Militant Groups

This paper uses Social Movement Theory (SMT) to trace the historical trajectory of ULFA, the most notorious and powerful Assamese insurgent group till date. It utilises a three-level (micro, macro, meso) analytical framework and a dual epistemological method (diagnostic and prognostic) to explore the outfit's recruitment capacities, networks of mobilisation, mass support, and finally, its metamorphosis into a textbook terrorist organisation.

El conocimiento histórico de lo que fue Guardia de Hierro, el surgimiento del Frente Estudiantil Nacional (FEN) y las transformaciones en el interior de estos tejidos peronistas en la entredécadas ’60-70 enriquece la comprensión del fenómeno global del militantismo y su radicalización armada. Más aún, como idea básica y liminar, estimo que resulta imposible entender las opciones militantes y la sacralización de la violencia como medio y hasta fin político-religioso sin car cuenta de estas redes. Si algunas de las lecturas han insistido en el papel de lo religioso en la construcción de una violencia justificada en tanto que lucha armada popular, violencia desde abajo, revolucionaria o de la liberación, ¿cuál ha sido la relación entre redes católicas, legitimidades religiosas y lucha armada en espacios que escaparon ya en los ’70 a la categoría específica de “partidos armados”? En este sentido, el análisis denso del objeto histórico escogido (trayectorias, redes y representaciones en construcción, deconstrucción y pugna de Guardia de Hierro-FEN-OUTG) permite la discusión de ciertas categorías que, en este caso, involucran un conjunto de relaciones político-religiosas.

En el artículo de presentación del dossier “Experiencias políticas en la Argentina de los sesenta y setenta”, señalamos con Moira Cristiá la existencia de una “laguna asombrosa de aproximaciones académicas” sobre determinados fenómenos políticos incluidos en tal período. Desde aquella constatación han pasado cinco años. Una de esas lagunas ha sido, precisamente, el análisis de trayectorias y casos organizativos pertenecientes a lo que ha recibido el nombre, más por parte de los actores adversarios que por los propios protagonistas, de derecha peronista. En los últimos años, con la lentitud que exige la realización de investigaciones enmarcadas en tesis doctorales, esa ausencia de estudios ha comenzado a ser superada.  Las razones de este desfasaje se comprenden claramente con un simple análisis de aquellos actores intelectuales que crearon un sentido común sobre tal derecha peronista; tal sentido común nos habla mucho más de los valores, posiciones y recorridos de quienes han referido sobre el tema o lo han juzgado como “ilegítimo” que del universo empírico en sí, en un tipo de interpretación que encontraría notables parentescos con la lectura realizada por Federico Neiburg sobre los intelectuales y sus definiciones sobre los orígenes del peronismo

Militant tendencies in Pakistan have been a leading security challenge because of its adverse effects on political, economic, social and ethno- religious landscape of Pakistan. The case of Balochistan explicates the multivariate nature of militant manifestation in which nationalist and separatist aspirations tend to be a major tributary of militancy in Balochistan. The formation of militant groups on nationalistic and religious identities explains the two main sources of militant groups. Their linkages and networking further recognizes their operational capability and presence in the province. Moreover, geographical realities of the province along with its relationship with the federation and weak infrastructure, all contributes in shaping an environment which is conducive to militant tendencies in the shape of low intensity conflict. This article is based on a qualitative analysis which identifies genesis of militancy in Balochistan keeping in view the current changing geopolitical realities. After examining the facts, it is being concluded that traditionally call for separation is the driving force of militancy in Balochistan, however, ever since a decade, certain concentrated pockets of religiously grounded groups have been involved in target killing and suicide bombing.

In theory, terrorism is a political communication strategy for groups to convey their grievances and the costs of ignoring them. In practice, though, terrorist groups take responsibility for just a small portion of their attacks. Rather than getting credit for the violence, terrorist leaders generally deny their operatives committed it. This theoretical and empirical disconnect may explain why scholars have ignored the subject of unclaimed attacks despite the fact that they are the norm. With a mixed-methods research design, our study helps to fill this lacuna by proposing and testing a new theory to account for these so-called “anonymous” acts of violence.

The enemy: Hefazatul Islam (defenders/protectors of Islam) it is called and just like our Blogger Comrades their strategies and agitation methodology have more elements of similarity than dissimilarity! Our worries peaked when these ‘pure Huzurs’ stunned us with their ultimatum to the Government that our Blogger Comrades ought to  be arrested, tried and hanged by the 6th of April 2013. Failing, they have threatened an occupation of Manik Mia Avenue, where they plan to erect an “Islamic Jagoron Moncho” with the ‘faithful’ from all over Bangladesh thronging and besieging Dhaka.

The allegations: They enemy says a) we are atheist b) we have insulted Prophet Muhammad c) we have disrespected the Holy Qur’an; apparently good enough reasons to get us hanged .

