EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

Αντικείμενο της παρούσας μελέτης είναι η παρουσίαση, η ανάλυση και η ανάδειξη των σπουδαιότερων σημείων της απόφασης του Δικαστηρίου της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (ΔΕΕ) επί της υπόθεσης Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses . Η υπόθεση αφορά προδικαστικό ερώτημα του Πορτογάλου εθνικού δικαστή προς το ΔΕΕ, με αντικείμενο τη συμβατότητα των διά εθνικής νομοθεσίας περικοπών των αποδοχών Πορτογάλων δικαστών, η οποία έλαβε χώρα για τη διόρθωση του ελλείμματος , με τη δικαστική ανεξαρτησία όπως κατοχυρώνεται στο άρθρο 47 του Χάρτη Θεμελιωδών Δικαιωμάτων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (Χάρτης) και στο άρθρο 19 § 1 εδ. β΄ της Συνθήκης για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (ΣΕΕ).
Η μελέτη της απόφασης, της οποίας η μεγάλη σημασία προδικάζεται απ’ το γεγονός ότι εξεδόθη από το Τμήμα Μείζονος Συνθέσεως, χωρίζεται σε δύο Μέρη: στο πρώτο παρουσιάζονται τα πραγματικά περιστατικά και το σκεπτικό του ΔΕΕ, και στο δεύτερο αναλύονται και σχολιάζονται τα σημαντικότερα σημεία και οι προεκτάσεις της. Στο τέλος διατυπώνονται τα συμπεράσματα του συγγραφέα.

The fundamental question addressed is whether there is any compelling or convincing argument (s) vis-à-vis to changing our Human Rights Act 1998 and replacing it with a distinctively British Bill of Rights. The overarching theme of this paper is that our human rights should not be based on what our government finds convenient, acceptable or compatible with its electoral aims. Any change to our Human Rights Act should only serve to further bolster human rights protection and not in any way whatsoever water-down, in this author’s view, the fairly minimalist status quo.

The article examines the use of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the so-called “horizontal” cases. For this purpose it investigates three questions: first, the formal status of the Charter in horizontal situations; secondly, the problems which arise when open-textured provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights are applied horizontally; and thirdly, the different ways in which restrictions could be imposed on the horizontal use of the Charter. It argues that the question of the appropriate scope of horizontal application of the Charter goes beyond the technical subtleties of distinguishing between the Charter and the “general principles” of fundamental rights, or between their “direct” and “indirect” effect. Starting from the assumption that constitutionalisation of contract law should have limits, the article argues for a substantive doctrine to regulate the reach of the Charter in horizontal cases. The article considers the possibility of reconciling a traditional private law perspective, focused on protection of contractual freedom and efficiency, with the concern for ensuring efficacy of fundamental rights in situations where substantive freedom and equality are in need of protection.

This short paper evaluates the political nature of designating a country as ‘safe’, and the impact this political decision has on an applicant’s right to an effective remedy, laid down in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter).

French Abstract: Ce chapitre offre un bref aperçu des liens entre la lutte contre le recul de l'État de droit au sein de l'Union européenne et la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’UE. Il défend que la Charte pourrait et devrait jouer un rôle plus important dans le respect de l'État de droit tant au niveau des États membres qu’au niveau supranational lui-même. La relation entre le respect de l’État de droit et la Charte a toujours été compliquée : d’une part, les efforts visant à résoudre les problèmes dans les États membres de l'UE sont restés inexistants, tapis dans l'ombre de l'article 19 paragraphe 1er du Traité sur l’UE, d’autre part, ils ont menacé de saper la lutte pour l'État de droit, en particulier lorsque le principe est présenté comme un droit découlant exclusivement de l'article 47 de la Charte. En outre, la Charte a jusqu’à présent été appliquée de manière limitée et problématique concernant les questions d'État de droit qui se rapportent à l’Union européenne elle-même. Sur la base de l’étude de cas du financement des partis politiques au niveau supranational, il montre que, prise sérieusement en considération, la Charte pourrait faire la différence dans la protection de l'État de droit au sein l'UE.

In the EU, environmental democracy is to a large extent realised through the right of the general public to access documents and information held by EU bodies in environmental matters. Even though the matter is ruled by the ‘widest possible access’ principle, a recent increase in presumptions of confidentiality and still existing difficulties in establishing when there is an overriding public interest in disclosure rather seem to favour some secrecy than disclosure and openness. Therefore, this paper aims to answer the question whether the EU regime on access to documents and information in environmental matters is genuinely democratic or not.​

Nell’Unione europea il concetto di democrazia ambientale si realizza in larga misura attraverso il diritto di accedere ai documenti e alle informazioni detenute dagli organi dell’Unione in materia ambientale. Nonostante in materia il principio fondamentale sia quello del “più ampio accesso possibile”, la progressiva elaborazione giurisprudenziale di presunzioni di riservatezza e le difficoltà ancora esistenti nello stabilire quando vi sia un interesse pubblico prevalente alla divulgazione sembrano favorire una certa segretezza anziché la trasparenza dell'ordinamento dell'Unione. L’articolo, pertanto, esamina il regime che regola il diritto fondamentale all’accesso alle informazioni ambientali nell’ordinamento dell’UE, per comprendere se esso sia realmente democratico o meno.​

This article addresses potential issues of ne bis in idem under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (“SSM”), both in the relation between the different types of instruments available to the ECB and NCA’s as well as in the interaction with national (criminal) laws. Challenges are foreseeable in the interaction with national criminal law in the light of the diversity of national legislative responses to financial misconduct that have emerged during and after the past financial crisis.

