Henry A. Kissinger

This paper will seek to ask the tough questions as to why Zimbabwe -- a prosperous nation at the time of transition to majority rule -- collapsed economically as a besieged ZANU-PF reacted against outside public opinion and began undoing the careful work of social progress the government had embarked on.  This paper will further examine critically the outside pressures levied by the South African apartheid-led government, failures of both the United States and United Kingdom to aid Zimbabwe's transfer to majority rule, the failure of the United Kingdom to back the Lancaster House "willing buyer, willing seller" commitment for land reform, and finally whether Mugabe's actions were influenced in whole or in part by these events -- in effect creating a pincer movement thwarting both the Zimbabwean government's ability to reinvest both socially and fiscally while pushing ZANU-PF to play a political dead man's hand -- opting for politically popular land grabs that only further buckled and finally broke the agricultural backbone of Zimbabwe's economy.

Capítulo 3-Da Universalidade ao equilíbrio. Richelieu, Guilherme D Orange e Pitt. 1. O que os historiadores chamam de sistema europeu de equilíbrio de poder nasceu no século XVII do colapso final da aspiração medieval à universalidade-conceito de ordem mundial que era o amálgama das tradições do Império Romano e da Igreja Católica. O mundo era um espelho dos céus. Um só Deus reinava no céu, assim um imperador devia mandar no mundo secular e um papa reger a igreja universal. 2. No século XVII, os estados feudais da Alemanha e do norte da Itália estavam agrupados sob o Sacro Imperador Romano. Esse império teve potencial para dominar a Europa. A França e a Inglaterra eram estados periféricos. 3. A França era o país mais a perder com o revigoramento do Sacro Império Romano, pois poderia ter sido-para usar um termo atual-"finlandizada" por ele. Enfraquecidos os constrangimentos religiosos, a França passou a jogar com as rivalidades geradas pelas Reforma entre seus vizinhos. Os governantes franceses viram que a fraqueza progressiva do Sacro Império Romano (melhor ainda, sua desintegração) favoreceria a segurança da França e, com ajuda da sorte, a deixaria expandir-se para o leste. 4. O grande autor desta política francesa foi uma figura rara, um príncipe da Igreja, Armand Jean du Plessis, cardeal de Richelieu, primeiro-ministro da França de 1624 a 1642. Diz-se que, ao saber da morte do cardeal Richelieu, o papa Urbano VIII comentou: "Se existe um Deus, o cardeal Richelieu terá muitas contas a prestar. Se não...bem, sua vida terá sido uma vitória". Poucos estadistas podem reivindicar maior impacto sobre a história. Richelieu foi o pai do moderno sistema de estados. Ele criou o conceito de raison d´état e o praticou inflexivelmente em favor do seu país.

Much of the existing historical research discusses the 1973 oil crisis through single national perspectives. In contrast, this article focuses on the multilateral dimension of this far-reaching event. Starting with the Suez crisis of 1956, it explores the work of the OECD Oil Committee and its High Level Group regarding possible oil crises. However, the crisis mechanisms the OECD developed were not activated when the 1973 oil crisis hit. Thus, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took the initiative to form a stronger group of oil consuming countries outside the OECD, which should have guaranteed cohesion in the West in future oil crises. Pressured by the United States and expecting advantages from close transatlantic energy cooperation, the other Western industrialized countries, except France, approved of the project. The result was the founding of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in November 1974. Its structure and voting rules reflect the crucial role the United States play in the agency. Therefore, in the context of international relations, the IEA serves as an example of the United States’ struggle to maintain its hegemony in the Western camp.

In this controversial and monumental book arguably his most important Henry Kissinger illuminates just what diplomacy is, Moving from sweeping overview of his own interpretation of history to personal accounts of his negotiations with world leaders, Kissinger describes the ways in which art of diplomacy and the balance of power have created the world we live in, and shows how Americans, protected by the size and isolation of their country, as well as by their own idealism and mistrust of the old world have sought to conduct a unique kind of foreign policy based on the way they wanted the world to be, as opposed to the way it really is.

The traditional focus regarding the Angolan Civil War, 1974 – 1976, has been on the nature of Soviet and Cuban involvement, the American response to communist activities, and South Africa’s invasion. A point often mentioned, but rarely elaborated upon in the literature, is the degree to which the USA encouraged South Africa to intervene in the Angolan conflict. This paper investigates the extent and nature of American collusion with South Africa in the civil war, and the degree of complicity of senior American officials. The paper argues that on balance, the evidence suggests that senior elements of the United States executive branch, covertly and informally, colluded with South Africa. South African politicians overestimated the depth and extent of American support for its intervention, and when the USA ceased its assistance, they felt betrayed by Kissinger.

