectors. The need of this book was felt to draw a true picture of the on-going insurgency in the beautiful valley of Swat. Being a close observer of the situation here since the initiation of The F.M Radio by Mullah Fazlullah and the criminal negligence of the government of that time which not only helped nurture the militancy but also challenged the writ of the government openly, I tried to catch the attention of the people towards the reality behind the scene and the so-called show.

Today when we talk about the militancy or extremism in the different parts of the Pakhtoon belt, we really forget that the eruption of the militants and their barbaric acts are not all of a sudden, but due to the gradual and long injustices of the society. As an Arab proverb says, ―Those who sow injustice, harvest barbarism,‖ and it is rightly said that barbarism is the fruit of injustice. It has also been observed through the history of mankind that whenever and wherever the human rights have been violated by the upper class in any society has always resulted in barbaric actions. And peace can never be attained by a society where there is no justice. As the Prophet Jesus said before circa 2000 A.D.: "Peace will be the fruit of justice" (32:17). The ongoing insurgency and the militancy or the extremism in the valley of Swat is not only the direct result of the  negligence of the government authorities but also the bitter fruit of injustices by the elite and aristocrats who use to press the lower class and curb their rights since long. If the government is sincere and true in so eradicating the extremism, it must come forward to solve the real issues of the common people, according to justice. The stake holders of the society must not forget Jesus' words: "All who take the sword will perish by the sword." In order to eradicate the extremism, we have to address the root causes, without which we can never reach any solution because to cure any disease we want to kill the germs not the person with the disease. Here, I must mention the criminal silence observed by the common people throughout the period, when they were the direct target not only by the militants but also by the security forces. They always kept their mouth shut whenever, and regardless of how, others behaved towards them. They were killed, and their properties were destroyed and captured by both the sides, but they could not open their mouths against them, thereby harvesting criminal silence. It is the time now for these common people to break their silence and raise voice against any act of barbarism by any side. And if they do not do so, time will not forgive them, and they will become the dark side of the pages of the history.

At the end I am grateful to Mr. Amjad Ali Sahab and Mr. Subhani Jawhar for his comments and proof reading of the book. I also thank Mr. Shah Asad and Mr. Fazal Mahmood Rokhan who helped me in collection of the pictures.

Fazal Khaliq Fazal
Swat valley, Pakistan

Sixteen years of war in Afghanistan by US and NATO imperialism is the longest in their history. In spite of their incomparable high tech military and economic superiority, and after gathering the military forces of 50 client countries there, committing diabolical atrocities, and spending close to a trillion dollars, they have essentially lost the war against the poorly equipped Taliban and their allies that have been waging an effective and experienced guerrilla warfare against the invaders and becoming stronger in the process, again demonstrating the accuracy of dialectical theories of guerrilla warfare by Mao Zedong , Vo Nguyen Giap , and Ernesto Che Guevara.

The foundations of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy have been to prevent the formation of an independent Great Pashtunistan that includes the Pashtun ethnic population in Pakistan and geographically to the northwest of Pakistan and to reduce the influence and interference of India on Afghanistan. In this context, the main problem for Pakistan has been Pashtun nationalism originating from Afghanistan and the indirect problem has been the existence of India.

The Afghan Taliban have grown stronger and more deadly over the past 13 years, something Pakistan is often
blamed for by Afghans and some in the international community. Thus, Pakistan is seen as the key player in
bringing the Taliban to the negotiation table. However, the Taliban claims their militancy in Afghanistan is
completely independent of Pakistan. In this context, there are three major concerns associated with materializing
peace talk efforts between Afghanistan and the Taliban. First, it remains unclear whether Pakistan will cooperate in
the Afghan peace process and urge the Taliban to stop fighting. Second, and of most interest, is whether the Taliban
will listen to Pakistan. Third, Afghanistan’s role in a lasting and enforceable settlement has yet to be determined.

Pakistan and Afghanistan are interlocked into numerous connections ranging from geographical proximity, ethnic religious commonalities to historical experiences. But no harmony of interests or shared strategic considerations for the region and the world as well could take place. From the outset Pakistan aspired to have friendly relations with Afghanistan. Since 1947 Afghanistan had been supporting Pakhtun separatists due to its denial of legality of the Durand line.To meet the challenges emanating from Afghan governments’ hostilities, a shift in Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan occurred when in the 1970s, it created links with a number of Afghan Islamists opposition leaders. In 1980s, these links fully matured with a new dimension to force a communist super power Soviet Union for its retreat from the backyard of Pakistan. Since then Pakistan has actively remained engaged with Afghan affairs. This study analyzes various phases and perspectives on Pakistan’s Policy towards a strategically important country, with which Pakistan’s peace and stability are divinely bound due to its geographical vicinity, racial, ethnic and religious intricacies.

