Russian Policy in the Middle East and Caucasia

تسعى الأطراف الدولية المتدخلة في الأزمة السورية إلى إطالة أمد الصراع التركي-الكردي في سوريا لاستنزاف القدرات العسكرية التركية، وتحجيم النفوذ التركي في سوريا، بهدف استبعاد أنقرة من معادلات تقاسم مناطق النفوذ بعد نهاية الصراع. وفي المقابل، تسعى تركيا لإيجاد موطئ قدم لقواتها في سوريا، وانتزاع الهيمنة على المناطق الحدودية الفاصلة بين تركيا وسوريا من وحدات حماية الشعب الكردية، بالإضافة إلى تأسيس مسارات مستديمة للإمداد العسكري لدعم الفصائل السورية الموالية لها.
وفي هذا الإطار، يتناول هذا التحليل تقييم أبعاد التدخل التركي الذي دخل في أسبوعه الرابع، ويتناول الأهداف التركية من وراء هذه العملية، وأبرز تداعياتها السياسية، والعوامل المؤثرة على مستقبلها.

Alors que la crise syrienne est entrée dans sa cinquième année, l’évolution du contexte sécuritaire en Syrie et en Irak depuis l’été 2014 met en lumière le rôle grandissant des Kurdes comme force combattante contre l’État islamique (EI). S’inscrivant dans le contexte plus général du renouveau de l’influence russe sur la scène Moyen-Orientale constaté depuis la fin des années 2000, le développement des relations russo-kurdes est entré dans une nouvelle phase depuis le début des années 2010. Russes et Kurdes disposent d’une série d’intérêts convergents qui s’articulent principalement aujourd’hui autour de la lutte contre l’EI et de la coopération dans le domaine énergétique. Les relations russo-kurdes n’en demeurent cependant pas moins dépourvues de contradictions inhérentes à la diplomatie à géométrie variable déployée par Moscou au Moyen-Orient : le Kremlin est en effet l’un des rares acteurs de la scène stratégique Moyen-Orientale à disposer de la capacité à discuter avec tous les États de la région. Or, la Turquie, la Syrie et l’Iran, qui sont autant de partenaires stratégiques pour Moscou, redoutent tous le danger séparatiste kurde. Jusqu’à présent, le numéro d’équilibrisme diplomatique du Kremlin lui a cependant permis de densifier ses relations avec les Kurdes sans pour autant compromettre celles avec les États riverains concernés par la question du Kurdistan.

With the Syrian crisis entering its fifth year, the changing security context in Syria and Iraq since the summer of 2014 has highlighted the increasingly important role played by the Kurds as a fighting force against Islamic State (IS). In a more general context of renewed Russian influence in the Middle East since the late 2000s, the development of Russo-Kurdish relations has entered a new phase since the beginning of the current decade. Russians and Kurds have several converging interests, the main focus of which is currently the fight against IS and cooperation in the energy sector. Russo-Kurdish relations are not without contradictions, however, due to Moscow's multifaceted diplomacy in the Middle East. The Kremlin is one of the rare strategic players in the region that has the ability to negotiate with all of its countries. Turkey, Syria and Iran, which are equally strategic partners for Moscow, all fear the danger of Kurdish separatism. Until now, the Kremlin’s diplomatic balancing act has enabled it to strengthen its ties with the Kurds, without compromising its relations with neighboring countries concerned about the issue of Kurdistan.

This study provides a brief overview of Russian and EU policies towards the MENA, followed by case studies of Russian engagement in three distinctive groups of countries in 2011-20: the Arabian Peninsula, Levant and Iraq, and North Africa. Examining them in a comparative perspective, we attempt to solve the following puzzle: What is the nature of Russian foreign policy towards Arab countries? What are its main drivers? Is it a systematic and multi-sectored concerted effort across security, economic, political sector, or somewhat ad hoc, narrow-focused engagement? The principal added value of the study lies primarily in looking into what implications do Russian policies in Arab countries have for the EU; making it a distinctive contribution given most publications on the matter are US policy-focused.

