"Belt and Road" Initiative

Purpose – According to official statements, BRI is a Chinese call for global cooperation, based on five
priorities: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-topeople
bonds. The purpose of this paper is, primarily, to describe and contextualize the official discourse of
China’s foreign policy toward Latin America, emphasizing on BRI. On that basis, the author aims to contrast
official rhetoric with real facts, bringing problematic cases associated with implementing BRI in Asian and
African developing countries, so as to discuss possible challenges that Latin America can encounter when
implementing the initiative. Finally, the author evaluates potential implications of resembling the Chinese
three-level scheme of development in the region and make suggestions on this subject.
Design/methodology/approach – In an effort to evaluate possible implications of BRI in Latin America, the
paper describes and contextualizes Chinese foreign policy official rhetoric toward the region’s countries. Based
on that, the author brings to discussion Asian and African experiences in the implementation of the initiative
and raise questions on controversial issues that Latin America could meet when enforcing BRI-related projects.
Findings – As a part of its new foreign and economic policies, China continues to strengthen its engagement
with Latin American countries, enlarging its strategy though the promotion of BRI. If Latin American
countries, through BRI, seek to replicate the Chinese three-level of development scheme, including domestic,
regional and global scopes, certain controversial issues cannot be ignored in the design and implementation
processes. Also, equal participation of Chinese and Latin American governments, societies and enterprises is
decisive if the goal is to settle a long-term development scenario for the region.
Originality/value – The central thesis of this paper is that the implementation of BRI in Latin American
countries could potentially replicate the Chinese three-level development proposal. To achieve such an
ambitious goal, much depends on how Latin American countries define and enforce BRI projects. Full
understanding of those challenges requires close attention to what the Chinese official rhetoric claims and what
actually puts into practice in other developing countries already involved in BRI, so as to anticipate possible
consequences for the region.

The Indo-Pacific region stretches from the eastern Indian Ocean shores of Africa and West Asia to the littoral countries of the western Pacific. The region constitutes the ‘maritime underbelly’ of Asia, and is the fastest growing region in the world; and in a few decades, is likely to witness what may be referred to as ‘Renaissance 2.0’. The region is, therefore, ripe with enormous opportunities, not only for regional countries, but also for the rest of the global community. And yet, the region is beset with equally colossal security risks that emanate from inter alia the rise of China - that is not satisfied with ‘status quo’ in the global order including established international law and norms; strategic rivalries and the attendant security dilemma and arms race; issues of governance including maritime jurisdictions; the proliferation of malevolent non-state actors involved in maritime crimes and terrorism; and so on. The book is a collation of commentaries that analyse the trends with regard to the geopolitical and maritime security environment, along with the naval developments, in the Indo-Pacific in the past half-decade or so.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) from the People’s Republic of China is receiving a tremendous amount of attention. Press articles try to document what it is, how it has advanced and what it means for different parts of the world. Assessments presented are often based on studies from think tanks, consultants and academics that discuss a variety of subjects, ranging from infrastructure development, geopolitics and global governance to the future of multilateralism. More than ten thousand articles have been written on the subject in the course of a few years.

Many interpretations exist regarding the underlying objectives of the BRI. Economic motivations could include securing supply chains for strategic commodities; optimising transport chains for Chinese exports; stimulating trade opportunities of China’s inland provinces and internationalising and upgrading China’s commercial and industrial maritime cluster. This cluster includes shipping, port construction and development, shipbuilding, dredging and port services. According to some observers, military objectives might also be served. There seems to be a consensus that China aims to achieve multiple objectives through the BRI, simultaneously. Indeed, the open and flexible manner in the way that BRI is defined allows for multiple directions.

The objective of this paper is to analyse the initiative’s potential impacts on global trade. The BRI is examined as a collection of planned transport-corridor developments and analyse what their impact could be on maritime trade flows.

