Minister

Silvio Berlusconi has unquestionably been one of Italy’s most important political figures since the early 1990s. The general election campaign of February 2013 demonstrated that he is anything but out of the political game. Consequently, it seems worthwhile to examine Berlusconi as a prime minister and coalition leader. This article seeks to understand the extent to which he was able to command and guide his governing coalition, as Prime Minister, as well as his influence and the constraints on his actions. After presenting the theoretical framework, the article examines Berlusconi within the context of Italian political history and explores his impact on coalition governance by illustrating two cases of how he managed intra-coalition conflicts during his second term of office. Finally, it discusses the findings and highlights the resources Berlusconi was able to deploy ‘against’ his allies and the constraints he faced as Prime Minister. A brief comparison of Berlusconi and other Italian prime ministers is provided

In this article, we examine the variation in the institutional powers granted to president to terminate cabinets (by dismissing prime ministers), and appointing ministers to show how variations affect both cabinet durability (and the mode of cabinet termination) and ministerial durability (i.e., the overall time a minister remains in cabinet). Using the most extensive survival data set on ministers in 14 Central and Eastern European countries available to date alongside data on government survival, our Cox regression models demonstrate that the institutional rules granting extensive powers to the presidents are powerful determinants of ministerial durability. We show that the effect of presidential powers reduces cabinet durability but increases ministerial durability. These results demonstrate that the specific powers given to chief executives are essential for issues surrounding implications for ministerial and cabinet durability, institutional choice, policy stability, and governmental accountability.

Political advisers are an established third element in a number of Westminster-styled jurisdictions, as they are in New Zealand ' s institution of executive government. In this paper we report the initial fi ndings of a research project focusing on the role and accountabilities of ministerial advisers in New Zealand. We locate these fi ndings in the context of a growing body of international and comparative research on the role and accountabilities of non civil-or public-service advisers within political executives and comment on the extent to which the fi ndings affi rm or refute the view that the ' third element ' constitutes a threat to the continued application of Westminster principles and practices in New Zealand ' s system of government -once described as more Westminster than Westminster. In doing so, we highlight defi ciencies in standard conceptions of politicization and argue that there is a need to more clearly differentiate between its procedural and substantive dimensions.

"The advent of ministerial advisers of the partisan variety – a third element interposing itself into Westminster’s bilateral monopoly – has been acknowledged as a significant development in a number of jurisdictions. While there are commonalities across contexts, the New Zealand experience provides an opportunity to explore the extent to which the advent of ministerial advisers is consistent with rational choice accounts of relations between political and administrative actors in executive government. Public administration reform in New Zealand since the mid 1980s – and in particular machinery of government design – was quite explicitly informed by rational choice accounts, and normative Public Choice in particular. This article reflects on the role of ministerial advisers in the policy-making process and, on the basis of assessments by a variety of political and policy actors, examines the extent to which the institutional and relational aspects of executive government are indeed consistent with rational choice accounts of the ‘politics of policy-making’. The reader is offered a new perspective through which to view the advent, and the contribution of ministerial advisers to policy-making in executive government."

Political advisers are now an established feature of the executive branch of government in the community of Westminster nations. However, there have been few attempts to establish why ministers appoint political staff, and even fewer that are empirically grounded in politicians’ own experiences and reflections. The purposes of this article are to (i) establish ministers’ motives for appointing political advisers, (ii) to theorise those motives through the lens of core executive studies and (iii) to assess the degree to which findings in one empirical setting enjoy wider applicability. Drawing on data from New Zealand, we find evidence that recourse to political advisers is one response to the multiple demands made of ministers in the context of contemporary governance; while that imperative has wider application, we also find that ministers’ requirements are structured by personal and institutional variables which are contextually specific.

El artículo examina la elección de los ministros y estima las posibilidades de selección de los políticos profesionales vis-à-vis la selección de técnicos o políticos novatos en gabinetes multipartidistas. La selección ministerial es analizada como un cálculo partidario para convertir la designación ministerial en un recurso para la retención y/o proyección de sus cuadros partidarios. Se testearon dos hipótesis: a) la lealtad, los vínculos partidarios y la pertenencia a partidos competitivos aumentan las chances de selección de políticos profesionales para el cargo de ministro; b) las probabilidades de selección de políticos novatos o tecnócratas aumentan con la expertise o la pertenencia a partidos en fase de expansión organizacional. El análisis se concentra en los gobiernos multipartidistas formados en Brasil (1995-2010). Los resultados muestran que la trayectoria dentro del partido es decisiva para la selección de políticos profesionales, mientras que la pertenencia al partido del presidente favorece el ingreso de nuevos cuadros en el gobierno. El estudio presenta evidencias sobre la complejidad de la selección ministerial en gabinetes multipartidistas a la luz de los dilemas organizacionales enfrentados por los partidos.

