Papers by Barry R . Weingast
This paper contributes to the debate over the unity in Smith's corpus by emphasizing his perv... more This paper contributes to the debate over the unity in Smith's corpus by emphasizing his pervasive use of an analytic method. Specifically, Smith consistently relies on equilibrium arguments to explain why a given pattern of economic, political, or social interaction is stable; and comparative static arguments to explain how a stable pattern changes. Our paper focuses on several examples central to his work: the political economics of development in the Wealth of Nations and the Lectures on Jurisprudence; the learning and of and adherence to moral norms in the Theory of Moral Sentiments; and the development and evolution of language in Smith’s essay on the “First Formation of Languages.” We argue that Smith’s analysis of patterns of central tendencies and “general rules”—equilibria—and the conditions under which those rules change are defining features of his “science of man.” Not only do they anticipate analytic modes in modern social science, Smith’s use of equilibrium and com...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
Most people in medieval Europe lived at subsistence in a violent feudal world. Adam Smith explain... more Most people in medieval Europe lived at subsistence in a violent feudal world. Adam Smith explained both the long-term stability of the feudal system and how the towns escaped this violence trap through political exchange that fostered their ability to enter long-distance trade, significant division of labor, and economic growth and development. Violence is central to Smith's approach to development, which Smith scholars have systematically under-appreciated. In the face of episodic violence, individuals had little incentives to be industrious, to save, or to invest. Smith argued that the medieval towns escaped the violence trap through trade expansion. In Smith's view, development required three mutually reinforcing elementslaw and liberty; commerce, including long-distance trade; and security from all forms of violence.
How do authoritarian states build the institutional infrastructure (e.g. secure property rights, ... more How do authoritarian states build the institutional infrastructure (e.g. secure property rights, contract enforcement, and the rule of law) necessary to support efficient markets? Tremendous political impediments hinder states from developing the rule of law. The path for the West involved parliaments and independent judiciaries that constrained the ruler. China’s path differs considerably; from the beginning, it involved the delegation of authority from the central government sometimes known as “federalism, Chinese style.” China’s problem with creating the rule of law governing markets is made worse by the “authoritarian’s legal dilemma”; that is, the creation of a strong, non-corrupt judiciary that would supply and only supply private law (e.g., secure property rights, contract enforcement). Although China wants to improve its private law, it wants to avoid an independent judiciary that might challenge and constrain the central government. Using China’s online market as the contex...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
In this paper, I discuss Deirdre McCloskey's argument that 'ideas, not capital or institutions,' ... more In this paper, I discuss Deirdre McCloskey's argument that 'ideas, not capital or institutions,' were the cause of the 'great enrichment,' the spectacular growth of the world economy since 1800. I disagree that the ideas of liberty and equality alone caused the great enrichment but agree that these ideas were central and necessary for it. Most theorists of development and economic history fail to recognise the importance of these ideas despite implicitly assuming them in what I call the 'neoclassical fallacy.' I also extend McCloskey's views to include a greater understanding of liberty and equality through their implementation, which necessarily involves institutions that provide political officials with incentives to honour these ideas in practice. Ideas of liberty and equality are not self-implementing, and most attempts to implement them fail. Finally, I argue that a range of political theorists from Hobbes to Madison studied the problem of implementing liberty and equality. In the 150 years prior to 1800, they helped devise a series of institutions that sustained liberty, equality, and the rule of law. These ideas also contributed to the great enrichment.