While Russia remains relatively weak in the Arab MENA region, it proved that with little resources, it is able to secure influence in countries and over conflicts, primarily in Libya where it effectively retreated from long ago, or Syria. The EU in turn, was not able to react cohesively to Russian return to the MENA, and that includes North Africa, a region of utmost strategic importance for Europe. As long as the US remains intensely engaged in the region, it effectively prevents further Russian encroachment, primarily in the security sector. Should the US divert its attention elsewhere, the EU must even more acutely assume a more decisive role in countering Russian influence, in particular in North Africa, Lebanon, and Syria.

Russland zeigt nach Syrien nun auch in Libyen Präsenz. Das Vorgehen ist jedoch sehr verschieden. Die militärische Unterstützung für den ostlibyschen Machthaber Chalifa Haftar fällt deutlich schwächer aus als die für Assad in Syrien. Auch wenn es in Moskau Kräfte gibt, die eindeutig auf Haftar setzen, hält sich Russland alle Optionen offen. Es geht zum einen um ökonomische Interessen-um Waffenverkäufe und Beteiligungen im Energiesektor. Politisch präsentiert sich Russland als wichtiger Machtfaktor in Konkurrenz zu den USA-wenn auch deutlich weniger antagonistisch als in Syrien.

ÇARLIK'TAN BOLŞEVİK DEVRİMİ'NE RUSLARIN ORTADOĞU POLİTİKASI

Öz
Uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründe Rusya'nın Ortadoğu coğrafyasına verdiği jeopo-litik değerin, son 100 yılda izlenen emperyal politikaların bir uzantısı olarak değer-lendirildiğini söylemek mümkündür. Yapılan bu değerlendirmelerin yanlış olma-makla birlikte bir ölçüde eksik kaldığı söylenebilir. Zira Rusların bugün ki Ortado-ğu politikasını tam anlamıyla analiz edebilmek için çarlık dönemine kadar geri gitmek gerekmektedir. Bunun temel nedeni, Rusların Ortadoğu'ya yönelik ilk so-mut politika oluşturmaya başladığı dönemin çarlık dönemi olmasıdır. Çarlık döne-minin ardından başlayan imparatorluk döneminde ise Rusların Ortadoğu politikası daha net çizgiler kazanmaya başlamıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Rusların çarlık ve imparatorluk dönemi Ortadoğu politikasına ilişkin tarihsel bir değerlendirme sun-maktır. Söz konusu değerlendirme ile Rusların Ortadoğu'ya atfettiği jeopolitik de-ğerin yaklaşık 500 yıllık bir tarihinin olduğu ortaya koyulmaya çalışılmaktadır. Bu kapsamdan hareketle çalışmada Rusların Ortadoğu'ya yönelik ilk somut politika oluşturmaya başladığı çarlık ve imparatorluk döneminde nasıl bir strateji izlendiği, hangi devletlerle nasıl ve ne boyutta bir ilişki kurulduğu analiz edilmektedir.

First published in American Chronicle, Buzzle and AfroArticles on 30th December 2010
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Here, I would like to merely ask the following question:

When Islam's worst enemies, namely the Zionist - fake Freemasonic regimes of England and France, permeate and penetrate an Islamic country from border to border and determine every aspect of its daily life and international position, does it really matter whether the local people pray five times per day, fast in Ramadan, and abstain from alcohol, pork and premarital sex?

In fact, it is ridiculous to think that Islam exists after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In reality, there is no Islam anymore. There is only a fabricated ghost - a spiritual elementary useful for the Satanic needs of the Zionist & Freemasonic gangsters who use printed pages of the Quran to clean their ass or to perform sexual rituals on them.

Without a cultural, educational, scientific, military, socioeconomic, and imperial rule effectuated under total control by the indigenous Muslim population and elite, there is no Islam.

