European Constitutionalism

In recent years, scholars have produce literature in constitutional amendments, in particular in analyzing the unamendability phenomenon and its relationship with democracy, abusive and populist constitutionalism. The study of constitutional design is of interest, in large part, because a constitution can be amended and such processes make room for the fundamental questions about legitimacy of the constitutional order, the holder and the locus of sovereignty, especially in those legal orders where a popular legitimated process of altering the constitution is entrenched. Indeed, in some legal orders "We, the People" are called to initiate and/or approve any constitutional change. In this view, the paper brings the reader alongside the "We, the People" claim, stressing, though in restrictive manner, who are "the people", how they act and react, and when their action unveil a(n) (un)constitutional change, in order to draw citizensled constitutional changes grounded on three keywordspopulism, (un)constitutional amendments and constitutionalism. The paper is an invitation to the development of "the people" approaches in a constitutional framework that struck populism as democracy's sentinel.

A key focus of much scholarly attention is on the (theoretical) relationship between legal orders. The practical question I intend to answer in this article is the following: how can we know who has the final say – international, European Union (EU) or national law? I proceed in three steps. First, I critically sketch major current theories – monism and dualism, as well as global legal pluralism and global constitutionalism. However, because none of them offers a satisfactory answer to the question posed, I move to the reconceptualization stage of the theoretical relationship between legal orders. In the second step, I offer my account of how to think about the relationship between legal orders by introducing the theory of the law creators' circle (TLCC). The TLCC provides a theoretical foundation for deciding on the source of the decisive norm. It does not, however, provide a general solution which fits any norm conflict stemming from overlapping legal orders. Thus, the purpose of this article is to develop a legal theory which facilitates the understanding of the interaction between international law, EU and national law. Third, I use a doctrinal analysis to show the results of the TLCC application. For instance, in the famous Kadi saga, according to the TLCC, the EU should have either claimed that the UN Security Council was acting ultra vires or considered the UN Security Council Resolution faulty because UN human rights (instead of EU human rights) had been violated.

Giovedì 18 luglio 2019 ore 11 Sala riunioni Senato-CdA Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna | Sede di Palazzo Toscanelli, vis Santa Cecilia 3 – Pisa, Tavola rotonda con Gian Luca Conti, Emanuele Rossi, Giovanni Tarli Barbieri, a partire dal volume "Questioni costituzionali al tempo del populismo e del sovranismo", a cura di Giuseppe Allegri, Alessandro Sterpa, Nicola Viceconte, Editoriale Scientifica, 2019. Saranno presenti Autori e curatori.
https://www.santannapisa.it/it/event/presentazione-del-volume-questioni-costituzionali-al-tempo-del-populismo-e-del-sovranismo

Opracowanie okładki polskiego wydania na podstawie wydania niemieckiego Ewa Wąsowska Zdjęcie na okładce Achim Schmidt ISBN 978-83-61736-96-7 INSTYTUT ZACHODNI 61-854 Poznań, ul Mostowa 27A tel. 61 852 76 91 fax 61 852 49 05 e-mail: [email protected] www.iz.poznan.pl Skład, druk i oprawa CERDRUK

The fundamental question addressed is whether there is any compelling or convincing argument (s) vis-à-vis to changing our Human Rights Act 1998 and replacing it with a distinctively British Bill of Rights. The overarching theme of this paper is that our human rights should not be based on what our government finds convenient, acceptable or compatible with its electoral aims. Any change to our Human Rights Act should only serve to further bolster human rights protection and not in any way whatsoever water-down, in this author’s view, the fairly minimalist status quo.

"Solidarity is at the same time a foundation of European integration and a condition for its progressive development. This is true for both aspects of solidarity – as a principle of mutual responsibility, and as practical mutual assistance and support. For many years now, the Economic and Monetary Union and the Common European Asylum System have been in a deep crisis. The epicenter of such crises is Greece, but their root lies deeper, in a constitutional and legal framework that hinders the pursuit of the common interest and the development of solidarity. The efforts undertaken so far to remedy these shortcomings are not up to the challenge. And what is at stake is not only the success of two important integration projects, but the preservation of the values on which the Union is founded, above all democracy and fundamental rights.
***
La solidarité est à la fois un fondement de la construction européenne et une condition de son développement. Elle l’est dans ses deux dimensions : principe de responsabilité réciproque et action concrète d’assistance mutuelle. Depuis plusieurs années, l’Union économique et monétaire et le Système européen commun d’asile sont en crise. L’épicentre de ces crises est la Grèce, mais leur origine réside, en amont, dans un cadre constitutionnel ou légal empêchant l’affirmation de l’intérêt commun et le développement d’une action réellement solidaire. Les efforts entrepris jusqu’ici pour remédier à ces carences ne paraissent pas à la hauteur des défis. Or, l’enjeu n’est pas seulement la réussite de deux importants projets d’intégration, mais aussi la préservation des valeurs sur lesquels l’Union est bâtie, et tout particulièrement des principes de démocratie et de respect des droits fondamentaux."