Das rasche Wiedererstarken der Taliban hat die Öffentlichkeit weltweit überrascht. Was die Kernelemente der Taliban Ideologie sind, wie diese mit der DeobandiBewegung zusammenhängt und was das für Frauenrechte bedeutet erörtert Dr. Thomas K. Guglervon der Goethe Universität Frankfurt im Gespräch mit der Dokumentationsstelle.

Pakistan's religious leaders, ulama, have been put under significant strain in relation to how to deal with questions about the political tensions and violence over the past decade flowing from the Taliban's role in the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The effects of this fraught environment on religious authority can be seen through the way that religious leaders have issued contradictory and opaque fatawa (non-binding, but highly influential, legal opinions). This article particularly considers the way that different fatwa-giving religious groups, such as Deobandis, Brevalis, and Ahl-i-Hadith, have dealt with these problems. The violence, which has struck the heart of Pakistan civil society, has led to a confusing array of fatawa from these religious elites. These opinions have sought to categorize violence as either legitimate or to be condemned. This article, therefore, shows how these fatawa and the conflicting positions they took have compromised religious authority in contemporary Pakistan.

The enemy: Hefazatul Islam (defenders/protectors of Islam) it is called and just like our Blogger Comrades their strategies and agitation methodology have more elements of similarity than dissimilarity! Our worries peaked when these ‘pure Huzurs’ stunned us with their ultimatum to the Government that our Blogger Comrades ought to  be arrested, tried and hanged by the 6th of April 2013. Failing, they have threatened an occupation of Manik Mia Avenue, where they plan to erect an “Islamic Jagoron Moncho” with the ‘faithful’ from all over Bangladesh thronging and besieging Dhaka.

The allegations: They enemy says a) we are atheist b) we have insulted Prophet Muhammad c) we have disrespected the Holy Qur’an; apparently good enough reasons to get us hanged .

The Prediction: One can be rest assured that hundreds upon thousands of white skull caps will ride the crest of an imminent tidal bore – for the precise three points ‘championed’ by the enemy, (rightly or wrongly is a separate matter) is good enough reason to excite the passions of millions of pious – if not fanatical or fundamentalist Bengali Muslims, to take to the streets. And why do I say so?

The Pretenders: Do these hate filled so-called “defenders of Islam”, who in reality are Muslim pretenders, and are agents for murder mayhem, strife, disquiet and disorder in civic life; ever consider that attributes such as benevolence, forgiveness and mercy are also foundations of the Creators all encompassing omnipresence, in the course of human destiny? The concept of “God fearing Muslims” is a construct of hate merchants backed by Free Masonic agents, disguised in robes of religiosity, to misguide the pious and ‘religion sensitized’ masses. That this mindset of division dates back to periods of Islamic history, post the death of Prophet Muhammad, is rarely, if ever acknowledged.

The 6th April siege of Dhaka: I am glad 04/06 happened, for the purpose, attitude, appearance, and the intent of the enemy has never been clearer than now. What they have already spelt out implies a pledge to slide us back into the dark pits of medievalism, confine women to homes, perforce enforce the hijab, ban female and coeducation systems, ban music, ban fine arts, specially sculpture  and anything considered deviant or not in conformity of what in their perception is ‘Islamic’.

The 5th May crackdown on Hefazat: We get to see the likes of Allama Shafi riding insanely expensive SUVs and helicopters, while his half-fed ‘supporters’ are coaxed and threatened to join his murderous jihad on fellow Muslims, are made to endure a ‘long march’ to Dhaka? How more corrupt and vulgar can these fake ‘god men’ be? How long shall we be in fear of these so-called ‘apolitical theologians’ that are no different from sections of our corrupt politicians? And after a day spent haranguing the ‘faithful’ with screams of imaner lorai (fight/resolve of faith) where they promise in public view and that of the world, never to leave their ground, never to return home if their demands are not met, to sacrifice their blood, to become immortal shaheeds (martyrs) — and all it takes is 17 minutes of security forces action, for the ‘millions’ to flee, to literally disappear into thin air.

