Minister

The impact of ministry on Australian families is understudied. We conducted a qualitative survey across four years, including an online, anonymous survey of over 281 participants. 99.1% told us that we needed to provide structured, long- term support, regulated systems of accountability + extensive and uniquely tailored pastoral care to suit their personal needs. Their responses, in a brief, easy-to-read format, are below. We encourage communities to share and discuss these findings where possible.

(Eng)  This paper grasps academic intentions of Bourdieu’s critical sociology, and discusses its practical feasibility. Bourdieu points out the academic error of “theoretical reason” common in both subjectivism and objectivism theory. He argues that theorists can overcome such an error; theorists may establish more objective sociological theories by conducting reflexive work on themselves. Bourdieu suggests that he can objectify the pre-reflexive acts and “doxic experience” of actors in his theories, called “reflexive sociology” or “field analysis theory.” They guarantee objectivity through which actors can realize social truth, the cause of pain. These intentions imply the premise of the theorist’s epistemological superiority.
  I embody Bourdieu’s argument, and seek how his emancipatory interest can exert a liberating effect in the practitioner’s practice space. In order to do this, I ask three questions: “Can theorists abandon the epistemological superiority of intellectuals?” “Can a synthetic social theory actually be able to carry out the critique?” and “What should we do to offer criticism as a sociologist?” I apply Bourdieu’s theory to the case of “sexual harassment by Pastor Byung-Wook Jeon,” a representing sexual crime case in Korean Protestantism. By analyzing Bourdieu’s concepts such as “habitus, illusio, field, symbolic capital, and symbolic violence” revealed in the Jeon’s sexual crime case, it can be understood that Bourdieu’s theory is an academically excellent explanatory framework.
  However, there are four difficulties that theorists with interest in liberation confront in having a conversation with actors, apart from the explanatory power of the theory. They reveal how demanding it is for the critical work of theory to have a liberating effect on the world of practice, and achieve substantive change. The four challenges are as followed: The fact that the interest of theorists and actors differs in the first place, the fact that actors cannot accept the concepts and terms used in the sociology discipline as well as theorists do, and that actors do not easily accept the epistemological superiority of theorists. Finally, even if actors practiced as taught by theorists, liberal change is not guaranteed to be made.
  I take a step further and attempt to rebut criticisms presented above on the Bourdieu logic. Bourdieu argues the possibility to start an open dialogue with actors by employing their interest with his research method called “participant objectivation,” translating academic terms into everyday terms used by actors. This method could be more effective as theorists could guide the direction of conversation towards liberation. In this way, actors may understand the concepts as well as theorists do. In addition, the actors whom Bourdieu encountered evidence Bourdieu’s claims, since they acknowledged his academic authority and epistemological superiority as a theorist, and expressed gratitude to him. Bourdieu sets the objective criteria for liberation by specifically suggesting “relational, linguistic, and situational conditions” that enable the society to be liberated through sociology.
Still, the fundamental limitations of the theory remain. Actors may not pay attention to the theorists’ interests and practices, and reject objectification interventions internally or externally. Furthermore, the liberating effect that Bourdieu desires requires pre-achievement of many conditions that cannot be acquired at the same time. In the end, in order for actors to accept the authority that theorists behold, and to undergo liberating experience, they must rely on the contingency created by human beings and their social world. Therefore, a theory is a mere dialogue as a part of conversation, and the only thing that theorists can do is to communicate with actors. What actors choose, at the end, is a matter of persuasion.