Covid-19 brought to the surface many structural vulnerabilities in the Western Balkans, a European periphery marked by its weak economies and inefficient and underfinanced healthcare and social welfare systems. There has been a pressing need for external support and several external actors (such as the EU, China, Russia and Turkey) have stepped in to provide assistance. Under normal circumstances, the prompt response of a plurality of actors should have been a very positive development for the region. However, this is not entirely the case. External actors have been in direct competition in a fierce race for geopolitical influence and preeminence, striving to position themselves ahead of the others for the challenges and opportunities of the post-pandemic period. The EU distinguishes itself from the other external actors for its comprehensive pandemic-related assistance to the region, which has exceeded €3.3 billion. Its concerns cover a range of priorities, from supporting national healthcare systems to stimulating socioeconomic recovery. The EU has also donated more than 23 million pieces of personal protective equipment, as well as dozens of ambulances, ventilators and intensive care monitors. Moreover, Brussels has given €70 million for the procurement of EU-approved vaccines; promised to provide 651,000 vaccine doses until August 2021; and said it would also deliver more than 1.1 million vaccine doses until June 1 www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/covid-support-western-balkans-health-vaccines/.

The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on the Mediterranean region. The research addresses two main questions. First, it investigates the factors driving the BRI and China’s involvement in the Mediterranean. Second, it evaluates how the initiative affects China’s foreign policy posture toward the region and its relationship with regional powers.
The thesis first argues that the Belt and Road Initiative can be seen as the product of the convergence of two sets of factors. On one hand, the BRI is driven by economic imperatives necessary to sustain China’s economic growth and development in the future and to address domestic economic imbalances. On the other hand, the BRI represents the flagship tool for China to claim greater space in the international system and to pursue the long-held objective of returning to great-power status.
The expansion of China's footprint in the Mediterranean reflects some of the economic priorities at the core of the initiative. By operating, acquiring, and expanding some of the most relevant ports in almost every country of the basin, China has established a broad and well-connected network of maritime infrastructures that fosters the circulation and the distribution of Chinese goods. The research further maintains that, while China’s increasing economic exposure in the Mediterranean sets the stage for a more proactive foreign policy, its involvement in regional security dynamics is still limited.

European definition of micro, small and medium enterprises as an instrument of the development policy of the enterprise sector – experience, postulates and conclusions for the future

The subject of the article is the issue of separating micro, small and medium enterprises (SME) from the general economy which due to their small size encounter market barriers hindering their development. The basic legal instruments in this matter is the definition of the SME sector at the level of the EU regulations. The purpose of the analysis is to look for advantages and disadvantages of the existing definition, as well as to refer to the selected ideas of its modification, considering European Union case law. The main research hypothesis is: regarding the importance of SME’s definition for the EU economy, the changes that must be made in the analysed concept must take into account the existing economic conditions as well as the previously available use of the same definition by the institutions. However, it is equally important to identify the purpose for which the SMEs were separated under a specific definition. The purpose of this separation was to provide support for such SMEs, which they de facto need. The basic research method used in the article is the dogmatic and legal method. Its subject was the analysis of the content of normative acts, the EU case law, as well as reports and analyses in the field of the SME sector.

Przedmiotem artykułu jest problematyka wyodrębnienia z ogółu gospodarki mikro, małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw (MŚP), które z uwagi na swoje nieduże rozmiary napotykają na bariery rynkowe utrudniające im rozwój. Podstawowym narzędziem prawnym w tym zakresie jest definicja sektora MŚP określona na poziomie przepisów UE. Celem prowadzonej analizy jest poszukiwanie zalet i wad obecnej definicji oraz odniesienie się do poszczególnych pomysłów jej modyfikacji, z uwzględnieniem linii orzeczniczej organów Unii Europejskiej. Zasadnicza hipoteza badawcza brzmi: z uwagi na znaczenie definicji MŚP dla gospodarki UE, zmiany jakie powinny zostać dokonane w analizowanej definicji, muszą uwzględniać zarówno obecne uwarunkowania gospodarcze, jak i dotychczasowe doświadczenia organów stosujących tę definicję, jednak zasadniczym punktem odniesienia przy konstruowaniu zmian jest cel, dla którego przedsiębiorstwa te zostały wyodrębnione. Celem tym jest wsparcie podmiotów, takiej pomocy de facto potrzebujących. Podstawową metodą badawczą, zastosowaną w artykule jest metoda dogmatyczno-prawna. Jej przedmiotem była analiza treści aktów normatywnych, orzecznictwa organów UE, a także branżowych raportów i analiz z zakresu sektora MŚP.