Europe is facing an essential change in understanding of the foundations of dignity, and this seems to be happening unnoticed. At the core of this change lies an abandonment of recognition of the inherent character of dignity, which is among the crucial elements of a universal paradigm for understanding human rights. The considerations here serve to explain some of the consequences of this change for the understanding of human rights, especially their claim to be universal. It is argued that recognition of the inherency of dignity is interrelated and interdependent with recognition of the universality and equality of dignity, and – in consequence – with recognition of the universality and equality of human rights. The exclusion of inherency from the qualities of dignity recognised by law results in a rejection of the universality and equality of dignity and rights.

Seit es wissenschaftlich nachgewiesen ist, dass Rauchen die Gesundheit schädigt, haben Regierungen versucht, Gesetze zu verabschieden, um das Rauchen einzu- dämmen. So wurde mit der Begründung, dass die Gesundheit der Bevölkerung geschützt werden müsse, eine Reihe von Nichtraucherschutzgesetzen in der ganzen EU eingeführt. Die Tabakhersteller tun jedoch alles, um sich dieser Gesetzgebung zu entziehen und nutzen dabei juristisch alle Mittel, indem sie weder vor Verfassungs- beschwerden noch vor Investitionsschutzklagen zurückschrecken. Der neueste von der WHO propagierte Trend gegen das Rauchen lautet Einheitsverpackung (Plain Packaging), welcher jegliche Marken verbietet und ein standardisiertes Aussehen vorschreibt. Der nachfolgende Beitrag widmet sich der Vereinbarkeit von solchen Einheitsverpackungen mit dem europäischen Primärrecht.

Punto focale della sentenza n. 236/2016 della Corte costituzionale è lo status del principio di proporzionalità delle pene, pienamente assurto a parametro di legittimità costituzionale anche in forza della valorizzazione del riconoscimento tributatogli nella Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell'Unione Europea. Viene conseguentemente riplasmato il giudizio di uguaglianza-ragionevolezza nella cui cornice tale principio trova "giustiziabilità". Il giudizio assume, ora, una struttura bifasica in cui la verifica del rapporto di proporzione tra reato e pena interno alla fattispecie precede (senza più esservi subordinata) il tradizionale raffronto col tertium comparationis.

Commentaire article par article de la Charte des droits fondamentaux - Article 52 limitations

« Il n’est pas de liberté sans ordre, ni plus d’ordre sans liberté », rappelle P. Abravanel. La préservation de l’intérêt général et des intérêts d’autrui n’est pas l’« Autre » des droits et libertés, mais, dans une très large mesure, une condition de leur effectivité.

Point de manichéisme étroit, mais un subtil rapport dialectique fait de la recherche constante d’un équilibre entre les biens juridiques rivalisant. Entre autres objets, l’article 52 de la Charte fixe le cadre de la réalisation de cet équilibre. Nous en examinerons successivement le champ d’application (I) et la portée (II), en passant de revue, à ce niveau, les conditions de validité formelles et substantielles auxquelles il subordonne la licéité des limitations aux droits et libertés.

The aim of this study is to examine the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the light of the principle of subsidiarity in EU law. The Charter constitutes a point of intersection of subsidiarity and fundamental rights, brought together by their common purpose of guiding the exercise of public powers and reconciling a diversity of Member State values with the need for European unity. With a particular focus on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the study embraces the principle of subsidiarity for the purpose of interpreting the legal nature of the Charter and systemising its application.

The formal link between subsidiarity and fundamental rights under the Charter is found in Article 51(1). In order to clarify the legal nature of the Charter and the context in which it operates, the study looks into how fundamental rights and subsidiarity have developed in EU law as well as how they are interrelated. The subsidiary nature of EU fundamental rights law is demonstrated by the restrictive personal and material scope of the Charter. Similarly, the principle of subsidiarity is used to analyse the Charter’s minimum and maximum level of protection.

The Court’s application of the Charter is analysed by examining the expressions that the principle of subsidiarity takes when the Charter is balanced with economic freedoms, applied in conjunction with other norms, used to invalidate EU norms or called to set aside national legal acts. In addition to this, the analysis considers the role of subsidiarity in cases where the Charter was not applied, either because the Court lacked jurisdiction or remained silent on its applicability.

The study demonstrates how the legal nature of the Charter to a great extent can be explained through the principle of subsidiarity. However, the EU legal order has its proper understanding of subsidiarity in relation to fundamental rights. Fundamental rights protection is only one of several EU objectives that need to be balanced when determining the appropriate level of action. Ultimately, the application of the Charter is triggered by the need to preserve the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law. Only in exceptional circumstances, these requirements may be overridden with reference to the principle of legal certainty, as recognised by the Charter. Conversely, subsidiarity as an interpretative principle of EU fundamental rights law may also contribute to enhanced legal certainty regarding the application of the Charter.

It is certainly true that the juridical system on the protection
of human rights in Europe is rather complex. This is for two
main reasons; firstly, the Charter serves as a clear legal basis
for the CJEU to rule on fundamental rights issues and, secondly,
the EU’s intensive legislative activity in criminal matters
has produced a great amount of cases that most often impinge
upon sensitive human rights issues. This has necessarily resulted
in the CJEU dwelling on what has so far been an exclusive
domain of the ECtHR and national courts. Against this
background, the current article highlights issues with respect
to the sharing of competence over fundamental rights by the
two courts.

Deoarece tema aleasă este vastă, în realitate am reușit să identific doar anumite probleme esențiale și să aduc, acolo unde a fost posibil, clarificări conform rezultatelor culese din studiul doctrinei și din analiza jurisprudenței CJUE. Principalele probleme identificate au fost următoarele: aplicarea orizontală a cartei, aplicarea extrateritorială a cartei și domeniul de aplicare material conform art. 51 alin. (1) CDFUE. Întrebările la care mi-am propus să răspund, pe parcursul acestui referat, au fost următoarele: (i) Are Carta o aplicabilitate orizontală?; (ii) Are Carta o aplicabilitate extrateritorială?; (iii) Care este domeniul de aplicare material al Cartei?; și (iv) Ce înseamnă noțiunea de „legătură între dreptul național și dreptul european”?

