Populism

If politics is ultimately about our deepest fears and desires rather than about, say, tax policy or better health care, then what place is there for a Left whose raison d’être will always be tied to improving the economic fortunes of the least fortunate? One answer is to begin to outline an “economics of meaning,” where economic or class critiques are a means to channel anger, create meaning, and build solidarity rather than to implement better policy outcomes (although, of course, policy changes would be good on their own, for moral rather than necessarily electoral reasons). This requires changing standard conceptions of what elections are for and what it means to win.

How do leaders' idiosyncrasies are developed, and how do these, in turn, impact their political behaviour? This study traces the idiosyncratic behaviour of Presidents Andrew Jackson and Donald Trump. It details four historical traditions-Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian. The study expands upon Jacksonian tradition and sees that how Trump pursued this tradition and how is his political behaviour remained similar to that of Andrew Jackson. Three specific areas in which these variables are determined are personal lives, narcissism and authoritarian behaviour, and populism and corruption. The paper also charts out the ways and means through which Donald Trump's administration is termed as Jacksonian in nature.

The Euroscepticism of contemporary populist parties is analysed starting from contemporary political literature (Mudde and Taggart). In this article the question about the creation of a new political cleavage between anti-Eu and pro-Eu parties is discussed, along with an articulation of the Eu scepticism into a right-winf and a left-wing  criticism.

Following the signing of the Prespa Agreement in June 2018, the Macedonian name issue became the most prominent topic on the Greek political agenda, catalysing an exceptional political confrontation and contributing to the realignment of political parties and eventually to government change. Analysing the political discourse and public debate on the issue from January 2018 until the July 2019 national elections, as well as opinion polls and electoral results, the paper explores the conditions leading to the escalation of political polarisation on the left/right axis, at the expense of smaller centrist parties. It is argued that political antagonism was built on the previous political cleavage (although the populist/anti-populism axis was now reversed). However, by mobilising the public’s emotions around an alleged ‘national threat’, the polarisation around the Macedonian name issue proved to be far more successful for the Greek right than for the left.

In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, 81 percent of American evangelicals voted for right-wing populist Donald Trump. Since his election, evangelical support has not dropped below 65 percent. These numbers argue for an affinity between Trump and evangelical belief. While this may be the case, this paper argues that those beliefs are not the religious beliefs associated with evangelical activism (opposition to abortion and gay marriage for instance). After sketching a rubric that allows us to justify calling a movement populist, the article explores the historico-cultural materiel from which American right-populism draws its worldview and policies: most importantly, a robust, democratic localism and wariness of  central authority. Under economic or "way of life'" duress, these may become the ground for the binarized "us-them" politics associated with right populist movements. Finally, the article traces a parallel wariness of central government, which has special traction among evangelicals for theological and religio-historical reasons. Evangelical support for the small-government-ism of the Republican party and right populism is thus not a Faustian bargain, where evangelicals are indifferent to economic and political positions but support them in return for Republican support on religious matters. Rather, evangelicals are drawn to their own traditional beliefs in a self-reliant, Tocquevillian republic unmolested by an over-reaching government and other potentially disruptive intruders. This, in addition to more narrowly religious issues (abortion, gay marriage) helps explain evangelical support for the Republican party and Trump. The article closes with a look at the vocal minority of evangelicals who oppose him.

Based on an original definition of modern populism as “democratic illiberalism” and many years of meticulous research, Takis Pappas marshals extraordinary empirical evidence from Argentina, Greece, Peru, Italy, Venezuela, Ecuador, Hungary, the United States, Spain, and Brazil to develop a comprehensive theory about populism. He addresses all key issues in the debate about populism and answers big questions of great relevance for today’s liberal democracy, including:

What is modern populism and how can it be differentiated from comparable phenomena like nativism and autocracy?

Where in Latin America has populism become most successful? Where in Europe did it emerge first? Why did its rise to power in the United States come so late?

Can Trump's America be compared best with Venezuela’s Chávez, France’s Le Pens, or Turkey’s Erdoğan?

Why has populism thrived in post-authoritarian Greece but not in Spain? And why in Argentina and not in Brazil?

Can populism ever succeed without a charismatic leader? If not, what does leadership tell us about how to challenge populism?

Who are “the people” who vote for populist parties, how are these “made” into a group, and what is in their minds?

Is there a “populist blueprint” that all populists use when in power? And what are the long-term consequences of populist rule?

What does the expansion, and possibly solidification, of populism mean for the very nature and future of contemporary democracy?

Populism and Liberal Democracy will change the ways you understand populism and imagine the prospects of liberal democracy.