Based on its cultural heritage and future vision, Syria launched the Five Seas Initiative in 2004, with the intention of improving regional cooperation. This initiative triggered a plethora of new paradigms and terminologies that address several developments expected to influence both the Middle Eastern conflict theater and the international landscape, particularly in the period 2010-2011 After nine years of war that served to undermine the Five Seas Initiative, and upon the failure of the hegemony of global capitalism in its crude forms, it is now time to put forward a real alternative based on common interests between regional and international actors, which would respect regional diversity away from extremism. Since Middle Eastern countries share common problems, proposed solutions to these problems would be more effective if they were formulated and carried out collectively. Ultimately, development is the only way to bring peace to the Middle East, and a lasting solution to shared problems can only be reached within the framework of “Peace Through Development”. The combination of the “Five Seas Strategy” and the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) would provide such a solution by reconstructing southwest Asia and creating a network of infrastructures thanks to Syria’s privileged geopolitical position at the intersection of the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Caspian Sea, and the Black Sea. Full engagement with this combined strategy seems to be the best way to avoid another wasted decade for the majority of Middle Eastern countries.

China is pressing ahead with ambitious plans to create a massive infrastructure network connecting it with many countries across the globe. Some of the 'belt and road' infrastructure will however, run through regions convulsed by chronic civil unrest, substantial criminality and incipient insurgencies and need protection by China's private security companies. Simultaneously the Chinese state is undertaking a major 'anti-secession and counter-terrorism' campaign in Xinjiang using a variety of high-technology means: artificial intelligence, big data, wireless connectivity, autonomous systems and robotics. The demand and supply sides seem to be in sync, suggesting Chinese private security companies will soon use a suite of advanced information technology systems with a proven employment doctrine across much of Central Asia, South Asia and Africa. Such a future may be plausible but it is by no means certain as various factors may yet thwart China's private security companies.

This paper analyses EU and member-state responses to the Belt and Road Initiative and addresses norm contestation in Sino-European discourse regarding the primary institutions of Sovereignty, International Law, and Market Economy. The paper combines the toolset of the English School with norm contestation theory in its discourse analysis. The findings show evidence for contestation and increasing tension in Sino-European discourse and relations since the beginning of Xi’s presidency. Moreover, that the BRI, while at first a projection screen for substantive disagreements and contestation, eventually became subject to contestation itself. Based on these findings, the paper advances three arguments. First, that the BRI increasingly presented a challenge to EU cohesion and unity, especially in member states’ foreign policy vis-à-vis China. Second, that substantive disagreements between China and the EU, Germany, and Italy were based in a clash of pluralist and liberal-solidarist interpretations of Sovereignty, International Law, and the Market Economy. Third, that in contesting liberal-solidarist interpretations of PIs, China is resisting European solidarisation and arguably proposing a pluralist alternative to a liberal-solidarist order.

Research on Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is rising but far fromcomplete. This special issue (SI) aims to enhance our understanding of how firms in Asia and beyond strategically respond to the BRI and what new theories and investigations are needed to better elucidate this new environment. In this editorial, we present a brief description of BRI, a review of related studies in the international business (IB) domain, a summary of the articles included in the SI and their contributions to the study of BRI, and an agenda for future research. We suggest that more attention should be given to examination of organizational heterogeneity
under the BRI theme. In particular, there exists a variety of players like the governments of the host countries, non-government institutions, firms with different ownership structures, managers with different backgrounds, and their idiosyncratic characteristics should be incorporated in BRI studies. Moreover, future studies should find fine-grained ways to theorize and operationalize the policy effects of BRI. We call for further investigation of the consequences of BRI, including but not limiting to different aspects of IB activities, innovation, entrepreneurship, and corporate social responsibility.

Summary The India’s Look East policy was introduced for better economic relation with it’s eastern neighbors. However jumped into  “Act East policy” under Modi’s government which aims to improve and strengthen India’s foreign policy with ASEAN with special emphasis on Greater-Mekong Sub-region Economic Corridors under china’s B&R initiative.  India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway  will connect Moreh to Mae Sot in Thailand, via Mandalay and Yangon in Myanmar. The road will be further linked to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. According to GMS statistical database, GMS countries reached $ 3.1 trillion (GDP at PPP , 2016) and currently has more than 200 projects are in the pipeline. The Mekong countries are gradually shifting its economy from agriculture to market-based and has the potential to be one of the world's fastest growing region. There are three main economic corridors in the Greater Mekong subregion i.e. The North-South Economic Corridor (NSEC), The East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC) and The Southern Economic Corridor (SEC)....