The occurrence and outcomes of the Cod Wars defy both popular and academic expectations. Iceland, a microstate, essentially won four disputes against the United Kingdom, a great power. The two states furthermore belonged to a Western security community, sharing significant institutional, economic and cultural ties. This article reviews the history and international relations literature on the Cod Wars to explain and evaluate why the Cod Wars occurred and why Iceland won them. This article also explains what lessons international relations scholarship has learned from the Cod Wars for liberal IR theory, realism and asymmetric bargaining.

American prevailing perceptions of the Cold War serve current US national foreign policy process goals that emphasize the expansion of US global influence. The prevailing view in the American polity remains that the Soviet Union was an aggressive, imperialist threat that the US defeated through its containment strategy. The validity of this ultimately self-serving assumption requires critique because Communist state postwar foreign and public policy behavior patterns did not conform with this prevailing position. Failure of the academy generally to predict the remarkably peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union is further evidence that this politically prevailing viewpoint was fundamentally flawed. Current dissent is in effect tied to the New Left that emerged partly as a critique to Cold War assumptions that produced the Vietnam debacle. This article analyzes the political interests that support the prevailing belief that the US nevertheless won the Cold War despite this left dissent. These interests overwhelm current critique of US global dominance that continues to rely on Cold War-era formulated hard power containment prescriptions. By accepting the validity of this assumption that the US won the Cold War, the academy weakens its ability to critique US foreign policy behavior in the so-called war on terror.

This paper examines the reasons behind the normalization process of U.S. - China relations in the 1969 - 1976 periods, when the U.S. was under the Nixon Administration. The paper refer to declassified documents from the U.S. Department of State to explore the reasons why the United States decided to normalize relations with China, despite facing risks in doing so.

Presiding all over Europe is indeed a hard task to conclude in one man's competence. The interrelating and interplaying potentiality, duties and foundational origination of the roles served in the top hierarchy layers of the European Union, make it difficult for "Kissingers" around the globe to find this precious "one phone number to call Europe". The exact counterparts of the United States Secretary of the State and the President of the United States are yet to be identified in the European Framework. Some link the High Commissioner to the counterpart of the U.S. Secretary of the State and others tend to compare the President of the U.S. to the President of the European Council, granting to the President of the Commission a "secondary - more administrative" role. However, only time will tell, whether the emerging far - reaching powers and ends of the High Commissioner in combination with his / her strong potential and absolutely qualitative diplomatic skills may prove sufficient to surpass the consolidated divide et impera decision making competences of the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council.

Makale, ABD yöneticilerinin konuşmalarından ve yazılarından yola çıkarak ABD'nin Vietnam Savaşı'nda izlediği politikanın analizini yapıyor. Birincil kaynakların önemli bir yer tuttuğu makale özellikle savaşın haklılığı ve ABD politikalarının gidişatı arasındaki ilişkiye dikkat çekiyor. Yazı Teori dergisinin Şubat 2016 tarihli sayısında yayınlanmıştır.

Who is winning in the Taiwan Strait? What is China’s strategy towards North Korea? Today, the American media space is increasingly dominated by anti-Chinese headlines, alleging either Chinese aggression or non-action. However, do these stories see the full picture? Is it truly Chinese aggression, or simply self-protection and a different diplomatic strategy?

Western-based American and Chinese military philosophies are fundamentally different, such that looking at Chinese decisions through a Western lens will not reveal fundamental truths behind the Great Wall. Since China embarked on the mission of national development in 1978, there has been a revival of interest in Sun Tzu and other classical Chinese military thought in China. To see beyond the wall, we look at Sun Tzu and his famous Art of War which has permeated Chinese military history for the last 2,500 years and continues to play a large role in strategic decision-making today.

By replacing Aristotle and Machiavelli with Confucius and Sun Tzu, we are able to understand both Western and Chinese military styles. The West assumes that China measures it’s power strategy and model based on western notions and concepts of war. However, while western concepts of war are based on ideas developed during Greek and Roman empires, echoing strategies and logic from Aristotle and Machiavelli, Chinese concepts of war are based on philosophers such as Confucius and Sun Tzu, whose teachings hold several key differences in approach to war. According to Sun Tzu, it is in China’s best interest to avoid war.

