Bashar al-Assad

The Syrian war will allow Russia to recover its naval presence in the Mediterranean. The Russian Navy will have more facilities at the same time that the Chinese Navy will appear in this scenario. This new situation will give us a new world order; this period we call "Tens Calm". Something similar happened after Bismarck Era, the period called "Armed Peace" (1890-1914), when the global balance was broken. This pre-war environment in the media could have been avoided. Russia today tries to recover its old deployment in the Mediterranean to become a global power.

Azzam, F. (2021).  If you are Syrian these days. (G. Alatrash, Trans.). Gutter Magazine. 
(The magazine of new Scottish and international writing), 24, p. 13-17. 

YouTube link:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vpobMibtOzA

Original Arabic:  https://dahnon.org/archives/7069

تسعى الأطراف الدولية المتدخلة في الأزمة السورية إلى إطالة أمد الصراع التركي-الكردي في سوريا لاستنزاف القدرات العسكرية التركية، وتحجيم النفوذ التركي في سوريا، بهدف استبعاد أنقرة من معادلات تقاسم مناطق النفوذ بعد نهاية الصراع. وفي المقابل، تسعى تركيا لإيجاد موطئ قدم لقواتها في سوريا، وانتزاع الهيمنة على المناطق الحدودية الفاصلة بين تركيا وسوريا من وحدات حماية الشعب الكردية، بالإضافة إلى تأسيس مسارات مستديمة للإمداد العسكري لدعم الفصائل السورية الموالية لها.
وفي هذا الإطار، يتناول هذا التحليل تقييم أبعاد التدخل التركي الذي دخل في أسبوعه الرابع، ويتناول الأهداف التركية من وراء هذه العملية، وأبرز تداعياتها السياسية، والعوامل المؤثرة على مستقبلها.

The longer the conflict continues and the Syrian population came back to traditional structures such as clan and community. The defense of the community and clan is becoming more important than ideologies and political demands. The religious minorities (20% of the population) generally support the regime because their presence in Syria is threatened, particularly the Alawi community has a lot to lose. The military opposition to the regime come from the popular classes Sunni Arabs (65% of the population), when the bourgeoisie remains loyal to the regime. As for the Kurds (15% of the population), they work to build an autonomous region, preferring Bashar al-Assad weakened to a strong Sunni Arab domination. The religious minorities and Kurds do not believe the pledges of the opposition to ensure their rights. Certainly, minorities, like all Syrians want democratic reforms in Syria, but not at the cost of their marginalization or destruction.

Plus le conflit se prolonge et plus la population syrienne se replie sur les structures traditionnelles que sont le clan et la communauté. La défense de la communauté et du clan prime sur les idéologies et les revendications politiques. Les minorités confessionnelles (20% de la population) soutiennent globalement le régime car leur survie est menacée, en particulier la communauté alaouite qui a beaucoup à perdre. L’opposition armée au régime provient des classes populaires arabes sunnites (65% de la population), quand la bourgeoisie demeure fidèle au régime. Quant aux Kurdes (15% de la population), ils travaillent à la construction d’une région autonome, préférant un Bachar el Assad affaibli à une domination arabe sunnite forte. Les minorités confessionnelles et les Kurdes ne croient pas aux promesses de l’opposition de garantir leurs droits. Certes, les minorités, comme tous les Syriens, souhaitent des réformes démocratiques en Syrie, mais pas au prix de leur marginalisation, voire de leur élimination.

Unlike other Arab revolution which were found relatively quickly exits, the Syrian revlt is continuing for more than two years and it can not seem to find a rapid conclusion. The geostrategic position of the Syrian Arab Republic, ruled by Assad family since 1970, and communitarianism explain the transformation of the Syria crisis into a civil war.

Contrairement aux autres révolutions arabes auxquelles ont été trouvées des issues relativement rapides, la révolte syrienne court depuis plus de deux ans et ne semble pas prête à trouver un dénouement rapide. Les enjeux géostratégiques que représente la République Arabe Syrienne gouvernée par les Assad depuis 1970, et le communautarisme expliquent la transformation de la crise syrienne en une guerre civile.