In recent years, scholars have produce literature in constitutional amendments, in particular in analyzing the unamendability phenomenon and its relationship with democracy, abusive and populist constitutionalism. The study of constitutional design is of interest, in large part, because a constitution can be amended and such processes make room for the fundamental questions about legitimacy of the constitutional order, the holder and the locus of sovereignty, especially in those legal orders where a popular legitimated process of altering the constitution is entrenched. Indeed, in some legal orders "We, the People" are called to initiate and/or approve any constitutional change. In this view, the paper brings the reader alongside the "We, the People" claim, stressing, though in restrictive manner, who are "the people", how they act and react, and when their action unveil a(n) (un)constitutional change, in order to draw citizensled constitutional changes grounded on three keywordspopulism, (un)constitutional amendments and constitutionalism. The paper is an invitation to the development of "the people" approaches in a constitutional framework that struck populism as democracy's sentinel.

For decades, Turkish Islamists have failed to attract the votes of large sections of society and remained marginal. As a result of this failure to come to power, and due to domestic and international constraints and windows of opportunities, they have declared that they have jettisoned Islamism. Many Turkish Muslims whose religious disposition was shaped by the pluralistic urban Ottoman experience and small-town Anatolian traditionalism, and by the contesting currents of cosmopolitan pluralism and rural social conservatism, voted in favour of these former Islamists who have become " Muslim Democrats ". This paper elaborates on the genealogy of Turkish Islamists and their political trajectories and argues that when the forces and constraints of domestic and external social, political and economic conditions disappeared and the opportunities derived from being Muslim Democrats no longer existed, the former Islamists easily returned to their original ideology, showing that despite assertions to the contrary their respect for democracy and pluralism had not truly been internalised. This paper also aims to demonstrate that similar to other authoritarian populists, Erdoganists perceive the state and its leader as more important than anything else and as being above everything else, which has culminated in a personality cult and sanctification of the state. As long as Turkey's economy continued to boom, almost everyone was happy that Turkey could readily market the " Muslim Democrats " story to the whole world for a long period as a major success story, or as an " exemplary Muslim country " or " model ". Yet, Middle Eastern elites and Western forces got carried away and learnt the hard way just how naive their view was in perhaps the first great transformation movement of the twenty-first century – the Arab Spring. Likewise, the Turkish Spring turned all too quickly towards autumn and then winter.

Populism is one of the most dynamic fields of comparative political research. Although its study began in earnest only in the late 1960s, it has since developed through four distinct waves of scholarship, each pertaining to distinct empirical phenomena and with specific methodological and theoretical priorities. Today, the field is in urgent need of a comprehensive general theory that will be able to capture the phenomenon specifically within the context of our contemporary democracies. This requires our breaking away from recurring methodological pitfalls and, above all, rethinking about a truly minimal definition of populism.
This article has three goals. First, it offers an overview of the ways various scholars have treated, and advanced, over recent decades “populism” both empirically and theoretically. Second, it identifies a number of – mostly methodological – shortcomings that in many instances have beset the study of populism: (i) unspecified empirical universe, (ii) lack of historical and cultural context specificity, (iii) essentialism, (iv) conceptual stretching, (v) unclear negative pole, (vi) degreeism, (vii) defective observable-measurable indicators, (viii) a neglect of micro-mechanisms, (ix) poor data and inattention to crucial cases, and (x) normative indeterminacy. Third, in an explicit attempt to cure the foregoing shortcomings, this article proposes a minimal definition of modern populism as democratic illiberalism. This novel re-conceptualization of populism is expected to lead to a more conceptually sensitive and methodologically solid comparative study of the phenomenon at a time when the malfunctioning and pathologies of our modern-day representative democracies are all too visible and sorely felt.

In questi ultimi anni, varie formazioni di estrema destra – fasciste, populiste o nazionaliste – sembrano aver assunto una maggiore visibilità e capacità di penetrazione politica tra le popolazioni europee. Prodotto dei forti cambia- menti che stiamo attraversando, sintomo di una progressiva frantumazione sociale, tali formazioni si battono sia contro una Unione europea che ha espropriato gli Stati nazionali della loro sovranità, sia in difesa di una pre- sunta identità culturale dell’Occidente, oggi “minacciata” dai crescerti flussi migratori.
Nel nostro paese, una delle espressioni più evidenti e paradigmatiche di una generale deriva sovranista, nazionalista e identitaria, cui assistiamo in questi anni di crisi economica e sociale, è sicuramente rappresentata da Ca- saPound. Studiarne pertanto la struttura, la cultura e l’azione, come si pro- pongono queste pagine – che raccolgono anche le ragioni di appartenenza espresse dai suoi militanti –, costituisce un contributo importante alla com- prensiene di una cultura politica che va ben al di là di coloro che la riven- dicano apertamente definendosi “fascisti del terzo millenio”. Dall’osserva- zione e dall’analisi antropologica di un caso concreto, cogliendone le pecu- liarità, analizzandone la matrice culturale, il programma politico, le forme della militanza e le tensioni che lo attraversano, emergono in realtà molti degli elementi che in vario modo e in forme diverse connotano i sentimenti e i comportamenti di una parte sempre più consistente delle nostre società, prese nel gorgo di una trasformazione di cui è difficile cogliere il profilo e prevedere gli esiti.