It is vital for the current U.S. administration to understand Chinese ancient philosophy when evaluating China’s diplomatic moves. While the U.S. views the Taiwan Strait situation as China sparring for military power and capabilities, China views the situation in their favor based on strategy, encirclement and terrain. The ancient game of wei qi is being used as a model for China’s encirclement by using the string of pearls in the Indian Ocean and military action in the South China Sea. 

Chinese foreign policy is directed by the concept of ‘shi’, present and future energies used for long-term strategic planning. Implementing ancient Chinese thought to game theory, we are able to understand that China will naturally strive to a state of perfect information, as told from Sun Tzu’s text in understanding the opponent’s plan. Based on mutual interdependence, game theory helps isolate principles of abstract decision-making when the outcome of people’s choices depends on what others decide.

Applying Sun Tzu thought to game theory places a strong advantage of moving away from simultaneous games and thus shifting to sequential ones. Cyber hacking should not come as a mystery to the West, as the Chinese are striving for a state of perfect information. These key differences can be seen through Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and the popular Chinese strategic game similar to chess called wei qi. China’s objective of understanding the opponent thoroughly, otherwise known as cultural salience, is an important strategic advantage described in “The Art of War”.  It is virtually impossible and extremely dangerous to play the game of wei qi with a chess mindset. Different from western thought, Chinese thought stresses subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage.

Game theory is a tool increasingly popular in psychology, sociology, politic and even in business. Games are what on which kids, and so human beings, begin to face reality and have a feedback from it. The art of a game brings a reflection of a particular society, history or culture. The game of chess was born thousands of years ago in India and has been practiced mainly by intellectuals of the major Indo-European civilization, which contributed in the development of the actual western culture. On the other hand, in China, Korea and Japan the ancient game practiced by intellectuals was the game of weiqi. In China, it was considered a classic art, like calligraphy (shu), painting (hua) and the practice of guqin (古琴). Several scholars and politicians, such as Henry Kissinger and Scott Boorman, found parallelism between chess/weiqi and the political culture of Western/Eastern countries. Although no game can explain the endless twists of international politics, they turn out to be a simplification of reality that can help us to better understand the evolution of the current geopolitical landscape and the strategy of a rising China.

This long essay seeks to address the many issues raised in World Order and highlighted by the reviewers in three parts. First, I reconstruct the broad sweep of the book’s arguments, point out its various strengths, and explore the overall purpose of the book in the context of Kissinger’s work, life, and times. Second, I explore Kissinger’s descriptions of the three international orders – the Westphalian, the Asian, and the Islamic, arguing that they are somewhat removed from the contemporary academic debates, and ponder over how this should influence the way we read Kissinger’s project. Third, I point out certain flaws in Kissinger’s historical narrative, and contextualize his project from a historian’s perspective. I conclude that while World Order often fails to engage with many of the major academic debates of our time, it remains an important work in the canon of Realism for successfully summarizing Kissinger’s oeuvre in the service of the busy policy practitioner and the interested public.

This essay deals with the ambivalent relationship between Carl Schmitt and the United States, focusing on the subject of International Relations. In the first paragraph, I summarize the place held by the U.S. throughout Schmitt's works: although he obviously sees America as an enemy, he is nevertheless an admirer of its imperial policy, and draws inspiration from the Monroe Doctrine when he shapes his concept of Großraum. In the second paragraph, I sketch the intertwining of political and theological themes in Schmitt's referring to the U.S. as an incarnation of biblical figures (the katechon and the Antichrist). Finally, I present some considerations on Schmitt's connection with two important émigré scholars, Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger, who were somewhat influenced by his works.

published in: Global Research, May 8, 2020

https://www.globalresearch.ca/corona-tyranny-death-famine/5711942

By the end of 2020 more people will have died from hunger, despair and suicide than from the corona disease. We, the world, is facing a famine-pandemic of biblical proportions. This real pandemic will overtake the "COVID-19 pandemic" by a long shot. The hunger pandemic reminds of the movie the Hunger Games, as it is premised on similar circumstances of a dominant few commanding who can eat and who will die-by competition.