We evaluate the respective roles, functions and prospects of the 15 Chinese ports, intended to be the 'eastern end' of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). To achieve this, and thus contribute to the future development of BRI, we introduce the concept of sustainable development capability. We employ principal component analysis and analytic hierarchy process to build a model which evaluates the (cooperative) sustainability of the ports, based on four dimensions: capacity of port operations; (ambient) economic conditions; environmental factors; and human intellect and technology (HIT). Sensitivity and cluster analysis are used, to classify the ports into four categories (respective roles): international hub ports, regional hub ports, node ports, and regional gate ports. We hope that the port system we present and assess here will provide guidance to ports and countries, especially in Europe, leading to the right 'port alliances', that could turn BRI into an efficient global transportation system.

Grand strategies are vital elements of formulation of long term foreign and security policies of the great powers. In other words, great powers mobilize all of available strategic tools and methods to achieve their regional and global political goals. China’s recent initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), sets a good example of implementation of great power’s grand strategy. China, by enhancing its bilateral and multilateral economic and political relations with the countries in the BRI zone, aims to further its influence in the regional and global levels. An examination of Chinese action plans and strategic documents asserts that the Levant is one of the most important regions in Chinese policy formulations along with the Arctic. The importance of the Levant in China’s grand strategy derives from its geostrategic location since the Levant is a regional connection hub for land and maritime transportation. Therefore, China has been heavily investing in the region in the last two decades such as its investment in Piraeus Port in Greece. Given the Levant’s importance in China’s grand strategy, this study evaluates Chinese investments in the region, particularly via national championships. Furthermore, it engages the Chinese strategy towards the region and evaluates Chinese expansion into the greater Mediterranean region.

In Jul 19, China released its new defence white paper, "China's National Defence in the New Era". Notably, the title draws upon the thought developed by President Xi Jinping, “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. This brief analyses the document in the context of the seminal geopolitical developments since the last White Paper published in 2015, notably the assumption of the office by the current US President (Jan 17), the India-China Dokhlam military stand-off (Jun-Aug 17), inauguration of China's first overseas military base in Djibouti (Aug 17) and President Trump's enunciation of “Indo-Pacific” concept during his Asia tour (Nov 17).

The Ukrainian crisis of 2014 has been a popular theme of journal and media articles for obvious reasons. Its "Chinese", or rather Sino-Russian dimension has been less so, though the Chinese reaction to the Ukrainian crisis and the implications of this reaction represent interesting political phenomenon. This article tries to fill this gap and uses the description of Russia and China policies during the crisis as a case study of Moscow's and Beijing's political behavior on the international scene in general. Its thesis is that the Ukrainian crisis represents a great case study of these behaviors. Moreover, this case is also a supplement to the general discussion in the field about the state of Russia-China contemporary political relations.

As the world urbanizes and builds more infrastructure, the extraction of built-up areas using remote sensing is crucial for monitoring land cover changes and understanding urban environments. Previous studies have proposed a variety of methods for mapping regional and global built-up areas. However, most of these methods rely on manual selection of training samples and classification thresholds, leading to low extraction efficiency. Furthermore, thematic accuracy is limited by interference from other land cover types like bare land, which hinder accurate and timely extraction and monitoring of dynamic changes in built-up areas. This study proposes a new method to map built-up areas by combining VIIRS (Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite) nighttime lights (NTL) data and Landsat-8 multispectral imagery. First, an adaptive NTL threshold was established, vegetation and water masks were superimposed, and built-up training samples were automatically acquired. Second, the training samples were employed to perform supervised classification of Landsat-8 data before deriving the preliminary built-up areas. Third, VIIRS NTL data were used to obtain the built-up target areas, which were superimposed onto the built-up preliminary classification results to obtain the built-up area fine classification results. Four major metropolitan areas in Eurasia formed the study areas, and the high spatial resolution (20 m) built-up area product High Resolution Layer Imperviousness Degree (HRL IMD) 2015 served as the reference data. The results indicate that our method can accurately and automatically acquire built-up training samples and adaptive thresholds, allowing for accurate estimates of the spatial distribution of built-up areas. With an overall accuracy exceeding 94.7%, our method exceeded accuracy levels of the FROM-GLC and GUL built-up area products and the PII built-up index. The accuracy and efficiency of our proposed method have significant potential for global built-up area mapping and dynamic change monitoring.

