Separation of Power

Decía al inicio de este trabajo que la discusión sobre conflictos de interés público en sede judicial, con la consiguiente mayor injerencia de los tribunales en el campo de las políticas públicas, es un fenómeno relativamente novedoso en la República Argentina.  Esto se debe en gran medida al hecho que en los últimos años, y cada vez con mayor intensidad, diversos actores sociales han ganado allí un rol protagónico en el escenario del debate público mediante el planteo de acciones judiciales de diversa índole que configuran, a no dudarlo, una modalidad muy concreta de intervención política en el sistema democrático. Una modalidad bien diferente al sufragio popular y con gran potencial de impacto concreto en la agenda pública. Mediante el planteo de tales acciones estos sujetos se han convertido en "aceleradores" de ciertas decisiones gubernamentales impostergables que, no obstante revestir tal carácter, eran efectivamente diferidas en el tiempo por los poderes Ejecutivo y Legislativo con motivo de la existencia de otras prioridades en la agenda. Los casos "Mendoza" y "Verbitsky" sirven nuevamente como ejemplos paradigmáticos ya que muestran una activa intervención de la CSJN en procesos colectivos de reforma estructural que involucran aspectos de política pública tan delicados como la salubridad del entorno vital de millones de individuos y las condiciones de detención de las personas  privadas de libertad en la Provincia de Buenos Aires. Estos casos y varios otros más -como pueden ser el caso "Rizzo", promovido por una agrupación de abogados  para discutir la constitucionalidad de la última reforma al Consejo de la Magistratura de la Nación, "ADC c. PAMI", donde se buscaba obtener acceso a información respecto del modo de inversión de la pauta publicitaria de un organismo público, o "F.A.L", sobre condiciones de acceso seguro al aborto no punible- trasladaron al seno del Poder Judicial el debate sobre conflictos que en otras épocas se resolvían, con un amplio margen de discreción, en sede administrativa o legislativa. Además, estos casos fueron determinantes para demostrar las trascendentes consecuencias sociales, políticas y económicas que genera el corrimiento en el ámbito de discusión de tales conflictos para los departamentos de Estado encargados de diagramar e implementar políticas públicas. Entre ellas pueden señalarse al menos las siguientes: (i) imposibilidad de esgrimir razones de mérito y conveniencia para postergar decisiones cuando hay derechos fundamentales afectados, y consiguiente obligación de instrumentar soluciones aún en situaciones de crisis y limitaciones presupuestarias para garantizar el mínimo existencial de tales derechos; (ii) severa restricción en el manejo del tiempo de las decisiones; (iii) Puesta en juego de la responsabilidad (política y personal) de los agentes y funcionarios encargados de tomar tales decisiones; (iv) alta exposición mediática de los asuntos, lo cual produce un reposicionamiento de los factores de poder y genera una mayor transparencia en la discusión; (v) traslado del poder de decisión sobre asignación de recursos presupuestarios, al menos indirectamente, a manos ajenas (a manos de los jueces); y (vi) obligación de discutir en base a reglas iguales para todas las partes involucradas y frente a un tercero imparcial, quien debe resolver el asunto justificando su decisión conforme a derecho y no en directrices políticas.

Pada abad Pertengahan (kira-kira tahun 1000 – 1500 M), kekuasaan politik menjadi persengketaan antara Monarki (raja/ratu), pimpinan gereja, dan kaum bangsawan. Kerap kali Eropa kala itu, dilanda perang saudara akibat sengketa kekuasaan antara tiga kekuatan politik ini. Sebagai koreksi atas ketidakstabilan politik ini, pada abad Pencerahan (Abad 15 sampai awal 18M) mulai muncul semangat baru di kalangan intelektual Eropa untuk mengkaji ulang filsafat politik yang berupa melakukan pemisahan kekuasaan.

Hal demikian mengarahkan gagasan utama yang kemudian muncul ke permukaan dimana gagasan yang ada mencari alternatif terhadap sistem Monarki Absolut yang dijalankan oleh para Raja Eropa dengan legitimasi Gereja—The Traditional authority of the church was undermine by scientific discoveries, and the idea of monarchs ruling by divine right—.  Di Eropa khususnya di Perancis, banyak pemikir politik mulai menginvestigasi/mempertanyakan kekuasaan monarki, klerus dan aristokrasi. Tokoh-tokoh pemikir era ini antara lain adalah Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), Montesquieu (1689-1755) dan JJ Rouseau (1712-1778).