To believe that Islam can possibly exist in a fake country whereby the criminal Freemasonic gangsters of England, France and America, disguised as diplomats, academia, and cultural advisors, move free, contact anyone, bribe and corrupt whomever they like, plot along with their local lackeys, and promote their agenda for total control of the former Ottoman province, is not simply idiotic; it is a crime against the interests of all the indigenous peoples irrespective of their religion, origin, language and culture.

What Kemal Ataturk understood and all the filthy Satanic sheikhs of Mecca, Medina, Riyadh, Jerusalem, Amman, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis, etc. cannot understand is the conclusion about the gradual collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the key role played by the Anglo-French Freemasons and Zionists in this ominous process, which spread terror and death throughout the Ottoman territories that the Satanic Western Zionist and Freemasonic mass media mendaciously and ludicrously call "Middle East".

∎ Relations between Turkey and Russia are a puzzle to many in the West. How sustainable is the relationship? What is it grounded on? And what can the West learn from it? ∎ Central to the relationship is its bilateral nature. Relations between Ankara and Moscow are based on the mutual recognition of security interests. The resulting dynamics have shaped Turkish-Russian cooperation since the 1990s and can be observed in the current partnership in Syria. ∎ Mutual regard for the other's security concerns is facilitated by the prospect of collaborative projects that promise greater advantages than continued conflict. ∎ Trust is of secondary importance, as is the quality of personal relations between the Turkish and Russian presidents. More important is the interdependence between Russia and Turkey. ∎ The potential for confrontation or cooperation between Ankara and Moscow in regional conflicts depends on current priorities rather than past rivalries. The form and extent of their collaboration are determined not by which side of the conflict they are on, but by their respective motives.

Russia’s recent military engagement in Syria and calls for the establishment of an international coalition against the terrorist group calling itself the Islamic State (ISIS) has produced renewed interest in Moscow’s policies toward the jihadist quasi-state. Against this background, while many have speculated about Moscow’s true intentions in the Middle East, relatively little attention has been paid to Moscow’s interests in Central Asia in the context of its increasingly vocal rhetoric of fighting ISIS. Moscow is actively utilizing the risks and threats stemming from the ISIS to boost its clout in the near and far abroad.

This chapter provides an analysis of the political effects of the Egyptian Revolution from the perspective of postcolonial state theory.  It starts from the premise that the uprisings of 25 January 2011 and 30 June 2013 have set in motion an incomplete revolutionary project whose main political effect was to deform rather than transform Egypt’s postcolonial state.  Using the concept of praetorian parliamentarism it argues that the old military/bureaucratic apparatuses of the postcolonial period responded to the Revolution of 2011 through a compromise strategy that sought to replace the patrimonial networks of the Mubarak era with a new set of ‘guarded’ elected institutions.  The chapter concludes with the assessment that since the uprising of 2013, the military/bureaucratic apparatuses have not completely eradicated Egypt’s praetorian parliamentary system, but are significantly altering the balance in this power sharing arrangement in favour of its authoritarian pillar.

Étonnante  par  son  dynamisme  et  par  sa résilience, la relation israélo-russe a été mise à l’épreuve par l’établissement d’une forme de « protectorat  militaire »  par  Moscou  sur  la Syrie  utile  en  septembre  2015.  Les  Israéliens ont  été  les  premiers  à  cerner  les  contours  de l’intervention  directe  de  la  Russie  dans  le conflit syrien, et à conclure avec les Russes des accords  en  matière  de  « déconfliction »  dans l’espace  aérien  syrien,  ouvrant  la  voie  à  un modus  operandi en  matière  de  cohabitation militaire.  Toutefois,  la  recomposition  géopolitique du Moyen-Orient, notamment caractérisée  par  l’accroissement  de  l’influence régionale  de  la  Russie  mais  aussi  de  celle  de Téhéran,  pourrait  conduire  Russes  et  Israéliens  à  forger  un modus  vivendi permettant aux  deux  acteurs  de  faire  cohabiter  leurs agendas    stratégiques    respectifs,    tout    en  ouvrant  de  nouvelles  perspectives  pour  leur partenariat bilatéral.