Bu makale, 1960lardan beri önemli bir çalışma konusu olan Avrupa’daki popülizmin mevcut durumunun teorik incelemesine odaklanmaktadır. Makale, 1960lar itibariyle yazılmış, farklı bilim insanlarının çalışmalarına atıfta bulunarak, popülizmin tanımı üzerine bir tartışma ile başlamaktadır. Ardından çalışma, ekonomik ve mülteci krizinin vurduğu Avrupa’da son on yılda fazlasıyla yaygınlaşan modern popülizmin özellikleri üzerinde durmaktadır. Bu makale ayrıca, 1960lardaki “ideolojinin sonu” tartışmalarıyla birlikte, neoliberal yönetim biçimleri ve popülist politik söylemlerin yükselişi arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektedir. Makale popülizm incelemesini, hangisinin daha ilişkili olduğunu bulmak için analiz seviyelerinin kısa bir tartışmasıyla sonlandırmaktadır: lider mi, parti mi?

Bu raporda, akademik literatürün temel tartışma alanlarının penceresinden, yükselen popülizmin içeriği, yükselişinin nedenleri ve en önemlisi siyasal rejime etkileri değerlendirilmektedir. Raporun birinci bölümünde popülistler kısaca tanıtıldıktan sonra, ikinci bölümde popülizm literatürü bu üç başlık altında eleştirel bir şekilde değerlendirilmektedir. Buna ek olarak, ikinci bölümde, literatür üstüne bir gözlemde ve popülizm demokrasi ilişkisi üzerine bir iddiada bulunulmaktadır. Gözlem, popülizm literatüründeki aşırı tanımsal çeşitliliğin daralması ve popülizm çalışan sosyal bilimcilerin popülizmi halk-elitler ayrımına dayalı bir siyaset çerçeveleme biçimi olarak gören tanımlar çevresinde toplanmaya başlamasıdır. İddia ise, iktidardaki popülizmin liberal demokrasinin yarıdemokratik çok sayıda mekanizmasından biri olan seçimleri kutsallaştırarak yalnızlaştırdığı ve bu yolla liberal demokratik rejimi başka bir demokrasi biçimine dönüştürmediği, sadece otoriterleştirdiğidir. Esasen, bu iddia, popülizmin otoriterliğe yol açtığını gösteren kuramsal literatüre, bu otoriter etkinin yolu konusunda bir katkı niteliğindedir. Raporun son bölümündeyse, literatürden çıkan temel fikirler, bulgular ve gözlemler ışığında, iktidardaki ve muhalefetteki popülistlerle mücadelenin zorlukları hakkında yorumlarda bulunulmaktadır.

Bu makale, Avrupa Birliği’ndeki popülist ‘zeitgeistin’ sosyal, politik ve ekonomik kaynaklarını ortaya koymaktadır. Çalışma, Avrupa’daki popülist sağın mevcut durumuna ilişkin bir analizle başlamaktadır. Hemen ardından ise; küreselleşme, çokkültürlülük, finansal kriz, mülteci krizi, İslamofobizm, terör, Avrupa şüpheciliği ve nativizm ile karakterize edilen bir zamanda, popülist politik retoriğin güçlü bir şekilde yerleşmeye başladığı mevcut politik çerçevenin farklı yönlerini ele alacaktır.

Sus banderas están en las movilizaciones callejeras, sus militantes trabajan en los barrios, sus dirigentes obtienen cargos en intendencias, bancas en las legislaturas y en el Congreso. Adhirió al kirchnerismo e integró sus gobiernos, pero en los mismos años demostró en la calle el rechazo a algunas de sus políticas. Denunció activamente el ajuste neoliberal del macrismo, pero negoció con sus funcionarios y logró más poder en el manejo de planes sociales. Algunos de sus seguidores marchan en reclamo por la situación laboral tras una imagen de San Cayetano; otros lo hacen en apoyo a la legalización del aborto.