Social media has become an increasingly important tool in the extremists' handbook. In particular, Instagram has become a major platform for the public relations posts of Syria’s Assad regime, which has been classified as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1979. Additionally, Assad has employed public relations tactics through social media apparatuses in order to overcome the poor conception that Western / international governing bodies have of the regime’s recent actions, while also attempting to lessen the impact of ISIS’s (mainly social, as well) media campaign against them. These virtual combatants have become successful enough in creating a negative image of the Assads that it has necessitated an employment of rhetorical techniques on social media by the regime, which has attempted and failed to deflect criticism while building a community of adherents that add to their overall social capital.

Syria's sectarian fragmentation was not created when the war began in 2011; it had its genesis in an inherited Ottoman millet system whose traits were accentuated by the "divide to reign" policies of Hafiz al-Assad. The war has compelled Syrians to cling to their sectarian identities more tightly, whether out of socioeconomic self-interest or simply to survive. Examining these identities is therefore crucial to answering the most fundamental questions about the ongoing upheaval. In many ways, the Syrian conflict has been taken out of the hands of Syrians themselves, becoming a proxy war between regional and international forces that often exploit the country's divided society for their own benefit.

Since the Middle Ages, Saladin has been one of the most influential figures of historical memory in Eurasia. He was used as a symbol of the noble enemy, of war with the West and Israel, and of peace. In various incarnations he was also a national hero. According to Assmann, any collective memory of a symbol or figure creates orientation within a group and identity for the individual. Cultural memory is reconstructive,
as knowledge of the past is aligned anew with contemporary
needs.

US NATO Krieg in Afghanistan seit 2001 ohne Erfolg,
in Vietnam ohne Erfolg, Irak ohne Erfolg, in Libyen ohne Erfolg und jetzt gegen Russland?
Der Intelligente Teil der Welt lacht schon über so viel Größenwahn!
Kriegstote
Bisher kamen über 3.470 Koalitionssoldaten ums Leben, darunter 54 Soldaten der Bundeswehr und drei deutsche Polizisten. Die Vereinigten Staaten als größte Truppensteller haben mit rund 67 % der insgesamt getöteten Soldaten der Koalition die höchsten Verluste zu verzeichnen. Die Anzahl gestorbener afghanischer Soldaten und Aufständischer ist unbekannt oder egal.

Kosten des Idiotischen Krieges

Die Kosten für die Vereinigten Staaten belaufen sich auf etwa 100 Milliarden US-Dollar pro Jahr. [126] Da die Vereinigten Staaten etwa 70 Prozent aller Truppen stellen, kann vermutet werden, dass bei ihnen auch nur 70 Prozent der anfallenden Kosten auflaufen. Damit würde der OEF/ISAF-Einsatz pro Jahr etwa 143 Milliarden US-Dollar kosten. Von 2003 bis 2014 hat der Krieg in Afghanistan die International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) und die USA gut eine Billion Dollar gekostet, so Wolfgang Koschnick. Er gehe davon aus, dass noch mehrere hundert Milliarden Dollar an Kosten folgen werden.

Der deutsche Anteil beträgt etwa ein Hundertstel des amerikanischen Beitrags: „Die offiziellen Kosten für die Bundeswehrmission in Afghanistan wurden bei jeder der 13 Mandatierungen durch den Bundestag seit 2001 festgeschrieben. Im ersten Jahr waren es 436 Millionen Euro, inzwischen hat sich diese Summe mehr als verdoppelt: Im Mandatstext von Januar 2011 wurde erstmals etwas mehr als eine Milliarde Euro veranschlagt.“ Darin enthalten sind Kosten für Personal, Infrastruktur und Material. Das Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) rechnet darüber hinaus auch Kosten durch Tod oder Verletzung von Soldaten sowie die Investitionen von Entwicklungsministerium und Auswärtigem Amt zu den gesellschaftlichen Gesamtkosten und kommt so auf eine Summe von 17 Milliarden Euro über zehn Jahre. Jedes weitere Jahr koste nach Rechnung des DIW dreimal mehr als die offiziell veranschlagte 1 Milliarde Euro pro Jahr.