America is withdrawing. Once more the voices signalling a defeat of the American "empire and its legions" in the Hindukush. The political message is clear, the Taliban strategy has paid off, in the near term at least, America is humbled. Shadows of the Vietnam experience settling in the political circles in Washington, Brussels and the Middle East and the consequences of pulling out for political, economic and strategic reasons are yet to emerge.

But the globalist jihadist scene has taken notice. Increases of incident in Africa, in Afghanistan paints a reality the political leaders in Europe and the United States like to be forgotten. Taliban commanders already warn of the taking over from the "slave administration" and provide support in Pakistan and elsewhere. UN reports illustrate the links between Al Qaeda leaders residing in Afghanistan, the Taliban and the Haqqani's. meet frequent.

This unclassified commentary looks at options for Afghanistan in the post U.S. withdrawal. Total collapse, Second, a Columbian protracted war of attrition or last slugging along the muddy path of failed state. A fragmentation of the Afghanistan like former Yugoslavia should not be ruled out even if a peace deal is struck.

In its magazine, Sunnat-e Khola, Tahrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) called upon women to rise because the 'Time of Martyrdom has come'. This research addresses questions surrounding how women are framed in jihadi rhetoric and what roles they play within these frames. Using a mixed-methods approach, we analysed sixty-eight jihadi magazines by Islamic State (ISIS), TTP, Al Qaeda, and Taliban, generating 3,417 codes which were further sorted into relevant contextual categories. These data were analysed through the lenses of social movement framing theory, which highlight the nuances and fine-grain differences among the aforementioned jihadi extremist groups in how women are depicted and how women's agency within these groups is constructed. A significant finding of this paper is that Al Qaeda and ISIS often show opposite trends in how they depict women within diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framings. Furthermore, while the TTP has a higher proclivity to follow similar patterns to ISIS, the Taliban shares more similarities with Al Qaeda than any other group. For example, both ISIS and TTP are more likely than the Taliban and Al Qaeda to encourage women to do hijra and join jihad.

It was once a stop on the hippie trail and inspiration for the Lonely Planet guidebooks. So how did Afghanistan come to be defined by war and terrorism?
The one thing everyone knows about Afghanistan is that it cannot be conquered. As this story goes, every army since Alexander the Great's in 330BC has had to leave in defeat (though Alexander, or Iskander as he was known in the East, left his name on Kandahar, the country's first capital).
The British, who fought three wars in Afghanistan between 1838 and 1919, did much to popularise the idea of it as inhospitable and unattainable.
Three things should be said about this account. Firstly, while travellers and mapmakers had for centuries talked about "the land of Afghans", or Afghanistan in Persian, there wasn't a country called Afghanistan until the 18th century. Secondly, by that time the area had been conquered repeatedly by Persians, Arabs, Mongols and Indians – peoples whose history is not always closely studied in the West.
Thirdly, and most importantly, Afghanistan is a place on the edge of every place, a landlocked crossroads at the easternmost limits of the Middle East, the westernmost limits of the Far East, the northernmost limits of South Asia and the southernmost limits of Central Asia. Empires haven't been killed there, but they have often found the end of their reach.
This has meant that, again and again, they have sought controlling influence over Afghanistan's affairs without having to rule there, or as Britain's viceroy in India, Lord Curzon, put it in 1906: "We do not want to occupy it, but we also cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes."

Esa mañana yo estaba preparando todo para irme a la universidad. Prendo la tele y veo una torre gemela en llamas y el impacto del segundo avión. Creí que era una película. Luego vi el recuadro del Pentágono explotando. En ese momento me entró el mello. Me pregunté: ¿Qué sigue? ¿Al país más poderoso del planeta le están partiendo su mandarina en gajos y no puede defenderse? ¿En realidad lo que sigue es un hongo radioactivo en Manhattan o en Los Ángeles? Mientras yo seguía viendo petrificado los reportes televisivos...
20 años después, los US Military salen con la cola entre las patas de Kabul y el Talibán resurge más fuerte que nunca. En términos geopolíticos, los ganadores con la retirada estadounidense son China, Rusia e Irán. Los paquistaníes también se consideran ganadores, pero cada vez que estos cuates creen que tienen todo bajo control, las cosas truenan miserablemente por todos lados. Los paquistaníes le han dado the kiss of death a la nueva Afganistán y eso no son buenas noticias para las potencias medias en la región, incluyendo la India.

Political parties push for FATA  in reforms to mainstream the 'sick man of the Pashtun belt', so-called the hotbed of terror its and merger with KP.  The government has been trying to maintain some semblance of order in the region by making arrangements for emerging social forces while keeping the traditional classes in its fold to enable them to make the return of militants impossible.