This article aims to reconstruct and theorise the autonomy of the European Union (EU) legal system by drawing on Hartian legal theory. It comprises four claims. First, the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) 'foundational case law' on autonomy-and direct effect and supremacy as its corollaries-is conceptualised as a second-order thesis about the genus to which EU law belongs (the 'autonomy thesis'). Second, the ECJ's reliance on the full effectiveness of EU law as a justification for the autonomy thesis alludes to the deep connection between legality and effectiveness, but this connection cannot rationally explain the normativity of the autonomy thesis as an internal statement of law. Third, in order to provide such an explanation, the autonomy thesis is reconceptualised as an 'internal recognitional statement' by which the ECJ asserts a normative formulation of an autonomous EU rule of recognition. Fourth, within this Hartian analysis of the EU legal system, the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy lack self-standing analytical value. This article finishes with some very preliminary observations on a well-known objection against the autonomy of EU law based on the attitudes and perspectivism of national courts. two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. The usual disclaimer applies.

'Membership of the European Union changes the relationship between Parliament and the courts in the British constitution. Parliament is no longer sovereign and the courts are no longer bound to uphold the will of Parliament.' Can this possibly be true?

A Constituição Política da Monarquia Espanhola, de 19 de março de 1812, seria conhecida na Espanha como a Constituição de Cádiz. Sua elaboração precoce fez da Espanha um dos primeiros países do mundo a ter sua Constituição escrita. Ela foi o resultado da luta organizada pela sociedade espanhola contra o Imperador Bonaparte e se tornaria o bastião do liberalismo durante a década de 1820 em todo o Ocidente, influenciando países europeus e americanos que lutavam pelo constitucionalismo e a limitação da monarquia. A França, longa aliada, havia coagido a dinastia reinante a entregar a coroa em 1808. A resposta da população foi a resistência organizada. O invasor estrangeiro seria recebido por uma população pronta para o enfrentamento – que resultaria, inclusive, na primeira derrota de Bonaparte em terra –, e por uma elite preparada para organizar um movimento político que culminaria no texto constitucional.
Influenciada pelas experiências francesas e americanas, a Constituição de Cádiz foi um texto liberal. Suas normas estabeleciam a democracia representativa por meio de um sufrágio de quatro graus. Ao contrário das tendências da época, poucos requisitos existiam quanto a rendas ou propriedades. Os espanhóis escolheriam seus representantes, e a eleição seria feita com mais liberdade do que as constituições antecedentes haviam permitido.
A influência sobre a Constituição, no entanto, não foi só a da ruptura e da separação em busca da liberdade. A Constituição de Cádiz também foi marcada pela experiência inglesa, pelo desejo de manter instituições estáveis, respeitando a história e a tradição. Não é por acaso que o seu preâmbulo enuncia que as cortes estavam restabelecendo as antigas leis fundamentais da monarquia, acompanhadas das mudanças oportunas – alterações muito amplas, influenciadas pelo liberalismo. Não seria esquecido o respeito às leis medievais e às tradições do povo. A norma não foi uma simples reação ao sistema anterior, não negaria as suas instituições históricas. Como proferiram os deputados espanhóis, havia séculos as antigas leis já eram a Constituição da Espanha, que agora seria escrita e modificada para atender às necessidades contemporâneas.
Sob os auspícios das ideias dessas três influências – invasão estrangeira, liberalismo francês e respeito ao passado – se reuniriam os deputados, cerca de trezentos. Quase um terço desse grupo era de membros do clero. Os advogados e os servidores públicos formavam um grupo de cerca de cinquenta membros cada, e os militares eram quase quarenta. Os demais grupos sociais eram fracamente representados. Os trabalhos foram conturbados. As discussões envolviam os principais temas do liberalismo, que precisavam ser adaptados para a realidade da Espanha. A Constituição de Cádiz precisaria reger um país sitiado, que manteria o sistema monárquico, era muito religioso, temia um caos como o criado pela Revolução Francesa e, no entanto, almejava criar uma das normas mais liberais e democráticas do seu tempo.