Era ini juga ditandai dengan munculnya pemikiran Republikanisme (Machiavelli) dan liberalisme awal (Locke) serta konsep negara yang berdaulat dan terpisah dari kekuasan eklesiastikal (Hobbes). Lebih jauh, gagasan awal tentang sistem pemisahan kekuasaan (Montesquieu) dan demokrasi modern (JJ Rouseau) diperkenalkan sebagai alternative dari model absolutis, tokoh-tokoh tersebut merupakan contoh dari intelektual Eropa yang melakukan kaji ulang seputar bagaimana kekuasaan di suatu negara/kerajaan harus diberlakukan

Critical Review ini akan memberikan ulasan singkat mengenai dua tokoh penting yang muncul pada masa itu; Montesquieu dan Rousseau, memaparkan essensi-essensi pemikiran keduanya dan bagaimana konsepsi yang dirumuskan telah diadopsi dalam praktik demokrasi dari Era Medieval hingga ke era kontemporer.

In India, the Constitution is regarded as Supreme law of the land. No one is above the Constitution. It provides for three organs of the Government, viz., the Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary, each to function independently so that the rule of law in the state could be
upheld in the State. But, due to ineffective legislature and also because of the powers of the executive being in the hands of one person, there has been a series of inaction by the legislature. Henceforth, the Judiciary has involved itself to bridge the gap in the law which the state is lacking by means of establishing new doctrines, expanding the horizons of the law by giving wide interpretations and also by declaring new principles. Thus, the question arouse is that whether in doing so, is Judiciary encroaching the powers of the Legislature?

This article demonstrates the overlooked contribution of the ancient Near East to the development of constitutional law. The legal corpus of Deuteronomy provides a utopian model for the organization of the state, one that enshrines separation of powers and their systematic subordination to a public legal text—the “Torah”—that delineates their jurisdiction while also ensuring their autonomy. This legislation establishes an independent judiciary while bringing even the monarch under the full authority of the law. Deuteronomy’s implicit model for a political constitution is unprecedented in legal history. Two of its cornerstones are fundamental to the modern idea of constitutional government: (1) the clear division of political powers into separate spheres of authority; and (2) the subordination of each branch to the authority of the law. This legislation was so utopian in its own time that it seems never to have been implemented; instead, idealism rapidly yielded to political pragmatism. Nonetheless, Deuteronomy’s draft constitution provides an important corrective to standard accounts of constitutional legal history.

Keywords:
Constitutional theory; rule of law; separation of powers; Deut 16:18-18:22; Laws of public officials; Law of the king; independence of the judiciary; Deut 17:14-20; Ämtergesetze; Verfassungstheorie; Torah monarchy; Sophocles Antigone law; Herodotus Demaratus; Greek kingship; Mishnah King; mishnah Aboth 1:1; American constitution; Josephus πολιτεία [politeia]; origin of judicial system; Hammurabi; founding myth; independent judiciary.

This collection of texts is intended as a practical tool. It contains the relevant international agreements, declarations and standards on judicial independence that are to be observed in judicial activity, but also in dealings with the judiciary. The collection is aimed at legal practitioners and policy-makers.

According to many social scientists, democratic institutions are subject to much discontent and distrust today. Citizens sense the existence of a substantial disconnect between the rhetoric of representative democracy and its reality—what citizens believe their proper role to be and what the realities of our government and society allow them to be. More to the point, citizens of all stripes believe that those who “represent” them live lives quite different from their own, and that those representatives are not seriously interested in the perspectives, ideas, or well-being of most people. The nature and extent of this discontent raises serious questions about the future of representative democracy and the conditions necessary for it to flourish.
What, then, are the conditions of democracy? Among other things, citizens must share some sense of solidarity and common purpose. There must be a quality educational system committed to providing everyone—regardless of race or economic status—with an appropriate foundation for citizenship and personal fulfillment. There must be equal employment opportunity. Citizens must be well educated, and they must have access to credible news sources. Public officials must not be seen to cater to the rich or famous or seek short-term partisan advantage at the expense of long-term systemic values and stability. If a democratic society does not strive to satisfy these conditions, among others, representative democracy will either be brought down or so hollowed out as to become unrecognizable.

Rather than attempting the impossible feat of addressing all of the conditions necessary for the flourishing of a democratic society, this Essay first explores what we mean to say when we talk about the concept of representative or constitutional democracy and then considers three of the ways in which our current governmental and political system may frustrate the practice of constitutional democracy.