By Sartaj Khan
Abstract
This article examines one of the key responses to terrorism in Af-Pak—courting Pashtun Mashran (commonly known as elders such as Khan, Maliks and tribal chieftains and others influentials)— to counter Taliban’s militancy in the Pashtun region of Pakistan comprising FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. The aim of this article is to discuss both the success and failures of the strategy in various parts of the region especially forming Peace Committees/Militias (Lashkars) as a counter-insurgency strategy. The analysis evaluates the strategy which initially focuses on strengthening the local influentials rather than combating Taliban for its strategic interest in Afghanistan. However, the fallacy of this strategy has never been fully acknowledged. Instead of counter-insurgency measures, the government’s initial approach was to protect the local influentials on one hand and close eyes on Jihadi groups on the other. This strategy paved the way to strengthen the former Jihadi and religious figures and finally an insurgent movement. This has created suspicion amongst people and particularly in Pashtun traditional elites. Pakistani government resorted to military operations in various parts of the region. As part of the strategy government has tried to court Pashtun elites and help in creating local militias/Lashkars to combat Taliban. However, the situation in Swat and FATA shows that Pashtun elites no longer enjoy support in society at large. They are dependent on state to protect them, their families and property. The strategy of facilitating and arming local influentials bring less fruit as Pashtun elites are unable to stand to militants because of their social basis. The emergences of new social forces on Pashtun soil consequently destabilize society as a whole. Despite military operations in various parts of the region, law and order situation has deteriorated and means of peace far from being achieved yet.

With the War in Afghanistan in its 19th year now the conflict seems to have no end. The recent agreement with Taliban appears that their position is much stronger than it was at any point after the U.S invasion in the country. To examine if the particular reason that have contributed in the situation that's linked to the popularity of the the insurgency among Pashtuns. The ethnic group have contributed a major part in keeping the insurgency alive, and to examine the possibilities of countering this problem that can play major part in counterinsurgency narratives and in ending the insurgency.  The example of which is not absent in practical.

Pakistan faced severe challenges of violent extremism and terrorism after US invasion of Afghanistan. The successive governments pursued both political and military means to bring an end to this problem but to no avail. The war against terrorism was highly unpopular among the people and it was the main cause of failure to combat terrorism. In 2013, the newly formed government led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif decided to give peace a chance after a decision of an All Parties Conference (APC). Consequently, the dialogue process, through the committee members nominated by the government and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ensued that kindled the hope of peace and stability in the country. However, the process was crippled after a few months and government launched a military operation against TTP and other militant outfits in the country. The paper explores the factors that lead the government to start peace talks with TTP and analyzes the challenges that dialogue process faced and ultimately caused its failure. Finally, it highlights the benefits, particularly the national consensus to combat terrorism that dialogue process produced despite its failure to bring peace in the country.

The Culture & Conflict Review
Vol. 2, No. 2, March 2008
The Taliban is a fractious organization. In their drive for post-9/11 power, they have set aside a number of ideological positions in order to defeat a common enemy. As this month’s actions have shown, even the identity of that common enemy is a subject of debate and friction. This, in turn, has led to a fracturing of the Taliban itself.

Over 140 children were killed in an Army Public school in the capital city of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province on December 16, 2014. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed the responsibility for the school siege and attack and said the assault was a “response to military’s ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ offensive, the killing of Taliban fighters and the harassment of their families.”

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have always been characterised by mutual rivalry and hostility. Over the past few years, however, some remarkable developments have opened up new opportunities to improve stability in the region and could advance the peace process between the actors involved. Lately, this has had less to do with US involvement (though not because of aid cuts announced by President Trump) and more with China, whose influence in the region is growing. This is reflected in current changes in the way Pakistan is dealing with the Taliban. Although it is not yet clear whether these trends will continue, new opportunities for stability in South Asia are already emerging.