O produto dos trabalhos foi o estabelecimento de uma monarquia constitucional moderada, amplamente limitada pelo principal órgão de representação – as cortes. Esse legislativo, por sua vez, passaria a ser o centro de emanação das leis e das principais decisões da Espanha. Uma profunda igualdade entre os espanhóis foi estabelecida, e apesar de tantos membros do clero, a Igreja perdeu quase todos os seus privilégios, ao lado das demais classes distinguidas anteriormente. Muitos foram os avanços: a liberdade de imprensa, o fim dos tormentos, os direitos individuais à liberdade e à educação, a jurisdição unificada no Estado, o fim das corporações de ofício, a igualdade entre americanos e europeus, a representação proporcional à população, e por fim, a submissão igualitária de todos à Constituição e à lei.
Com a queda de Napoleão em 1814 e a formação da Santa Aliança, a restauração da monarquia teria lugar em toda a Europa, e também na Espanha. A Constituição de Cádiz cairia apenas dois anos depois de viger, com a volta do rei destituído. Os reis voltavam à política com poderes semelhantes aos do passado. Devido à guerra e ao curto período de vigência, especialistas afirmam terem existido poucos efeitos concretos das normas gaditanas sobre a sociedade nesses primeiros dois anos.
A história da norma espanhola não seria tão lembrada se tivesse vigido apenas esses dois anos iniciais. Através da vontade popular e do exército, a Constituição seria reposta em vigência para o chamado Triênio Liberal, entre 1820 e 1823. Nesse período a inspiração foi grande para todo o mundo ocidental: ela era a mais influente Constituição liberal vigendo na Europa. Os outros países haviam voltado a ser governados por monarcas centralizadores do poder político. O liberalismo que restava havia sido restringido na Europa. Na França, governava novamente um Bourbon, apesar das limitações impostas. Por sua história de criação e por ser um bastião de resistência liberal durante a restauração, o texto espanhol foi, então, admirado por outros revolucionários que buscavam os mesmos ideais. A Constituição de Cádiz, a partir desse momento, se tornaria um estandarte de liberdade e fonte de inspiração na busca por igualdade. Na Itália e em Portugal, ela seria mais do que um farol, seria proclamada Constituição, e foi fonte de influência profunda no início das vidas constitucionais desses países.
A influência da Constituição de Cádiz no Brasil foi motivada pela sua importância para o liberalismo durante o Triênio Liberal (1820 a 1823) – coincidente com os anos da independência e da elaboração da primeira Constituição no Brasil (1822 a 1824). A importância do texto espanhol para a história de Portugal e a Revolução de 1820 também foram fatores para que o texto fosse relevante nas origens da independência brasileira. Enquanto a ligação do Brasil com Portugal era forte, a enorme influência espanhola sobre os portugueses gerou efeitos também no Brasil.
Apesar da sua documentada história de influências sobre diversas nações ocidentais europeias e americanas, a Constituição de Cádiz é pouco estudada nos seus efeitos sobre a América Portuguesa. Esta é inspiração do presente trabalho: conhecer as normas liberais espanholas e analisar a extensão da sua influência sobre o Brasil. No primeiro capítulo é feito o estudo do contexto e do teor da Constituição de Cádiz. O escopo é apresentar de maneira sistemática todo o texto da Constituição – com seus trezentos e oitenta e quatro artigos, sendo os mais importantes transcritos nas referências para facilitar a consulta.
O método principal é a pesquisa qualitativa em fontes primárias históricas e em normas. Ao lado das fontes primárias, o acesso aos doutrinadores de Direito Constitucional e História do Direito são utilizados para contextualizar o ambiente e verificar os efeitos jurídicos sobre a norma na Europa.

Nei primi cinque lustri successivi al trattato di Roma del 1957, gli organismi europei non hanno tenuto in alcuna considerazione il tema della cittadinanza. L’“Europa dei popoli” non costituiva oggetto né di corpus giuridico ad hoc né di riferimento all’interno di contesti più generali. Questa visione “merceologica” confinava, nel passato che non diventava presente, le grandi personalità culturali e politiche che avevano espresso nei loro scritti e nelle loro azioni l’ideale di un’Europa che teneva al primo posto gli abitanti, considerati protagonisti e non “attori muti”. L’istituzione di una cittadinanza europea, introdotta dal TUE nel 1992, è da considerarsi un apprezzabile passo avanti sul piano dell’integrazione, ma per il futuro bisognerà partire dal presupposto che se gli Stati membri dell’Unione non saranno veramente uniti, difficilmente potranno essere in grado di fronteggiare le grandi sfide poste dal multipolare scacchiere geopolitico e geoeconomico mondiale