First, many Americans hold an idealized view of our democracy that prevents us from comprehending the full significance of the anti-democratic features of our constitutional system and hampers efforts to preserve and strengthen it. Second, our idealized view of American democracy prevents us from acknowledging that one important aspect of our constitutional tradition has been a preference for defining our political community in terms that are exclusionary, rather than inclusive. That, in turn, blinds us to the strong influence that this exclusionary preference continues to exert on our political life. Third, constitutional democracy requires nothing so much as a fair electoral system, but the ordinary political process often cannot ensure such fairness because politicians control the process and have little incentive either to draw maps that are fair or to undertake other necessary reforms. In many states, the people lack the power to assign these decisions to more disinterested agents, and, in recent years, the courts have tended to hold that such matters are unsuitable for judicial resolution. This Essay argues that these three obstacles must be overcome if representative democracy is to flourish.

Cette these propose une definition des termes de centralisation et de decentralisation par reference a la separation du pouvoir selon la repartition des facultes de statuer et d'empecher entre organes centraux et non centraux. En appliquant cette definition a chaque niveau de la hierarchie des normes elle propose une definition de l'organisation normative des Etats, notamment de l'Etat federal et unitaire, modes d'organisation de la production de la norme de deuxieme rang, et de l'Etat centralise et decentralise, modes d'organisation de la production de la norme de troisieme rang, puis elle rend compte, dans ce cadre, de l'organisation du pouvoir normatif en France sous la Veme Republique. La premiere partie montre que les termes de centralisation et de decentralisation visent un mode de production des normes juridiques dans un systeme juridique hierarchise dans le cadre de l'exercice par des organes centraux et non centraux des facultes de statuer et...

Аутор у раду разматра институте амнестије и помиловања, и то њихове уставноправне и кривичноправне елементе. Хронолошки излаже историјски преглед од правних система старог вијека до данашњих правних система. Посебну пажњу поклања правној природи самих института, дејству института као и њиховим доносиоцима. У упоредноправном прегледу осврће се на уставне системе Америке и Француске. На крају рада разматра односне институте у уставном систему Републике Србије закључивши да они припадају вансудском систему власти и својеврсни "хирушки захват" законодавне и извршне власти у судско "ткиво." Аутор наводи и извјесне пропусте у материји која регулише институт помиловања као што су потпуно одсуство образложења акта о помиловању од стране надлежних орагана и одсуство било каквог вида матријалноправне контроле над тим органом, чиме се претпоставља и могућност злоупотребе института.

Крізь призму теоретичних і практичних, конституційних і політичних вимірів, а також в рамках конституційного права і порівняльної політології проаналізовано особливості та наслідки поділу і дуалізму виконавчої влади в рамках різних видів напівпрезиденталізму. Аргументовано, що напівпрезиденталізм дефінітивно та практично завжди окреслюється дуалізмом виконавчої влади, хоча останній і позначається різними особливостями, динамікою та наслідками у рамках різних видів цієї форми/системи державного правління. Водночас на підставі особливостей ієрархічних і транзакційних міжінституційних відносин обґрунтовано, що дуалізм виконавчої влади в рамках напівпрезиденталізму характеризується здебільшого не подвійною природою відповідальності виконавчої влади, а подвійною природою її формування та здійснення.
Ключові слова: форма/система державного правління, напівпрезиденталізм, поділ влади, виконавча влада, дуалізм виконавчої влади.

Rational choice scholars argue that there is no such thing as legislative intent, and that courts should abandon futile efforts to find and enforce that intent. Faced with ambiguous statutes, these scholars suggest judges either actively interpret statutes to achieve the best public policy possible; or they advise the judges to accept a default assumption that congressional ambiguity will be read as implicit delegation of interpretive discretion to the executive branch. Both options pose problems for the American system of separated institutions. Though legislative intent may be impossible to discern, an effort to identify legislative purpose may be critical to assure the maintenance of a balance of institutional power. How that purpose is identified is a problem not only for the Court, but for the legislative institutions responsible for statutory drafting and approval.

Nowadays, the notion of the State Treasury does not generate particular interest in the legal doctrine. This situation raises concerns because opinions on said entity’s nature presented in the literature on the subject often contradict one another. The view granting the State Treasury permission to exercise so-called imperious powers (i.e. state control that includes the possible use of coercive measures) is gaining more and more support among authors. In this light, the State Treasury is presented as an entity of dual character which acts as the state in fulfilling the functions of both the imperium and dominium spheres. This article aims to confront one view on the exercise of imperious powers by the State Treasury which is already quite well represented in the doctrine. The author argues that the aforementioned view is contrary to the traditional and well-established conclusions regarding the nature of the entity in question. Applicable regulations governing the legal status of the State Treasury and judicial decisions of general jurisdiction courts constitute the point of reference for the reflections contained in the article.