Today the Silk Road is rapidly becoming one of the key geocultural and geostrategic concepts of the 21st century. A narrative of connected histories, it now operates as a platform for international trade, heritage diplomacy, infrastructure development and geopolitical ambition. Identified by two principal routes - maritime and overland, the Silk Road stretches across the Indian Ocean and Eurasian landmass, regions that will be of paramount importance in an increasingly multi-polar world.
This presentation examines how these narratives of historical connectivity and the idea of a Maritime Silk Road came about. It poses the question: Does the Maritime Silk Road stretch back millennia or is it merely an invented history less than five decades old? And if it is invented, does that matter?

The scope of this essay is to underline and comprehend the role of soft power that is associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. It is really important to implore further into this particular topic during a time of fading American influence across the world, The promotion of Chinese soft power is to serve domestic purposes. In particular, Chinese soft power is designed to “better safeguard the people’s cultural rights, to enrich the cultural life of the Chinese society, and to raise the people’s aspiration for progress. The expansion of Chinese soft power abroad aims to serve dual purposes. Internally, it contributes to social cohesiveness which could be translated into public support for the government action. Externally, it could help de-legitimize the US hegemony.

China is trying to bring in more people from across the world in touch with Chinese understandings and preferences and by explaining their source, the hope is that people will become more accepting of them – ultimately, perhaps, they might even share and support them, but the aim at least in the short run is for them not to be found worrying and/or offensive. For western society particularly for the elites, there often has been a gathering amount of interest in understanding and perceiving the Chinese culture in their sort of way. In developing its own soft power, China wants to undermine that of the United States of America which threaten the legitimacy of an authoritarian China.

La pandemia de Covid-19 profundizó las tendencias estructurales de la transición geopolítica en curso. El cambio del centro de gravedad del poder mundial hacia múltiples polos de poder emergentes, sumado al nuevo dinamismo económico del Asia Pacífico, son los procesos más importantes en este sentido. En el presente trabajo, hacemos un repaso del desempeño de la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta (Ruta de la Seda) en el año 2020, un año marcado por la crisis mundial, pero en donde China ha logrado ser el motor de la economía mundial, tendencia que se profundizará en 2021.

Diaspora tourism has become a significant form of transnational mobility that underlies many issues in the field of tourism and migration studies. Despite a considerable body of research that focuses on tourism motivations of home return and its social functions in collective identities and meaning-making, the political roles of diaspora tourism in shaping ethnic bonds and transnational networks need to be further acknowledged. Since 2014, a group of Muslims from Kazakhstan have travelled to China to celebrate their return after over 140 years of displacement from their homeland. Interviews with local officials and residents in Xi’an illustrate the political factors of host governments and local Muslim communities in organising the formal group tourism events. Unlike informal and personal travel, such officially organised diaspora tourism does not serve as a simple act of homecoming. The host governments have used it as a political tool to shape transnational networks and domestic ethnic governance under the discourse of ‘Belt and Road’ initiative. To fulfil this political agenda, the official narrative of diaspora tourism involves a process of remembering and forgetting, and the creation of itineraries that authenticates the imagined ancestral homeland while effacing the unsettled past. The itinerary of tourism events and related cultural practices focuses on a shared ethno-religious identity and common interests of cultural and business exchange between the selected diaspora representatives and host communities. However, due to its political nature, the sustainability of diaspora tourism does not only relate to funding and resource management. Such organised diaspora tourism is also closely associated with the shifting ethnic and migration policies of the host nation-state.

In these papers I will explore, through the lens of social power structures, the material and ideological structures and aims that frame the Belt and Road Initiative, precisely its flagship project China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. In the first part, I will frame my argument in line with Frantz Fanon's thread of colonial and post-colonial societies described in 'The Wretched of the Earth'. I will compare his analysis with the current state of Pakistan’s implementation of CPEC, dissecting the causes, methods and possible consequences of it. The second part will focus more on the actual implementation of these projects in two ares of Pakistan: Gilgit-Baltistan and Gwadar, Balochistan. I will focus on the following research questions: who is going to benefit the most from these projects, and how? What are the ideological pillars of the Initiative? Is it economically, environmentally, ethically sustainable? What's the role of Pakistani establishment in it? What kind of vision of humanity does this Initiative propose? This dissertation will contribute to the discourse on the betterment of current projects and, hopefully, will provide for some necessary and feasible alternatives.