El Movimiento Evita es una de las organizaciones sociales más grandes, discutidas y singulares de la Argentina, y un participante activo de su escena política. De alto perl público, enorme capacidad de movilización y agenda política propia, el Evita –que nació como tal en 2006- logró arraigo en cientos de barrios populares de casi todas las provincias, consolidó su capacidad de generar fuertes lazos entre los militantes –incluso de crear y “educar” cuadros políticos-, evitó siempre las discusiones ideológicas, hizo y deshizo alianzas sin haber sufrido una ruptura en más de una década de existencia.

Este libro –el primero en explorar en profundidad y especícamente al Movimiento Evita- recorre los orígenes, la identidad y las estrategias políticas del Evita y se pregunta qué implica el acceso a cargos de gestión en el Estado para un movimiento que hizo una bandera de la autonomía y que, como dice su líder Emilio Pérsico, quiere representar a “los últimos de la fila”. ¿Se burocratiza? ¿”Traiciona” sus ideales? ¿Se puede estar a la vez en la calle, en los barrios y en el Estado?

A través de entrevistas a decenas de integrantes del movimiento –desde sus líderes más importantes, como Pérsico, el “Chino” Navarro y Leonardo Grosso, entre otros, a militantes de base-, y mediante un trabajo etnográfico en locales, merenderos, congresos y movilizaciones, Francisco Longa construye un retrato equilibrado y persuasivo de un espacio político díscolo, plebeyo, verticalista y pragmático, que con sus particularidades ilumina el siempre dinámico mundo de las organizaciones sociales en la Argentina.

Wayne Vucinic Book Prize 2007, "for the most important contribution to Russian, Eurasian, and East European studies in any discipline of the humanities or social sciences." 

Endorsement by Slavoj Zizek:

"Alexei Yurchak's Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More immediately seduced me by its very title with a profound philosophical implication that eternity is a historical category--things can be eternal for some time. The same spirit of paradox runs through the entire book--it renders in wonderful details the gradual disintegration of the Soviet system from within its ideological and cultural space, making visible all the hypocrisy and misery of this process. I consider Yurchak's book by far the best work about the late epoch of the Soviet Union--it is not just history, but a pleasure to read, a true work of art." (Slavoj Zizek, author of In Defense of Lost Causes)

Abstract:

Soviet socialism was based on paradoxes that were revealed by the peculiar experience of its collapse. To the people who lived in that system the collapse seemed both completely unexpected and completely unsurprising. At the moment of collapse it suddenly became obvious that Soviet life had always seemed simultaneously eternal and stagnating, vigorous and ailing, bleak and full of promise. Although these characteristics may appear mutually exclusive, in fact they were mutually constitutive. This book explores the paradoxes of Soviet life during the period of "late socialism" (1960s-1980s) through the eyes of the last Soviet generation.

PREVIEW BOOK CHAPTER - The chapter engages with mainstream explanations of the electoral growth of the xenophobic and separatist Flemish far-right party, Vlaams Blok, in Belgium from the late 1980s onward. The issue of right-wing populism in Flanders is introduced by briefly outlining the genesis of the current political situation, and subsequently explaining the two dominant political positions held by the Vlaams Blok, separatist nationalism and authoritarian xenophobic populism, as they were articulated in Party manifestos and electoral platforms. Thereupon it summarizes and problematizes the two foremost types of analysis that have been put forward to account for the electoral upsurge of the Vlaams Blok, and relate them to strategies employed by the mainstream democratic elites to marginalize this party. From this, it is argued that the current dominant frame of thinking is missing a crucial point. The rise of an ultra-nationalist and authoritarian-populist party in Flanders, as elsewhere in Europe, can be better understood in the context of a hegemonic consensus around the political centre, resulting from an ideological convergence between the established political parties, characterized by the disappearance of antagonism. Such an alternative account has been developed over the years by Chantai Mouffe, and I shall first summarize and expound her thesis, and explain how and why it is applicable to the case of the Vlaams Blok.

While most scholars acknowledge that the media play an instrumental role in furthering or limiting the spread of populism, the exact nature of the relationship between right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) and the media remains poorly understood. This article analyses the various ways in which the media choose to deal with RWPPs in the Benelux region (i.e. Belgium; the Netherlands; and Luxembourg). Using evidence from interviews with media practitioners (n=46), the findings suggest that in the absence of a credible right-wing populist challenger, media practitioners in Luxembourg and Wallonia adhere to strict demarcation, whereas the Dutch and Flemish media have become gradually more accommodative to RWPPs. This study makes two contributions to the field. First, it systematically theorises the different ways in which the media can approach the populist radical right. Second, it provides illustrative, comparative evidence about the rationale for why some media provide space for RWPPs while others deny it, thereby illuminating the under-researched topic of societal responses to the populist radical right.