(Kor)  본 논문은 부르디외의 비판 사회학이 가진 학문적 의도를 파악하고, 그 의도의 실질적 실현 가능성을 논증한다. 부르디외는 주관주의와 객관주의 이론이 공통적으로 가진 ‘이론적 이성’(theoretical reason)이라는 학문적 오류를 지적하면서, 이론가가 스스로에 대한 성찰적 작업을 해야만 보다 객관적인 사회학 이론을 정립할 수 있다고 주장한다. 부르디외는 객관성을 담보한 ‘성찰적 사회학’ 혹은 ‘장 분석 이론’으로 불리는 자신의 이론으로 행위자들의 전성찰적인 행위와 ‘독사적 경험’(doxic experience)을 객관화하여, 행위자들이 사회적 진실과 고통의 원인을 깨닫게 할 수 있다고 생각한다. 그러한 의도에는 이론가의 ‘인식론적 우월성’이라는 전제가 내포되어 있다.
연구자는 부르디외의 논의를 따라가면서 그의 해방적 이해 관심이 행위자의 실천 영역에서 얼마나 해방의 효과를 발휘할 수 있는지 확인하고자 한다. 이를 위해 ‘지식인의 인식론적 우월성을 버릴 수 있는가?’, ‘실제로 종합적 비판 사회 이론이 비판을 수행할 수 있는가?’, ‘사회학자로서 비판을 수행하기 위해서는 어떻게 해야 하는가?’라는 세 가지 문제의식을 제기하고, 한국 개신교의 대표적 성범죄 사건인 ‘전병욱 목사 성추행 사건’을 연구 대상으로 삼아 부르디외의 이론을 적용해보고, 분석한다. ‘하비투스, 일루지오, 장, 상징 자본과 상징 폭력’과 같은 개념들을 ‘전병욱 목사 성추행 사건’에 대입하여 분석함으로써 부르디외 이론이 학문적으로 탁월한 설명 틀임을 확인할 수 있다.
  하지만 이론가가 해방적 이해 관심을 가지고 행위자와의 대화를 진행하면서 겪게 되는 네 가지 난점은 이론의 현실 설명력과는 별개로 이론의 비판적 작업이 실천 세계에 해방적 영향을 미치고 실질적인 변화까지 달성하기가 얼마나 어려운 것인지 밝혀준다. 여기서 네 가지 난점이란 ‘이론가와 행위자의 이해 관심이 애초에 다르다는 점, 행위자가 사회학 학문 장에서 사용되는 개념과 용어를 이론가만큼 잘 수용할 수 없다는 점, 이론가가 전제하는 인식론적 우월성을 행위자가 쉽게 받아들이지 않는다는 점, 마지막으로 행위자가 이론가의 가르침대로 실천한다 해도 실제로 해방적 변화가 도래하기 어렵다는 점’이다.
연구자는 한 발 더 나가 앞서 제기된 비판점들에 대해 부르디외의 논리로 재반박을 시도한다. 부르디외의 입장에서는 ‘참여 객관화’라는 자신만의 연구 방법으로 행위자와 얼마든지 이해 관심을 연동하여 개방적인 대화를 시작할 수 있고, 학문적 용어를 행위자가 사용하는 일상적 용어로 번역하고 대화의 전략도 해방을 유도하는 방향으로 바꾼다면 얼마든지 이론가의 개념을 행위자가 납득할 수 있다는 것이다. 뿐만 아니라 부르디외가 실제로 만난 행위자들은 이론가의 학문적 권위와 인식론적 우월함을 인정하고 그에게 감사를 표현함으로써 부르디외 이론을 지지하는 증거가 된다. 그리고 부르디외는 사회학을 통해 해방된 사회가 가능하다고 주장하면서 이를 가능케 하는 ‘관계적 · 언어적 · 상황적 조건’을 구체적으로 제시하여 객관적인 해방의 기준을 설정하고 있다.
  그럼에도 근본적인 한계는 남는다. 행위자는 여전히 이론가의 관심과 실천에 대해 귀 기울이지 않으며, 학자의 객관화 개입을 내적으로나 외적으로 거부할 것이기 때문이다. 그리고 부르디외가 희망하는 해방의 효과는 ‘동시에 달성될 수 없는 수많은 조건의 선이행’을 요구한다. 결국, 행위자가 이론가의 권위를 받아들이고 실제로 해방적 경험을 하려면, 인간이라는 존재와 이들이 형성하는 실천 세계가 가진 우연적 특성에 의존할 수밖에 없다. 그러므로 이론은 하나의 대화이며, 이론가는 행위자와 대화를 이어나갈 수 있을 뿐이다. 행위자가 어떤 선택을 하는가는 설득의 문제인 것이다.

There seems to be almost universal agreement that Paul restricted women’s role in ministry, largely based on two texts—1 Cor 14:34-35 and 1 Tim 2:11-15.1 Pauline authorship is not crucial to the interpretation of these texts on the role of women. In fact, one of the significant obstacles to authenticity and Pauline authorship is the traditional reading of the 1 Timothy passage as antagonistic to ministry roles for women. This makes many scholars uncomfortable—as perhaps it well should.