Towards the end of October 2018, a political crisis erupted in Sri Lanka when Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena dismissed Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. How did the Chinese react to this development and what is the state of affairs of the Sino-Sri Lanka bilateral relationship? This article focuses in particular on the maritime dimension of this relationship highlighting the increasing range and complexity of China’s Maritime Silk Road project in South Asia.

This chapter (11) explores how the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has impacted agency, connectivity and integration in South Asia. Following this, it investigates how academic perceptions and policies have evolved in the region in response to the BRI since its inception in 2013.

Most countries in the region are discussed but the emphasis is on India and Pakistan. These two states provide a unique agency, in this chapter the ability to influence or resist influence, disparity in the BRI context. The region's dominant power, India, is a staunch critic that refuses to sit at the figurative BRI table. India is exemplary of the degree to which a non-partaking actor can counter, or supplement, the BRI in its region. The region's other power, Pakistan, hosts the BRI's flagship project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and is the single largest recipient of BRI investment. Pakistan provides insight into how a deep-seated partaker's perceptions and policies on the BRI have evolved. Moreover, this chapter grants an understanding of the BRI's interplay with South Asia's various geopolitical fissures. To permit tailored data collection, the author conducted a series of interviews with leading Indian and Pakistani academics on a non-attributive basis.

Part of the LeidenAsiaCentre Book: Schneider, Florian (ed.) Global Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency through Regional Connectivity. Amsterdam. Amsterdam University Press 2021. DOI: 10.5117/9789463727853_CH11

About the book:
The year 2013 saw the launch of the largest, most influential investment initiative in recent memory: China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This globe- spanning strategy has reshaped local economies and regional networks, and it has become a contested subject for scholars and practitioners alike. How should we make sense of the complex interactions that the BRI has enabled? Understanding these processes requires truly global perspectives alongside careful attention to the role that local actors play in giving shape to individual BRI projects.

The contributions in Global Perspectives on China's Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency through Regional Connectivity provide both 'big picture' assessments of China's role in regional and global interactions and detailed case studies that home in on the role agency plays in BRI dynamics. Written by leading area studies scholars with diverse disciplinary expertise, this book reveals how Chinese efforts to recalibrate the world are taken up, challenged, revamped, and reworked in diverse contexts around the world.

All right in this chapter (11) are reserved and in particular further distribution is prohibited. Referencing is obviously welcome.

隨著泰國軍政府於近年穩定國內政治並推動泰國4.0與東部經濟走廊計畫等，泰國在東南亞的戰略地位明顯提升，間接成為中國和臺灣皆希望拉攏的重要國家，無論是在中國的「一帶一路」倡議或是臺灣的「新南向政策」中，泰國皆扮演相當重要的角色。本文將檢視在兩岸關係下，中國與臺灣各自發展出的戰略如何在第三地進行，探討一帶一路倡議與新南向政策的目標以及具體於泰國的實踐。在前言之後，本文第二部份將概述亞太區域經濟整合的發展，以利理解內容的背景脈絡。第三部份接著比較分析一帶一路與新南向政策的內容與目標，第四和第五部份則分別探討一帶一路及新南向政策在泰國的實踐。透過檢視兩岸在泰國的競逐，本文試勾勒出中國和台灣在公共外交上的努力和成果。

In recent years, following the gradual establishment of domestic stability in Thailand and efforts devoted towards Thailand 4.0 and the Eastern Economic Corridor, the strategic value of Thailand increased markedly, indirectly making Thailand into an important regional actor that both China and Taiwan vie for. Whether in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy (NSP), Thailand reserves a significant status. Noting Cross-strait relations, this article examines the realization of China and Taiwan’s respective strategies, namely the BRI and the NSP, in Thailand. After the introduction, part two briefly discusses the development of economic integration in the Asia Pacific. Part three carries out a comparative analysis regarding the content and goals of the BRI and NSP. Parts four and five examine the respective realization of the BRI and NSP in Thailand. Through the examination of Cross-strait competition in Thailand, this article seeks to describe both Chinese and Taiwanese efforts and accomplishments in public diplomacy.

This handbook brings together a mix of established and emerging international scholars to provide valuable analytical insights as to how China’s growing Middle East presence affects intra-regional development, trade, security, and diplomacy.