This book is a recollection of al the works and papers of the author (Allan R. Brewer-Carías), written  during the past twenty years (1999-2021), studying the continuous process of demolition of the autonomy and independence of the Judiciary in Venezuela, which has been completely controlled by the Executive Power in collusion with the also controlled Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal.

Yale Maestro Bruce Ackerman wrote his famous 93-page thesis on New Separation of Power in Volume 113, No. 3 of the Harvard Law Review in the year of 2000. Since then the theory has drawn unprecedented curiosity in the academic arena. One of Ackerman’s former students at Yale, Steven G. Calabresi questioned him though a 55-page “Why Ackerman is Wrong” thesis in the Constitutional Commentary Volume 18, No. 1 the next year.  Six years later, in 2007, Professor Cindy Skach of Harvard Law School came out with a 29-page thesis on “Newest” Separation of Power in the International Journal of Constitutional Law (I.CON).  Ackerman attacked the U.S. model of Separation of Power and proposed a British-German influenced version of Constrained Parliamentarianism. Calabresi would vigorously defend the U.S. Presidentialism. Skach would rather propagate a French influenced version of Semi-presidentialism feeding his “Newest” Separation of Power.

Approach of this Research Note Series is not critical, nor is it an analytical one. It is rather a mere exploratory or descriptive attempt to introduce the beginners in legal studies with modern trends of research and innovation over Montesquieu  and Madison  and their theory of Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances. Apart from telling what the contemporary scholars of Separation of Power are thinking, this article does not attempt a story or argument of its own. As part of the series, I propose to explain Bruce Ackerman in this issue of SCLS Law Review. I intend to explain Steven G. Calabresi and Cindy Skach in the upcoming two issues of the SCLS Law Review.

Abstract: in this paper the author, inspired by the reading of Sergio Cotta, analyses the hypothesis that Montesquieu’s travels had influence on the development of Esprit des Lois. In particular, he analyses the elements contained in the travel notes by Baron de La Brède and the evolution of the theories in his masterpiece. The journey is not only amusement for Montesquieu, but it becomes an instrument of knowledge to sharpen his thinking and ideas through observation about the society.

Observers have long speculated about the effect of war on judicial behavior. While common lore maintains that courts are reluctant to affirm claims against the government in wartime, over the past sixty years a number of notable cases have gone against the U.S. government. Recently, empirical research has suggested that the
Supreme Court does not rule differently on war-related cases which reach the Court during wartime versus those which reach the Court after the relevant war has ended. We consider the role of public opinion as a possible explanatory variable in wartime cases, noting that in a number of important verdicts which have gone against the elected
branches, public opinion showed high levels of disapproval for the President, the war, or both. We examine notable Supreme Court verdicts in the separation of powers and in cases concerning claims for executive power during the period 1938 to 2008. Historically, popular presidents have won in the courts, while weaker Presidents have
been less successful. We further argue that researchers must ask at what stage in a crisis was the Court’s the decision made, what was the President’s own popularity at that point in the war or crisis, what was the public’s perception of the credibility of the threat or emergency, and what was the public’s attitude about the policies the President
was urging or enacting.

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Nigeria does not have a long history with executive orders like other jurisdictions. Hence whenever the President issues an  executive order it is viewed as an overreach of his constitutional powers. This work assesses the legality of the executive orders in Nigeria, it also addresses its potential for abuse. It highlights the thin line between executive orders and presidential law making. Finally it discusses how the Presidents powers in this regard can be controlled to maintain constitutional harmony.

En ausencia de separación de poderes y, especialmente, de un sistema de justicia independiente e imparcial, los partidos políticos y los votantes deberían exigir que los gobernantes y representantes fueran personas irreprochables éticamente, moralmente inmaculadas (y, por extensión, libres de eventuales máculas jurídicas). En cambio, en la medida en que funcione la separación de poderes y, concretamente, cuanto más independiente, imparcial y efectiva sea la persecución de los delitos, resulta más soportable el hecho de tener políticos que carguen sombras de corrupción, entre otras conductas éticamente reprobables, sobre sus hombros. Frente a sospechas y debilidades éticas, podríamos dar prioridad a otras virtudes de los políticos, como la representatividad, la pericia y la efectividad.