The present article argues that the discipline of international relations is bound to repeat its rounds of debates about realism as long as the underlying dynamic intrinsic to the realist tradition is not understood. Whereas present debates tend to criticize contemporary realists for going astray (an unhappy conjuncture, as it were), this article claims that
there exists a systematic theoretical problem with the way realist theorizing has developed within international relations,
and consisting of two fundamental dilemmas. The first or ‘identity dilemma’, the choice between distinctiveness and determinacy, results from the characteristics of the central concept ‘power’ — realists either keep a distinct and single
micro–macro link through concepts of power/influence which provides indeterminate explanations or they improve their explanations, but must do so by relaxing their assumptions, thereby losing distinctiveness. The second or ‘conservative
dilemma’, the choice between tradition and justification,
results from the fact that realism is a form of practical
knowledge, which needs some form of justification other than the recourse to mere tradition. Hence, realists either update the practical knowledge of a shared diplomatic culture while losing scientific credibility or, reaching for logical persuasiveness, cast their maxims in a scientific mould which distorts the realist tradition. Realism in international relations
is fated to return to these dilemmas until it abandons its
own identity as derived from the ‘first debate’ between realism
and idealism. By doing so, however, it would be free to join a series of metatheoretical and theoretical research avenues which it has so far left to other schools of thought.

Αὐτὰ ἔγραφε μία ἐφημερίδα τοῦ Λονδίνου τὸν Σεπτέμβριο τοῦ 1831, λίγο πρίν, δηλαδή, ἀπὸ τὴ δολοφονία τοῦ Καποδίστρια. (Ἡ ἐπίσημη μετάφραση βρίσκεται στὸ ὑπουργεῖο Ἐξωτερικῶν: ΑΥΕ, 1831, ἄ.ἀ.κ. [δ].) Καὶ ἐδῶ ἐντοπίζεται ἡ αἰτία τοῦ δράματος ὁλόκληρης τῆς Νεότερης καὶ Σύγχρονης Ἱστορίας τοῦ τόπου μας: Φυσικὸς σύμμαχος τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἦταν καὶ εἶναι ἡ Ρωσία· ἡ Ἑλλάδα ὅμως παραμένει δέσμια τῶν Δυτικῶν ἤ, καλλίτερα, Ἀτλαντικῶν Δυνάμεων, Βρεταννίας, Γαλλίας καὶ Ἡνωμένων Πολιτειῶν τῆς Ἀμερικῆς. Ἡ πρόσδεση αὐτὴ ἐπιτυγχάνεται θεωρητικῶς μὲν μὲ τὴ συνεχῆ, ad nauseam προβολὴ τῆς σπουδαιότητας τοῦ θαλάσσιου χώρου, ποὺ σχεδὸν ἀπὸ παντοῦ περιβάλλει τὴν ἑλληνικὴ γῆ, καί, πρακτικῶς, μὲ τὴν ὕπαρξη ἀθέατου κοινωνικοῦ μηχανισμοῦ, ἡ ἑκάστοτε πολιτικὴ ἀπόληξη τοῦ ὁποίου πλήττει ὁποιονδήποτε ἀμφισβητεῖ τὴ βρεταννικὴ καί, στὶς μέρες μας, ἀμερικανικὴ κυριάρχηση τοῦ τόπου μας.

Forthcoming in a shortened version in Coady &  Lippert-Rasmussen eds  Blackwell Companion to Applied Philosophy '
Are conspiracy theorists epistemically vicious? Not necessarily, not always, and maybe not even usually. But it IS intellectually vicious to be a consistent conspiracy skeptic. The broad-band skeptic commits intellectual suicide whilst the restricted skeptic blinds herself to facts which, as an active citizen, she really needs to know. Both are vicious, though self-imposed blindness is better than epistemic suicide. As in other areas, so with conspiracy theories: the virtuous policy is to proportion belief to the evidence.

The paper contains an extended cirque of a recent paper by Quassim Cassam in in Aeon Magazine and of Sunstein and Vermeule (2008) 'Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures' .

This Master's thesis deals with the main achievement of U.S.' diplomacy during the presidency of Richard Nixon, the establishment of triangular network of relations between the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States itself. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser and later the State Secretary of the United States, was the chief co-conceptualizer of triangular diplomacy, and that is why I backed up my research by his writings and reflections on international relations, diplomacy, and the history of triangular diplomacy itself.

The questions I asked myself throughout the work on "Triangular diplomacy reconsidered" are: "What lessons can I, as a diplomat, draw from triangular diplomacy for my own diplomatic career? Can triangular diplomacy teach me anything about the norms which should guide the conduct of diplomats and politicians in general, and which should guide my own diplomatic conduct in particular?" The answers to the above questions, which I provided for myself, and which could be beneficial for any other diplomat as well, are presented in the four parts of my research paper: Realist interpretation of triangular diplomacy, Liberalist interpretation of triangular diplomacy, the 'Conflict Resolution' approach to triangular diplomacy, and the 'Creativity' narrative of triangular diplomacy.