In this article, we examine the variation in the institutional powers granted to president to terminate cabinets (by dismissing prime ministers), and appointing ministers to show how variations affect both cabinet durability (and the mode of cabinet termination) and ministerial durability (i.e., the overall time a minister remains in cabinet). Using the most extensive survival data set on ministers in 14 Central and Eastern European countries available to date alongside data on government survival, our Cox regression models demonstrate that the institutional rules granting extensive powers to the presidents are powerful determinants of ministerial durability. We show that the effect of presidential powers reduces cabinet durability but increases ministerial durability. These results demonstrate that the specific powers given to chief executives are essential for issues surrounding implications for ministerial and cabinet durability, institutional choice, policy stability, and governmental accountability.

Przedmiotem niniejszej pracy jest analiza zasad regulujących odpowiedzialność polityczną ministra w ustroju III Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, zarówno w wymiarze solidarnym (poprzez konstruktywne wotum nieufności wobec Rady Ministrów), jak i indywidualnym.
Praca składa się ze wstępu, pięciu rozdziałów oraz zakończenia i bibliografii.
W rozdziale pierwszym podjęte zostały rozważania dotyczące genezy urzędu ministra  w ustrojach wybranych państw europejskich oraz statusu ministra jako członka Rady Ministrów w ustroju II Rzeczypospolitej i Polski Ludowej. W rozdziale drugim opisany został przebieg transformacji ustrojowej lat 1989 – 1997 w dziedzinie statusu prawnego ministrów, a także omówiona zostanie treść aktualnych przepisów Konstytucji RP oraz najważniejszych aktów rangi ustawowej dotyczących trybu powoływania Rady Ministrów, miejsca ministrów
w strukturze rządu oraz ich kompetencji, a także struktury personalnej i organizacyjnej kolejnych gabinetów od 1989 r. W rozdziale trzecim omówione zostały zagadnienia dotyczące odpowiedzialności politycznej ministrów przed Prezesem Rady Ministrów, jej przesłanek i metod egzekwowania. W rozdziale czwartym zaprezentowane zostały regulacje dotyczące odpowiedzialności ministrów przed Prezydentem RP. W tym wypadku podjęta została próba wyjaśnienia powodów rezygnacji z odpowiedzialności politycznej ministrów przed Prezydentem RP na gruncie obecnej ustawy zasadniczej. W rozdziale piątym przedstawione zostały uregulowania dotyczące odpowiedzialności politycznej ministrów przed Sejmem. Opisane zostały przesłanki i tryb pociągania ministrów do odpowiedzialności przed parlamentem, jak również skutki wyrażenia wotum nieufności wobec całego rządu oraz wotum nieufności wobec ministra.


The subject of this work is an analysis of the principles governing the political responsibility (accountability) of the Minister in the political system of the Third Republic of Poland, both in solidarity and in individual terms.
The work consists of an introduction, five chapters, and a bibliography.
In the first chapter, consideration was given to the genesis of the ministerial office in the systems of government of selected European states and the status of minister as a member of the Council of Ministers in the II Republic of Poland and People's Poland. Chapter two describes the course of the 1989-1997 transformation in the legal status of ministers, the contents of the current provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland as well as the most important statutory acts concerning the procedure of appointing the Council of Ministers, the place of ministers in the cabinet’s structure, their competencies, as well as the personnel and organizational structure of successive cabinets in Poland since 1989. In the third chapter were described the political responsibility of ministers to the Prime Minister, its premises and methods of enforcement. In chapter four were presented the regulations concerning ministers' responsibility to the President of the Republic of Poland. In this case an attempt was made to clarify the reasons for resigning from the political responsibility of the ministers to the President of the Republic of Poland under the current Constitution of the Republic of Poland. In chapter five were presented the regulations concerning the political responsibility of ministers before the Sejm. In this chapter were described the premises and mode of exercising the ministers’ responsibility to the parliament, as well as the effects of
passing a motion of no confidence to the cabinet and to the minister.