În secțiunea I.B, am expus anumite considerații generale privind Carta, respectiv modificările aduse de Tratatul de la Lisabona statutului juridic al Cartei, legătura dintre Cartă și celelalte instrumente cu privire la drepturile omului și problemele esențiale privind domeniul de aplicare. În secțiunea II, am tratat pe scurt anumite noțiuni esențiale privind aplicabilitatea Cartei, în ceea ce privește domeniul de aplicare material, orizontal și extrateritorial și consecințele care decurg din includerea Cartei în dreptul primar al Uniunii Europene. În secțiunea III, am analizat, conform jurisprudenței CJUE, domeniul de aplicare material a Cartei. În secțiunea III.A, am identificat și analizat comparativ cele două extreme ale interpretării domeniului de aplicare, respectiv interpretarea restrictivă și cea extensivă. În secțiunea III.B, am analizat noțiunea de legătură între dreptul național și prevederile cartei. În secțiunea III.C, am prezentat o hotărâre recentă a CJUE care arată cum prevederile Cartei pot pătrunde, printr-o interpretare teleologică, și în domenii ce țin de suveranitatea unui stat. În concluzii, în limita posibilităților, am abstractizat și generalizat rezultatele din secțiunile anterioare.

Le principe de confiance mutuelle est un principe d'importance fondamentale en droit de l'Union. Il permet la constitution et le maintien d'un espace européen sans frontières sans, pour autant, faire disparaître les singularités des ordres juridiques nationaux. Ce principe repose sur l'existence d'une communauté de valeurs qui unit les Etats membres. Or, force est de constater que l'Union européenne fait actuellement face à « une crise des valeurs » qui révèle des divisions profondes parmi les États membres quant au sens et à la portée de celles-ci. Cet article examine le sort qui est réservé à la confiance mutuelle en présence d'un tel délitement des valeurs au sein de l'Union européenne. En particulier, il interroge de manière critique les limites qui lui sont assignées en cas de risque d'érosion des valeurs fondatrices de l'Union.

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The principle of mutual trust is a principle of fundamental importance in European Union law. It allows an area without internal borders to be created and maintained, without the removal of the national legal systems' singularities. This principle is based on the existence of a community of values shared by the Member States. However, the European Union is currently facing a "crisis of values", which reveals deep divisions among Member States as to their meaning and scope. This article examines the fate of mutual trust in the face of such crisis. In particular, it critically assesses and questions the limits recognised to the duty of mutual trust in presence of a risk of erosion of EU's founding values.

The introduction of mandatory legal representation by a lawyer or a
person with a bar exam in third-instance civil procedure has a clear logic. The overall goal is to professionalize the proceedings before the Supreme Court, so that parties can no longer represent themselves, unless they are themselves legally qualified. This solution should ideally contribute to rationalization and raising the quality of the procedure initiated by the second appeal/revision, that is, to enable the fulfillment of proclaimed goals of the innovated revision system - less burden
for a supreme court, as a prerequisite for greater efficiency, unification of law and jurisprudence, better protection of and equality of citizens before the law. In this paper, the introduction of mandatory legal representation with the accompanying financial burden of civil justice will be analyzed, on the one hand, in the context of the legislator’s intention to assist the supreme court in the exercise of its functions, and on the other hand, in the context of the right to access to a court. Given that the issue of access to justice and the protection of rights before judicial institutions is particularly important when citizens are faced with significant procedural costs, including lawyer’s costs, it is important to establish fair balance between restricting access to the Supreme Court and respecting guarantees contained in fundamental human right to access the court, as developed by the case law of European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice.

Since the adoption of the Tampere Programme in 1999, the European Union has pursued the aim of moving the control of migration flows from its territory to third countries.
Such a process is known as ‘externalisation’ and basically consists of the involvement of countries of origin and transit in the management of both legal and illegal flows.
The aim of the present paper is to assess whether the policy of externalising migration control mechanisms complies with human rights obligations, by which the EU is bound.
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s human rights framework acquired a new legal value, in particular with regard to the Charter of Fundamental
Rights. Subsequently, the compliance of the EU’s acts with human rights enshrined therein can be judicially reviewed.
The first part of the paper provides an overview of the development of the EU’s
migration. This paper shows how the approach to migration has changed so far, and what the main characteristics of such a policy framework are. The second part illustrates
several concerns about the respect for migrants’ human rights related to the implementation of externalisation. The last part deals with the EU’s human rights
framework. Externalisation is analysed in light of binding human rights obligations, in order to assess whether and to what extent it violates those fundamental rights, upon
which the Union in founded.