The new civilian government in Pakistan tried its best to initiate a peace process by bringing the TTP to the negotiating table: but the very day this process was supposed to begin-when a delegation of clerics was supposed to take the government's message and offer of talks to the TTP-a US drone strike took out Hakeemullah Mehsud from play. The fallout of this single drone strike shattered all hopes for peace conjured up by the new civilian dispensation in Pakistan-the PML-N in the Center and the PTI in KP province-who pinned their hopes on negotiations rather than what Pakistan's Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, calls "unleashing senseless force" to end the bloodshed that has seen almost 40,000 Pakistanis killed so far, including more than 5,000 military personnel and thousands of members of the various arms and elements of Pakistan's security apparatus and forces, such as the police, paramilitary troops and even intelligence agencies' personnel and operatives. The US drone strike that killed Hakeemullah Mehsud not only dashed the chances for a negotiated peace between the Pakistani state and the TTP: it also brought with it a more deadly repercussion that manifested a few days after Hakeemullah's death and the deliberations of the Taliban shura (apparently stationed in North Waziristan as well as Afghanistan's Kunar province-whether this is the overall Taliban shura for both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, or just the TTP ruling council with little to no links with the Afghan Taliban movement, is yet to be clarified and ascertained). Now, the TTP is led by the Swat Taliban leader, Mullah Fazlullah, who is ardently opposed to talks. Out of three choices for the TTP leadership position, Fazlullah emerged as a dark horse and now leads the insurgent movement which has waged a bloody war against Pakistan since 2007, when the movement was formed. Fazlullah has always been a fervent enemy of the Pakistani state, and his election/selection as TTP leader is unorthodox for many reasons: he is the first non-Mehsud non-Wazir leader of the TTP, and does not even hail from the tribal areas. When he was ousted from Swat in 2009, instead of seeking refuge in North Waziristan, Fazlullah crossed the border and set up base in Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan.

The Pakistan military claimed at the beginning of June that it had achieved success in its all-out assault on Taliban insurgents after driving more than two million people from the Swat Valley and other areas of the north west of the country. The assault followed the breakdown of an agreement reached in February between the government and Sufi Mohammad, leader of one of the Islamist groups, for Swat's legal code to be based on Nizam-e-Adl—an attempt to mix constitutional rules with the local interpretation of sharia law. The agreement was meant to bring an end to fighting between the Pakistan army and the Swat Taliban, led by Sufi Muhammad's son in law, Maulana Fazullah. The military onslaught happened after pressure from the US, which worried about the implications an agreement between the Pakistan government and the Taliban would have for its operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Pakistan. But the assault found favour with most liberal and " civil society " opinion, and much of the left, even if this was sometimes mixed with horror at the effects on civilians. Articles in the Pakistani press habitually refer to the " barbarity " of " terrorist " rule in Swat. This feeling was given a sharp edge by a mobile phone video supposedly showing a 17 year old woman receiving 30 whippings for " illicit " relations with a man—although other reports claim that the video was fraudulent and that the woman has denied she was whipped. 1 Whatever the truth of the matter, the video played a role in leading much of the left internationally to take a similar approach to the Pakistani liberals, treating the Pakistan Taliban as if it were as much a foreign force in Swat as the Pakistan army or the US army in Afghanistan. Yet there is strong evidence of a class element to the conflict. The New York Times could report in April, " The Taliban have advanced deeper into Pakistan by engineering a class revolt that exploits profound fissures between a small group of wealthy landlords and their landless tenants…the Taliban seized control by pushing out about four dozen landlords who held the most power. To do so, the militants organised peasants into armed gangs that became their shock troops. " The Karachi newspaper The News has carried a debate which, according to one far left contributor, " has pitted those who claim that the situation in Swat is a reflection of longstanding class inequities against those who refute this notion of 'class war'; while the former suggest that the 'Taliban' has generated support amongst the subordinate classes, the latter argue that the 'Taliban' has imposed itself in the area on the basis of brute force ". 2 One of the articles prompting the debate, reprinted in edited form here, came from Sartaj Khan of the International Socialists of Pakistan.

Pakistan-Afghanistan border is an haritage of British Raj. Brittons decided to use local tribal militia as a border guard after two attempts to enforce their power on to local Pashtun tribes. Such solution occured quite effective during collonial rule. Pakistan inharited that and incorporated in their system. During Soviet invasion in to Afghanistan it has been currupted by Arab-Salafi fighters presence and collapse of local tribal structures. After Soviet withdrawal from Afganistan, Af-Pak frontier became virtually lawless area and local militias were underdeveloped because they were concideret un-trustworthy. The situation has changed afer 9/11 when the USA supported modernization of Pakistani Frontier Corps. Present situation is a kind of synthesis  between traditional tribal militias of British Raj and regular warfare of modern  battlefield. Even so, present government in Islamabad has no full confidence in the Frontier Corps.It is worried aboud possibility of further emancipation of Pashtun tribes and Pashtuns in general which may lead to proclamation of independence of Pashtunistan. It would mean replication of the process of freedom-fighting of Bengalis and 1971 War for their independence