This chapter analyzes the decision-making process in Italian political executives and highlights affecting factors. After presenting constraints and opportunities of Italian cabinets, the chapter provides an overview of the years 1948-1994, characterized by the presence of a pivotal party and weak prime ministers. Subsequently, the focus moves to the period of government alternation (1994-2011) and the return of proportional logics, yet under political personalization (2011-2018). The most recent developments are finally assessed from a long-term perspective

(co-authored with Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and Jan Berz) This book examines the changes in the career experiences and profiles of 350 European prime ministers in 26 European democracies from 1945 to 2020. It builds on a theoretical framework, which claims that the decline of party government along with the increase of populism, technocracy, and the presidentialization of politics have influenced the careers of prime ministers over the past 70 years. The findings show that prime ministers’ career experiences became less political and more technical. Moreover, their career profiles shifted from a traditional type of ‘party-agent’ to a new type of ‘party-principal’. These changes affected the recruitment of executive elites and their political representation in European democracies, albeit with different intensity and speed.

Barnard applied to the court for a review of the minister's decision denying him parole. The court declined to review the decision because it found it to be reasonable. The applicant only discovered the reasons that informed the minister's decision in the course of hearing his review application. The minister's failure to Granting parole to offenders serving life sentences has raised questions in public and political discourse. This contribution evaluates the discretion of the minister to decline parole under Section 78(2) of the Correctional Services Amendment Act 25 of 2008 (CSAA). It examines the drafting history of Section 78(2) of the CSAA, evaluates the full extent of the ministerial powers, and reviews its recent application in Barnard v Minister of Justice, Constitutional Development & Correctional Services and Another. It argues that ministerial discretion to refuse parole needs to be reexamined in the wake of that decision, and recommends elements for inclusion in the minister's decision to refuse parole. give the applicant information regarding the outcome of his parole, and the reasons for his decision before Barnard applied for review, are problematic. This contribution analyses the minister's refusal in light of the drafting history of the section and its application in Barnard v Minister of Justice, Constitutional Development and Correctional Services and Another (Barnard). 2 It is argued that an offender should know the decision and the reasons that informed it, at the time the decision is passed. The terms applicant, offender and prisoner are used interchangeably to refer to the offender under Section 78 of the CSAA.

Silvio Berlusconi has unquestionably been one of Italy’s most important political figures since the early 1990s. The general election campaign of February 2013 demonstrated that he is anything but out of the political game. Consequently, it seems worthwhile to examine Berlusconi as a prime minister and coalition leader. This article seeks to understand the extent to which he was able to command and guide his governing coalition, as Prime Minister, as well as his influence and the constraints on his actions. After presenting the theoretical framework, the article examines Berlusconi within the context of Italian political history and explores his impact on coalition governance by illustrating two cases of how he managed intra-coalition conflicts during his second term of office. Finally, it discusses the findings and highlights the resources Berlusconi was able to deploy ‘against’ his allies and the constraints he faced as Prime Minister. A brief comparison of Berlusconi and other Italian prime ministers is provided

This chapter deals with the internal decision-making process of political executives in parliamentary systems, that is, how executives take their own collective decisions. The focus is on the cabinet system as a whole, including both cabinet members and other involved party-political and bureaucratic actors. In particular, the chapter reviews literature’s debates about the nature of cabinet government, the role of prime ministers, and variations of decision-making. A special attention is payed to factors explaining intra-cabinet power distribution and the choice of different decision-making arenas. After introducing the topic, an overview of conceptual issues and main research questions is provided. Subsequently, the work discusses the way in which scholars have addressed these issues and the findings they have reached. The final part stresses existing deficits and seeks to set the agenda for future research

When it comes to illustrate how cabinets work and to classify them, one very promising way is to look at their internal decision-making processes. In this paper, I give a comprehensive picture of cabinets in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems on this basis. In particular, in the first part, I review what the literature has proposed in this respect. Secondly, after illustrating some shortcomings of the works at issue, I revise a famous Andeweg’s proposal, providing an amended typology of cabinets based on two dimensions. For each of the eight ideal-types stemming from it, some empirical examples are illustrated.

(co-authored with Ferdinand Müller-Rommel) Executive power has been and will continue to be a prominent and widely used concept in political science. This chapter shows that executive power has mostly been examined in context with political power and political institutions. After providing an overview of different concepts under historical perspective, the chapter introduces various definitions of executive power and advocates that executive power should be studied in context with the functioning of political institutions. In a third step, we examine different forms of executive power in authoritarian and democratic regimes. Fourth, we study the internal structure of political executives in democratic regimes particularly in light of their linkage to political parties and legislative support. Fifth, we discuss the issue of gender representation in the context of executive power. Finally, we tackle the pressing debate on how to measure executive power. We conclude that executive power should be treated not as a rigid, but as a flexible concept for analysing the complex interaction of political actors in their institutional environment.