This article analyzes the recruitment and circulation of ministerial and parliamentary elites in Russia from the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 until 2009. The social backgrounds and careers of all ministers in 13 cabinets (1991–2009) and all members of the State Duma during its five terms after 1993 are studied. Especially during Vladimír Putin’s presidency (2000–2008), a shift toward super-presidentialism altered the circulation and composition of ministerial and parliamentary elites. Cabinets in Moscow consisted increasingly of ministers recruited from state bureaucracies, while the State Duma more and more contained businessmen, party politicians, and celebrities who appeared to treat MP service as simply an episode in their wider careers.

When it comes to illustrate how cabinets work and to classify them, one very promising way is to look at their internal decision-making processes. In this paper, I give a comprehensive picture of cabinets in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems on this basis. In particular, in the first part, I review what the literature has proposed in this respect. Secondly, after illustrating some shortcomings of the works at issue, I revise a famous Andeweg’s proposal, providing an amended typology of cabinets based on two dimensions. For each of the eight ideal-types stemming from it, some empirical examples are illustrated.

The Changes in the Scopes of Activity of Ministers Directing Branches of Government Administration from 1997 to 2016

Until 1997, the principle of the creation of ministerial offices by statute was in force in Polish
constitutional law. In light of the rules of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997
and the Branches of Government Administration Act of 4 September 1997, the current principle is
that the ministry offices are established by regulations of the Prime Minister. In addition, the head
of government has a great deal of freedom in defining the name of the ministerial office and its
scope of activity. The practice of functioning the Cabinet from 1997 to 2016 has shown that the
prime ministers often made changes to the scopes of activities of “departmental” ministers, dividing
the existing portfolios into smaller ones, and merging several ministerial offices into one “super
minister” office that handles several portfolios. This has affected the number of ministers directing
a branch of government administration, which ranged from 14 to 19 in the period in question.

Do 1997 r. w polskim prawie konstytucyjnym obowiązywała zasada tworzenia urzędów ministrów w drodze ustawy. W świetle przepisów Konstytucji RP z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. oraz ustawy
z dnia 4 września 1997 r. o działach administracji rządowej obecnie urzędy ministrów kierujących
działami administracji rządowej tworzone są w drodze rozporządzenia Prezesa Rady Ministrów.
Ponadto szef rządu dysponuje dużą swobodą w przedmiocie określania nazwy urzędu ministra i zakresu jego działania. Praktyka działania Rady Ministrów lat 1997–2016 wskazuje, iż kolejni premierzy często dokonywali zmian zakresów działania ministrów „działowych”, dzieląc dotychczasowe
resorty na mniejsze oraz łącząc kilka urzędów ministrów w jeden superresort kierujący kilkoma
działami administracji. Wpłynęło to na liczbę ministrów kierujących działami administracji rządowej, która w omawianym okresie wahała się od 14 do 19.

Pierwszym etapem prac nad przygotowaniem Konstytucji Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej
z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. było wniesienie projektów w trybie określonym w ustawie
konstytucyjnej z dnia 23 kwietnia 1992 r. Ostatecznie wniesiono 8 projektów, przygotowanych
przez prezydenta RP, członków Zgromadzenia Narodowego oraz grupę
obywateli.
W omawianych projektach przedstawiono różnorodne propozycje dotyczące pozycji
rządu i funkcjonowania władzy wykonawczej. Natomiast odnośnie regulacji trybu
powoływania ministrów, zakresu ich kompetencji oraz odpowiedzialności indywidualnej
i solidarnej członków rządu zgłoszone projekty były zbliżone. W zasadniczej części
treść omawianych projektów nie odbiegała od norm wyrażonych w Małej konstytucji,
wprowadzała natomiast pewne modyfikacje istniejących rozwiązań. Główne różnice
pomiędzy projektami dotyczyły kwestii trybu działania Rady Ministrów oraz określania
kompetencji ministrów.
Omawiane projekty były przedmiotem dalszych prac w Komisji Konstytucyjnej
Zgromadzenia Narodowego i stały się podstawą do opracowania statusu ministra w Konstytucji RP z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r.

The Constitutional regulations placing a minister in projects of
Constitution of the Republic of Poland introduced to
Constitutional Commission of National Assembly
The first stage of work over the Constitution of the Republic of Poland passed on 2 April,
1997, was introducing the Constitution Projects according to procedure regulated in
Constitution-Preparing Law of 1992. In result, there were 8 Constitional Projects, introduced
by the President of the Republic of Poland, members of National Assembly
and group of citizens.
In those projects were many proposals of legal regulations concerning the government
and the model of executive power. However the legal regulations included in those
projects concerning appointing of ministers, their competences and form of individual
ministerial responsibility as well as cabinet collective responsibility were similar. Most
of the regulations concerning ministers included in those projects were not different
from the rules of the Small Constitution of 1992, although some changes were introduced.
The main issues were the way of government work and the way to determine the
competences of ministers.
Those projects were used in further works of Constitutional Commission and were
the foundation for the process of forming the final Constitution regulations placing the
minister in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland passed on 2 April, 1997.