Krieg in Afghanistan seit 2001
Kabinett George W. Bush
George W. Bush
Terroranschläge am 11. September 2001
Nationale Islamische Vereinigte Front zur Rettung Afghanistans
Kabul
Kandahar
Kunduz
NATO
International Security Assistance Force
Operation Enduring Freedom
Vereinigte Staaten
Vereinigtes Königreich
Deutschland
Australien
Usbekistan
Afghanische Nationalarmee
Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten
Joseph F. Dunford
Mudschahed
Rote Armee
Pakistan
Iran
Saudi-Arabien
Masar-e Scharif
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam
Ahmad Schah Massoud
Nordatlantikvertrag
Rules of Engagement (Militär)
Deutsche Beteiligung am Krieg in Afghanistan
Bundesregierung (Deutschland)
Alec Station
Gefangenenlager der Guantanamo Bay Naval Base
Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum
Kalaschnikow
Einsatz des Bundesheeres in Afghanistan
US-amerikanische Beteiligung am Krieg in Afghanistan
Kanadische Beteiligung am Krieg in Afghanistan
Einsatz der Dänischen Streitkräfte in Afghanistan
Niederländische Beteiligung am Krieg in Afghanistan
Australische Beteiligung am Krieg in Afghanistan
Georgische Beteiligung am Krieg in Afghanistan
Französische Beteiligung am Krieg in Afghanistan
Polnische Beteiligung am Krieg in Afghanistan
United States Marine Corps
Bombardierung der Klinik von Ärzte ohne Grenzen in Kundus
FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency
Vietnamkrieg
Begleitschaden
Arabische Halbinsel
Einsatzgeschwader Mazar-e Sharif
Bagram Air Base
Zalmay Rassoul
Marc Grossman
Haqqani-Netzwerk
Islamisches Emirat Afghanistan
United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne)
Veröffentlichung des Kriegstagebuchs des Afghanistan-Krieges durch WikiLeaks
WikiLeaks
Unabhängige Afghanische Menschenrechtskommission
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
Zwischenfälle der Bundeswehr in Afghanistan
Liste von Flugunfällen und Abschüssen von Luftfahrzeugen im Afghanistankrieg
Kill-Team-Morde in Afghanistan
Luftangriff bei Garani
Unruhen nach Koran-Verbrennungen in Afghanistan im Februar 2012

The goal of this dissertation is twofold. First, to analyse the three most seminal US policy decisions during the first two and a half years of the Syrian conflict for possible media impact. Those are the US government's decision to demand president Bashar Al-Assad's resignation, to declare the “red line” and the decision not to intervene militarily. The second goal is to use the empirical findings to contribute to the theoretical debate about the influential relationship between the news media and foreign
policy. I have chosen Robinson’s policy-media interaction model (2002) as theoretical framework, which is built on a two-way understanding of the influential relationship between media and foreign policy. The empirical analysis comprises two main parts. Firstly, the quantity and framing of newspaper coverage from New York Times and the Washington Post in the three weeks leading up to each policy decisions was analysed. Secondly, the level of consensus in the legislative and executive branch in the United was assessed, since Robinson’s model only allows for media influence when there is disagreement about policy
in both branches. The analysis has shown that news media coverage had minor influence on the US decision to demand Assad’s departure and remained non-influential with respect to the other two decisions. The findings support two notions. First, that media coverage is most likely to have an influence on foreign policy decisions with low political and economic costs. Second, that media power surrounding high-profile events and with respect to strategic foreign policy decisions is confined to
the agenda setting level.