There has been a great deal of speculation and prognostication about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The project's name suggests it is intended to be an 'economic corridor' connecting Pakistan overland with China's Xinjiang province. This book examines whether CPEC's primary purpose is as an overland conduit for trade and economic cooperation between China and Pakistan. The key finding is that aims related to regional geopolitics and internal security have, in reality, a more significant impact. The book demonstrates that China's goals in Pakistan are primarily geopolitical rather than geo-economic, since the notion of constructing an economic and transportation 'corridor' between Pakistan and China is logistically and economically problematic due to a range of foreseeable problems. Most importantly, border disputes with India and the containment of domestic separatism motivate are the driving forces for cooperation between the partners. This book will be of interest to scholars who research the BRI, as well as policy makers.

Inicijativa "Pojas i put" obuhvata preko 60 država sa tri kontinenta, koje kroz saradnju sa kinom nastoje da ostvare ekonomsku i političku korist. Te kori-sti nastoji da ostvari i inicijator, kina, čiji su različiti trgovinski, finansijski, politički i bezbednosni interesi sadržani u ideji koja stoja iza pokretanja ini-cijative. Cilj ovog rada je sagledavanje ekonomske i političke dimenzije inici-jative "Pojas i put", koje podrazumevaju osnovne interese subjekata koji rade na realizaciji inicijative, izazove sa kojima se suočavaju na tom putu, kao i očekivane ekonomske i političke posledice inicijative. Prema rezultatima istraživanja, ekonomska dimenzija inicijative je znatno očiglednije prirode i podrazumeva pitanja kao što su razvoj infrastrukture i posledično razvoj tr-govine, pitanja u bliskoj vezi sa ekonomskim rastom kine, finansijska pitanja i problem unutarregionalnog ekonomskog razvoja kine. Politička dimenzija "Pojasa i puta" se može sagledati kroz suočavanje kine sa pritiscima među-narodnog sistema, snaženje njenog uticaja širom sveta i unutrašnje i spoljne bezbednosne interese koje Peking preko inicijative nastoji da ostvari.

Persian Gulf has a unique geographic location, it has the potential to create a positive economically connection between China and Arab Region. The political and security status in the Gulf region is unpredictable, China will be facing many challenges to implement this project it the gulf region. The situation is same for the gulf countries, they will need to establish a stable economic framework and policies for China’s large-scale and long-term economic project, in order to have a stable long-term cooperative relationship with China. BRI currently is an ongoing process, and through this project China and Gulf region not only will benefit from economic cooperation, integrating local economic strategies, but also able to acknowledge and maximize the ascendancy of two different civilization.
    BRI a profitable global economic project will be facing many unpredictable challenges, not only for the project initiator country, but also the ones that participate. This paper will mainly focus on GCC countries in the Gulf region, although GCC are not directly along the BRI trade routes, still GCC states has high economic and geopolitical value in BRI, hence, what is the foreseeable challenges and the perspectives for the future development of GCC states.

In the summer of 2018 China and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) upgraded their bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, China’s highest level of diplomatic relations. This follows a trajectory of deepening multifaceted ties that has been steadily becoming strategically important for both states, especially as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, results in deeper engagement in the Middle East. This article examines the features of the China-UAE relationship, providing an original historical framework that explains the context of relations through four periods prior to the BRI: indifference, hostility, transition, and interdependence. It then analyzes developments in the bilateral relationship during the early stages of the BRI, demonstrating that the UAE has become a key partner for China in its Middle East policy.

In the light of the implications of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for Greater Eurasia and, in particular, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) countries, this paper assesses the prospects of seven actual and potential trans-Eurasian overland transport corridors. Based on the analysis of trade flows, railway tariffs, existing restrictions and individual routes' potential efficiency, the most promising overland China-EU and China-EAEU transport corridors and their prospective goods nomenclatures are identified. China-EAEU-EU transit is interpreted as the 'story of the container'. The principal interests of EAEU countries in developing BRI transport corridors are identified, as are the opportunities that involvement in China's BRI affords for the promotion of a substantial transit business and, most importantly, better regional and interregional connectivity within both the EAEU and Greater Eurasia.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), formerly known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), has emerged as one of the top priorities for Chinese President Xi Jinping ever since he unveiled the initiative in 2013. This special issue surveys the reception of BRI in East Asia. As China's immediate neighborhood, this region will play an important role in determining whether Beijing's signature project will succeed in the mid-to long term. However, research has thus far mostly focused on BRI's reception in Central Asia and (Eastern) Europe. In this introduction, we first provide an overview of the literature by identifying three main strands of interpretation on BRI, namely those focusing on geoeconomics, on geopolitics, and on international norms as well as order. Next, we provide a review of the contemporary research on both Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian perceptions of and policy responses to BRI. Finally, we discuss research gaps in the literature and provide an overview of case studies and findings in this special issue. We conclude by identifying recurring themes and characteristics in East Asian responses to BRI.