2 Aos meus pais, eles sabem porquê. O Princípio do Nível Mais Elevado de Protecção em Matéria de Direitos Fundamentais 3 AGRADECIMENTOS Uma tese nunca é um trabalho de uma pessoa apenas. Há sempre mentes e braços que, atrás do pano, ajudam a transformar o projecto em realidade. Esta obra resulta do frequência do curso de Mestrado em Ciências Juridico-Políticas da FDUC, no qual foram meus professores o Doutor Fernando Alves Correia, cujas aulas foram palco de importantes debates sobre justiça constitucional; o Doutor Jorge Leite, que me mostrou caminhos e pistas a seguir no estudo do direito comunitário; e ainda o Doutor José Carlos Vieira de Andrade que, além dos comentários argutos e dos desafios que me colocou, teve também a amabilidade de aceitar ser orientador desta dissertação, mostrando-se sempre disponível para esclarecer dúvidas e aplacar inquietações. Ao Doutor José Manuel Cardoso da Costa, regente, durante estes anos, da cadeira de Direito Constitucional, cujas aulas práticas assegurei, agradeço os ensinamentos e todo o apoio que sempre me prestou. No plano institucional, cabe ainda um agradecimento à D. Maria do Rosário Lucas, que nunca poupou esforços para que todo o processo decorresse sem incidentes. Tenho uma enorme dívida de gratidão para com o saudoso Conselheiro Luís Nunes de Almeida, que me mostrou a importância dos tribunais constitucionais, e me ensinou que, com todos os defeitos, eles são, ainda, os guardiães dos direitos. Muito do que sou, no plano profissional, a ele se deve. Ao meu amigo e colega Luís Meneses do Vale, agradeço as longas conversas e a troca de ideias, a companhia para aprender alemão, e todo o apoio dado para este trabalho. Ao Afonso Patrão, meu companheiro de bunker,um obrigada pelo ânimo e pelos debates nas nossas pausas para café. Ao Miguel Ângelo Manero de Lemos e ao Rui Dias agradeço as pistas e as indicações bibliográficas. À Matilde Lavouras agradeço muitas coisas que não caberiam aqui, mas que se resumem numa só: a sua amizade. À Maria João Gonçalves e à Ana Caniço, minhas amigas, obrigada por ouvirem os meus desabafos. E ao Nils, obrigada por ser um amigo para todas as ocasiões. Finalmente, devo ainda um enorme agradecimento a toda a minha família. Ao meu pai, pelo apoio, pelo carinho e pelo estímulo. À minha mãe, por estar sempre lá, pronta a ouvir e a ajudar, nas grandes e pequenas coisas, como só as mães sabem. À colocam ao constitucionalismo do século XXI, ALESSANDRO PACE 9 chama a atenção para a emergência de novos significados do termo, a par do sentido mais clássico, de teoria jurídica de limitação do poder político. Assim, a esta acepção, juntase, entre outras, a de constitucionalismo entendido como uma certa concepção da Constituição, ou como expressão de determinadas tendências constitucionais. O autor expressa, porém, objecções sérias a esta polissemia, e funda-as em duas ordens de razões: em primeiro lugar, ao utilizar-se o conceito como referência genérica à 24 Enquanto conjunção dos três elementos habitualmente enumerados -território, povo e soberania -o Estado está, efectivamente, dependente de factos históricos e de outros acontecimentos não inteiramente previsíveis e dificilmente controláveis, como migrações e evolução demográfica, ocupações militares, guerras e revoluções, para nomear apenas alguns. Ou seja, os Estados são, nos seus três elementos constituintes, o produto "de uma sedimentação histórica". Nestes termos, e na visão dos seus detractores, uma vez que o Estado, tal como o entendemos hoje, não existiu sempre, não pode também afirmar-se com certeza (pelo contrário, dever-se-ia colocar seriamente em causa) a sua subsistência enquanto figura central da teoria jurídica e política, fonte de legitimação e quadro de organização do sistema jurídico-político, verdadeira âncora das democracias constitucionais. Pese embora a veracidade de alguns dos seus argumentos, concordamos, porém, com NEIL WALKER, quando alerta para a necessidade de não sobrevalorizar estas críticas. Como afirma este autor, o facto de uma parte considerável dos trabalhos de investigação em ciências sociais e humanas continuar a ocupar-se de questões claramente baseadas na (e enquadradas pela) figura do Estado "não implica, de forma alguma, a rejeição do valor e da importância do projecto pós-nacional, mas também não exige a sua aceitação acrítica". Como dá conta M. ZURN 19 , o debate sobre o declínio ou o reforço do Estado-Nação soberano está hoje, pelo menos em parte, ultrapassado. As análises mais aprofundadas sobre o tema reconhecem, de forma unânime, a existência de mudanças significativas, mas afirmam que delas apenas decorre a necessidade de uma reConstituição ou transformação do conceito de soberania e do papel do Estado, levando ao desenvolvimento de um conceito multidimensional de Estado soberano que permita enquadrá-lo adequadamente na constelação pós-nacional. Para ZURN, é, pois, importante compreender hoje o Estado como elemento de uma estadualidade

Η παρούσα εργασία καταπιάνεται με την θεματική του τεκμηρίου αθωότητας. Πρωτίστως, ο συγγραφέας αναφέρεται εν συντομία στην θέση που κατέχει στο Κοινοδίκαιο και στην Κυπριακή έννομη τάξη. Ακολούθως, επεκτείνεται στην υπερεθνική του διάσταση, όπου επικεντρώνεται, κατά ένα μεγάλο μέρος, στην ανάλυση του τεκμηρίου αθωότητας υπό το πρίσμα της Νομολογίας του ΕΔΑΔ δίδοντας έμφαση στις κυριότερες θεματικές του, όπως η νομική του φύση, το χρονοδιάγραμμα προστασίας και το περιεχόμενο του. Εν συνεχεία, δράττεται της ευκαιρίας να αναφερθεί σε μια ειδική έκφανση του τεκμηρίου και συγκεκριμένα στο δικαίωμα της σιωπής και μη αυτοενοχοποίησης, το οποίο επεξηγεί με πληρότητα. Ενόψει της ανάλυσης περί υπερεθνικής διάστασης του τεκμηρίου, ο συγγραφέας αναφέρεται και στην νομική υπόσταση του τεκμηρίου αθωότητας κατά τον Χάρτη Θεμελιωδών Δικαιωμάτων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, καθοδηγούμενος από την Νομολογία του ΔΕΕ. Σημειωτέο ότι σε όλη την έκταση της παρούσας εργασίας γίνεται ουσιαστική μνεία στις κυριότερες πρόνοιες της πολυσυζητημένης και σχετικά πρόσφατης Ευρωπαϊκής Οδηγίας 2016/343/ΕΕ, όπου αυτή σχετίζεται ή διαφοροποιείται κυρίως με τα προαναφερόμενα υπερεθνικά νομοθετήματα. Εν κατακλείδι, ο συγγραφέας παραθέτει σε συντομία τις θέσεις του.