This article is made up of two main parts. The first part points out two different definitions of cabinet – that is, functional and legal definitions. It also highlights the strong points and the shortcomings of both, proposing at the same time a new definition more suitable for a comparative analysis. In doing this, it puts forward some useful criteria with a view to establishing what a minister actually is, what a cabinet is and how it is made up. The second part provides an overview of the structures of governments in 38 countries, from core to junior ministers, on this basis.

about portfolio allocation in Eastern and Western Europe is replicated with a differently constituted equation. While Druckman and Roberts's original OLS regression presented a model where constitutive terms were not included, this research note argues that such exclusion is not theoretically sustainable. A new regression is carried out and its results are given an interpretation different from the one proposed by Druckman and Roberts.

Political advisers are now an established feature of the executive branch of government in the community of Westminster nations. However, there have been few attempts to establish why ministers appoint political staff, and even fewer that are empirically grounded in politicians’ own experiences and reflections. The purposes of this article are to (i) establish ministers’ motives for appointing political advisers, (ii) to theorise those motives through the lens of core executive studies and (iii) to assess the degree to which findings in one empirical setting enjoy wider applicability. Drawing on data from New Zealand, we find evidence that recourse to political advisers is one response to the multiple demands made of ministers in the context of contemporary governance; while that imperative has wider application, we also find that ministers’ requirements are structured by personal and institutional variables which are contextually specific.

This article examines the trends in the political and social pathways to the cabinet in the modern Turkish Republic. It intends to fill the lacunae in the literature on Turkey's cabinets and ministerial elites in several respects. First, it examines the cabinets and the changes and/or continuities in their composition from 1923 until 2009, a period which has not been covered in its entirety by previous research. Second, it provides data and analysis on the social background and recruitment patterns of prime ministers and cabinet members in the governments. Third, it focuses on the impact of regime changes and democratic transitions on the continuities and changes in the composition of the ministerial elites. Fourth, it locates the Turkish case within the wider comparative framework of studies on ministerial elites, particularly the findings of research on Southern Europe. The main argument of the article is that the aggregated profiles of the cabinets have displayed significant changes, along with some notable continuities, since the establishment of the Republic.

Karen Baehler’s contribution to the previous edition of this journal was a stimulating one in several respects. It provided a reminder of the timelessness of the debate about the rationality of policy-making, gave us something new to think about (the public argument test), and offered a number of thoughtful points on the subject of how far policy analysts should go in their endeavours to do the right thing.

The advent of Ministerial Advisers of the partisan variety-a third element interposing itself into Westminster's bilateral monopoly-has been acknowledged as a significant development in a number of jurisdictions. While there are commonalities across contexts, the New Zealand experience provides an opportunity to explore the extent to which the advent of Ministerial Advisers is consistent with rational choice accounts of relations between political and administrative actors in executive government. Public administration reform in New Zealand since the mid 1980s-and in particular machinery of government design-was quite explicitly informed by rational choice accounts, and normative Public Choice in particular. This article reflects on the role of Ministerial Advisers in the policymaking process and, on the basis of assessments by a variety of political and policy actors, examines the extent to which the institutional and relational aspects of executive government are indeed consistent with rational choice accounts of the 'politics of policymaking'. The reader is offered a new perspective through which to view the advent, and the contribution of Ministerial Advisers to policymaking in executive government. http://mro.massey.ac.nz/ Massey Documents by Type Journal Articles Ministerial advisers and the politics of policy-making: Bureaucratic permanence and popular control Eichbaum, C 2007-12

Prezentowany artykuł został opublikowany w Biuletynie Informacyjnym pracowników AGH w następstwie tego, że będący gościem na inauguracji roku akademickiego 1999/2000 były rektor AGH,  a w momencie inauguracji urzędujący Minister Edukacji Narodowej, prof. Mirosław Handke, w swoim przemówieniu do pracowników AGH zawarł sugestię, że on chciałby przyznać uczelni bardzo duże środki na inwestycje i na remonty, ale nie może tego zrobić z tego powodu, że władze AGH, a zwłaszcza autor artykułu jako urzędujący rektor - o te środki nie zabiegają.
Ponieważ była to jaskrawa nieprawda – napisany został artykuł wyjaśniający, jak się rzeczy naprawdę mają i opublikowane zostały trzy tabele: wykaz inwestycji realizowanych na AGH bez wsparcia ze strony Ministerstwa, wykaz inwestycji planowanych na AGH o których dofinansowanie wystąpiono do MEN i nie otrzymano środków oraz wykaz remontów, na które także bezskutecznie usiłowano pozyskać współfinansowanie z Ministerstwa.