Systematischer Tendenzjournalismus,
Nachrichtenunterschlagung und bellizistische
Propaganda: Die Informationen der "Tagesschau" über
das Massenmorden in Syrien sind beispiellos einäugig.
Das ist ganz im Sinne der Bundesregierung. Deren
Völkerrechtsbruch, grundgesetzwidrige Politik und
strafrechtlich relevanter Friedensverrat sind dem
Durchschnittszuschauer nicht bewusst. Dessen verzerrte Sicht auf die Kriege des US-Imperiums gegen den Rest der Welt erlaubt es den politisch verantwortlichen in Berlin, sich fortgesetzt als friedliebende Demokraten und Verteidiger der Menschenrechte aufzuspielen.

History repeats itself. Not as a farce; but as tragedy. Those who witnessed the White House-led propaganda against Iraq in the run-up to the 2003 American war on that country cannot miss the startling similarities between those days and the past few ones. Replace Iraq with Syria. It’s almost a reloading of history. If Iraq was part of a larger American plan to reshape the Middle East, irrespective of what all the explanation the Bush clique and the neocon media were distributing, the real reasons behind a possible Syrian war cannot be different.

This time the target is Iran, and to weaken the geopolitical standing of Russia. Syria has been the most trusted ally of Iran for years. And it’s also a key link between the Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite group, and Iran. The Islamic Republic sends weapons and cash to the Hezbollah through Syria. The Hezbollah is an effective threat to any future American/Israeli plans to attack Iran. In the wake of a future strike on Iran, the Hezbollah could open a new front on Israel’s northern border. A master in asymmetrical warfare, the Hezbollah has fought long battles with Israel in the past. It successfully resisted Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon for long 18 years, forcing the “most powerful country in the Middle East” to end the occupation unilaterally in 2000. Six years later, Hezbollah again resisted a month-long Israeli bombing and ground operations.

Bachar al-Assad a gagné la guerre. L’avenir du pays dépend désormais d’un accord entre la Russie, l’Iran et la Turquie. Les Etats-Unis restent présents provisoirement dans le Nord-Est du pays, mais une fois l’Etat Islamique éradiqué, ils devraient se retirer et laisser leurs positions à la Turquie. L’Occident ne pèse donc plus guère dans le conflit syrien, en revanche il va continuer à en subir les conséquences, notamment le terrorisme et la pression migratoire. Dès le début de cette guerre l’Occident a commis trois erreurs majeures, il a sous-estimé la détermination de Bachar el Assad, les fractures communautaires au sein de la société syrienne et enfin l’engagement des alliés internationaux du gouvernement syrien. Si l’Occident veut désormais soutenir la compétition internationale, il doit revenir à la Realpolitik.

Middle East has never been free from battle, conflict, war and change. Hosting these protracted problems Middle East is experiencing the same type of events in the current phase of history. The article will focus on Syrian Civil War which has enlarged its scope since the day of its inception. The countries neighboring Syria have taken their positions and assigned specific policies towards the issue. Iran’s foreign policy towards Syria will be analyzed in this context and the reason why there is a separation between Syria and Bashar al-Assad because one has the idea that there can be solutions for Iran without al-Assad. The historical context also has a significant impact in constructing the current circumstances. Syria’s value to Iran will be analyzed in the study to indicate that Iran’s actions in Syria are not haphazard. Also, This study will try to bridge the historical background with the current situation within the perspective of continuation of previous conflicts and unsettled wars. Additionally the study will be in the pursuit of alternative policies that will relieve Iran from further loss of prestige and connections with the other parts of Middle East society than Shiia.

In 2011, there was general agreement that Bashar al-Assad would fall like a ripe fruit after a few months of fighting and that the Syrian revolution was pacifist, non-religious, and democratic. There was no risk of radicalization, for Syrian civil society would supposedly oppose any moves in such a direction. The communitarian structure of Syrian society was completely ignored by researchers in the social sciences, as was the Salafist re-Islamization of Syrian society that had begun in the 1990s. In addition, from 2011 it was clear that Bashar al-Assad would benefit from the unfailing support of Russia and Iran, enabling him to resist an insurrection that was quickly backed by Iran’s enemies.