The Prediction: One can be rest assured that hundreds upon thousands of white skull caps will ride the crest of an imminent tidal bore – for the precise three points ‘championed’ by the enemy, (rightly or wrongly is a separate matter) is good enough reason to excite the passions of millions of pious – if not fanatical or fundamentalist Bengali Muslims, to take to the streets. And why do I say so?

The Pretenders: Do these hate filled so-called “defenders of Islam”, who in reality are Muslim pretenders, and are agents for murder mayhem, strife, disquiet and disorder in civic life; ever consider that attributes such as benevolence, forgiveness and mercy are also foundations of the Creators all encompassing omnipresence, in the course of human destiny? The concept of “God fearing Muslims” is a construct of hate merchants backed by Free Masonic agents, disguised in robes of religiosity, to misguide the pious and ‘religion sensitized’ masses. That this mindset of division dates back to periods of Islamic history, post the death of Prophet Muhammad, is rarely, if ever acknowledged.

The 6th April siege of Dhaka: I am glad 04/06 happened, for the purpose, attitude, appearance, and the intent of the enemy has never been clearer than now. What they have already spelt out implies a pledge to slide us back into the dark pits of medievalism, confine women to homes, perforce enforce the hijab, ban female and coeducation systems, ban music, ban fine arts, specially sculpture  and anything considered deviant or not in conformity of what in their perception is ‘Islamic’.

The 5th May crackdown on Hefazat: We get to see the likes of Allama Shafi riding insanely expensive SUVs and helicopters, while his half-fed ‘supporters’ are coaxed and threatened to join his murderous jihad on fellow Muslims, are made to endure a ‘long march’ to Dhaka? How more corrupt and vulgar can these fake ‘god men’ be? How long shall we be in fear of these so-called ‘apolitical theologians’ that are no different from sections of our corrupt politicians? And after a day spent haranguing the ‘faithful’ with screams of imaner lorai (fight/resolve of faith) where they promise in public view and that of the world, never to leave their ground, never to return home if their demands are not met, to sacrifice their blood, to become immortal shaheeds (martyrs) — and all it takes is 17 minutes of security forces action, for the ‘millions’ to flee, to literally disappear into thin air.

Résumé

L’article traite dans un premier temps des usages du « populaire » dans le champ politique français. En parlant au nom des classes populaires, les professionnels de la politique construisent un imaginaire à propos de ces catégories, imaginaire porteur de nombreux implicites et qui mérite d’être déconstruit. Dans un second temps, il s’agit de confronter ces discours à la réalité des pratiques partisanes. Dans un portrait de deux jeunes militants – l’un de gauche (PCF), l’autre de droite (UMP) –, nous tenterons de montrer comment le sociologue peut proposer un regard plus empirique sur la politisation des classes populaires, notamment en interrogeant leur marginalisation au sein des collectifs militants.

Abstract

This article firstly explores the several ways the « popular » is handled in the French political field. When talking on the behalf of lower classes, politicians tend to build illusionary images about them, that convey lots of implicit ideas and must be undone.Secondly, the author highlights the gap between these lines and the actual activist practices. Through the portraits of two young activists – a left-winger (PCF) and a right-winger (UMP) – we try to demonstrate how the sociologist could suggest a more empirical look on lower class politicization, particularly by wondering about their social marginalization in militant groups.

Militant tendencies in Pakistan have been a leading security challenge because of its adverse effects on political, economic, social and ethnoreligious landscape of Pakistan. The case of Balochistan explicates the multivariate nature of militant manifestation in which nationalist and separatist aspirations tend to be a major tributary of militancy in Balochistan. The formation of militant groups on nationalistic and religious identities explains the two main sources of militant groups. Their linkages and networking further recognizes their operational capability and presence in the province. Moreover, geographical realities of the province along with its relationship with the federation and weak infrastructure, all contributes in shaping an environment which is conducive to militant tendencies in the shape of low intensity conflict. This article is based on a qualitative analysis which identifies genesis of militancy in Balochistan keeping in view the current changing geopolitical realities. After examining the facts, it is being concluded that traditionally call for separation is the driving force of militancy in Balochistan, however, ever since a decade, certain concentrated pockets of religiously grounded groups have been involved in target killing and suicide bombing.

The militant groups in the Philippines have gone beyond the tolerable by initiating provocative actions against anti-riot police to entice them to show force that when captured in photos can be used against them as proof of their "brutality".