In bijna alle bijdragen in deze bundel staat het thema Reformatie centraal. Van een beweging van onderop, van (een deel van) de bevolking die in verzet kwam tegen het gezag van de katholieke kerk bleek in Drenthe niets. De impuls om in Drenthe een Reformatie tot stand te brengen kwam dan ook van buitenaf, op een moment dat zich deze in andere gewesten allang voltrokken had. De Drentse Reformatie ontstond niet, zij werd afgekondigd bij plakkaat. Daarom is deze ook zo scherp op een datum vast te pinnen: 10 mei 1598. Enkele maanden later kwam de eerste gereformeerde kerkelijke vergadering in Rolde bijeen. De artikelen in deze bundel laten overduidelijk zien dat men moeilijk kan spreken over dé Reformatie, maar dat wij het veeleer moeten hebben over reformatie(s) op verschillende niveaus: op het niveau van de kerspellieden, van de predikanten en de schoolmeesters, van de kerkelijke organisatie en op dat van de overheid. Het heeft decennia geduurd voordat Drenthe over de hele linie echt gereformeerd werd voorgegaan en onderwezen. De meeste Drenten lieten de Reformatie gelaten over zich heen gaan en namen niet of nauwelijks de moeite lidmaat te worden door geloofsbelijdenis af te leggen. Interessante vraag hierbij is hoe het kan dat er twee eeuwen later nauwelijks een spoor van het katholicisme te vinden is.

Political advisers are now an established feature of the executive branch of government in the community of Westminster nations. However, there have been few attempts to establish why ministers appoint political staff, and even fewer that are empirically grounded in politicians’ own experiences and reflections. The purposes of this article are to (i) establish ministers’ motives for appointing political advisers, (ii) to theorise those motives through the lens of core executive studies and (iii) to assess the degree to which findings in one empirical setting enjoy wider applicability. Drawing on data from New Zealand, we find evidence that recourse to political advisers is one response to the multiple demands made of ministers in the context of contemporary governance; while that imperative has wider application, we also find that ministers’ requirements are structured by personal and institutional variables which are contextually specific.

This article analyzes the recruitment and circulation of ministerial and parliamentary elites in Russia from the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 until 2009. The social backgrounds and careers of all ministers in 13 cabinets (1991–2009) and all members of the State Duma during its five terms after 1993 are studied. Especially during Vladimír Putin’s presidency (2000–2008), a shift toward super-presidentialism altered the circulation and composition of ministerial and parliamentary elites. Cabinets in Moscow consisted increasingly of ministers recruited from state bureaucracies, while the State Duma more and more contained businessmen, party politicians, and celebrities who appeared to treat MP service as simply an episode in their wider careers.

Abstract This article examines the trends in the political and social pathways to the cabinet in the modern Turkish Republic. It intends to fill the lacunae in the literature on Turkey's cabinets and ministerial elites in several respects. First, it examines the cabinets and the ...

A few months after becoming minister, I used to say that “no one who has never before been an education minister should ever become an education minister”. This silly joke wasn’t usually understood. But what I meant was clear to me: this is the type of job for which we are always unprepared.
How can someone who has the advantage of having had such an experience be useful to those who are initiating it? Maybe by listing a few recommendations that for the very same person, i.e., me, have proven to be more important than I thought.