"La legge n. 92 del 2012 ha apportato alcune modifiche alla disciplina dei licenziamenti collettivi, consistenti in una serie di cambiamenti alla procedura prescritta dalla legge n. 223 del 1991.
Questa riforma riveste una portata rilevante in termini sia pratici che di sistema. Essa, infatti, da un lato, si colloca all’interno di un’ importante revisione degli ammortizzatori sociali, con abolizione, seppure non immediata, dell’indennità di mobilità, dall’altro interviene su due profili, oggetto di massimo interesse da parte del legislatore comunitario e molto significativi della regolazione: quello della correttezza dello svolgimento della procedura di informazione e consultazione e quello, strettamente complementare al primo, delle conseguenze sanzionatorie in caso di vizi della medesima"

Nell’attuale quadro normativo europeo i riferimenti al dato culturale sono molteplici, ma è ancora assente una trattazione organica del tema e il settore di riferimento è la cultura considerata in senso più ampio, secondo quanto disposto dall’art. 151 del tce, ora articolo 167 del tfue. Il diritto dei beni culturali sembra rimanere confinato nelle frontiere nazionali. È evidente, pertanto, che l’azione dell’Unione europea sia rivolta al plurale concorrendo, quindi, allo sviluppo “delle culture” degli Stati membri e non di una cultura propriamente europea. Nel settore dei beni culturali l’attività normativa di diritto secondario ha avuto come obiettivo quello di conciliare nel mercato interno la libera circolazione dei beni culturali con le esigenze di protezione degli stessi. Prima dell’adozione del regolamento 3911/92, relativo all’esportazione dei beni culturali, e della direttiva 7/93, relativa alla restituzione dei beni culturali usciti illecitamente dal territorio di uno Stato membro, gli Stati si limitavano, infatti, ad effettuare controlli alle frontiere esclusivamente con riguardo ai beni rientranti nel proprio patrimonio

Today, concepts of constitutionalism are widely used in international legal scholarship, both to describe and to promote changes in the international legal order in support of the rule of law, the protection of human rights and other common values of the international community. Against this background, the present article deals with a question so far addressed only cursorily—the “writtenness” of international constitutional law. Can we assume the existence of an “unwritten” international constitution, or does the very concept of a constitution in the modern sense require that a constitution is laid down in written form? The article discusses the importance of “writtenness” in modern constitutionalism and addresses the “English exception”, that is the absence, in the United Kingdom, of a document called “the constitution”. The paper concludes with a plea for taking the constitutional character of the UN Charter more seriously, arguing that the idea of an unwritten constitution of the international community does not provide a viable alternative.

The full citation for this article is:
International Constitutional Law: Written or Unwritten?
Bardo Fassbender
Chinese Journal of International Law (2016) 15  (3):  489-515. 
doi: 10.1093/chinesejil/jmw032

First published online: October 24, 2016
Full text available at:  https://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/15/3/489.full

I diritti umani appaiono ormai oggetto di una tutela frammentata e diffusa tra Carte e Corti nello scenario internazionale. Sul piano formale, infatti, da una parte la tutela “rigida” delle Costituzioni nazionali dovrebbe garantire il “nucleo duro” di principi e diritti fondamentali vigenti negli Stati. Dall’altra, con una forza normativa variabile nei diversi sistemi, le Carte sovra e inter-nazionali corroborano, indeboliscono o espandono la tutela costituzionale di quelle stesse situazioni giuridiche, in un’ottica di omogeneizzazione dei diversi ordinamenti nazionali.
Il compito di dare “sostanza” a tali operazioni spetta naturalmente alle giurisdizioni. Il formante giurisprudenziale, che piaccia o no, sembra difatti l’unico capace di garantire, caso per caso, le incessanti istanze di giustizia provenienti dalla realtà sociale. Istanze, queste, tese a dare concretamente senso e significato ai diritti umani sempre più “contaminati” dagli approdi della ricerca scientifica.
In questo scenario a “dialogare” di certo sono le Corti, ma non sempre le Carte. I giusdicenti appaiono infatti i protagonisti principali delle integrazioni ordinamentali nello scenario c.d. multilevel, mentre, paradossalmente, gli “antagonisti” sembrano essere, non di rado, proprio i legislatori. In tema di tutela dei diritti umani, dunque, l’impressione è che nei fatti sia la politica del diritto (dei legislatori nazionali) a creare attriti all’espansione del diritto (politico) formato dai giudici in conformità al diritto sovranazionale.
Partendo dall’assunto che nella realtà della dimensione giuridico-costituzionale il diritto è frutto di questo fisiologico dialogo/scontro tra legislatori e giudici (quella che, in altre occasioni, si è avuto modo di definire co-produzione normativa), nel paper si proverà a spiegare tale fenomeno prendendo come oggetto di studio la metamorfosi della “famiglia” a seguito del progressivo riconoscimento dei diritti vantati dalle coppie omoaffettive.