In 2011, everybody agreed on the fact that Bachar El Assad’s regime was about to fall apart after a few months of contestation, and that the Syrian revolution was a pacific, non-religious and democratic one. Everybody believed there were no risk of radicalization, for Syrian civil society was supposed to be opposed to any kind of drift. Comunautarianism, which is structuring Syrian society, was completely denied by the researchers in social sciences, and so was the Salafist re islamization of the Syrian society that began in the 90’s. Moreover, it was clear that from 2011, Bachar El Assad was going to benefit from a total support from Russia and Iran, which would allow him to resist an insurrection backed by Iran’s enemies. A de facto partition of the territory appears. The aim of the Syrian army is not taking the control over the country anymore, but to restore security by eliminating the rebel areas. In the end, there is no good scenario for Syria, and the worst might be still to come for no one seems to be able to control the Daech situation.

This thesis attempts to understand the impact of the nature of the Assad regime on the trajectory of the conflict which took place in Syria following the 2011 uprising. It argues that the Assad regime which has been ruling Syria since 1970 represents a case of neopatrimonial regime. The thesis elaborates the neopatrimonial conceptualization tracing the concept back to its Weberian roots. It follows the evolution of the concept from the ‘traditional’ patrimonialism to the modern ‘neo’ patrimonialism. The thesis claims that the neopatrimonial regime consolidates its power through personalization of the regime, patronage and clientelism networks. The claim puts forth is that through neopatrimonialism, the Assad regime was able to consolidate its patrimonial domination and penetrate the bureaucratic realm as well as the society through the patronage and clientelism networks. The thesis argues that the neopatrimonialism had fostered the durability of the regime, and limited the outcomes of the conflict to a rocking between a re-stabilization of the regime and an uncertain revolution, and has influenced the trajectory of the conflict which dragged the country into a state of civil war.

During the onslaught of the Islamic caliphate on Kobanî, Syria, media outlets across the globe broadcast pictures of brave and often unveiled Kurdish women fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), a quintessentially male force of destruction. The images of women fighting Islamist male aggressors aroused outrage, admiration, and pity among observers. But had all Kurdish fighters been male or had women fought for ISIS, viewers might have reacted differently. To examine some of the most widely disseminated gendered pictures and videos of the Syrian uprising in the media, this article draws on Mohja Kahf’s three categories, which typify how Muslim women, Arab women, or both are perceived by the Anglophone reading and viewing public: the first is victims; the second, escapees; and the third, pawns of patriarchy and male power. While this typology helps in examining gendered images of the Syrian uprising, it also obscures the socioeconomic realities on the ground.

The Russian military intervention in Syria since September 2015 has sparked spirited debates in Western policymaking and intellectual circles about the genuine motives behind the Kremlin's unexpected decision. Various monocausal explanations have been propounded, which, however, do not interpret this intervention in either an objective or systematic way. This article aspires to examine the Russian military intervention in Syria in an unbiased, innovative, and thorough way by adding the crucial geopolitical dimension. It will show that, without discounting the other incentives (e.g., support for the only Arab ally), this operation intends primarily to restore Russia's status as a world power in the twenty-first century.

While peace talks between Syria's government and opposition bump along in Geneva or Vienna, battle rage on the ground and the death toll and refugee wave rise. Europe wants its voice to be heard in the talks, but can it keeps its eyes and borders closed to the men, women and children fleeing from Syria? How can Europe better respond to the humanitarian and political disaster looming on its external border?
This essay's aim is to briefly present, in its first section, the situation on the ground in Syria, for a better understanding of the dynamics of the Syrian civil war and its consequences. Over the following sections it will be presented the European response to this Hobbesian conflict who generated a huge refugee crisis, seen now as a major threat for the unity and security of the European Union.
While a new approach of this crisis is a major challenge, much more is to be done when it comes to leaders' public positions. EU is built on democratic and humanitarian foundations and it has to keep its values.

The history of Syria in the 20th century is marked by foreign domination, imperialism and the difficult formation of a Syrian identity, linked to questions of territorial integrity and national unity. The creation of a small independent state for the Alawis, under French mandate, after World War I is of great significance in light of current events in Syria.