Τα κυριότερα ζητήματα που θα απασχολήσουν την ισραηλινή εξωτερική πολιτική το 2017. Δυτική Όχθη και Παλαιστινιακό, ο Συριακός εμφύλιος, οι σχέσεις με τη Ρωσία, την Τουρκία, τον άξονα Ελλάδας-Κύπρου, η περιφερειακή ενεργειακή συνεργασία και η αποκωδικοποίηση των διακηρύξεων του Ντόναλντ Τραμπ επί των σχέσεων Ισραήλ-Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών
A review of main issues affecting the Israeli agenda in 2017: West Bank and Palestine, Syrian war, relations with Russia, Turkey, Greece-Cyprus and their common energy projects , and Donald Trump's intentions on US-Israel relations.
הסוגיות המרכזיות שישפיעו על מדיניות החוץ של ישראל בשנת 2017
הגדה המערבית והפלסטינים, מלחמת האזרחים בסוריה, קשרים עם רוסיה, טורקיה, הציר היווני (יוון-קפריסין) והפרוייקטים המשותפים בתחום האנרגיה ופענוח הצהרותיו של דונלד טראמפ לגבי היחסים בין ישראל וארצות הברית

The Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new concept of foreign policy  of the Russian Federation at the end of November.  Compared with the previous concept of 2013, currently he concentrates more on security issues and countering threats. The document indicates the diminishing role of the West. Also, he negatively perceives NATO enlargement, moving NATO's military infrastructure closer to Russia's  borders and an escalation of military operations of the organization.  The document reverberates an assertion that the world order is in a state of chaos, is being created a new, moving towards Asia, and Russia is a key player that may stabilize this order with the help of the West (mainly US) or Asia (mainly China). In the document, Russia is referred to as 'the most influential center of the modern world'.

La crise syrienne a permis de faire franchir au partenariat russo-iranien un seuil qualitatif en lui ouvrant un champ inédit : celui d’une coopération militaire poussée. Avec la stabilisation des affrontements, le dossier syrien fait désormais office de « stress test » pour la relation irano-russe. La compétition multiforme à laquelle se livrent Moscou et Téhéran en Syrie est scrutée depuis l’Europe et les États-Unis où, en l’absence d’une stratégie syrienne, on table sur le fait que leurs intérêts divergents finiront par conduire Russes et Iraniens à la confrontation. Par ailleurs, l’accroissement des tensions dans la zone du Golfe est autant porteuse d’instabilité qu’elle créée la possibilité pour Moscou de se poser en médiateur entre différents protagonistes. Entre continuité et ruptures, la compétition coopérative à laquelle se livrent Russes et Iraniens reste ainsi un des fondamentaux de leur partenariat. Au demeurant, il s’agit d’un modus vivendi dont les deux estiment tirer plus de dividendes qu’ils n’en obtiendraient d’une confrontation.

Russia now is building up its strategy of seeming reconciliation with the West on the positive role it played in achieving the Iran nuclear deal. But no one should be fooled by Russia’s intentions. Since starting the war in Ukraine, Russia is trying to build as many anti-Western axes in the world as it can and to strengthen them as much as it can as well.
The Russia-China axis and Russia-Iran-Syria axis should be mentioned first, and all the steps Russia has recently taken should be considered from this perspective, including the Iran deal, courting the region by an anti-terrorism coalition proposal and other initiatives as well. Russia is serious about regaining influence in the Middle East. And there should be no doubt it is going to do that at the expense of the influence of the United States and the West as a whole, not as part of building a new platform of cooperation.