http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674729711

Convened following Napoleon’s defeat in 1814, the Congress of Vienna is remembered as much for the pageantry of the royals and elites who gathered there as for the landmark diplomatic agreements they brokered. Historians have nevertheless generally dismissed these spectacular festivities as window dressing when compared with the serious, behind-the-scenes maneuverings of sovereigns and statesmen. Brian Vick finds this conventional view shortsighted, seeing these instead as two interconnected dimensions of politics. Examining them together yields a more complete picture of how one of the most important diplomatic summits in history managed to redraw the map of Europe and the international system of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The Congress of Vienna investigates the Vienna Congress within a broad framework of influence networks that included unofficial opinion-shapers of all kinds, both men and women: artists and composers, entrepreneurs and writers, hosts and attendees of fashionable salons. In addition to high-profile negotiation and diplomatic wrangling over the post-Napoleonic fates of Germany, Italy, and Poland, Vick brings into focus other understudied yet significant issues: the African slave trade, Jewish rights, and relations with Islamic powers such as the Ottoman Empire and Barbary Corsairs. Challenging the usual portrayal of a reactionary Congress obsessed with rolling back Napoleon’s liberal reforms, Vick demonstrates that the Congress’s promotion of limited constitutionalism, respect for religious and nationality rights, and humanitarian interventions was influenced as much by liberal currents as by conservative ones.

Introduzione alla ripubblicazione del Manifesto di Ventotene, nel volume "Ventotene. Un manifesto per il futuro", manifestolibri, 2014, a cura di Giuseppe Allegri e Giuseppe Bronzini, con saggi, tra gli altri, di Luciana Castellina, Pier Virgilio Dastoli, Luigi Ferrajoli, Lucio Levi, Antonio Negri e un'appendice di Norberto Bobbio,

In the last twenty years, the EU policy in the field of digital technologies has shifted from a liberal economic perspective to a constitutional-based approach. The development of digital technologies has not only challenged the protection of individuals' fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and data protection. Even more importantly, this new technological framework has also empowered transnational corporations operating in the digital environment as hosting providers to perform quasi-public functions in the transnational context. These two drivers have led the Union to enter into a new phase of modern constitutionalism (ie digital constitutionalism). This evolution is described by three constitutional phases: digital liberalism, judicial activism and digital constitutionalism. At the end of the last century, the Union adopted a liberal approach. A strict regulation of the online environment would have damaged the growth of the internal market, exactly when new technologies were going to revolutionize the entire society and promising new opportunities for the internal marked. The end of this first season was the result of the emergence of the Nice Charter as a bill of rights and new challenges raised by private actors in the digital environment. In this phase, the ECJ has played a pivotal role in moving the EU standpoint from fundamental freedoms to fundamental rights. This second phase has only anticipated a new season of constitutionalism based on codifying of the ECJ's case law and limiting online platforms' powers within the framework of the Digital Single Market. The path of digital constitutionalism is still at the beginning. A fourth phase of EU constitutionalism is around the corner based on the extension of constitutional values beyond EU borders and the expression of a human-centric technological model in a global context.

Research Topic : "Constitutionalism" .
Programme: LL.M. (Master of Laws)
Course Name: COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW OR SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE
Definition of Constitutionalism ,Meaning of Constitutionalism,Traditions of Constitutionalism, Political constitutionalism: from mixed government to representative democracy, Legal constitutionalism: from the separation of powers to rights and judicial review, Difference between constitution and constitutionalism,Usage of Constitutionalism , History of Constitutionalism ,Important features of Constitutionalism, Entrenchement,Writtenness,Elements of Constitutionalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy, Constitutionalism and The Rule of Law, Constitutionalism and constitutional conventions, Constitutionalism in different countries,Organic Global Constitutionalism, Case Laws where principle of ‘Constitutionalism’ is legally recognized
by Supreme Court of India

In der positiv-verfassungsrechtlichen Perspektive der Gegenwart kulminiert die verfassungsrechtliche Bedeutung des Staatsvertrages vom St. Germain offenkundig im fünften Abschnitt des dritten Teils  des Abkommens bzw. den darin enthaltenen Verfassungsbestimmungen. Ebendas zu würdigen ist wichtig; dem ausschließliche Aufmerksamkeit zukommen zu lassen, würde dennoch zu kurz greifen. Vielmehr braucht es eine multiperspektivische Betrachtung: was den Staatsvertrag als konstitutives Element der Staatsbildung anlangt, was den Staatsvertrages als affirmatives Moment der Staatsform anlangt, was den Staatsvertrag als konditionales Element der Verfassunggebung anlangt, was den Staatsvertrag als determinierendes Moment des Verfassungsinhalts anlangt und schließlich was das Verhältnis des Staatsvertrag zum Verfassungsuntergang anlangt. In all diesen Belangen sollte die Bedeutung des Staatsvertrags von St. Germain für die österreichische Bundesverfassung entscheidend sein. Ihnen und ihrem Widerspiel ist der Beitrag gewidmet.

