Historiography of 1973 Chile coup

Chile September 11th 1973, the Other 9/11? A Historiographical Review of the U.S Role in the 1973 Military Coup William Foley 3HI3: American Foreign Relations Dr. Streeter March 18, 2019 “Death came from the skies. A building--a symbol of the nation--collapsed in flames in an act of terror that would lead to the deaths of 3,000 people. It was Sept 11. But the year 1973, the building Chile’s White House” read a 2003 New York Times article titled ‘The Other Sept.11’. The New York Times, “The other Sept 11,” September 11th, 2003, The New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/11/opinion/the-other-sept-11.html. The article purposefully uses the coinciding dates between the terrorist attack on the twin towers in 2001, and the 1973 military coup d’état which overthrew the world’s first democratically elected Marxist government Unidad Popular (UP), to highlight how although a catastrophic attack occurred in America, the U.S. was also responsible for destabilizing events in Chile. The article firmly concludes “The United States did not directly participate in the coup, but it laid the groundwork for it and supported the plotters.” The New York Times, “The Other Sept 11” This conclusion given by the New York Times however is not corroborated by an academic consensus. Instead, there is a continuous debate about this exact question: is the United States responsible for the 1973 military coup which overthrew Salvador Allende’s UP government? Surprisingly, the publics’ perception of the coup predominantly echoes ardent-revisionist historians’ claims, that U.S. intervention alone caused the overthrow of Allende. The publics’ acceptance of this ‘myth’ has stoked an often irate reaction from the ardent-realist school of thought, Ardent-realist scholars often phrase the revisionist interpretation as a ‘myth’, for example: Mark Falcoff, “Kissinger and Chile: The Myth that Will Not Die,” which argues that U.S. intervention had no influence over the military coup. These two schools, often fueled by ideology or biases, are complemented by more ‘moderate’ versions of these perspectives which accept both internal and external factors played a role. Moderate-revisionists accept that Allende’s faults contributed to the coup, but posit the U.S. actions as the primary factor. Conversely, moderate-realists believe U.S actions played some role in the coup, but it arose predominately due to Allende’s shortcomings in office. The variety of interpretations can be attributed to the complexity of the events that unfolded in Chile, which revolve around three key areas of U.S. un/involvement. (1) The efforts to stop Allende from taking office by provoking a military coup, cumulating with the murder of constitutionalist commander of the Chilean army, General Rene Schneider, known as Track II. Track I was U.S. covert actions to prevent Allende being elected, primarily by distributing propaganda. Once Allende was elected, the U.S. implemented Track II to try to foment a military coup before he was confirmed by Congress. (2) The U.S’s role in destabilizing the Chilean economy and spreading propaganda (3) the planning and executing of the 1973 military coup which overthrew Allende, and established the brutal Pinochet dictatorship. The revisionist school generally argues (1) and (2) are the reason the coup occurred, and often will argue the U.S.’s actions were central in (3), with some scholars placing them directly responsible for the coup occurring by partaking in the plotting. The realists, depending on what documents were available during publication, either deny the U.S. role in any of the three areas or downplay the effectiveness of U.S action in these events, often claiming they were failed missions. The historiography of the U.S. role in the 1973 Chilean coup can be split into two phases, each originating with the release of State Department internal documents. The first phase begins following the 1975 United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, commonly referred to as the Church Committee. The committee was pressed by the public after U.S media began reporting on rumours of ethical misconduct by U.S. intelligence agencies, including a rumour of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) plot that assassinated the Chilean General Rene Schneider, thereby giving academics access to internal documents related to the Chilean coup. Some works were published before the Church Committee, such as The Black Book of American Intervention in Chile. It is worth noting the English translation of Uribe’s book was published in 1975, and was updated to include information from the Church Committee. The Black Book was written by an ex-diplomat of Allende’s administration and is largely a written account of his perspective of the coup. Uribe’s admiration for his former president may also be due to the ideological similarities between the two, as Uribe’s is explicitly a leftist and a Dependista. Dependency theory became popularized in the 1970s and argues that following the end of colonialism, ex-colonial countries became dependent on imperial countries for loans to build their infrastructure thus creating a debt cycle, as well as coercing them to be reliant on an export based economy, consequently making them ‘dependent’. This is exemplified in Uribe’s description of the Chilean economy, “Chile’s economy was hardly autonomous. Its main characteristics were heavy external debts (and) a high proportion of exports controlled from outside the country.” Armando Uribe, The Black Book of American Intervention in Chile. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974), 18 Casting its motivations as economic, Uribe prescribes the maximum amount of blame on the U.S. claiming the coup plotters “worked hand in hand with the United States.” Urbine, The Black book, 148 The inverse of Uribe’s argument is exemplified in the former 1971-1973 U.S. Foreign Ambassador to Chile, Nathaniel Davis. Davis’s account was written to absolve him of his suspected role in the coup. Published in 1985, Davis’s book is also undoubtedly influenced by the Cold War environment; with relations beginning to ease between the USSR and the U.S, any credence towards U.S involvement potentially had disastrous effects on their reborn relationship. And indeed, Davis gives no credence to that idea, arguing “it was not U.S policy during my time in Chile to ‘destabilize’ Allende and bring him down” Nathaniel Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende. (London: I.B Tauris, 1985), 327. Davis says there was no U.S policy to try and bring Allende down, but does admit to U.S support for opposition groups before his arrival in 1971.. Davis argues that U.S policy was to only assist in preserving democracy, which he claims Allende was attempting to undermine. Instead, the Chilean coup had “indigenous roots” Davis, The Last Two Years, X originating in Allende’s nationalization policy, which stocked a middle-class backlash. Davis points out that the plan of nationalizing the trucking industry in the province of Aysen caused the Truckers to embark on a national strike in protest, which was soon joined the Shop Keepers Federation in “a middle-class movement.” Davis, The Last Two Years ,109 Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger corroborates Davis’s claim stating “The truth is that the coup was indigenous.” Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,1982),374 Kissinger also states the U.S did not attempt to ‘destabilize’ Chile by funding strike movements, instead “we offered them advice,” Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 393 and their dissatisfaction with Allende came from his organically incoherent economic policies, not because of a U.S blockade. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 381-85 Although not a former member of U.S government, Mark Falcoff’s, Modern Chile, 1970-1989: A Critical History, completely disregards the Church Committee’s findings, and relies heavily on Davis and Kissinger’s testimonies, therefore building off their arguments. Falcoff agrees with the two former U.S statesmen, that American policy was not to ‘destabilize’ Chile to encourage a coup, but instead strengthen the oppositions support so that Allende would lose the next election in 1976. Mark Falcoff, Modern Chile 1970-1989, (London: Transaction Publishers,1989), x Continuing their democratic sentiments in the weeks leading up to the coup, the C.I.A. retracted support from military officers known to be in favour of a coup and who were actively considering it to be a viable option. Falcoff, Modern Chile, 238 Somehow failing to recognize their interconnectivity, Falcoff claims that what instead caused the military coup was Allende’s attempt to implement socialism without the support of the majority of the public, “there was no Chilean road to socialism in the sense that there was never a socialist political majority in that country.” Falcoff, Modern Chile, 81Similarly, once in power Allende’s policies rendered him incapable of building unity among leftists and left-leaning Christian Democrats. Falcoff primarily places blame on the Land Reform, which alienated his supporters and “became the backdrop for a civil war in miniature” Falcoff, Modern Chile, 104. Arguing along similar lines, Robert Alexander’s Tragedy of Chile downplays the extensiveness of the destabilization policy. He believes there was a malicious CIA campaign to “spoil” Allende by destabilizing his regime, but maintains that it had “only the most marginal impact” in causing the coup, as the CIA’s actions were ineffective. Alexander, Tragedy of Chile, 217-230 Conversely, in a 1975 Foreign Affairs article, Richard Fagen argues the U.S did attempt to destabilize Chile. Directly contradicting the ardent-realists claims, Fagen points out the CIA authorized 8 million dollars to ‘destabilize’ Allende’s government from 1971-73, which with Chile’s rapid inflation was more akin to 40 to 50 million. Richard Fagen, “The United States and Chile: Roots and Branches,” Foreign Affairs, 298 Although not commenting upon its effectiveness, Fagen demonstrates a plan for further destabilization after Allende’s election, quoting then CIA director, William Colby, stating the need to make it impossible for Allende to govern satisfactorily, and the necessity to capitalize on any mistake Allende made. Fagen, “The United States and Chile”, 305 Fagen believes the idea of ‘domino theory’ was motivating the state departments actions, as they were concerned that