Speaking briefly, the first two parts center around the idea that diplomats should be guided by both the norms of realism (power, national interest, national security) and the norms of liberalism (justice, cooperation, adherence to the standards of democracy). Triangular diplomacy was used as a test-case to confirm the idea of a necessity of combining considerations of power with considerations of morality in diplomatic theory and practice. The second two parts of my research deal with an additional set of norms that a diplomat should attempt at materializing. The set includes the norm of an effective communication aiming at reduction and transformation of the potential for conflict, as well as the norm of skilful and creative individual needed in management of diplomatic relations, and in actual implementation of the norms to which diplomacy should give its voice, as referred to above.

I also described at some length Kissinger's views on diplomacy, foreign policy making, and international relations, to which I wholeheartedly subscribe.

Finally, in my conclusion I proposed a few ideas on the ways in which my analysis could be extended and applied to a number of practical and theoretical issues that diplomats as well as theoreticians of diplomacy must address.

Recently Niall Ferguson has begun a major assessment of the diplomatic career of Henry Kissinger. In his first volume of Kissinger (2015) Ferguson claims to have exploded the myth of Kissinger as the arch “realist” of American foreign policy. Ferguson puts this claim starkly when he asserts: “the young Kissinger was indeed an idealist.” (Ferguson, K, 32) This claim serves to breath more life into the ongoing debate between the proponents of the so-called “realist” and the “idealist” perspectives in international relations.

This essay will offer a perspective on this debate by using Henry Kissinger’s conception of foreign policy as a case study. If any American is widely supposed to embody the realist perspective it is Henry Kissinger who was indirectly and directly involved in the formulation of American foreign policy from the very beginning of the Cold War right through to the end of the Vietnam War and into the present.