Une contribution relative à l’autonomie institutionnelle des Etats membres dans l’Union européenne pourrait apparaître quelque peu vaine. La doctrine en la matière est en effet aussi ancienne  que foisonnante . Pourtant, à bien y regarder, c’est très souvent au principe globalisant d’« autonomie institutionnelle et procédurale » que les études sont consacrées. La présente contribution est donc née de l’interrogation suivante : peut-on essayer de « séparer » ces frères siamois que seraient, d’une part, l’autonomie institutionnelle et, d’autre part, l’autonomie procédurale ? Et si oui, existe-t-il un intérêt à l’étude isolée du principe d’autonomie institutionnelle ?
A l'analyse, il apparaît que le principe d’autonomie institutionnelle est un marqueur de la souveraineté interne de l’Etat membre, dont l’appartenance à l’Union européenne le laisse libre d’organiser comme il le souhaite ses organes, ses structures et ses institutions, pour peu que celles-ci soient aptes à assurer les fonctions dévolues par le droit de l’Union. Certes, ce principe n’est pas sans faiblesses. D’une part, il n’est pas, à lui seul, opposable aux institutions de l’Union, de sorte que cette autonomie est largement tributaire d’une forme d’auto-limitation du législateur de l’Union. D’autre part, il connaît certains tempéraments, résultant du droit originaire, de la jurisprudence et du droit dérivé. Ces tempéraments sont cependant peu nombreux. Cela ne signifie pas que l’appartenance d’un Etat à l’Union européenne est sans incidences sur sa structure et ses équilibres institutionnels. Cependant, ces incidences ne sont qu’induites par le droit de l’Union, et non exigées par lui. Les transformations institutionnelles par lesquelles passent les Etats membres de l’Union sont donc très largement endogènes. De là se déduit toute la tension inhérente au statut d’Etat membre : souverain dans un espace juridique intégré, il lui est nécessaire de s’adapter à la superstructure dans laquelle il s’insère et de répondre aux exigences (primauté, effectivité) du droit qu’il contribue à élaborer et qu’il a le devoir de mettre en œuvre, mais il dispose pour ce faire d’une marge d’appréciation significative qui lui permet de ne pas renier son identité.

Il volume intende offrire una visione relativamente sintetica ma approfondita del ruolo della Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo, e della giurisprudenza della Corte di Strasburgo, nel nostro ordinamento, a partire dallo scenario delineatosi per effetto delle sentenze della Corte costituzionale n. 348 e n. 349 del 2007 e progressivamente evoluto anche per effetto di successive, importanti decisioni (in primis, ma non solo, la sentenza n. 49 del 2015).
Nel volume si alternano (o si intrecciano) parti ricostruttive, soprattutto del ricco quadro giurisprudenziale interno e in certa misura degli sviluppi avutisi a livello sovranazionale, e parti di riflessione teorica, le une e le altre volte a cogliere le implicazioni “operative” di tale scenario con riguardo al rispettivo ruolo della Corte costituzionale, dei giudici comuni e della Corte EDU, anche nella prospettiva di un’ulteriore evoluzione del quadro complessivo in conseguenza delle “svolte” della Corte costituzionale sul versante “eurounitario” della tutela dei diritti fondamentali (da ultimo, con la sentenza n. 269 del 2017), oggetto di trattazione nell’ultimo capitolo.
L’intento è quello di offrire uno strumento utile non solo in ambito accademico e per gli studiosi, ma anche per gli operatori giuridici (in primis magistrati e avvocati) e in genere per chi intenda approfondire temi di sempre maggior importanza nella vita quotidiana e nello sviluppo del nostro ordinamento.

Article 260 TFEU (the former Article 228 EC) now provides for financial sanctions to be applied more easily, and in more situations. This paper examines the operation of the new rules, and the impact that they could have on the enforcement of EU law in practice.