The Welfare State is increasingly concerned with providing its citizens with an improvement in their living conditions,
especially in the protection of universal and free health, free education, unemployment protection and retirement, but to this
end it has to obtain financial resources from these same citizens. Each of us thus supports a growing tax burden in return for
our social benefits. This study analyzes the tension between the duty to pay taxes and the protection of property in Portugal,
to know what is the maximum limit that each one has to pay to avoid confiscation. Methodologically, among others, we rely
on the protection of property given by the Convention to the “Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” and
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as, the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights,
in addition to statistical data of the Portuguese Tax and Customs Authority

En esta contribución examinaremos cómo la libertad de expresión se ha convertido en un derecho esencial de las sociedades modernas (II), tanto en su caracterización general (II.A) como, en particular, por parte de los medios de comunicación (II.B). Pero veremos también cómo ese derecho encuentra un límite infranqueable en el llamado discurso de odio (III), cuya conceptualización no es siempre una tarea sencilla (III.A). Nos detendre- mos, concretamente, en la labor protectora que en esta materia han desarrollado el Con- sejo de Europa, con el relevante papel del Tribunal de Estrasburgo (III.B), para pasar posteriormente a analizar la actividad en el mismo campo de la Unión Europea (III.C), con el mucho más limitado rol del Tribunal de Luxemburgo. Finalizaremos esta comuni- cación con unas breves reflexiones motivadas por las consideraciones analizadas (IV).

The Lisbon Treaty fundamentally changed the constitutional architecture of EU external action. As general principles, Article 21 and 3(5) TEU commit the EU to protect and promote human rights globally when developing and implementing its foreign policies. The legal value of this mandate and its concrete policy implication, however, have remained neglected by policy makers and legal scholarship. Aiming to provide a clear framework (of what can be done and what must be done) in EU foreign policy, this paper analyses the meaning of the human rights objective in the context of the vertical and horizontal division of competence (the ‘can’) and in context of fundamental rights protection endorsed by the EU (the ‘must’). This analysis leads to two conclusions. In terms of the ‘can’, the human rights objective gives new normative impetus that enables EU human rights policy to overcome its previous limited conception as being primarily a development concern or a mechanism for third country conditioning. In terms of the ‘must’, Article 21 TEU should be seen in connection with the EU’s fundamental rights responsibility that breaks with the territorial/extraterritorial dichotomy, which still cabins conventional international human rights jurisprudence and doctrine. The ‘can’ allows for sufficing the ‘must’, which prescribes a human rights policy that is global in its extent and self-constraining in substance. Thereby the human rights objective exhibits a progressive concept of human rights responsibility that is able to adequately take into account the global reach of the EU’s legislative action.

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the European protection of family, deriving from the recognition of the right to family reunification, its evolution in the relevant case-law and the achievements in this field. On the basis of family reunification, it has been possible to lay the foundation for the protection of the family as well as for the safeguard of the best interest of the child.
Family is one of the most important pillars of culture and society, that may be one of the reasons that justifies the recognition and the protection granted by several European and International legal instruments.
As known, the fundamental relevance for the life of the individual has been affirmed since 1948 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 16.3, according to which “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State” as well as in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, who defines the family as “the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community”
Such right has been reaffirmed in the following years through various instruments –that is the reason why we will emphasize that fundamental rights which are strictly linked to it are granted a “multilevel” protection- but the two leading provisions that will be scrutinized in the first chapter are contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights at Article 7 as well as in the European Convention on Human Rights at Article 8.
It has to be emphasized that this discipline has been built up throughout the years, due to the fact that, initially, the European Community was born for improving the Internal Market and, hence, for economic reasons.
Gradually –in the light of the need for workers to move from one Member State to another and with the creation of the European citizenship- also the person and the rights to which everyone is entitled started to be taken into account and the concept of the protection of the family began to make headway.