Gheorghe Petruşan - az MTA köztestületi tagja - a Foaia Românească magyarországi román hetilap centenáriumi kiadásában "A magyarországi románok és az 1918. évi egyesülés" címmel jelentetett meg írást. Ebben a munkájában felvázolta a 20. századi fordulat előzményeit, megemlítve a dualizmus időszakában végbemenő, a nemzetiségek anyanyelvét és kultúráját ért "támadásokat", amelyek - meglátása szerint - a közoktatási törvényeken is nyomon követhetőek. Az erdélyi román irodalom szakértője értekezésében leírja, hogy a tanügy "elmagyarosítására" hozott jogszabályok a 19-20. század fordulóján sorozatban jelentek meg, a magyarországi románok magyar állammal szembeni lojalitását próbára téve. A kor magyar oktatáspolitikájának törekvéseit - Gheorghe Petruşan megfogalmazása szerint - Apponyi Albert 1907. évi törvénye "koszorúzta" meg, amely a "magyar embertelenség és zsarnokság notórius példája". Az Apponyiféle törvény - állítja a nyugalmazott professzor - "casus bellit teremtett a magyarok és románok között", és "elidegenítette a nem magyarokat a közös hazától, Magyarországtól".
Mihail Golu román oktatásügyi miniszter 1992-ben, amikor azt igyekezett megindokolni, hogy miért nem tanulhatják az erdélyi magyar tanulók a történelem és földrajz tantárgyakat anyanyelvükön egyes évfolyamokon, hivatkozott az Apponyi által beterjesztett és a magyar országgyűlés által elfogadott 1907-es törvénycsomagra. Apponyi Albert törvényjavaslatát – a későbbiek során csak Lex Apponyiként emlegetett törvénycsomagot – még el sem fogadták, de a hazai és a külföldi sajtó (román politikusok közbenjárásának köszönhetően is) már heves támadást indított ellene. A magyar oktatáspolitika asszimilációs szándéka vitathatatlan, azonban túlzás az 1907. évi XXVII. törvénycikket úgy jellemezni, hogy az a „magyar embertelenség és zsarnokság notórius példája”, mint ahogy Gheorghe Petruşan professzor tette.
Miért fordulhat elő mégis, hogy az Apponyi-féle törvényekre a rendszerváltoztatás után is a Petruşan-féle meghatározáshoz hasonlóan hivatkozhat a román oktatásügyi miniszter, úgy, hogy érvelése a nemzetközi és hazai közvélemény számára is elfogadható? Mi segített a sajtóhadjáraton kívül még Apponyi Albert oktatásügyi törvényeinek lejáratásában? Ki az a személy, aki a törvény szövegét tudatosan meghamisította, félrevezetve a nyugat-európai közvéleményt is?

In bijna alle bijdragen in deze bundel staat het thema Reformatie centraal. Van een beweging van onderop, van (een deel van) de bevolking die in verzet kwam tegen het gezag van de katholieke kerk bleek in Drenthe niets. De impuls om in Drenthe een Reformatie tot stand te brengen kwam dan ook van buitenaf, op een moment dat zich deze in andere gewesten allang voltrokken had. De Drentse Reformatie ontstond niet, zij werd afgekondigd bij plakkaat. Daarom is deze ook zo scherp op een datum vast te pinnen: 10 mei 1598. Enkele maanden later kwam de eerste gereformeerde kerkelijke vergadering in Rolde bijeen. De artikelen in deze bundel laten overduidelijk zien dat men moeilijk kan spreken over dé Reformatie, maar dat wij het veeleer moeten hebben over reformatie(s) op verschillende niveaus: op het niveau van de kerspellieden, van de predikanten en de schoolmeesters, van de kerkelijke organisatie en op dat van de overheid. Het heeft decennia geduurd voordat Drenthe over de hele linie echt gereformeerd werd voorgegaan en onderwezen. De meeste Drenten lieten de Reformatie gelaten over zich heen gaan en namen niet of nauwelijks de moeite lidmaat te worden door geloofsbelijdenis af te leggen. Interessante vraag hierbij is hoe het kan dat er twee eeuwen later nauwelijks een spoor van het katholicisme te vinden is.

Political advisers are an established third element in a number of Westminster-styled jurisdictions, as they are in New Zealand ' s institution of executive government. In this paper we report the initial fi ndings of a research project focusing on the role and accountabilities of ministerial advisers in New Zealand. We locate these fi ndings in the context of a growing body of international and comparative research on the role and accountabilities of non civil-or public-service advisers within political executives and comment on the extent to which the fi ndings affi rm or refute the view that the ' third element ' constitutes a threat to the continued application of Westminster principles and practices in New Zealand ' s system of government -once described as more Westminster than Westminster. In doing so, we highlight defi ciencies in standard conceptions of politicization and argue that there is a need to more clearly differentiate between its procedural and substantive dimensions.