Die sechs Jahre der sowjetischen Perestroika zwischen 1985 und 1991 stellen eine krisenhafte Umbruchszeit dar, in der der Wandel von Bevölkerung und politischer Elite bewusst erlebt und aktiv gestaltet wurde. In dieser speziellen Periode ermöglichte die Lockerung medialer und gesellschaftlicher Zensur die Entstehung informeller Organisationen, die sich in Form einer lautstarken Demokratiebewegung für diverse Systemalternativen einsetzten. Die Kritik am repressiven Staatssozialismus sowie am ungerechten Kapitalismus eröffnete den Blick auf viele Dritte Wege, die in einer Zeit rasanter öffentlicher Politisierung intensiv diskutiert wurden. Die Massendemonstrationen und propagierten Alternativen der russischen Informellenbewegung werden jedoch von Geschichtsschreibung und Sozialwissenschaften weitgehend ignoriert und sind so in Vergessenheit geraten. Der vorliegende Beitrag versucht diesem Vergessen entgegenzuwirken und die damaligen Ideen in aktuelle Diskussionen um eine Redemokratisierung der Demokratie bzw. um sozialistische Systemalternativen einfließen zu lassen. So soll eine neue Perspektive auf das Verhältnis von Demokratie und Sozialismus eingenommen werden. Nach einer historischen Einbettung des
Forschungsgegenstandes werden die diversen Reformvorschläge und Alternativkonzeptionen dargestellt. Da es zu den Inhalten der russischen Informellenbewegung fast keine Literatur gibt, wurden sechzehn qualitative ExpertInneninterviews mit AktivistInnen verschiedenster ideologischer Richtungen in Moskau durchgeführt. Abschließend werden die besprochenen Ideen in den Kontext aktueller Krisen- und Alternativdiskussionen gestellt.

Schlagwörter: Alternative Demokratiekonzepte, Sozialistische Ideengeschichte, Russland, Perestroika, Systemtransformation, Zivilgesellschaft, Demokratiebewegung

Many Third Ways: Alternative Conceptions of Democracy in Russia during the Perestroika

The six years of Soviet perestroika represent a time of radical change, consciously experienced and actively promoted by society and the political elite. In this special period the loosening of social and media censorship enabled the emergence of informal organisations, promoting their various ideas of system alternatives in a loud democracy movement. The criticism of repressive state socialism and unjust capitalism opened a perspective on many Third
Ways, which were vividly discussed in a time of rapid public politicisation. The mass demonstrations and promoted
alternatives of the Russian informal movement are, however, ignored by historic and social sciences and are thus almost forgotten. This paper tries to counteract this oblivion and to incorporate those ideas into current discussions about a re-democratisation of democracy or socialist alternatives respectively. Thus a new perspective on the relationship of democracy and socialism is taken into account. After a historic overview of the Russian informal movement, the various reform suggestions and system alternatives are illustrated. Since almost no literature on this
topic exists, sixteen qualitative interviews with activists of various ideological backgrounds were taken in Moscow. Finally, the illustrated ideas will be put into the context of current alternative discussions of democracy.

Keywords: Alternative models of democracy, history of socialist ideas, Russia, perestroika, system transformation,
civil society, democracy movement

Jie-Hyun Lim: Rezension zu: De Baets, Antoon: Crimes against History London  2018. ISBN 978-1138574229, in: Connections. A Journal for Historians and Area Specialists, 17.07.2020, <www.connections.clio-online.net/publicationreview/id/reb-28422>.

Since the kick-off in 2015 of the last presidential campaign, a climate of fear and intimidation has dominated national life in the United States to a degree rarely seen before, poisoning our politics and reaching into our very relationships with friends, co-workers, and neighbors.
    Confronting Political Intimidation is about how this came to be, how we can see ourselves through it, but also why it is not likely to go away anytime soon.
      At the core of this political history is a larger U.S. public culture of intimidation and bullying in the workplace, media, and political arena that has been building for 30 years. It is not by chance that in 2017 the U.S. inaugurated Donald Trump, an openly authoritarian president who is an abusive CEO, capitalist folk hero, and Internet troll.
    The current harsh environment is a direct challenge to citizens and residents, especially those seeking to engage in progressive activism and party politics now and in the years to come.
      This short book offers a unique guide to the strategies and dynamics of contemporary political intimidation and public bullying: the dangers they present, the snares and traps that envelop their targets, and the lessons to be learned.
      In the end, it’s about shedding light on the dark side of contemporary national life in order to see beyond it.

Net sales proceeds will go to Indviisible National of IndivisbleGuide,com.

