European Problems in Understanding Human Dignity

This paper challenges the claim that human dignity is not the foundation of human rights, but is rather a special kind of human right itself. The claim recognizes that human persons have a vulnerable and psychologically constructed identity called the Self which is continuously developed throughout their lifetime. Such a claim relies on moral Contractualism as the basis for human rights and the Self is said to be an integral part of the human person such that she both demands that it remain free from serious insult while agreeing to refrain from insulting any other person’s Self. The argument for human dignity as a right will be critiqued for too quickly dismissing alternative accounts of dignity which place it as the foundation, rather than a result of human rights. Dignity is, by definition, that which makes one worthy rather than the result of being worthy. Therefore, dignity is not the kind of thing which can be the result of human rights. Dignity is best understood as the foundation of human rights as articulated by the theory of “attribution-dignity” which argues that people have dignity based on their status as human beings. Human beings possess a self, and dignity is constituted by the possession of the Self by humans, rather than their demand that the Self which they possess be protected.

In Brett G Scharffs, Andrea Pin, and Dmytro Vovk (eds). Human Dignity, Judicial Reasoning and the Law: Comparative Perspectives on a Key Constitutional Concept. (Routledge), 2023

The first part of the chapter will uncover the plurality of meanings of the notion of human dignity expanded after World War II in legal philosophy to sketch a typology of six notions of human dignity. Considering human dignity´s multivocal features, I outline a typology of notions of human dignity as a convenient tool for unveiling the different usages of human dignity in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This controversial term has been invoked by both parties in front of the Court, dissenting judges of the Court, third parties, or national authorities in the framework of the margin appreciation doctrine. Since analyzing the vast number of Strasbourg´s cases concerning human dignity is arduous, I have selected key cases in which human dignity has played a significant role in elucidating the current trends in the so-called “dignity cases.”

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of ' dignity ' or ' human dignity ' in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of ' dignity ' , beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specifi c, varying signifi cantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to signifi cant judicial manipulation, increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its signifi cant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally, highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of ' human dignity ' plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.

Ratio Publica, 2023

This paper explores the possible relations between human dignity and human rights and identifies the appropriate account of the relations. There are at least three crucial issues concerning human dignity as a ground for human rights. The first is whether dignity is a useful notion for human rights. Some say dignity is a useless or incoherent notion by itself, while others say dignity cannot justify human rights because it cannot demonstrate why people have the rights equally. The paper rejects both of these. The second issue is about the connection between the two notions. Some say that support for dignity does not entail support for human rights, while others say that the support for human rights does not involve support for human dignity. Through examination, the paper supports the statement that the support for human rights entails the support for human dignity (primarily, the article supports the justification that grounds human rights, at least in part, on dignity). The third issue is that of grounding: How does human dignity ground human rights? Some claim capacities are appropriate for understanding dignity, while others claim that we should add vulnerabilities in understanding the notion when it grounds human rights. The paper offers a dualistic view that accommodates both by treating interests concerning agency and equality as grounds for human rights. Finally, the paper elucidates the advantages of dualism compared to the capacity-based pluralism recently posited by Pablo Gilabert.

2021

The Punta del Este Declaration, and this book dedicated to elaborating upon it, is devoted to exploring the ways that human dignity for everyone everywhere can be a useful tool in helping to address the challenges and strains facing human rights in the world today. In 2018, an initiative was instigated to revitalize the human rights project by way of engaging the notion of human dignity. This resulted in the Punta Del Este Declaration on Human Dignity for Everyone Everywhere (Punta Del Este Declaration), a declaration co-authored by over 30 human rights experts from all over the world. The Punta Del Este Declaration simplifies and brings coherence to the concept of human dignity in 10 brief statements that capture the many dimensions and aspects of human dignity and the practical ways that human dignity is useful in the promotion of human rights. This book provides an overview of how the notion of human dignity has been used to strengthen human rights. It discusses how human dignity plays many different roles in human rights discourse and has the force to revitalize the human rights project; it is the foundational principle upon which the human rights project is built. But it is also the telos, or end goal, of human rights. At the same time, it is an important evaluative mechanism for assessing how well a country is doing in the implementation of human rights. The book will be a valuable resource for all those working in the areas of International Human Rights Law, Legal Philosophy, and Law and Religion.