Coğrafyayı tarihten kopararak yapılacak analizler dar, soyutlayıcı ve anlamlandırmadan yoksun kalacaktır. Tarihi süreç her katmanda farklı ilişki biçimlerini şekillendirmekle hibrit ilişkiler üretmektedir. Analiz katmanlarında (Uluslararası- küresel, ulusal ya da devlet ve ulus içi- toplumsal, kentsel vd.) köklü yapısal dönüşümlerin gözlemlendiği günümüz siyasi coğrafyasında gelişen önemli olaylar dejavu duygusu üretmektedir. Yeni çağın değişimine uyum sağlayamayan kadroların kalıtsal stratejik hamlelerinde önceki yüzyılın geri dönüşüm ürünlerine rastlanılmaktadır ki Rusya, karar vericilerini bu kapsamda sorgulamalıdır. “Güvenlik kültürlerinde” gelişen sezgilere ve normlara rağmen ters yönde adımlar ile siyasi bir sonuç yanılgısına kapılmak, dış politik süreçte paradoksal sürtünmelere yol açmaktadır.
Rus jeopolitiği yerel ve bölgesel katmanda Türkiye’yi arka bahçesinden uzak tutarken, küresel katmanda Türkiye’nin Anglo-Amerikan hegemonik alanında sorunlu bir paydaş olarak kalmasını mı öngörmektedir?

Since the late 2000s, the Russian Federation has expanded its naval footprint in the Eastern Mediterranean, and even resurrected its Mediterranean Squadron in 2013. The backbone of this operational squadron is provided by units coming from the Black Sea Fleet, complemented by vessels from other Russian naval formations (namely, the Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets, as well as the Caspian Sea Flotilla) on a rotational basis. As the Russian State Armament Program for the period 2011-2020 was implemented, the Black Sea Fleet received new warships and new diesel-powered submarines. Consequently, by the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, Moscow’s naval footprint in the Mediterranean had already been reconstituted. Yet, since the mid-2010s, a structural change occurred in the Mediterranean Squadron’s order of battle. The Squadron has morphed qualitatively and quantitatively, and has become more capable. Featuring fewer ex-Soviet large platforms
and more modern green water units, this naval task force has been
assigned mainly a defensive objective: locally counterbalance navies
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and protect Russia’s southern flank from perceived instability emanating from the Mediterranean's southern shore, in the context of the Arab Spring. Moreover, Moscow’s direct military involvement in the war in Syria has provided the Mediterranean Squadron with a new purpose while highlighting a conventional deterrence mission.

Seit  2015  ist  Russland  Kriegspartei  in  Syrien.  Mit  seinem  Kriegseintritt verfolgte  der  Kreml  drei  Ziele:  das  Assad-Regime  zu  stabilisieren,  vom eigenen Krieg in der Ostukraine abzulenken und das Machtgleichgewicht in  Syrien  und  im  Nahen  Osten  zu  eigenen  Gunsten  so  zu  verändern, dass  der  Westen  als  Gegenleistung  für  eine  Mitsprache  in  Syrien die Sanktionen  gegen  Russland  aufheben  könnte.  Dieses  Kalkül  ist  kaum aufgegangen. Das Assad-Regime kontrolliert zwar militärisch weite Teile des Landes. Die Entfremdung vom Westen ist jedoch tiefer denn je. Im ei-genen Land ist der Syrien-Krieg unpopulär. Doch der Rückzug aus Syrien ist schwierig. Das Assad-Regime ist politisch labil, Frieden in weiter Ferne. Russlands  partielle  Verbündete  Iran  und  Türkei  verfolgen  Interessen,  die den  eigenen  widersprechen.  Und  Russland  droht,  zwischen  die  Fronten des Israel-Iran-Konflikts zu geraten

Turkey's geopolitical identity has been in flux since the end of the Cold War. While societal pressures for democratization initially motivated popular support for European integration, seemingly incompatible identity narratives and rising Islamophobia made such integration increasingly difficult. Turkey's vocal support for democratization in the context of the Arab Spring brought these contradictions to the fore. The coup in Egypt in July 2013 was a turning point with Turkey and key Western powers adopting sharply different positions. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)'s offensive in July 2015 and the failed coup attempt in July 2016 elevated immediate security threats above all other considerations — Turkey gradually downplayed its support for opposition forces to the military dictatorships in Egypt and Syria, while seeking a rapprochement with Russia.