Allende could provide a powerful example of how a coalition party of socialists and communists could successfully be elected. This fear specifically pertained to the U. S’s Western-European allies of France, Italy, and Spain, as they had large communist parties. Fagen, “The United States and Chile”, 306-308 Fagen’s argument of a ‘domino theory’ concern originates in what he perceives as a concern for national security, which differs from other ardent-revisionist scholars like Petras and Morley who believe the state’s function of the world hegemon is to keep markets open. In the United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government, Petras and Morley introduce a combination of Marxist and World Systems theories, to argue the U.S intervened in Chile to “sustain and nurture the multinationals” by creating economic instability consequently leading to middle-class discontent and the military coup. James Petras and Morris Morley, The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government, (New York: Monthly Review, 1975),IX Petras and Morley do not believe the U.S intervened specifically for the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, (ITT) or any other corporation, but rather “out of a concern for the collective interests of the capitalist class.” Petras and Morley, Imperialism and the Overthrow, ixThey argue, the subservience of Pinochet to international capital, and the restoration of a favourable business climate in Chile further proves their thesis. Although the first phase in the scholarship is dominated by ‘ardent’ realist and revisionist interpretations, a few ‘moderate’ perspectives began to appear. Clodomiro Almeyda Medina, The Minister of Foreign Affairs under Allende, takes a more balanced view in his writing than his peer Uribe. Medina takes a moderate-revisionist approach, stating that the coup originated as a result of internal factors in Chile, but these factors were enhanced and antagonized by U.S. policy. As the U.P. began to entrench the revolutionary program into Chile, the middle-class reacted to its successes and began to align themselves against the government; and while the extent of their dissatisfaction was augmented by the economic war, Medina maintains their role in promoting the coup would have been the same without it. He applies a similar analysis to the Chilean military, that there was always a ‘reactionary’ culture in the military, but this was further fomented through the anti-communist military training many officers received at the School of the Americas in Panama. Medina ultimately concludes that the coup would have likely occurred without U.S destabilization tactics, but it would not have had such widespread support, and might have been a failure. Clodomiro Almeyda Medina, The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government, in Chile at the Turning Point, (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979) For his conclusion, see page 100. Paul Sigmund presents a moderate-realist interpretation in his book The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976. Sigmund dismisses the ‘dependency school’ interpretation arguing that U.S intervention was not the primary determinant resulting in a coup. He does not dismiss the role U.S intervention played entirely as ardent-realists do, instead positing they were a secondary factor, and “could not of themselves, assured Allende’s transition to socialism would fail.” Paul Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile 1964-1976, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,1977) 284 Sigmund’s argument is that U.S intervention exacerbated the already existing political and economic tensions, which stemmed from the contradictions of Allende’s coalition. Although Allende claimed to be dedicated to a ‘peaceful transition to socialism’, he would often support the more radical revolutionaries of his coalition, such as during MIR’s unconstitutional land seizures, or pardoning MIR members convicted for terrorism and bank robbery. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende, 139 Indeed, Sigmund argues, “the contradictions between parliamentarianism and revolution led to his overthrow.” Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende, Xiii The first phase in the literature ends in the early 1990s, with few works being published in that decade. In 1999, Spain was attempting to try Pinochet for crimes against humanity. However, Bill Clintons administration was resisting any means that would aid Spain. Worried about the perception of defending a dictator who had been, as Eisenhower infamously put it ‘our S.O.B’, the Clinton administration launched the ‘Chile Declassification Project’. The second phase of the scholarship begins in the 2000s as a result of these documents. These documents led some scholars to believe the field had begun to approach a consensus, See Tanya Harmers introduction in Allendes Chile and the Inter-American Cold War although by no means was this sentiment corroborated by all. The first work of the second phase is The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability by Peter Kornbluh, and is an analysis of the newly released documents. Kornbluh’s analysis shed new light on CIA involvement in Chile, revealing the depth to which the CIA had attempted to coordinate a coup before Allende’s election, including telling “coup-minded officers” they would have the full support of the U.S in leading a coup. Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassifed Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: The New Press, 2003) 14 Kornbluh also argued that the CIA is liable for the death of General Rene Schneider as agents constantly lauded General Valenzuela to take “anti-Allende actions” and, after several botched kidnappings, murdered him. Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 28-29 Although finding no ‘smoking gun’ which directly indicted the U.S for orchestrating the coup, Kornbluh was adamant that these documents demonstrated the U.S was to blame for the coup, labelling any historian who placed the blame entirely on Allende “disingenuous official historians.” Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 83 Kristian Gustavason is a likely ardent-realist historian who Kornbluh would lambast as disingenuous. Analyzing the same documents, in Hostile Intent-US Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974, Gustavson draws contrary conclusions. Gustavson asserts that scholars, such as Kornbluh, have overstated the U.S role, and, in fact, as there was no evidence that the U.S arranged the coup or ordered the assassination, so it therefore cannot be held responsible. Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974 (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2011) Conversely is ardent-revisionist Lubna Qureshi’s Nixon, Kissinger and Allende, US Involvement In the 1973 Coup in Chile, examines why the U.S intervened. Using the previously unanalyzed Nixon tapes, Qureshi emphasizes the influence and close relationship of particular corporations with Nixon, arguing Nixon’s administration intervened due to the pressure of U.S business interests Quershi, Nixon, Kissinger and Allende, Xii. Qureshi also contributes to the debate on the U.S role in the coup stating it is “inconceivable” that the Chilean armed forces would have enacted the coup without promises of U.S support, therefore placing the blame on the U.S government. Quershi, Nixon, Kissinger and Allende, 133 She also places the origin of the faulty Chilean economy as a result of the U.S blockade, stating, “many of the shortages…. Were the direct result of the machinations of Washington. Quershi, Nixon, Kissinger and Allende 119 ‘Ardent’ perspectives expounding on the new documents is not the entirety of the second phase in the literature. ‘Moderate’ scholarship from both schools also began to incorporate new perspectives to illuminate how responsible the U.S was for the 1973 coup in Chile, and has resulted in some of the best work in the field. Margret Powers, Right-wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against Allende, 1964-1973, uses a gender-based analysis focusing on the role of right-wing women in the military coup. Gendered based analysis originates out of feminist movements of the early 1970s which changed societal ideas about a ‘woman’s role’. The 2nd wave feminist movement eventually impacted universities, providing a new perspective to interpret history from. Past scholars denied Chilean women’s agency, assuming they were just following their husbands’ lead. Power effectively disbands this narrative. Her book follows the Poder Femenino (PF), a group led by upper and middle-class women, but also included lower-class women. The PF played an important role in anti-Allende demonstrations, mobilizing previously un-politicized women against the UP which contributed to the coup climate. Margaret Power, Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Agaisnt Allende, 1964-1973 (University Park, Pa: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002) 163 Powers focus on the role the PF ultimately places her as a moderate-realist in the historiography as she also discusses U.S involvement in women’s’ groups. Power documents how the U.S. clandestinely supported a “Scare Campaign” in both the 1964 and 1970 elections, which attempted to frighten women into voting against Allende. Power, Right-Wing Women in Chile, 13-14, 133 Power is careful not to discount their agency and maintains that many women had legitimate grievances with the UP, as the poor shape of the economy made it difficult to feed their families. Power, Right-wing Women, 151 Working to ‘de-center’ the debate about the coup from a focus on the U.S, Tanya Harmers Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War uses a regional approach. Harmer’s regional approach focuses on the involvement of the Cuban and Brazilian governments in Chile. Brazil was often framed as a passive actor supporting the role of the U.S, instead, Harmer shows that Brazil had an interest in overthrowing Allende and pushed the U.S to harden their position towards Allende, Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011) 10 which Harmer characterizes as “tactical caution.” Harmer, The Inter-American Cold War, 120 When the coup plotting began, Brazil continued pursuing its own interest’s becoming, “a direct sponsor and supporter of [the] coup plotters.” Harmer, The Inter-American Cold War, 273 Harmer also argues that CIA-sponsored intelligence news reports