This paper will assess the alleged relevance of the realist thinking in International Relations by answering the question whether Realism still dominates the theory and practice of International Relations. Examination of some core theoretical assumptions of Realism and assessment of the continuing significance of the realist thinking during the Cold War period and after will be undertaken with regard to both theory and practice. To answer the key research question whether Realism is still dominant, arguments against and in favour of the claim will be presented. Based on evidence, the line of argument establishes that although the realist depiction of International Relations, with its stress upon the distribution of power, provides an important departure and continuous insight, not to mention the ‘timeless wisdom’ into the understanding of the behaviour of states, it is not in itself definitive as Realism has some noticeable weaknesses. This paper begins from the premise that although Realism alone is insufficient for understanding of contemporary international relations, its insights remain necessary to that enterprise. The method adopted is Toulmin model of argument, which serves as a basis for structure and organization. The big idea is an elucidation on ‘an enlightened Realism’, which confirms the continuing validity of Realist principles throughout history. It is explained through a juxtaposition between statecraft by Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Despite arguments questioning the relevance of the classical paradigm Realism is nowhere near becoming irrelevant in the practice of some states. Whereas the discipline has witnessed an astounding flourishing of numerous post-classical theories of International Relations. Despite emergence of such new theories, it is reasonable to suggest that Realism has not become obsolete. Undeniably, Realism produces numerous prolific critics, perhaps deservedly, because in its power political mode, it provides instrumental interpretation of the international system. Some would argue even, immoral examination of international politics, as opposed to a normative one, unlocked by the study of alternative International Relations theories, such as the English School, Constructivism, Feminism, Green theories or Global Environmentalism. It will be argued, however, that scholars of international politics cannot totally discard the Realist paradigm since security, rather than economic development, still remains the most important concern for many states in the developing world (although emancipation concerns are coming to the fore as well). Realism’s applicability and ability to explain the current international politics remains unparalleled. Although the world is changing (45% of the world is democratic), in certain fundamentals, it has not changed as much as many contemporary International Relations theorists believe. To a large extent, it remains characterised by anarchy, and its attendant logic of self-help and struggle for survival. The world is still decentralised, the key political actors are states which are competitive. This confirms Realist analyses of power politics with states compelled by their anarchic environment to act in a ‘functionally undifferentiated’ manner while using capability advantages to gain more influence over outcomes based on power accumulation, as timeless. In other words, Realism as one of not many theoretical paradigms remains relevant despite the passing of history, in other words, it aspires to explain events even beyond history as it is the longest tradition of thinking about international political reality. Thus, Realism remains essential to understanding states’ choices and actions. Consequently, despite the emergence of postpositivist approaches, it would be incorrect, some would argue even naïve, to state that Realism is not dominant. However pessimistically it may sound, based on data and evidence of states' practice Realism persists. Realism is far from being an exhaustive theory though, neither has it existed without evident limitations, nor has it remained universally applicable to all times and epochs (despite claims for it being beyond history, i.e. being relevant in all epochs), but its savage, simplistic variant is still evident in the world. Whether in brutal acts of war, acts of avenge, revanchism, competition and breaking of human rights, Realism is still unrivalled when it comes to the conduct of states in the non-democratic world. However, Realism's influence is not monolithic when it comes to theory. Realism persists in acts of states only when weak leaders sacrificing integrity and objectivity decide to allow so, for example, by not disarming an aggressor in time, or by turning a blind eye to unlawful military interventions, or by not being guided by ethics. Hard military power counts for more in the context of international politics than it does in democratic domestic politics. In international relations, conquest, or pure coercion, is not leadership, but mere dictation. In other words, 'offensive' Realism exists, as long as, weak leaders who are on top of states follow the realist precepts and its attendant logic of competition, rivalry, carnal revenge and retort to war. In so doing though dictators put whole societies as well as liberal order in danger. In contrast, strong leaders help groups create and achieve shared goals. Successful transformational leadership is about change. When strong leaders allow for the possibility of transformation of the structure towards security community, then the realist logic no longer holds true and is not accurate. Realism and neo-realism are unable to explain structural change in world order. In line with the evidence, although Realism is not definitive (i.e. even weak leaders have alternatives and societies have democracy to choose strong leaders), it is alive and well, and it looks like it is not likely to disappear anytime soon from both theory and practice of International Relations. Primitive, savage and brutal elements are unfortunately still visible in 21st century civilized world. What can IR scholars do to make Realism less dominant in both IR theory and practice of states? The relationship between theory and practice is that of mutual, dual causality. If Realism persists on top echelons of power, it persists also in the practice of states. To change this, scholars have to initiate a theoretical innovation among the top most powerful statesmen. Realism persists unless IR scholars are actively engaged in innovative refinement and eclectic creation of new theories which could then be, in turn, readily applied by strong, transformational leaders, i.e. leaders who believe in change and bring about real, multiple social change. In principle, good theories lead to good policies since policy problems inspire theoretical innovation. Theories inform policy although policy makers pay relatively little attention to the vast theoretical literature in International Relations. If this trend could be reversed, if more scholars would become more interested in doing policy-relevant work and if more policy makers started to listen to IR scholars, then this would enable more effective bridging of the gap between theory and policy. If it is accepted that the point of IR theory is to enable a convergence in which political theory meets practice. Then, such an analytic activity could be, thereby leading to a smoother and swifter transfer of new, well crafted, fine-tuned, and more innovative theories strengthening 'transmission belt' from theory to policy. This would be followed by implementation of effective, successful policies to enable peaceful change though within the system, in actual reality, leading to the innovative and technological transformation of the whole system. Perhaps, even civilizing the International Society in the way that some of the English School scholars have long time ago envisaged. Creative, original ideas exist, but they are rarely applied by policy makers and statesmen who often discard eco-movements, feminist, postmodernist, pospositivist theories. Thus, if scholars and academics produce useful knowledge, as for example with the theory of 'an enlightened Realism', such constructive ideas could be implemented into the practice of statecraft. When successful, research for policy’s sake could perform an enlightenment function of social sciences (this metaphor illustrates the role of a theory in understanding the world of IR - we can only shed light on what is known, and even then, we cannot be 100% certain about the activity of theorising, for what is unknown remains in the darkness) making the discipline more diverse and the world a better place. Reminding at the same time that each of the theories whether classical or post-classical, reveal only part of truth about contemporary international political reality, and thus, from this standpoint, none is sufficiently satisfactory.

.>>>>>>>>>>>>> update of August 18, 2023:

what a surprise!!! more evidence that the 'massacre' is a CIA fabricate!!!!