El artículo examina la elección de los ministros y estima las posibilidades de selección de los políticos profesionales vis-à-vis la selección de técnicos o políticos novatos en gabinetes multipartidistas. La selección ministerial es analizada como un cálculo partidario para convertir la designación ministerial en un recurso para la retención y/o proyección de sus cuadros partidarios. Se testearon dos hipótesis: a) la lealtad, los vínculos partidarios y la pertenencia a partidos competitivos aumentan las chances de selección de políticos profesionales para el cargo de ministro; b) las probabilidades de selección de políticos novatos o tecnócratas aumentan con la expertise o la pertenencia a partidos en fase de expansión organizacional. El análisis se concentra en los gobiernos multipartidistas formados en Brasil (1995-2010). Los resultados muestran que la trayectoria dentro del partido es decisiva para la selección de políticos profesionales, mientras que la pertenencia al partido del presidente favorece el ingreso de nuevos cuadros en el gobierno. El estudio presenta evidencias sobre la complejidad de la selección ministerial en gabinetes multipartidistas a la luz de los dilemas organizacionales enfrentados por los partidos.

A lle Parteien wollen Digitalisierung fördern und gestalten. Uneins sind sie aber über die Frage, wer dafür verantwortlich sein soll. Während die FDP ein Digitalministerium fordert, will die CDU einen Staatsminister im Kanzleramt und einen Kabinettsausschuss "Digitalpo-litik". Die anderen Parteien machen zwar keine spezifischen Vorschläge, aber gerade die Idee des Digitalministeriums taucht im-mer wieder auf. Verkehrsminister Alexan-der Dobrindt und der Spitzenkandidat der Grünen, Cem Özdemir, haben eines gefor-dert, Wirtschaftsministerin Brigitte Zy-pries hat sogar schon zu einem Digitalmi-nistertreffen der G 20 eingeladen. Aber soll man wirklich den Herausforde-rungen, Chancen und Risiken mit einem neuen Ministerium für Digitalisierung be-gegnen? Besser wäre ein ganzheitlicher An-satz, der verschiedene Institutionen unter einem Dach zusammenbringt. Digitalisie-rung sollte Chefsache sein, trotzdem sollte die Verantwortung dafür auf viele Schultern verteilt werden. Damit das funktionie-ren kann, wäre eine Digitalisierungsagen-tur nötig, die in verschiedenen Konstellati-onen berät, vernetzt und unterstützt.

Abstract This article examines the trends in the political and social pathways to the cabinet in the modern Turkish Republic. It intends to fill the lacunae in the literature on Turkey's cabinets and ministerial elites in several respects. First, it examines the cabinets and the ...

The Changes in the Scopes of Activity of Ministers Directing Branches of Government Administration from 1997 to 2016

Until 1997, the principle of the creation of ministerial offices by statute was in force in Polish
constitutional law. In light of the rules of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997
and the Branches of Government Administration Act of 4 September 1997, the current principle is
that the ministry offices are established by regulations of the Prime Minister. In addition, the head
of government has a great deal of freedom in defining the name of the ministerial office and its
scope of activity. The practice of functioning the Cabinet from 1997 to 2016 has shown that the
prime ministers often made changes to the scopes of activities of “departmental” ministers, dividing
the existing portfolios into smaller ones, and merging several ministerial offices into one “super
minister” office that handles several portfolios. This has affected the number of ministers directing
a branch of government administration, which ranged from 14 to 19 in the period in question.

Do 1997 r. w polskim prawie konstytucyjnym obowiązywała zasada tworzenia urzędów ministrów w drodze ustawy. W świetle przepisów Konstytucji RP z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. oraz ustawy
z dnia 4 września 1997 r. o działach administracji rządowej obecnie urzędy ministrów kierujących
działami administracji rządowej tworzone są w drodze rozporządzenia Prezesa Rady Ministrów.
Ponadto szef rządu dysponuje dużą swobodą w przedmiocie określania nazwy urzędu ministra i zakresu jego działania. Praktyka działania Rady Ministrów lat 1997–2016 wskazuje, iż kolejni premierzy często dokonywali zmian zakresów działania ministrów „działowych”, dzieląc dotychczasowe
resorty na mniejsze oraz łącząc kilka urzędów ministrów w jeden superresort kierujący kilkoma
działami administracji. Wpłynęło to na liczbę ministrów kierujących działami administracji rządowej, która w omawianym okresie wahała się od 14 do 19.