Over the past decades, bilateral relations have deepened and trade soared between Malaysia and China. China has become Malaysia's largest trading partner in the last decade. Now, the two countries are more closely linked. Hence, this study attempts to look into the past achievement particularly in enhancing the ties between Malaysia and China in trade and investment. These policy initiatives are analyzed with connections to multinational corporations (MNCs) strategies and governments' developmental objectives in Malaysia. Recommendations are drawn not only for Malaysia but for other developing nations.

Breaking the prolonged silence in the global political arena, the G7-2021 announced the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative as a values-driven, high-standard, and transparent infrastructure partnership led by 'major democracies' to help narrow the infrastructure need in the developing world, that is exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Further to this, the White House proclaimed that "while different G7 partners will have different geographic orientations, the sum of the initiative covering low-and middle-income countries across the world, and through B3W, members of the world's 7 largest democracies, as well as other 'likeminded partners' will coordinate in mobilizing private-sector capital in four areas of focusclimate, health, and health security, digital technology, and gender equity and equality-with catalytic investments from our respective development finance institutions." China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that came into existence in 2013 to improve connectivity and cooperation on a transcontinental scale, currently connects more than 60 percent of the global population living across Asia, Europe, and Africa, via six different economic corridors, three mainland routes and two maritime routes. Today 140 countries and 30 international

This article compares Turkey and Ukraine’s motivations behind their participation in interregional connectivity projects. Specifically the issue of connectivity between the Black Sea and the Caspian regions was explored. Their policies towards trans-Caspian connectivity present an opportunity to assess a room for cooperation between two countries that are potential competitors regarding transit routes. In this sense, the article analyzes the countries’ perceptions of their interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the recent activities along the trans-Caspian route, the countries’ interaction with the outside great powers, and finally their cooperation with the regional countries of adjacent regions. This case also presents an opportunity to explore motivations of the participants of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

After the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the fall of the Milosevic regime, Serbia experienced tremendous changes in its foreign policy. While the country tried to distance itself from the past conflicts and nationalist enthusiasms with its European Union membership; it also copes with historical and political obstacles due to the region's characteristics while also simultaneously fight against economic hardships. Serbian President Alexander Vucic called his country's relations with China as an 'opportunity' to meet the EU's economic and social standards. But on Brussels's side, the same story looks different as, EU increasingly sees China as alien power in a region, where the ghost of nationalist and authoritarian experiences continues to coexist. This research will compare both Serbia and the EU's views towards the Sino-Serbian relationship as to whether an opportunity for furthering the Europeanization process of Serbia or whether as an off-track path towards an old-school nationalism and authoritarianism.

For decades, South Asian politics has remained realist-oriented with little or no room for liberal ideals such as regionalism. Security-centric approach towards domestic and regional affairs has no doubt curtailed South Asia‘s potential, turning it into the sick man of rising Asia.‘ But the mega developmental projects such as the BRI could herald a new era of liberalism in the region through promoting economic interdependence and connectivity.

Since 2013 “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR, also “Belt and Road Initiative”) has been one of the most commonly used terms in public discourse regarding Chinese foreign policy. This show the importance of the initiative to the Chinese leaders, particular president Xi Jinping. The enterprise consists of two parts: The Silk Road Economic Belt and The 21st-century Maritime Silk Road. The article aims to consider the future development of the project. The analysis of Chinese documents, statements of political leaders, and expansion of the project from 2013 to mid-2017 was employed in order to assess possible outcomes of the policy. The results of the study lead to three conclusions. Firstly, OBOR is becoming an umbrella term for different regional development strategies across Eurasia, Africa and perhaps beyond. Those strategies include many aspects, ranging from economy, through security, science to environmental protection. Secondly, OBOR became the cognitive framework, a paradigm, for international relations – the way that people perceive them. Thirdly, the introduction of the initiative may be the beginning of China in the role of architect of new global institutions and rules. However, the rapid expansion of OBOR, both in term of quantity of participants as well as various aspects of cooperation, may lead to ineffectiveness of the initiative.