over exaggerated the role of the Cubans in Chile. This led the Chilean military to fear a Cuban sponsored revolution may occur and contributed to their decision to launch a coup, and the necessity to be brutally violent. Harmer The Inter-American Cold War,, 93, 253 Deserving special attention in the second phase of scholarship is Jonathan Haslam’s book, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allendes Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide, which is given significant praise throughout the literature. The moderate-revisionist Haslam takes a cautious and encompassing approach. Drawing on archives from a variety of countries, Haslam argues the U.S government was the proximate cause of the coup. He however, dismisses the traditional arguments of both ardent realist and revisionist schools as overly simplistic. Jonathan Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide (New York: Verso, 2005), 2 He does agree with the realists’ argument that Allende made many mistakes, both by having a coalition government rife with tension and from being tied to radical organizations such as the MIR, ultimately undermining his credibility. Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende, 30-34 Nevertheless, Haslam maintains that the U.S government was the “architect” of the coup, and the internal chaos of Chile was a secondary cause. Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende, 230Haslam attributes this belief to an anonymous source, “a formal senior U.S official in a position to know” who explained to Haslam the recently appointed deputy director of the CIA, General Vernon Walters, worked with a relative of General William Westmoreland, who coordinated the plot with the Chilean military leadership through a hotel in Santiago. Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende, 219 The anonymity of the source makes it impossible to verify the claims, but if true, it appears Haslam uncovered the ‘smoking gun’. In the introduction to The Overthrow of Allende, Sigmund stated, “In the complex patterns of this hyperpolticized country one could find confirmation of almost any theory, and left and right could produce completely consistent-and totally contradictory-interpretations of recent Chilean history”. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende, 9. With the wide variety of interpretations continuing in the second phase of scholarship, this statement from 1979 is still relevant. However, the second phase of scholarship has produced increasingly well-rounded accounts that attempt to take into account a multiplicity of these complex factors. In addition to Sigmund’s book The Overthrow of Allende from the first phase, the most comprehensive works emerging from the second phase include Power’s Right-wing Women, Harmer’s, Inter-American Cold War, and Haslam’s, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende. The ability of future historians to completely answer the question of the U. S’s role in the 1973 Chilean coup will not only be determined by their producing of comprehensive accounts but will rely on increased access to internal state department documents. Historians can only hope the public’s perception of the ‘other 9/11’ will only necessitate increased urgency from the state to release more internal documents. Bibliography Alexander, Robert J. 1978. The Tragedy of Chile. London: Greenwood Press. Davis, Nathaniel. 1985. The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende . London: I.B. Tauris. Fagen, Richard. 1975. "The United States and Chile: Roots and Branches." Foreign Affairs 297-313. Falcoff, Mark. 1989. Modern Chile 1970-1989: A Critical History . New Jersey : Transaction Publishers. Medina, Clodomiro. 1979. "The Foreign policy of the Unidad Popular Governmet" In Chile at the Turning Point: Lessons of the Socialist Years, 1970-1973, by Frederico Gil, Ricardo Lagos and Henery Landsberger, 76-104. Philadelphia : Institute for Human issues. Gustafson, Kristian. 2011. Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964–1974. Nebraska: University of Nebrska . Harmer, Tanya. 2011. Allende's Chille and the Inter-American Cold War. University of North Carolina Press. Haslam, Jonathan. 2005. The Nixon Administration and The Death of Allende's Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide . New York: Verso. Kissinger, Henry. 1982. Years of Upheaval. Boston: Little, Brown and Company . Kornbluh, Peter. 2003. The Pinochet File: A Declassifed Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability . New York: The New Press. New York TImes. 2003. The New York Times. September 11. Accessed March 15, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/11/opinion/the-other-sept-11.html. Petras, James, and Morris Morley. 1975. The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government. New Yotk: Monthly Review Press. Power, Margret. 2002. Right-Wing Women in Chile: Femine Power and the Struggle Against Allende, 1964-1973. Penn State University Press. Qureshi, Lubna. 2009 . Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile . New York : Lexington Books . Sigmund, Paul. 1977. The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Uribe, Armando. 1974. The Black Book of American Intervention in Chile. Boston: Beacon Press. 11