https://mronline.org/2023/08/10/new-book-reveals-tiananmen-square-massacre-others-fabricated-by-u-s/


publiziert in: Peds Ansichten, 21-02-2019

https://peds-ansichten.de/2019/02/tiananmen-massaker-1989/

Auf dem Platz des himmlischen Friedens gab es im Juni 1989 keine Todesopfer, weder bei den Protestierenden noch bei den Sicherheitskräften. Doch selbst über die Gewalt außerhalb des Platzes wird bis heute voreingenommen und damit einseitig wie emotional berichtet. Allein dass kaum über die Vorgeschichte der Proteste wie auch den Einfluss westlicher Geheimdienste und vorgeblicher Nichtregierungsorganisationen berichtet wird, lässt eine differenzierte Darstellung gar nicht erst zu. Ein Tipp zu Beginn: Dieser umfangreiche Artikel liegt auch als Hörstück vor. Nun-im Jahre 2019-jährt sich das "Massaker auf dem Tiananmen-Platz" zum dreißigsten Male und es ist zu befürchten, dass wir erneut und umfassend mit dem klassischen Narrativ der Meinungsführerschaft bombardiert werden. Nicht zuletzt öffentlich-rechtliche Medien werden nicht müde, auch Jahrzehnte später Folgendes in die Köpfe zu hämmern: "In der Nacht vom 3. und 4. Juni 1989 eröffnete die chinesische Volksbefreiungsarmee auf dem Platz des Himmlischen Friedens das Feuer auf wehrlose Demonstranten. Schätzungsweise 3000 Menschen wurden bei der gewaltsamen Räumung des "Tiananmen-Platzes", so der chinesische Name, getötet."

Se hace una revisión crítica del Premio Nobel de Economía, con una recopilación del papel de Yanus Varoufakis en las negociaciones con la Unión Europea en 2015, con el apoyo de Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman y Thomas Piketty, a partir de una crítica realizada por el economista colombiano Guillermo Maya Muñoz, en el que se muestra la farsa, que hay tras el Nobel de Economía.

A lo largo de la segunda mitad del siglo xx, la relación bilateral oficial entre España y Estados Unidos estuvo dominada en buena medida por los acuerdos sobre las bases militares firmados en 1953 y las negociaciones que hicieron posible su renovación -en ocasiones, con importantes modificaciones-en 1963, 1970, 1976, 1982 y 1988. Dada la importancia de estos acuerdos, es lógico que la literatura académica sobre dichas relaciones se haya centrado prioritariamente en este aspecto formal, y más concretamente en los esfuerzos de sucesivos gobiernos españoles por corregir en la medida de lo posible los desequilibrios heredados del acuerdo de 1953 1 . En cambio, hasta la fecha ha recibido menos atención la actitud de sucesivas administraciones estadounidenses ante la evolución política del régimen de Franco durante los últimos años de vida del dictador y el cambio de régimen que se produjo tras su muerte, siempre muy condicionada por el deseo de Washington de garantizar a toda costa su acceso a las bases militares en territorio español 2 . Este artículo -elaborado fundamentalmente en base a fuentes documentales oficiales estadounidensespretende contribuir a un mejor conocimiento de este aspecto central de las relaciones entre Madrid y Washington a través del análisis y 19 Estados Unidos y España, de la dictadura a la democracia: el papel de Henry A. Kissinger (1969Kissinger ( -1977*

With the dissolution of the frontiers of the cold war and the erosion of economic solidarity among USA-led countries, in a world dominated by geo-economic rivalries and not by geopolitics, the creation of a global economic market requires the control of trade routes, the access to natural resources, and the creation of strategic industrial clusters, in order to attract investments. For some analysts, Asia has so far been a passive user of global governance and the rise of the Chinese economy would be rebalancing its narrative. The thesis aims to synthetically explore, with a multi-scale approach through the New Silk Road, between Political Geography and the discipline of International Relations, the use of the power of digital devices, and the analysis of social transformations in urban contexts, how global governance is evolving.

Ο πασίγνωστος Χένρυ Κίσσινγκερ επανεμφανίστηκε πρόσφατα και έκανε δήλωση σχετικά με την ανησυχία του για την ρωσοουκρανική σύρραξη. Το γεγονός δεν θα προκαλούσε εντύπωση, εάν δεν συνέτρεχαν δύο καθοριστικής σημασίας λόγοι, δηλαδή: Πρώτον, η ηλικία του. Σήμερα ο Κίσσινγκερ είναι ενενήντα εννέα (99) χρονών. Δεύτερον, το περιεχόμενο της δήλωσής του. Αντί να στραφεί εναντίον των Ρώσων, άφησε αιχμές γενικώς κατά της πολιτικής των ΗΠΑ στην Ανατολική Ευρώπη.