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93 4 Il populismo fra politica della disintermediazione e trasformazioni delle basi sociali della democrazia di Lorenzo Viviani 4.1 Introduzione: leadership e populismo Quando si parla di trasformazioni della democrazia, i termini oggi imme-diatamente associati sono quelli di leader e di disintermediazione, rispetti-vamente come attore e processo alla base della ridefinizione del linkage fra politica e cittadini. La leadership ha progressivamente sostituito le ideolo-gie e i partiti non solo nell'ordinare la competizione politica per il potere, ma come criterio distintivo per individuare la più generale offerta politica. Il leader assume il compito di operare una semplificazione della realtà, of-frendo al tempo stesso una mappa cognitiva per comprendere i fenomeni politici, un elemento simbolico in cui riconoscersi e una strategia di poli-ticizzazione di nuove fratture sociali. Parlare di centralità della leadership nei processi di disintermediazione significa, quindi, ripercorrere temi e problemi da sempre presenti all'interno della democrazia, e in primo luo-go la cangiante relazione fra soggetti titolari della rappresentanza, sogget-ti rappresentati e modalità di legittimazione e costruzione della fiducia. Proprio in una fase di passaggio di questo tipo, il populismo emerge come declinazione particolare della riscrittura del rapporto tra società e politi-ca in una fase di trasformazioni delle basi sociali della democrazia e delle identità tradizionali. Il populismo è solitamente associato alla "crisi" del-le democrazie liberali, e vicendevolmente è descritto come patologia del-la democrazia rappresentativa, come indice del malcontento politico nei confronti dei partiti tradizionali, come politica dell'impolitica o come ra-dicalizzazione della contro-democrazia con la contestazione dei suoi stessi cardini rappresentativi (Canovan, 1999; Mény, Surel, 2001; Rosanvallon, 2012; Taggart, 2018). La struttura delle opportunità per lo sviluppo del populismo risiede in una complessa trama di trasformazioni nella politica economica, socia

Antes de pasar al acto, Brenton Tarrant, el extremista australiano de 28 años de edad que abatió a 50 personas en Christchurch, se cuidó mucho de publicar en twitter un manifiesto racista de 74 páginas bajo el título 'el gran reemplazo', en referencia a una teoría complotista muy popular en los foros de extrema derecha sistematizada por el escritor francés Renaud Camus hace casi una década, según la cual los «pueblos europeos» estarían siendo «reemplazados» por poblaciones de inmigrantes. en un alarde de narcisismo, el monstruo quiso teorizar su odio, para lo cual procedió a la selección de una serie de variables y motivos de la ultraderecha, el nazismo e incluso el «ecofascismo», dejando en evidencia un delirio obsesivo por la supuesta «sumersión» del «mundo occidental» bajo hordas invasoras étnica-mente discordantes. La filiación manifiesta de tarrant ha sido interpretada como un indicador de la expansión del radicalismo violento de ultraderecha en nuestras socie-dades, vinculando la matanza en nueva Zelanda con atentados como el de Oklahoma City de abril de 1995, que dejó un saldo de 168 muertos, y los de julio de 2011 en Oslo y la isla noruega de Utoya, que segaron la vida de 77 personas. Como mito movilizador compartido se halla la idea de que la raza blanca está desapareciendo y, por consiguiente, frente al apocalipsis pregonado, todos los medios se antojan lícitos. La aprensión al «reemplazo», cuyo colofón es el exterminio del hombre blanco, va de la mano del rechazo de una sociedad multicultural, pero sobre todo multiétnica, que abre la puerta a la definición de un enemigo compartido y, de paso, al establecimiento de una solidaridad y proyecto comunes.

In our article, we investigate the affective economy of national-populist image circulation on Facebook. This is highly relevant, since social media has been an essential area for the spread of national-populist ideology. In our research, we analyse image circulation as affective practice, combining qualitative and quantitative methods. We use computational data analysis methods to examine visual big data: image fingerprints and reverse image search engines to track down the routes of thousands of circulated images as well as make discourse-historical analysis on the images that have gained most attention among supporters. Our research demonstrates that these existing tools allow social science research to make theory-solid approaches to understand the role of image circulation in creating and sustaining national and transnational networks on social media, and show how national-populist thinking is spread through images that catalyse and mobilise affects – fear, anger and resentment – thus creating an effective affective economy.

In documenting the effects of neoliberal policy and economic restructuring, anthropologists reveal much about the pecarity and downward mobility that characterize contemporary life. They have also tended to project their values on those they identify as the victims of these processes.  Anthropology as a whole has been less attentive to working class and poor people whose attitudes and action advance right wing agendas.  Authoritarian populism, European cultural nationalism, Brexit, and of course the election of Donald Trump all derived decisive support from poor and working class communities that stand to gain little from these developments.  This chapter argues for a renewed attention to the corridors of power in which neoliberal policy is authored, as well as its multitude of "enablers" among the disenfranchised working class.