Цитата из статьи проф. М. С. Мегаломматиса «Почему Россия всегда терпела неудачи на Ближнем Востоке»
http://motimatik.livejournal.com/23641.html
Оказывается, "процесс 'арабизации' - уловка англо-французов, призванная обеспечить им постоянный колониальный контроль над Ближним Востоком".
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Читайте Мухаммеда Шамсаддина Мегаломатиса (Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis)!

Русская политика на Ближнем Востоке всегда отличалась недальновидность. Российские ориенталисты лишены оригинального мышления.
"Царство славное Салтана..."
http://igor-dzhadan.livejournal.com/60790.html
13th June 2008
Reference to and Comment about Prof. M. S. Megalommatis' article "Why Russia always failed in the Middle East"
First published in AfroArticles, American Chronicle, and Buzzle on 18th January 2008
http://www.afroarticles.com/article-dashboard/Article/Why-Russia-always-failed-in-the-Middle-East/72601

30 сентября 2015 г. Россия начала военную кампанию в Сирии. Ключевую роль для принятия российским властями решения о военном вовлечении в сирийский конфликт, по всей видимости, сыграли события весны-лета 2015 г., когда
после потери Идлиба, Пальмиры и ряда других ключевых пунктов катастрофически пошатнулись позиции режима Башара Асада. Нынешняя операция Кремля, видимо, в какой-то степени является продолжением мер по спасению режима Асада.

(...) "Η συμμαχία της Ρωσίας με τον Άσαντ, που μετράει από τα χρόνια της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης, είναι αναπόσπαστο κομμάτι του άξονα μεταξύ Ιράν, Συρίας, Χεζμπολά. Τυχόν κατάρρευση του καθεστώτος Άσαντ χωρίς την εξασφάλιση του ελέγχου στη διάδοχη κατάσταση ενέχει τον σαφέστατο κίνδυνο της απώλειας της βάσης της Ταρτούς που συμπαρασύρει την δυνατότητα παροχής στρατιωτικής στήριξης στη Χεζμπολά. Ακόμα, δεν πρέπει να παραγνωρίζεται ο ψυχολογικός παράγοντας στην άσκηση της εξωτερικής πολιτικής της Ρωσίας, ο οποίος μεταφράζεται σε μία πεισματική συνέπεια απέναντι στους συμμάχους της ώστε να καθίσταται αξιόπιστη και θελκτική ως σύμμαχος."

Problemstellung und Schlussfolgerungen Der geostrategische Kontext der türkisch-russischen Beziehungen Die Bedeutung der Nato für die Türkei Türkische Schwenks in Richtung Russland Die bilaterale Dimension der türkisch-russischen Beziehungen Handelsbeziehungen Energieprojekte Der Mythos der Kompartmentalisierung Syrien: Was ist neu in den türkisch-russischen Beziehungen unter Putin und Erdoğan? Moskaus Interessen in Syrien Ankaras Interessen in Syrien Wurzeln der türkisch-russischen Krise von 2015 Vorteile der Normalisierung Der Fall S-400

Уже много десятилетий турки занимаются
изданием большого количества трудов на
разных языках, в которых, исходя из политических
соображений, скрывают или фальсифицируют
исторические факты, вводя в заблуждение
и собственный народ, и человечество
в целом.
В редких случаях даются ответы на подобные
публикации, но чаще они остаются без
ответа, так как рассматриваются как абсурдные
труды.
Но в то же время многочисленные подобные
издания оказывают определенное влияние
на людей, являющихся непрофессионалами.
Именно такое воздействие оказывают турецкие
таблички армянских памятников на
территории Западной Армении.
Ниже приводим сфотографированные в
разные годы таблички некоторых исторических
памятников, сведения на которых либо
искажены, либо фальсифицированы.