A crucial role is constantly played by the two Judicial Bodies that, pursuant to their respective prerogatives, have ensured a judicial protection of the aforementioned family rights at European level: the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.
Thanks to their judgments, it has been possible to lay the groundwork for the adoption of a common framework on such a sensitive issue, which is represented by the enactment of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, that amended Regulation (EEC) N. 1612/68 and repealed the previous Directives on this matter, as well as by Council Directive 2003/86 on family reunification.
This latter represents the first instrument adopted by the Council after the amendment to the TEU brought by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty in the field of asylum and immigration and it sets out the conditions for being granted the right to family reunification for third country nationals, who legally reside in a Member State.
The analysis will mainly revolve around the children, because the safeguard of family life is even more important when there are children involved, who are more in need of care, support and protection by their parents, due to their age and development.
But why is family reunification so important? In the words of the Directive 2003/86 on family reunification, “Family reunification is a necessary way of making family life possible. It helps to create sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third country nationals in the Member State, which also serves to promote economic and social cohesion, a fundamental Community objective stated in the Treaty ”
However, EU competence in this field is limited and Member States prefer to retain their powers in such a sensitive matter, basing their need on Article 4.2 of the Treaty on European Union, which states that “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.” Thus, it will be described how to deal with this matter by balancing EU competence with the Member States’ sovereignty.
Furthermore in the second chapter, through the judgments on which we will focus on, it will be showed the evolution made by the two judicial Bodies –the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights- in the field of family and, consequently, in family reunification; in fact, starting from 1980s, it will be analyzed the first Strasbourg Case regarding expulsion  that can be considered as  the first awareness by the Court of a non compliance with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
In addition, it will be showed how the Courts reasoned in deciding cases concerning long-term immigrants convicted of criminal offences and on how to balance their conduct with the right to respect for private and family life, by applying the so-called Boultif Criteria which is a sort of test that judges have to take into consideration in delivering their judgments, concerning aspects such as the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant as well as the applicant’s family situation.
Besides this assessment, it must be borne in mind that the derogations that are expressly allowed in those circumstances concern public policy, public security and public health. This means that at all times the State must strike a fair balance between the competing interests of the individual and the community as a whole.
It should be underlined that a major step forward in the recognition of the best interest of the child has been represented by four leading judgments of the Court of Justice  , which prioritized the ties that children had with EU territory instead of considering the fact that their parents were no longer entitled to remain in the host Member State.
Thus-from these judgments onward- the question that has begun to arise was whether provisions of Directive 2003/86 were lawful and in compliance with fundamental rights, as well as if the discretion left to Member States had to be narrowed or not.
Instead, the third chapter has been assigned the function of describing the Italian Legislation on this topic, by virtue of the fact that Italy preceded the adoption of the Directive on family reunification with the enactment of  Turco-Napolitano and Bossi-Fini laws and was, therefore, considered as a model for Europe. Moreover, through the analysis of the decisions held by Italian Courts, we will see whether Italy could be still considered as a model for Europe, as well as its implementation of the Directive into the domestic legal order.
Finally, the fourth chapter will dwell on the proposals raised by the European Commission to the stakeholders for a reform of Directive 2003/86. In fact, as abovementioned, it has been called into question the discretion left to the Member States on the implementation of the Directive and it has been remarked the urgency for a uniform set of rules throughout the EU territory, due to the fact that nowadays family reunification has been one of the main reasons for immigration into the EU and there is therefore the need of managing such flux of immigrants in a manner consistent with the protection of fundamental rights, notably regarding the respect for family life and the principle of the best interests of the child.

The paper studies the social rights in the European integration process and, specifically, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and its general clauses: INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES GUARANTEED IN THE CHARTER (Subjective field:  The holders of the rights recognized by the Charter,  The subjects bound by the Charter -The institutions, bodies and agencies of the eu, while respecting the principle of subsidiarity and The Member States, but only when they apply the law of the EU, and the problematic about the horizontal effectiveness of the Charter-). Scope and interpretation of the rights and principles of the Charter (Article 52 of the Charter): The interpretive value of the updated explanations,  The limitations of fundamental rights and freedoms, its typology, the distinction between rights and principles and the difference between General principles of the law of the union and principles (informers) within the meaning of art. 52.5 of the DDFF Charter, The influence of the various international instruments on the interpretation of Charter rights and the Level of protection of the rights recognized in the Charter.

Les droits sociaux, droits fondamentaux à part entière, le dialogue des juges
et l’approche des juridictions helléniques
par Sophia Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos
RÉSUMÉ
Les droits sociaux sont des droits fondamentaux à part entière. Ils produisent les mêmes effets juridiques, selon les mêmes critères, que les autres droits. La Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme (CourEDH), le Comité européen des droits sociaux (CEDS) et la Cour de justice de l’UE (CJUE) le confirment et font des références réciproques à leur jurisprudence. Le principe de la primauté de la norme la plus protectrice, énoncé dans les traités de droits de l’Homme et dans la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’UE (Charte UE), conditionne l’interprétation de toute norme relative aux droits de l’Homme. La Charte UE ignore toute catégorisation et met les droits sociaux sur le même pied que les autres droits. La CourEDH, par le biais des obligations positives de l’État, dégage de la Convention des droits sociaux qui ont les mêmes effets que les droits civils et politiques, y compris la justiciabilité. Le CEDS souligne la justiciabilité des dispositions de la Charte sociale européenne. La CJUE reconnaît des effets directs à toute disposition du droit de l’UE, y compris celles de la Charte UE, selon les mêmes critères, sans distinction entre droits sociaux et autres droits. Le Conseil d’État hellénique étend la portée de droits constitutionnels se fondant sur la Charte sociale. Il s’inspire implicitement de décisions du CEDS pour invalider des mesures d’austérité réduisant des pensions au point d’affecter le noyau du droit à la sécurité sociale et la dignité des retraités.

Social Rights, Full-fledged Fundamental Rights, the Dialogue of Judges and the Approach of Greek courts
by Sophia Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos
ABSTRACT
Social rights are full-fledged fundamental rights. They produce the same effects, according to the same criteria, as the other rights. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) and the EU Court of justice (CJEU) are confirming this. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter) expressing the indivisibility of fundamental rights proclaimed in its Preamble, ignores any categorisation and places social rights at the same level as the other rights. The ECtHR, draws from civil and political rights of the Convention economic and social rights that have the same effects as Convention provisions. The ECSR considers that the Social Charter provisions are invocable by individuals. The CJEU attributes direct effects to EU law provision, including those of the EU Charter, according to uniform criteria. The principle of the primacy of the more protective standard is included in all human rights treaties and in the EU Charter. The Greek Council of the State (Supreme Administrative Court) draws inspiration from this principle in order to extend the scope of constitutional rights on the basis of the Social Charter. It also draws inspiration from ECSR decisions in order to invalidate austerity measures that reduce pensions so as to affect the core of the right to social security and the pensioners’ dignity.