On December 4, 2003, the Latin American Program and the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales co-sponsored a second conference on "Argentina-United States Bilateral Relations: An Historical Perspective and Future Challenges," held at the University of Buenos Aires in Argentina. The first panel dealt with the current Argentina-US bilateral relations and the future challenges. The panelists discussed US-Argentina bilateral relations during Kirchner's presidency. The second panel evaluated a new perspective on Argentina-US bilateral relations, given the declassification of 4677 documents about the dirty war period that were kept in the US Embassy in Buenos Aires. The declassification was ordered by the State Department on August 20, 2002; and new documents were then declassified in November 2003. This book contains an edited version of the panelists' presentations. Panelists included John Dinges, Columbia University; Carlos Osorio, National Security Archive; Horacio Verbitsky, CELS; Ariel Armony, Colby College; Agustín Colombo Sierra, Argentine Ministry of Foreign Relations; Roberto Russell, Torcuato Di Tella University; Mark Falcoff, American Enterprise Institute; and Diana Tussie, FLACSO Argentina.

This article examines Henry Kissinger’s role in shaping US strategy towards the Palestinian issue between 1973 and 1976, focusing a series of direct and indirect covert contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization and its representatives during these years. Although scholars have correctly noted that Kissinger’s Middle East policy concentrated on reconciling Israel with the Arab states, particularly Egypt, these contacts suggest an intent to keep open the possibility of bringing the PLO into negotiations with Israel.

El libro Orden Mundial, se publica en una coyuntura histórica clave, en el que el sistema de equilibrio internacional establecido por occidente, tras el fin de la Guerra Fría muestra signos de debilitamiento. La ruptura de los órdenes regionales cuestiona la difusión de la democracia liberal y se prevé cambios en las dinámicas del sistema internacional. La anexión rusa de Crimea en 2014, los cambios en las dinámicas estatales, sub estatales y la aparición de actores no estatales, pero con capacidad de influir en el contexto geopolítico, son algunos ejemplos del cambio en las estructuras del mundo contemporáneo.

Unlike the books, The End of History and the Last Man, The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order, Kissinger’s latest book World Order deals with the balance of power. In his own words, he analyses “how to build a shared international order in a world of divergent historical perspectives, violent conflict, proliferating technology, and ideological extremism”.

By focusing on Kissinger’s more theoretical works, I hope to draw attention to the contributions and problems of Kissinger the academic, hidden for so long in plain sight beneath the shadow of his own social clout. First, I provide a thumbnail sketch of Kissinger’s life and times to facilitate thinking about the developments which shaped his political thought. In the main analysis I argue that Kissinger should be best understood as a scholar within the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis, even though his emphasis on order and shared values among sovereign states is most in tune with Structural Realism, otherwise known as the English School of International Relations. With this radical interpretation, I explore the evolution in the meaning of key concepts that appear again and again throughout Kissinger’s works, including legitimate order, balance of power, revolutionary state, national interest, and leadership. In doing so, I also point out flaws and inconsistencies in Kissinger’s thought, specifically what he acknowledges to be a fundamental difficulty in separating non-revolutionary and revolutionary revisionism before it is too late; the lack of a clear roadmap for building consensus among diverse actors and his summary dismissal of international organizations that are already serving some of that function; his elitism and often downright hostility to democratic processes in the domestic sphere; and a certain cognitive dissonance in his insistence on asserting that American motives are principally noble even while acknowledging the enduring importance of power politics. I trace these flaws back, ultimately, to his quest for redemption, and acknowledge his manifold contributions to American foreign policy and world order.

A quarant’anni dal suo completamento, la Ostpolitik del cancelliere Willy Brandt continua a rappresentare un esempio di accettazione del tragico passato collettivo tedesco e di riconciliazione con il presente di un Paese diviso. Tuttavia, essa fu anche un laboratorio progettuale orientato alla ridefinizione della futura sicurezza europea e alla promozione di un nuovo ordine di pace per il continente. Dato il suo carattere di accentuata autonomia, la Ostpolitik comportò fasi di dissidio e competizione con la distensione promossa dal presidente statunitense Richard Nixon, incentrata sul dialogo esclusivo con l’Unione Sovietica. Tali processi furono fortemente condizionati dal riaffiorare a Washington di timori e sospetti in merito alla rinnovata intraprendenza della politica estera condotta dalle autorità federali tedesche, a un quarto di secolo dalla fine della Seconda guerra mondiale. Grazie alle fonti d’archivio oggi disponibili, il volume ricostruisce le dinamiche attraverso cui i due processi si influenzarono reciprocamente e posero le basi per la riformulazione della Guerra fredda in Europa, conferendole alcuni caratteri che essa avrebbe conservato fino al definitivo smantellamento della «cortina di ferro» e alla riunificazione della Germania.