Logics of Propaganda
Part Two. The Conspiratorial Logic of Populist Propaganda
Within the framework of the more general logics of propaganda outlined in Part One, Part Two of this study aims to shed light on the recently growing populist-propaganda front. In contrast to many researchers who speak of a ‘populist wave’ recently spreading almost across the world (from Putin to Trump and back), on the level of discourses we prefer to call this phenomenon ‘populist-propaganda front’. This newly coined term presupposes that the dispersed popular discontents have, to a great extent, already been captured and packaged in a new propaganda regime. Gradually after 2000, the new populist-propaganda package (basic grammar and vocabulary) was produced by Russian media, but Russia does not determine all of its uses; it can be and is used in anti-Russian rhetoric as well. This package – national-sovereignist and conservative in its own terms – does not serve the interests of the local people but is utilized by different local politico-economic actors (oligarchs): it is a circulating resource for state capture. The particular practical logic of this populist propaganda is outlined here on the basis of the empirical study on Anti-Democratic Propaganda in Bulgaria. News Websites and Printed Media: 2013 – 2016.
First, the populist-propaganda logics are based entirely on a conspiratorial grammar. The narrative figure of conspiracy, after a morphological analysis following Vladimir Propp, can be logically represented as a multiple relation with three logical positions: 1. Conspirator (Puppet-master, Villain) – 2. Helpers (Puppets) – 3. Victim (potential Hero). Populist propaganda totalizes this elementary conspiratorial grammar: everything in the (political and economic) world is a conspiracy. The scene of the conspiracy is the globe. Hence the position of the ‘Conspirator’ is translated into a geopolitical position: the usual suspect – the global Villain – is ‘the West’ (or the USA, NATO, Brussels, Soros, capitalism, liberalism, multiculturalism, etc., all of them metonymically substituted on demand).
Second, by totalizing conspiracy, populist propaganda totalizes cynicism: its first message is that everyone is pursuing their own self-interest. Every other normative and political standard (presumably invoked to limit selfish self-interests – human rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers, etc.) is discredited in advance as an ideological smokescreen hiding the conspiracy.
Third, the only legitimate interest is the people’s interest. But here a set of propaganda operations with the meaning of ‘the people’ takes place. 1. Using the Left repertoire of discrediting Western liberal capitalism, propaganda omits the inclusive Left meanings of ‘the people’ and substitutes them with exclusive ‘Right meanings’ (it is strategically targeted at the local majority represented in an ethnically-nationalist holistic mode); 2. The people’s interest and the people’s sovereignty are also strategically substituted by the state’s sovereignty (in geopolitical étatist terms); 3. But the state’s sovereignty understood as the existence of strong and mutually independent institutions is also strategically replaced by the ‘personal sovereignty’ of one strong and charismatic political leader. On the Bulgarian media scene, Putin and Orbán are usually cast in the role of real sovereign leaders countering the conspiracy of the West.
In conclusion, contemporary populist propaganda is racist (excludes on a racial basis), isolationist (excludes international normative regulations and control), and authoritarian (on the internal level, it excludes the institutional separation of powers and blocks civic resistances). It is not only a Russian weapon but also an effective local device for state capture for every oligarch fighting against all forms of public control (internal and external) and utilizing the state as a tool for securing economic advantages.
Keywords: logics, grammar, populist propaganda, conspiracy, state capture.

Demografi adalah ilmu yang mempelajari secara statistik dan matematik tentang besar, komposisi dan distribusi penduduk dan perubahan-perubahannya sepanjang masa melalui bekerjanya 5 komponen demografi yaitu Kelahiran (Fertilitas), Kematian (Mortalitas), Perkawinan, Migrasi dan Mobilitas Sosial. Pembagian Ilmu Demografi Demografi pada umumnya dibagi menjadi: -Demografi murni (formal demography)menekankan pada masalah jumlah, distribusi, struktur, dan pertumbuhan penduduk. -Demografi yang berusaha memberikan penjelasan tentang perubahan variabel demografi, meliputi Demografi Sosiologi, Demografi Sosial, dan Studi Kependudukan.