The paper explores the key components of the political project of post-war West Germany and the role of the Rechtsstaat within it. It argues that the post-war German state developed a specific reading of the rule of law as an order based on supra-legal values, which had to be defended even against democratic government. Contrary to common conception and the self-understanding of post-war legal theorists this did not signify a departure from the constitutional theory of the Weimar period. Rather, this paper argues, the decisive innovations in constitutional thought stem from the legal and theoretical challenges the Weimar state faced in its own time. As such the German Rechtsstaat, which is so strongly associated with the renewal of German democracy, carries with it a tradition of legal thought, which systematically and successfully expanded the reach of the judiciary within the political system to the detriment of the legislative and democratic action.

The emphasis in contemporary democratic theory and in the history of political thought on the peculiarly abstract theory of popular sovereignty of Locke and his twentieth-century intellectual descendants obscures a crucial relationship between constitutional self-government and nationalism. Through a Hobbesian and Filmerian critique of Locke and an examination of the political writings of George Lawson (a seventeenth-century critic of Hobbes), the article shows the necessary connections between popular sovereignty, constitutionalism and a form of national consciousness that renders concrete the otherwise abstract and airy notion of the pre-political com- munity to which government is to be held accountable, and, through a myth of national origin, memories of native traditions of self-government, and stories of heroic ances- tors who successfully defended those traditions against usurpers and tyrants, gives substance to theories of constitutional government.

Επιμέλεια: Αιμιλία Γανταδάκη
Εαρίνο Εξάμηνο 2019
Κλίμακιο: Γεραπετρίτης, Γιαννακόπουλος, Δρόσος.
Το εν λόγω αρχείο αποτελεί καταγραφή σημειώσεων από τις παραδόσεις του μαθήματος Εφαρμογών Δημοσίου Δικαίου, διανθισμένες σε ορισμένα σημεία από εδάφια σχετικών συγγραμμάτων είτε περαιτέρω προσωπικής αναζήτησης. Ιδιαίτερα χρήσιμο βρήκα το σύγγραμμα του κ. Γιαννακόπουλου («Οι επιδράσεις του δικαίου της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στον έλεγχο συνταγματικότητας των νόμων») καθότι βρίσκεται σε πλήρη συνάφεια με τις αναλύσεις του κατά τις παραδόσεις και διευκολύνει το διάβασμα. Το αρχείο περιλαμβάνει αρκετές αποφάσεις που είναι εκτός ύλης, εντούτοις έγινε μνεία σε αυτές από τους καθηγητές για την πληρότητα του μαθήματος. Οι αποφάσεις που είναι εντός ύλης βρίσκονται στον πίνακα των περιεχομένων.

Edited by: Aimilia Gantadaki
Spring Semester 2019
Scale: Gerapetritis, Giannakopoulos, Drossos.
This file is a record of the oral lessons of the Public Law Applications course, embellished in some places by verses from relevant books or further personal research. I personally found the book by Mr. Giannakopoulos ("The Effects of European Union Law on the control of the  constitutionality of Laws") very useful, as it is in full relation to his oral analysis at the amphitheatre and facilitates students' research. The file includes several law-cases, that are out of the examination material. However, they were mentioned by the teachers for the completeness of the course. Cases could be found in the contests.

Saggio pubblicato nel volume "Fare gli Italiani. Dalla costituzione dello Stato nazionale alla promulgazione della Costituzione repubblicana (1861-1948), a cura di G. Parlato e M. Zaganella, Roma, Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2011, pp. 119-145.

Стаття присвячена аналізу правомірності відновлення дії окремих положень Конституції України у 2014 році на основі дослідження співвідношення принципів вер­ ховенства права та верховенства конституції. Зроблено висновок, що за умов еволю­ ційного конституційного розвитку верховенство конституції є одним із засобів забез­ печення верховенства права. Поряд із цим обґрунтовано пріоритет верховенства права у тих випадках, коли верховенство конституції захищає свавільну владу, перед­ бачені конституцією засоби боротьби із державним свавіллям вичерпані і політична нація вдається до свого права на опір. В результаті зроблено висновок про правомір­ ність відновлення дії Конституції України у 2014 році. Ключові слова: верховенство права, верховенство конституції, відновлення дії Конституції України, конституціоналізм.

The paper analyses the intersections of Polish and European constitutionalism in the inter-war period. Although Poland had followed a unique constitutional path due to its historical background, nevertheless the general constitutional tendencies of that time still influenced the 1921 Constitution, as happened for example with the long and detailed bill of rights (full of both liberal and social rights), the important role of parliamentary system, the republican ideas, the strong democratic stance of the Constitution. The inter-war constitutionalism remains an important reference point for the following constitutional waves in Europe.