This essay questions what is argued by many scholars today, namely that the moral concept of human dignity provides the basis for the establishment of human rights. More specifically, I critically discuss the two most prominent conceptions of human dignity, the 'status' and the 'value' (coming from the Catholic and the Kantian traditions) conceptions of dignity, which are suggested today as the foundations of human rights (sections I and II). Ultimately, I propose a different, 'duty-based' philosophical account for the justification of the latter (section III). Since 1948, human rights have been widely accepted and ratified by most countries. However, a great number of human rights violations and abuses still occur worldwide. Even if there is a broad human rights' framework, the latter is considered to be ineffective. One of the main reasons of its ineffectiveness is the fact that in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and in the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC), rights are described in abstract terms. But for human rights to be respected they have to be clear and concrete. I argue that the formulation of rights by the drafters of the major human rights documents should be supplemented by their philosophical establishment. It is argued by many scholars today that human dignity provides the basis for the establishment of human rights. In this essay, I question the claim that human dignity is the foundation of human rights. More specifically, I critically discuss the two most prominent conceptions of human dignity, namely the 'status' and the 'value' (coming from the Catholic and the Kantian traditions) conceptions of dignity, which are suggested today as the foundations of human rights (sections I and II). Ultimately, I propose a different, 'duty-based' philosophical account for the justification of the latter (section III).

Oxímora. Revista Internacional de Ética y Política, 2016

This paper will evaluate the convenience of using the legal concept of human dignity in the human rights discourse and its effectiveness to address injustice in a twenty-first century democratic society. This article will argue that the difficulty of defining human dignity does not diminish its merits and allows it to be both solid and adaptable to new challenges. Then, this paper will argue that human dignity is a powerful concept due to its capacity to bring change and modernise society and will conclude that there is a strong relationship between time, human dignity, human rights and democracy.

Cambridge University Press eBooks, 2014

Many venerable legal documents suggest that human dignity is the ground of human rights. The German Constitution (1945) opens in Article 1 with the captivating declaration: 'human dignity is inviolable' , and goes on in Article 2 to state: 'The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world' (emphasis added). 1 The Helsinki Accords (1975) even more explicitly claim that human rights 'derive from the inherent dignity of the human person'. On this view human beings have rights because they have dignity. On an even stronger view, which is also quite common in constitutional law, it is the very function of those rights to protect the dignity of human beings. In that case, all human rights are specifications of one fundamental right: the right to have one's dignity (or the dignity of the human species?) respected. At the other end of the spectrum of possible views we find the sceptical idea that all appeals to human dignity are entirely vacuous: they can be made for any specific claim about human rights whatsoever, they are routinely being made for opposing views, for example about euthanasia, and have no argumentative, butonlyrhetorical,force.'Dignityisauselessconcept...andcanbeeliminated without any loss of content' (Macklin 2003). 2 I shall argue that both views are mistaken. Appeals to human dignity have a proper role in human rights discourse, but it is not a foundational and also in some other respects a limited role.

Background/Objectives: The term "dignity" is widely used in the texts of the international legal instruments, but international law has not developed its agreed definition. This concept of dignity is reflected in the first international human rights instruments. Methods/Statistical analysis: Analysis of international instruments on human rights shows that in the 20th century, the concept of dignity became the basis of human rights law. This is confirmed by the fact that, firstly, dignity is inherent to all members of the human family. Secondly, all human beings are free and equal in dignity and rights. And thirdly, these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. That is why the better understanding of human dignity as a traditional value can boost promotion and fulfillment of human rights. Findings: The article deals with the concept of dignity from the standpoint of philosophy, Western Christianity and Russian Orthodoxy that contributed to the formulation of the concept of dignity, its definition and elements, and international law. Applications/Improvements: The centrality of human dignity in universal human rights texts can be explained by its core nature. It is fundamental and at the same time it seems uncontroversial enough to attract the entirety of the world community notwithstanding the diversity of morals, cultures, ethnicities, and religions that exist within the broad range of nations.

Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad, 2016

The concept of human dignity is relatively new in international and domestic constitutional law. Dignity is protected as a value or a right, or both, in international law and many domestic jurisdictions. It is difficult to define human dignity in a legal context, as the concept is not defined in the first international document which recognizes inherent human dignity and the protection thereof, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1946) and many international (and national) documents enacted thereafter. Despite dissensus regarding the widespread use of the concept, dignity has come to display three elements in constitutional adjudication post World War Two: the ontological element which entails that human beings have equal inherent human dignity that cannot be waived or diminished; the second element being the claim that inherent human dignity has to be recognised and respected; and the limited-state claim as the third element which entails that states have a positive obligati...