Abstract
It can be said that normal democratic outcomes are those who seek the best interest of the majority, and therefore, they reflect the view of the true majority; and it can be said that extreme democratic outcomes are those who seek the best interest of the minority, and therefore, they reflect the view of the true minority.  From this point of view it can be said that i) normal liberal democracies bring different normal democratic outcomes into competition, where the one with majority votes wins the democratic contest; and that ii) extreme liberal democracies bring normal democratic outcomes and extreme democratic outcomes into competition, where again the one with majority votes wins the democratic contest. When normal democratic outcomes compete with each other under an independent rule of law system there is true democracy as there is democratic consistency that allows power to alternate between different normal democratic outcome if the result of the democracy process says so; and when a normal democratic outcome competes with an extreme democratic outcome under an independent rule of law system we have temporary democratic authoritarianism if the result of the democratic process says so. 
When we shifted from liberal democracy thinking to extreme liberal democracy thinking as we did in 2016 with the coming of Brexism and Trumpism we needed to shift our thinking from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking as true democracy thinking no longer holds in an authoritarianism based system if we wanted to understand what to expect from an extreme democratic outcome in terms of behavior or understand what to do either to save the democratic model or to prevent the coming of permanent authoritarianism from within. But apparently traditional democracy thinkers missed this 2016 shift in thinking, which may explain the confusion and knowledge gaps that have led people, academics, and politicians to treat extreme democratic outcomes and their expected behavior as if they were normal democratic outcomes when they are not, missing all together the democracy/authoritarian inconsistency at the heart of this new system.  Hence, there is a need to understand the working of true democracy thinking and of temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking in terms of normal and extreme democratic outcome theory in order to be able to point out the main implication of a shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking or vise a versa.  And this raises the following question: How can normal and extreme democratic outcome theory be used to point out the structure of the 2016 shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking and its main implications? Among the goals of this paper is to provide an answer to this question both analytically and graphically.

Resúmen
Se puede decir que los resultados democráticos normales son aquellos que buscan el mejor interés de la mayoría y, por lo tanto, reflejan la opinión de la verdadera mayoría; y se puede decir que los resultados democráticos extremos son aquellos que buscan el mejor interés de la minoría y, por lo tanto, reflejan la visión de la verdadera minoría. Desde este punto de vista se puede decir que i) las democracias liberales normales ponen en competencia diferentes resultados democráticos normales, donde el que tiene la mayoría de votos gana la contienda democrática; y que ii) las democracias liberales extremas traen resultados democráticos normales y resultados democráticos extremos a la competencia, donde nuevamente el que tiene votos mayoritarios gana la contienda democrática.  Cuando los resultados democráticos normales compiten entre sí bajo un sistema de estado de derecho independiente, existe una verdadera democracia, ya que existe una coherencia democrática que permite que el poder alterne entre diferentes resultados democráticos normales si el resultado del proceso democrático así lo dice; y cuando un resultado democrático normal compite con un resultado democrático extremo bajo un sistema de Estado de derecho independiente, tenemos un autoritarismo democrático temporal si el resultado del proceso democrático así lo dice.
Cuando pasamos del pensamiento de la democracia liberal al pensamiento de la democracia liberal extrema, como lo hicimos en 2016 con la llegada del Brexismo y el Trumpismo, necesitábamos cambiar nuestro pensamiento del pensamiento de la democracia verdadera al pensamiento del autoritarismo democrático temporal, ya que el pensamiento de la democracia verdadera no funciona en un sistema basado en autoritarismo  si quisiéramos entender qué esperar de un resultado democrático extremo en términos de comportamiento o entender qué hacer para poder salvar el modelo democrático o para poder prevenir la llegada de un movimiento autoritarismo permanente desde adentro.  Pero aparentemente los pensadores de la democracia tradicional se perdieron este cambio de pensamiento de 2016, lo que puede explicar la confusión y las brechas de conocimiento que han llevado a las personas, académicos y políticos a tratar los resultados democráticos extremos y su comportamiento esperado como si fueran resultados democráticos normales cuando no lo son, perdiendo todos juntos la inconsistencia democracia / autoritarismo la cual es el corazón de este nuevo sistema.  Por lo tanto, es necesario comprender el funcionamiento del pensamiento de la democracia verdadera y el pensamiento del autoritarismo democrático temporal en términos de la teoría del resultado democrático normal y extremo para poder señalar las principales implicaciones de un cambio del pensamiento de la democracia verdadera al pensamiento del autoritarismo democrático temporal o viceversa. Y esto plantea la siguiente pregunta: ¿Cómo se puede utilizar la teoría del resultado democrático normal y extremo para señalar la estructura del cambio en 2016 del pensamiento de la democracia verdadera al pensamiento de autoritarismo democrático temporal y sus principales implicaciones? Uno de los objetivos de este artículo es dar una respuesta a esta pregunta tanto analítica como gráficamente.

News coverage summarizing some of my recent work on the political psychology of the fragility of liberal democracy and the rise of populism.  One caveat - the author of the news piece, Rick Shenkman, emphasizes a neurological and evolutionary dimension to the issue.  This is his view, not mine.