This article deals with one of the most debated and fundamental issues that are associated with the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Charter builds on pre-Lisbon jurisprudence, and among the addressees of the obligation to respect fundamental rights includes also the Member States. This introduces a further federative element into EU law and could serve as a unifying factor for the protection of fundamental rights in the EU. However, the key clause of Article 51 (1) introduces only the relative binding nature of the Charter for Member States when it stipulates that Member States are obliged to respect the Charter "only when they implement" EU law. This provision is linked to a number of questions and interpretative problems. The authors of the text draw a closer look and analyse the CJEU key case-law from recent years, which is devoted to understanding of that limiting clause.

EU institutions are deeply involved in the making of European financial assistance conditionality. Nevertheless, mechanisms providing financial assistance to Eurozone States are still regarded as foreign to the EU legal order. This paper assesses financial assistance conditionality as applied by the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism to Eurozone States from an EU human rights perspective. First, the hybrid nature of European financial assistance is illustrated through a series of institutional and substantive links between the international and the EU legal order. Second, the relative responsibility of

The EU’s commitment to fundamental rights has grown tremendously during the past decade, but recent developments underscore how quickly progress can be undone. Across the EU, the fundamental rights system is increasingly under attack – dismissed as political correctness gone awry, as benefitting only select individuals, or as hampering swift responses to urgent challenges. This year’s focus section further explores these issues, providing a thorough review of the past decade’s highlights and persisting shortfalls.

Laut den aktuellen Angaben der Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) sind weltweit 2,3 Milliarden Menschen übergewichtig. Neben unzureichender Bewegung stellt eine ungesunde Ernährungsweise die häufigste Ursache für Übergewicht dar. Eine derartige Lebensweise führt zwangsläufig zu zahlreichen, sog nichtübertragbaren Erkrankungen (noncommunicable diseases), wie etwa Bluthochdruck, Diabetes sowie zu Erkrankungen des Herz-Kreislauf-Systems. Insoweit erscheint es gerechtfertigt, wenn bisweilen davon gesprochen wird, dass Sitzen das neue Rauchen sei.So werden parallel zu den Bestrebungen im Kampf gegen den Tabakkonsum Einheitsverpackungen auch in Bezug auf ungesunde Produkte in Erwägung gezogen. Von dieser Maßnahme dürften künftig insb Alkoholprodukte betroffen sein. Der vorliegende Beitrag widmet sich daher der Frage, ob diese Maßnahmen mit europäischem Recht, insb mit der Eigentumsgarantie des Art 17 EU-Grundrechtecharta (GRC), zu vereinbaren sind.

The judicial creativity in the former years of the EEC created a schism and theoretical split in the normative core of the Community. What was initially an economic institution went on to assert itself as a polity of legal supremacy and a human rights guarantor. Developing decades of case law, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights codifies existing general principles and recognises new protections which apply to member states and EU law-making institutions. While there is prima facie merit in deeming the Charter, with its now binding status, an efficient mechanism to make rights ‘visible and explicit’; this essay argues that the Charter, and the rights therein, are ‘lost in complexity’, and, in certain areas, have exacerbated confusion. The modernised ambit of the Charter and the ideal of ECHR accession are certainly attractive; but this attraction is marred by the legal and procedural difficulties within them. The Charter does little, therefore, to remedy the confusion of fundamental rights development and its efficiency generally. Indeed, is it realistic to expect otherwise in a legal environment where fundamental rights were mere afterthought.

This article discusses ways in which the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and post-GATS free trade agreements may limit the EU's ability to regulate privacy and personal data protection as fundamental rights. After discussing this issue in two dimensions-the vertical relationship between trade and national and European Union (EU) law, and the horizontal relationship between trade and human rights law-the author concludes that these limits are real and pose serious risks. Inspired by recent developments in safeguarding labour, and environmental standards and sustainable development, the article argues that privacy and personal data protection should be part of and protected by international trade deals made by the EU. The EU should negotiate future international trade agreements with the objective of allowing them to reflect the normative foundations of privacy and personal data protection. This article discusses the conflict of regulatory goals of privacy and personal data protection and its implications for the future of EU framework in the context of international trade law, suggests a specific way to achieve this objective.

SOMMARIO. 1. Obiettivi e piano dell'indagine.-2. Clausole di deroga nei trattati sui diritti umani: l'articolo 15 della CEDU.-3. (Segue) Necessità delle misure in deroga-4. Rilievo delle dichiarazioni di deroga ex articolo 15 della CEDU ai fini della portata degli obblighi posti dalla Carta dei diritti fondamentali.-5. (Segue) Indicazioni desumibili dalla giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia.-6. Non sospendibilità della Carta in applicazione delle norme internazionali sul diritto dei trattati.-7. Possibile rilievo della forza maggiore e dello stato di necessità quale causa di esclusione dell'illecito dello Stato.-8. (Segue) Efficacia diretta verticale e orizzontale della Carta.-9. Limitazioni ordinarie previste dall'art. 52, par. 1, della Carta e ruolo del diritto derivato negli stati di emergenza.-10. Considerazioni conclusive.