The Journal of Asian Studies, 2014
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2008
<p>This article introduces the modern political economic theory of elections. It discusses ... more <p>This article introduces the modern political economic theory of elections. It discusses the theory's foundations, which were laid down by Anthony Downs in <italic>An Economic Theory of Democracy</italic>. It shows that the economic theory of democracy has helped transform political science and economics and has introduced a methodology for theorizing about political strategy. This theory has also specified the implications for what government does and how well the democratic government represents the public. Several concepts are discussed, including valence issues, interest groups, candidate preferences, and electoral institutions.</p>
Journal of Legal Analysis, 2015
And what is the power of the laws? Is it that, if any of you is attacked and gives a shout, they'... more And what is the power of the laws? Is it that, if any of you is attacked and gives a shout, they'll come running to your aid? No, they are just inscribed letters and have no ability to do that. What then is their motive power? You [the jury] are, if you secure them and make them authoritative whenever anyone asks for aid. So the laws are powerful through you and you through the laws. You must therefore stand up for them in just the same way as any individual would stand up for himself if attacked; you must take the view that offenses against the law are common concerns. .. (Demosthenes, Against Meidias, 223-225).
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
Previous studies have argued that democracy diminishes the extent to which leadership contests de... more Previous studies have argued that democracy diminishes the extent to which leadership contests depress economic growth, by reducing the violence and uncertainty attendant on such contests. We reconsider the theoretical basis for this claim, highlighting the separate roles of executive constraint and electoral accountability. Exploiting panel data from 1850-2005, we show that the executive's horizontal accountability to the legislature significantly moderates the economic downturns associated with leadership turnover, while its vertical accountability to the electorate does not. These results suggest that, in terms of moderating succession-related downturns and thereby promoting steadier economic growth, the health of legislatures is more important than the health of elections.
Virginia Law Review, 1989
I N 1977, Congress substantially revised the Clean Air Act, 1 the nation's flagship legislation o... more I N 1977, Congress substantially revised the Clean Air Act, 1 the nation's flagship legislation on environmental policy. Many changes were considered, and among those that Congress adopted was an intricate redefinition of the procedures to be used by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in making rules. 2 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (1970 Amendments), which had moved responsibility for air pollution regulation from the Public Health Service in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to the newly minted EPA, set up the EPA's rulemaking procedures as "informal" with few procedural requirements and considerable decisional flexibility.' After extensive debate in both the 94th and 95th Congresses, 4 Congress changed this to a new hybrid process (more formal than "informal rulemaking" but less formal than "formal rulemaking") that requires a more elaborate written record and a clearer statement of agency intentions and of the bases for its decisions.' As a reading of the committee reports and floor debates about these and similar proposals makes clear, legislators regard the choice of administrative structure and process as vitally important. 6 The legislative history of admin
In Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law,' Lisa Bressman pulls together two disparate trad... more In Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law,' Lisa Bressman pulls together two disparate traditions in contemporary administrative law scholarship: one that stems from the work of generations of leading legal scholars and the other that emerges, more recently, from leading work in positive political theory (PPT) in political science. Professor Bressman explains why and how theories ofjudicial control of regulatory administration must take account of both how agencies function and the political environment in which administrative decisionmaking occurs. After all, administrative law shapes administrative politics in profound ways. Congress configures administrative procedures in the shadow of legal doctrines; moreover, courts are themselves deep in the business of procedure-configuring, as modern American administrative law amply demonstrates.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013
Why do developing countries fail to adopt the institutions and policies that promote development?... more Why do developing countries fail to adopt the institutions and policies that promote development? Our answer is the violence trap. The trap is set by the unavoidable interdependence of economic and political development. Key political reforms-opening access and reducing the risk of state predation-are typically feasible only when the domestic economy reaches a given level of specialization and integration (for reasons we specify); yet the economy typically can only reach the required threshold of development when key political reforms are already in place (for standard reasons). The trap entails violence because, as we show, the structure of unreformed polities (natural states) ensures poor adaptive efficiency. Following shocks to the distribution of military and economic power and bargaining to adjust to the shocks often fail among those with access to violence, due to the low economic cost of violence, asymmetric information, and commitment problems. Indeed, we show that violence is endemic in the developing world, with the median regime experiencing violent leadership turnover once every eight years. The trap is hard to escape because whenever overt violence breaks out, leaders seeking to restore order face an unspecialized economy, to which the best response is yet another unreformed polity. Indeed, the limits on access and rents characteristic of natural states are necessary to re-establish peace. Yet, these rents and limits also deter specialization, thereby keeping the economic costs of resorting to force low and ensuring that future bargaining will be in the shadow of viable military outside options.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
Why do governments in underdeveloped countries pursue policies that undercut long-term economic g... more Why do governments in underdeveloped countries pursue policies that undercut long-term economic growth? Focusing on Mexico's massive but inefficient land reform, we argue that governments do so to underpin political survival. Using a panel dataset of Mexican states from 1917 to 1992, we find that land distribution was higher during election years and where the threat of rural unrest was greater. Furthermore, PRI support eroded more slowly in states receiving more reform. The program, which carried restrictive property rights, thus served the PRI regime's electoral interests. But while land distribution generated a loyal political clientele, it generated steep costs-lower long-term economic growth.