This chapter deals with the internal decision-making process of political executives in parliamentary systems, that is, how executives take their own collective decisions. The focus is on the cabinet system as a whole, including both cabinet members and other involved party-political and bureaucratic actors. In particular, the chapter reviews literature’s debates about the nature of cabinet government, the role of prime ministers, and variations of decision-making. A special attention is payed to factors explaining intra-cabinet power distribution and the choice of different decision-making arenas. After introducing the topic, an overview of conceptual issues and main research questions is provided. Subsequently, the work discusses the way in which scholars have addressed these issues and the findings they have reached. The final part stresses existing deficits and seeks to set the agenda for future research

Pôster, 11º ENCONTRO ABCP, 2018.

Em sistemas presidencialistas de governo a coalizão inter-partidos é um meio de sustentação do Executivo e uma forma de garantir apoios para a formulação e implementação de políticas públicas. Este trabalho tem o propósito de compreender a relação Executivo-Legislativo através do tráfego de ex-congressistas e não-congressistas em gabinetes ministeriais, uma vez que devido a falta do apoio da maioria no Congresso Nacional o presidente utiliza ministérios como escambo de manutenção da governabilidade. O que se quer saber é se a experiência política anterior à nomeação para o gabinete ministerial influencia no tempo de permanência desses agentes no cargo. O objetivo específico é analisar as taxas de sobrevivência ministerial comparando os períodos democráticos de 1946 a 1964 e 1985 a 2016 para averiguar se há diferença em termos de estabilidade ministerial e diferença entre os dois perfis de ministros em cada regime.  A hipótese é que ministros com experiência legislativa ao transitar pela Câmara dos Deputados ou pelo Senado Federal, sobrevivem menos tempo no cargo em relação aos ministros sem experiência no âmbito Legislativo, independente do regime, justamente pela necessidade de utilizar certas pastas ministeriais como sustentação da coalizão e como moeda de troca constante. Os resultados apresentam  que há divergência entre os regimes, uma vez que apenas a democracia de 1985 é estatisticamente significativa e apresenta uma lógica nas demissões entre as tipologias de ministros. Já na democracia de 1946, os grupos não apresentam uma lógica estruturada e será necessário uma investigação mais minuciosa para compreender a causa. A especulação é que isso ocorra por ser um período de crise política constante, o que pode desestabilizar a coalizão e tornar as nomeações e demissões muito heterogêneas, sem um padrão específico.

Barnard applied to the court for a review of the minister's decision denying him parole. The court declined to review the decision because it found it to be reasonable. The applicant only discovered the reasons that informed the minister's decision in the course of hearing his review application. The minister's failure to Granting parole to offenders serving life sentences has raised questions in public and political discourse. This contribution evaluates the discretion of the minister to decline parole under Section 78(2) of the Correctional Services Amendment Act 25 of 2008 (CSAA). It examines the drafting history of Section 78(2) of the CSAA, evaluates the full extent of the ministerial powers, and reviews its recent application in Barnard v Minister of Justice, Constitutional Development & Correctional Services and Another. It argues that ministerial discretion to refuse parole needs to be reexamined in the wake of that decision, and recommends elements for inclusion in the minister's decision to refuse parole. give the applicant information regarding the outcome of his parole, and the reasons for his decision before Barnard applied for review, are problematic. This contribution analyses the minister's refusal in light of the drafting history of the section and its application in Barnard v Minister of Justice, Constitutional Development and Correctional Services and Another (Barnard). 2 It is argued that an offender should know the decision and the reasons that informed it, at the time the decision is passed. The terms applicant, offender and prisoner are used interchangeably to refer to the offender under Section 78 of the CSAA.

In bijna alle bijdragen in deze bundel staat het thema Reformatie centraal. Van een beweging van onderop, van (een deel van) de bevolking die in verzet kwam tegen het gezag van de katholieke kerk bleek in Drenthe niets. De impuls om in Drenthe een Reformatie tot stand te brengen kwam dan ook van buitenaf, op een moment dat zich deze in andere gewesten allang voltrokken had. De Drentse Reformatie ontstond niet, zij werd afgekondigd bij plakkaat. Daarom is deze ook zo scherp op een datum vast te pinnen: 10 mei 1598. Enkele maanden later kwam de eerste gereformeerde kerkelijke vergadering in Rolde bijeen. De artikelen in deze bundel laten overduidelijk zien dat men moeilijk kan spreken over dé Reformatie, maar dat wij het veeleer moeten hebben over reformatie(s) op verschillende niveaus: op het niveau van de kerspellieden, van de predikanten en de schoolmeesters, van de kerkelijke organisatie en op dat van de overheid. Het heeft decennia geduurd voordat Drenthe over de hele linie echt gereformeerd werd voorgegaan en onderwezen. De meeste Drenten lieten de Reformatie gelaten over zich heen gaan en namen niet of nauwelijks de moeite lidmaat te worden door geloofsbelijdenis af te leggen. Interessante vraag hierbij is hoe het kan dat er twee eeuwen later nauwelijks een spoor van het katholicisme te vinden is.