Sommario: 1. Il perimetro "instabile" dello spazio giuridico europeo dei diritti fondamentali.-2. Classificazioni dei diritti e regole d'interpretazione: l'art. 52 CDFUE e le Costituzioni nazionali.-3. I casi sui conflitti fra diritti della Carta e diritti costituzionali.-4. Costituzione e Carta dei diritti nel controllo di costituzionalità delle leggi: la giurisprudenza costituzionale italiana.-5. Conflitti fra principi della Carta e diritti costituzionali: tutela sistemica e livello minimo costituzionale di tutela dei diritti. 1. Il perimetro "instabile" dello spazio giuridico europeo dei diritti fondamentali Fra gli elementi caratteristici del processo d'integrazione europea vi sono le tecniche di "prevenzione" e di risoluzione delle antinomie fra norme costituzionali sui diritti e norme dell'Unione europea. Queste tecniche sono state elaborate in un contesto ordinamentale in cui i diritti costi-tuzionali sono stati qualificati dalle Corti costituzionali come controlimiti rispetto al processo d'integrazione europea, mentre il primato del diritto dell'Unione è stato assicurato dalla Corte di giustizia dell'Unione anche attraverso l'elaborazione di una giurisprudenza che ha condot-to, dapprima, a qualificare i diritti costituzionali come principi generali del diritto dell'Unione europea e, successivamente, a trasferire all'interno dei trattati clausole di garanzia dei diritti umani e le stesse tradizioni costituzionali 1. Con il Trattato di Lisbona, da ultimo, viene attri-* Professore associato di Diritto Costituzionale nell'Università degli Studi di Palermo 1 Corte cost. n. 170 del 1984; Corte cost. n. 348 e 349 del 2007; Corte cost. n. 269 del 2017; BVerfGE 89, 155 (cd. Maastricht Urteil) ed ancor di più BVerfG, Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 30. Juni 2009-2 BvE 2/08-, Rn. (1-421) (cd. Lissabon Urteil). Cfr. S.P. Panunzio, I diritti fondamentali e le Corti in Europa, in Id. (a cura di), I diritti fondamentali e le Corti in Europa, Napoli, 2005, 3 ss. e da ultimo R. Bin, Giurisdizione e ruolo delle Corti costituzionali nel processo di integrazione europea, in Dir. pubbl. comp. europeo, 2019-III, 905 ss., spec. tutto il paragrafo 7. Si veda anche P. Faraguna, Il ruolo delle Corti costituzionali dal principio di apertura alle regole di chiusura dell'ordi-namento, in Dir. pubbl. comp. europeo, 2019-III, 821 ss., che invece ipotizza che non sempre i controlimiti possa-no rivestire tale potenziale.

Should the UK Human Rights Act be repealed, another European Human Rights Charter would still remain in force in the UK - the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This instrument has also come under attack – for example, by the 2014 recommendation of the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee that legislation be passed by the UK Parliament disapplying the Charter in the UK.

However, we should be clear that the adoption of such legislation would place the UK in breach of its obligations under EU law, and open to financial penalties. This article considers the impact of the Charter in the UK, arguing that the European Scrutiny Committee is misguided in its call for its disapplication. Much of the Committee’s report targets a lack of clarity in certain aspects of the Charter, including a fear that it could be used to extend EU competences. The report also expresses some frustration that the UK’s so-called ‘opt-out’, in Protocol 30 Lisbon treaty, is in fact incapable of operating as such, despite the great claims made for it by some politicians at the time of its drafting.

However, I argue that, while there are some uncertainties in the Charter’s application, these are no greater than those applying in human rights law generally, and CJEU caselaw is in any case clarifying this law. On the other hand, we should be clear that the alternative of disapplying the Charter in the UK would lead to far greater legal uncertainty and also expose the UK to large fines for breaching EU law. But crucially, what the Committee report also ignores is the important protections and safeguards that the Charter offers against an overreaching EU – safeguards which have become visible in cases such as Digital Rights Ireland, in which the CJEU invalidated a whole EU measure for its failure to comply with the Charter. The last section of this article considers the Committee’s recommendation as a part of a broader euroscepticsm about fundamental rights, both within the UK and in the EU more generally.

In questo intervento si vuole ricostruire il dibattito europeo intorno ai processi costituenti e di (mancata) costituzionalizzazione che hanno coinvolto le istituzioni euro-unitarie a partire dalla fine degli anni Novanta del Novecento, con l'adozione della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell'Unione Europea, che avrebbe potuto costituire l'avvio di un nuovo modello sociale europeo nella società della conoscenza, ancora più necessario dinanzi ai mutamenti della società digitale e dei poteri privati che la governano. Perciò si approfitta di tre anniversari, l'ottantennale del Manifesto di Ventotene (1941), il trentennale della morte di Ursula Hirschmann (1913-1991), il ventennale oramai superato dell'adozione della Carta di Nizza/Strasburgo (2000) per proporre una controstoria dell'ultimo ventennio del processo di integrazione continentale, per pensare diritti sociali e solidarietà paneuropea dinanzi alle sfide post-pandemiche e delle accelerazioni delle innovazioni tecnologiche e digitali, a partire da un necessario welfare continentale fondato su garanzie universali di protezione sociale, come ad esempio il reddito di base, come vero e proprio ius existentiae nell'era digitale e pandemica.
https://www.rivistaitalianadiinformaticaediritto.it/index.php/RIID/article/view/83

Parole chiave: Modello sociale europeo - Società digitale - Diritti sociali -Solidarietà.

Sommario: 1. Premessa, a partire da tre anniversari 2. Ripensare la Carta dei diritti fondamentali come (mancata?) innovazione costituente nell'Europa precaria dell'economia della conoscenza 3. Per non ripetere gli errori del recente passato: diritti sociali e solidarietà paneuropea nella società automatica della comunicazione digitale. Primi appunti per la Conferenza sul futuro dell'Europa

Člen 23 Ustave Republike Slovenije, Uradni list RS, št. 33/91-I in nasl. 2 Prvi odstavek 6. člena EKČP. Zakon o ratifikaciji Konvencije o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin, Uradni list RS, št. 33/94, MP, št. 7/94. 3 Listina Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah, UL C 83, 30. marec 2010. 4 O vsebini temeljnih procesnih jamstev poglobljeno Aleš Galič, nav. delo.