American liberals and conservatives agree about very little concerning
foreign policy, war, and emergency powers, but they do agree that the
Constitution’s ambiguous allocation of foreign policy powers to the legislative, executive, and judicial branches is a problem that must be fixed. For conservatives, the answer has been a reliance on constitutional reinterpretation that might establish a bright line between executive power in foreign policy and war (which they embrace) and national authority to regulate domestic and economic affairs (which they do not). For liberals, who worry that constitutional ambiguity opens the door for the abuse of executive power, the solution has been to trade formal delegation of power constrained by strict statutory limits on the exercise of that power. These efforts—liberal and conservative alike—have failed, each producing results quite the opposite of what was sought. After setting these debates in their legal, historical, and political context, this review concludes with a reexamination of the potential virtues of constitutional ambiguity.

La distinction entre administrer et gouverner repose pour l’essentiel sur un fondement doctrinal dont cet article esquisse l’histoire depuis le XIXe siècle. La distinction émergea d’une part parce que l’activité du pouvoir exécutif commença à  dépasser ce qui pouvait être qualifié d’exécutif et d’autre part parce qu’il convenait de différencier les actes susceptibles de recours de ceux qui ne l’étaient pas. Pour établir la distinction on utilisa soit un critère hiérarchique, soit un critère politique, soit un critère opposant l’exceptionnel au normal et soit, enfin, un critère reposant sur la norme juridique servant de fondement aux deux fonctions. L’auteur constate qu’aucun de ces critères matériels n’est parvenu à  faire l’unanimité auprès d’une doctrine qui préfère les critères organiques qui ici ne peuvent pas servir.

L’articolo esamina le principali innovazioni introdotte dall’accordo interistituzionale "Legiferare meglio" entrato in vigore il 15 marzo 2016, analizzando in particolare: le nuove modalità di esercizio e controllo dei poteri delegati, il bilanciamento tra trasparenza e informalità nel processo legislativo, la nuova regolamentazione delle valutazioni d'impatto e la programmazione normativa dell'Unione. L'articolo, inoltre, mette in luce, nelle conclusioni, le conseguenze di tali innovazioni sull’equilibrio istituzionale tra potere esecutivo e legislativo nell’Unione.

The legal status of case-law is ambiguous in most legal systems.  Do judges "discover" law or do they "make" it? It is in fact a constitutional matter, a matter of separation of powers. If the judges can “make” the law, doesn’t it make them the equivalent of the legislative power? The legal situation of case-law in France traditionally reflects this ambiguity. However, a recent trend in French law seems to imply that case-law is progressively accepted as a source of law. Even though it has some positive effects - notably in terms of legal certainty - it also raises certain issues.

External shocks to democratic systems are likely to threaten the stability of relations between the executive and the representative assembly. This article investigates the impact of the so-called "war on terror" on executive-assembly relations in comparative perspective. We analyze data from seven countries, which varied in terms of form of government, level of democracy, culture, social structure, and geographic location, to evaluate its effects. We find that whereas in some systems the "war on terror" altered the balance of power between the executive and the assembly, in other cases the extant balance of power was preserved. We postulate various conditions under which the constitutionally sanctioned balance of power is most likely to be preserved in times of crisis.

'Jair Bolsonaro has shown disregard towards the well-being of the Brazilian people, democratic institutions, the system of checks and balances, constitutional rights and freedoms, and freedom of the press. His raw display of egotism, insensitivity, ideological blindness, and hunger for power might prove to be excruciating amid a global pandemic'.

The article discusses the legitimacy of the replacement of administrative discretion by judicial discretion generally guided by personal values or beliefs of the magistrate, which is a clear affront to the democratic principle. Moreover, judicial interference in the control of public policies is appropriate in cases of assault on fundamental rights or the constitutional principles of public administration. Nevertheless, judicial action requires parsimony and a minimum of objectivity, because the rational operation of the Public Administration, as an expression of their political-administrative autonomy, requires the necessary respect to the functional limitations of each power. The commitment to the democratic state does not deny the importance of institutional design stamped in the Constitution and, of course, of the reserve the exercise of political power resulting from the democratic principle.

Previous studies have argued that democracy diminishes the extent to which contests over political leadership depress economic growth, by reducing the violence and uncertainty attendant on such contests.  We reconsider the theoretical basis for such a claim, highlighting the separate roles of executive constraint and electoral accountability.  Exploiting panel data from 1850-2005, we show that the executive’s horizontal accountability to the legislature significantly moderates the economic downturns associated with leadership turnover, while its vertical accountability to the electorate does not.  These results suggest that, in terms of moderating succession-related downturns and thereby promoting steadier economic growth, the health of legislatures is more important than the health of elections.

Attorney General and Chief Justice of the federal court of the Marshall Islands  assist in the overthrow of the Constitution. Separation of power and Bill of Rights abolished.  Legislative body  complies with the Executive’s demand to strip the  independence from the courts