Abstract: Montreal’s Rencontres internationales pour un nouveau cinéma were the occasion for delegates from five French production and distribution collectives to discuss the future of militant cinema with their European, Latin American, African, Asian and North American equivalents. From the French perspective, the Rencontres also allowed the opportunity to provisionally take stock of militant cinema’s national situation, amidst the effervescence that had followed May 1968. Only a few weeks following the defeat of the Programme commun de la gauche in the French presidential elections, the Quebec meeting displayed the absences of unity and coordination amongst the French groups. This article seeks to analyse the different conceptions of French militant cinema that were being brought together in Montreal.

Résumé: Les Rencontres internationales pour un nouveau cinéma (Montréal, 1974) ont donné l’occasion aux délégués de cinq collectifs de production et distribution français de discuter avec leurs homologues européens, latino-américains, africains, asiatiques et nord-américains sur l’avenir du cinéma militant. Au niveau français la rencontre a permis aussi de faire un bilan partiel de la situation du cinéma militant national, en pleine effervescence depuis mai 1968. À seulement quelques semaines de la défaite du Programme commun de la gauche aux élections présidentielles, la rencontre québécoise montre une absence d’union et de coordination entre les groupes français. Cet article a pour objectif d’analyser les différentes manières de concevoir le cinéma militant français qui se sont donné rendez-vous à Montréal (des groupes associés aux forces politiques de gauche ou indépendantes, orientés vers les circuits parallèles de distribution ou vers le marché). De même, nous étudierons les raisons de l’absence d’union entre eux.

When one cultural group becomes dominated by another, resulting rapid change and loss of authority may make its original meaning system seem thin, ineffective, and contradictory. The resulting state of deprivation often
causes members to rebuild their culture along what they consider to be more satisfying lines. The process, which is called revitalization by anthropologists, has occurred over and over again among peoples throughout the world. Often couched in religious terms movements prescribe rituals and
beliefs designed to restore order to their existence. In this selection, William O. Beeman describes the process of revitalization and shows how it shapes the beliefs and actions of such groups as the militias that have sprung up
across America and the Islamic fundamentalists of the Middle East.

En el artículo de presentación del dossier “Experiencias políticas en la Argentina de los sesenta y setenta”, señalamos con Moira Cristiá la existencia de una “laguna asombrosa de aproximaciones académicas” sobre determinados fenómenos políticos incluidos en tal período. Desde aquella constatación han pasado cinco años. Una de esas lagunas ha sido, precisamente, el análisis de trayectorias y casos organizativos pertenecientes a lo que ha recibido el nombre, más por parte de los actores adversarios que por los propios protagonistas, de derecha peronista. En los últimos años, con la lentitud que exige la realización de investigaciones enmarcadas en tesis doctorales, esa ausencia de estudios ha comenzado a ser superada. Las razones de este desfasaje se comprenden claramente con un simple análisis de aquellos actores intelectuales que crearon un sentido común sobre tal derecha peronista; tal sentido común nos habla mucho más de los valores, posiciones y recorridos de quienes han referido sobre el tema o lo han juzgado como “ilegítimo” que del universo empírico en sí, en un tipo de interpretación que encontraría notables parentescos con la lectura realizada por Federico Neiburg sobre los intelectuales y sus definiciones sobre los orígenes del peronismo

Its appellation bears close resemblance to a pre-existing evangelical video. On July 23, Al Qaeda's media arm, As-Sahab, released the English translation of a video statement it had posted in June 2013 calling upon the Indian Muslims to join the jihad in Syria. Titled, "Why is There No Storm in Your Ocean?", the video features Maulana Aasim Umar, an Al Qaeda ideologue believed to be based in northwest Pakistan.

Drawing on a range of hitherto unknown first-hand data, this book is the first of its kind to offer an explanation of the incentives of various types of militants – avengers, nationalists, and jihadists – to abandon violence.
Empirically, the monograph problematizes the established view of North Caucasian militants as a monolithic category of 'Islamic terrorists.'
Theoretically, it points out that distinct types of insurgents are variously resilient to external and internal pressures – such as group membership and social bonds, (in)discriminativeness of violence and hidden identities, ideology and beyond – to individual disengagement. The study posits that stronger adherence to ideology, higher lethality rates and indiscriminativeness of violence, interrupted social links, and stonger group membership renders jihadists, followed by nationalists, and in contrast to avengers, the less likely category of militants to seek individual disengagement.

Positioning itself at the intersection of political sociology, social movement studies, the sociology of nonviolent action and organization studies, this paper theorizes the endogenous power of social movement networks. First, it sets out to derail Manichean power/resistance dichotomies and heteronomous theorizing of power, which have come to dominate social scientific and popular understandings. Actor-network theory is then synthesized with Arendtian and Spinozan insights to develop an alternative theory of autonomous (self-ruled) network power in the context of oppositional politics. In contrast to established conceptions of power, which are heteronomous (other-ruled) and fuel sad passions, autonomous power is characterized by voluntaristic coaction and invigorates participants through joyful and embodied interactive experiences.