SUMARIO: 1. UNA PRIMERA APROXIMACIóN A LA EVOLUCIóN hISTóRICA DEL DEREChO ADMINISTRATIVO DESDE EL MéTODO JURÍDICO COMPARADO. 2. LA «CONS-TITUCIONALIzACIóN» DEL DEREChO ADMINISTRATIVO. 3. LA «EUROPEIzA-CIóN» DEL DEREChO ADMINISTRATIVO. 4. LA RESPUESTA DE LOS ESTADOS DE LA UE A LA CRISIS DEL ESTADO SOCIAL. 5. CONCLUSIONES.

I testi nei box si devono a Ivana Bruno, ad eccezione di quelli ricorrenti alle pp. 9, 23, 26-31, 34, 35, 37, 40, 41, 50, 51, 87, 89, 92,93 a cura di Daniela Novarese ed Enza Pelleriti e alle pp. 57, 58, 59, 75, 76 a cura di Pierfrancesco Palazzotto copyright © 2012 Edizioni Ars Segretariato Generale Sicilia 1812, laboratorio costituzionale : guida ai luoghi ai fatti ai personaggi / ideazione e coordinamento di: Maria Andaloro ; cura di: Ivana Bruno e Pierfrancesco Palazzotto . -Palermo : ARS, 2012. ISBN 978-88-906805-1-9 1. Sicilia -Costituzioni politiche -1812. I. Andaloro, Maria. II. Bruno, Ivana. III. Palazzotto, Pierfrancesco. 945.8082 CDD-22 SBN Pal0244218 CIP -Biblioteca centrale della Regione siciliana "Alberto Bombace" Sicilia 1812: Laboratorio Costituzionale Guida ai luoghi ai fatti ai personaggi

Contemporary constitutional theory remains divided between competing approaches to the interpretation of normative texts: between originalism or original intent, on the one hand, and living constitution approaches, on the other. The purpose of this article is to complicate that problematic dichotomy by showing how cultures having a tradition of prestigious or authoritative texts addressed the problem of literary and legal innovation in antiquity. The study begins with cuneiform law from Mesopotamia and the Hittite Empire, and then shows how ancient Israel's development of the idea of divine revelation of law creates a cluster of constraints that would be expected to impede legal revision or amendment. The well-known Decalogue, or Ten Commandments, provides a valuable test-case, with its normative statement that God punishes sinners across generations (vicariously extending the punishment due them to three or four generations of their progeny). A series of inner-biblical and post-biblical responses to that rule demonstrates, however, that later writers were able to criticize, challenge, reject, and replace it with the alternative notion of individual accountability. The article will provide a series of close readings of the texts involved, drawing attention to their legal language and hermeneutical strategies. The conclusions stress the remarkable freedom to modify ostensibly nor-mative statements available to ancient judicial interpreters, despite the expected constraints of a formative religious canon attributed to divine revelation.

Keywords:
legal hermeneutics, normative texts, constitutional theory, Jewish law, individual liability, Decalogue, inner-biblical exegesis

Translated by J. B. Owens, Ph.D., Professor of History, Idaho State University
Because I have noted increased attention to the history of European fascist movements, I thought that there might be some interest in having available in English translation the key documents of the Spanish fascist government under the leadership of Francisco Franco. I claim no great originality or literary quality for this translation, which I prepared for students in my course “Constituting Modern Spain, 1808-1982”. This course was designed as a comparative, world history course in which we studied attempts to create countries on the basis of written constitutions.

journal article published in Korean - 근대 초기 유럽 자연법의 세계관과 정치사상

Natural jurisprudence was one of the most important intellectual traditions, along with republicanism, that weighed upon early modern European thought. If Republicans were concerned with popular Libertas and the health of states, the self-imposed task of natural lawyers was to find out what, in God’s or Reason’s eyes, was right and what was wrong. To live freely in a dynamic society was the goal of republican thought, whereas the priority of natural jurisprudence was to lead a peaceful life in a just society ruled by law. To understand the latter tradition in historical terms, one must grasp its Christian roots and moral worldview. Beyond the post-Enlightenment and French revolutionary concepts of natural rights and democracy appropriated by reformers, this article delineates the basic tenets of natural law from a historical perspective, dealing with its most crucial components such as duties and rights, human nature, social design, and political thought.

Constitutionalism is changing but the direction of change is an uncertain and open issue.  What can be the role of the comparative constitutional law and of the comparative lawyer in front of different contemporary visions of constitutionalism? First of all, this article aims at exanimating the empirical basis of the academic discourse on the constitutional convergence. The second step is a critical approach of methodological tools of this speech. Finally this article seeks an alternative way to understand the varieties of constitutionalism in a global perspective: a differentiated vision of constitutionalism is proposed on critical approaches but on one condition: do not forget the logic of limitation that founds the doctrine of constitutionalism to avoid falling into a bottomless relativism.