The Journal of Politics, 1984
... No ex ante agreement to support an alternative as the final social choice is enforceable ex p... more ... No ex ante agreement to support an alternative as the final social choice is enforceable ex post. It is precisely the behavior exhibited in this example that has led scholars to conclude that majority rule is badly behaved. No obvious ...
Economica, 2009
Financial market-based analysis of the expected effects of policy changes has traditionally been ... more Financial market-based analysis of the expected effects of policy changes has traditionally been exclusively retrospective. In this paper, we demonstrate by example how prediction markets make it possible to use markets to prospectively estimate policy effects. We exploit data from a market trading in contracts tied to the ouster of Saddam Hussein as leader of Iraq to learn about financial market participants' expectations of the consequences of the 2003 Iraq war. We conducted an ex-ante analysis, which we disseminated before the war, finding that a 10% increase in the probability of war was accompanied by a $1 increase in spot oil prices that futures markets suggested was expected to dissipate quickly. Equity price movements implied that the same shock led to a 1.5% decline in the S&P 500. Further, the existence of widely-traded equity index options allows us to back out the entire distribution of market expectations of the war's near-term effects, finding that these large effects reflected a negatively skewed distribution, with a substantial probability of an extremely adverse outcome. The flow of war-related news through our sample explains a large proportion of daily oil and equity price movements. Subsequent analysis suggests that these relationships continued to hold out of sample. Our analysis also allows us to characterize which industries and countries were most sensitive to war news and when the immediate consequences of the war were better than ex-ante expectations, these sectors recovered, confirming these cross-sectional implications. We highlight the features of this case study that make it particularly amenable to this style of policy analysis and discuss some of the issues in applying this method to other policy contexts.
American Journal of Political Science, 1984
This paper examines the properties of majority-rule institutions given fully strategic behavior b... more This paper examines the properties of majority-rule institutions given fully strategic behavior by all agents. Results are provided, characterizing majority-rule outcomes, for several alternative agenda institutions. The main conclusion is that institutional arrangements, specifically mechanisms of agenda construction, impose constraints on majority outcomes.
American Journal of Political Science, 1981
The purpose of this brief paper is to establish some general conditions under which rational legi... more The purpose of this brief paper is to establish some general conditions under which rational legislators institute and maintain the norm of uni-versalism in the realm of distributive politics. This practice, often noted to be the predominant feature of congressional land and resource ...
The Realists were ascending during the turbulent 1930s, when the Supreme Court was trying to hold... more The Realists were ascending during the turbulent 1930s, when the Supreme Court was trying to hold Roosevelt and the New Deal Democrats to Lochner era concepts of the role of the state, property, and contracts. Thus, the Realists confronted the debate about popular versus judicial sovereignty head on. Many Realists, including nearly all modem political scientists, argued for some form of popular sovereignty. Most modem political scientists who study the court, though not entirely normative, do take a realist position. That is, they assume that law is policy and that judges are engaged in policy making. Much of the focus of political scientists' research, then, has been to find the source of judicial preferences. One branch, called the attitudinalists, search for judicial preferences in the personal attitudes and characteristics of the judges. These scholars follow Pritchett, Schubert, Nagel and Spaeth, whose pioneering studies developed many of the techniques used to study judges' attitudes. See PRITCHETT, THE
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Papers by Barry R . Weingast