Es geht letztlich um das Unterdrücken von europäischer Integration und die Sabotage liberaler Gegenmodelle zum russischen Autoritarismus, also von alternativen Entwicklungsszenarien, welche dann auch in Russland populär werden könnten. Zusätzlich führen einige Beobachter geopolitische Argumente an, die sich auf die Projektion militärischer Macht über den Kaukasus hinaus beziehen, besonders in Verbindung zur Lage im gesamten Mittleren Osten. Russland will als Regionalmacht in Nahost präsent sein, und der fortgesetzte Einfluss im Südkaukasus ist dafür eines von vielen Instrumenten.

Για πρώτη φορά από την έναρξη του εμφυλίου, στις 17.3.2017 το καθεστώς Άσαντ ανταπάντησε στρατιωτικά στους επανειλημμένους ισραηλινούς βομβαρδισμούς κατά στόχων ιρανικού ενδιαφέροντος εντός του συριακού εδάφους. Παρά το ότι η κίνηση αυτή είχε άμεσο αποδέκτη το Ισραήλ, η Δαμασκός στέλνει ποικίλα μηνύματα σε Μόσχα, Ουάσινγκτον και Τεχεράνη.
For the first time since the beginning of the civila war, the Syrian regime retaliated on March 17, 2017 following Israeli airstrikes against military targets of Iranian interest. With this development, and despite the fact that the Syrian retaliation was aiming Israel, Damascus has sent various clear messages to multiple recipients, including Moscow, Washington and Teheran
לראשונה מתחילת מלחמת האזרחים בסוריה, השלטון הסורי מגיב לתקיפות האוויריות של צה"ל נגד מטרות צבאיות המחיוסות לאינטרסים אירניים בתוך סוריה
למרות שהתגובה הסורית מיועדת בראש ובראשונה אל ישראל, ההתפתחות הזאת שולחת מסרים לגורמים נוספים באיזור כגון: מוסקבה, וושינגטון וטהרן

Philipp Ammon - "Georgien zwischen Eigenstaatlichkeit und russischer Okkupation. Die Wurzel des russisch-georgischen Konflikts vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zum Ende der ersten georgischen Republik (1921)"
2015 Kitab-Verlag Klagenfurt - Wien
www.kitab-verlag.com
[email protected]
ISBN 978-3-902878-45-8
Buchpräsentation in der Botschaft Georgiens zu Berlin
Begrüßung: Kulturattaché Dudana Mazmanishvili
Moderation: Ekkehard Maaß
Vortrag: Philipp Ammon
Dankeswort: Botschafter Georgiens in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Prof. Lado Chanturia
29.11.2016
Veröffentlicht am 02.12.2016 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RXSoswMZhus)

„Buchvorstellung von Philipp Ammon in der georgischen Botschaft.
Am 29. November 2016 hat der junge Historiker Philipp Ammon den zahlreich erschienenen Gästen in der georgischen Botschaft sein äußerst spannendes Buch -"Georgien zwischen Eigenstaatlichkeit und russischer Okkupation" vorgestellt. Nach der Buchvorstellung gefolgt von Publikumsfragen hatten die Gäste die Gelegenheit georgische Köstlichkeiten zu probieren und sich über das Buch auszutauschen.“ (http://germany.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=GER&sec_id=243&info_id=39065)

The Soviets were South Yemen´s major partner, but South Yemen does not exist anymore. The Soviets built the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, but a few years later the opportunistic president Sadat terminated his country´s relations with the USSR, as Henry Kissinger had offered him a simulacrum of victory in 1973.

In the wider region of the Middle East, the Russian foreign policy has been characterized by the following traits:
Tuesday, February 05, 2008
Why Russia always failed in the Middle East
http://red-army-family.blogspot.com/2008_02_01_archive.html?view=sidebar
http://red-army-family.blogspot.com/2008/02/why-russia-always-failed-in-middle-east.html
First published in AfroArticles, American Chronicle, and Buzzle on 18th January 2008

Resume If the Arab Spring were to bring about meaningful changes to Arab societies, what is needed is a political order that is not only democratic but also inclusive. To be credible, the Arab world, including its Islamists, will have to tread the long and painful path of consensus building. This method is inclusive and hence more enduring than electoral democracy.