— Since the outbreak of Syrian war in 2011, an estimated 9 million Syrians have fled their homes, taking shelter in neighbouring countries like Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and other European Union nations. As a result of Turkey's " open door policy " , it is now hosting refugees more than its critical threshold which led to a huge economic stemming and is impacting the country socially, ethically, economically and culturally. With limited assistance provided by the international community, Turkey is now struggling to cope with the growing numbers. The paper intends to provide a profound analysis on how the displacement crisis has impacted Turkey and its shift on the refugee policies in order to encompass long term solutions.

L'IDEOLOGIA DEL BA 'TH (hizb al--Ba'th al--arabi al--'Isthiraki) IN SIRIA. Ad oggi la guerra civile siriana ha causato oltre cento mila morti e più di tre milioni di profughi, dimostrandosi uno dei più spaventosi e sanguinosi conflitti moderni e contribuendo ad incrementare l'instabilità di una regione già intrinsecamente frammentata, come quella del MENA.

In 2011, as a result of a series of social upheavals collectively called “The Arab Spring", a civil war started in Syria which would come to involve many parties and victims, both direct and indirect. During its first months, Bashar Al-Assad's government forces faced the Western-backed Free Syrian Army, which caused his government to become completely unstabilized. In the following years, the Syrian Civil War came to include more factions, among the radical islamic groups of Libyan and Iraqi origins, provoking utter and complete chaos. Al-Assad's brutal repression, which was responsible for over 200,000 deaths, was thus followed by an unprecedented migratory exodus.
This article will endeavor to explore and describe the participation of the United Nations coalition and above all that of Russia, which began its military intervention in Syria in September 2015 in order to shore up Bashar Al-Assad's regime, aiming to prevent its total collapse and replacement by the radical groups of the so-called Islamic State and the total radicalization of the region.

En el año 2011, producto de una serie de revueltas sociales denominadas en su conjunto como “La Primavera Árabe”, estalló en Siria una guerra civil que en los siguientes años iría sumando múltiples actores y víctimas, directos e indirectos. Durante los primeros meses se enfrentaron las fuerzas gubernamentales de Bashar Al Assad contra el Ejército Libre Sirio apoyado por distintos países de occidente, hecho que llevó a la desestabilización total del gobierno. En los años que siguieron, la guerra civil siria fue sumando actores, entre ellos grupos radicales islámicos provenientes principalmente de Iraq y Afganistán, provocando un caos absoluto. A la represión brutal de Al Assad, que dejó una cifra aproximada de 200 mil muertos, se le suma un desplazamiento humano sin precedentes. 
El artículo buscará explorar y describir la participación de los países pertenecientes a las Naciones Unidas y principalmente de Rusia, quien en septiembre de 2015 ingresó militarmente al país de Oriente Próximo para salvaguardar el régimen de Al Assad, en pos de sostener un gobierno central que impidiera a los grupos radicales del autodenominado Estado Islámico tomar el control absoluto de Siria, radicalizando completamente la región.

With the deadly ISIS advance, the sudden rousing of Shia militias and the threat of Kurdish secession, Iraq faces a host of deep-seated and intractable problems. Together, these events raise a number of serious questions, not just for Iraq and its future but also for the broader Middle East, the United States and its Coalition partners and the international community. While these challenges and questions will drive much academic debate, political analysis and media discussion in the months and years ahead, they are not the central purpose of this chapter. While there is always a risk in commenting on unfolding events, including the potential to overstate their significance and likely long-term impact, it is difficult to ignore the significance of the deadly ISIS advance and all that has happened since. This chapter argues that key to understanding these events is coming to terms with the three varied and complex legacies of the 2003 Iraq War. The first central legacy of the Iraq War is the ongoing consequences of several critical mistakes made by the US-led Coalition before, during and immediately after the 2003 intervention. The second legacy addressed here is the fact that the 2003 war shattered – perhaps irreversibly - Iraqis fragile cultural mosaic and its rich and complex history of overlapping and intersecting communities, ideologies and narratives. The third and final legacy of the 2003 Iraq War detailed in this chapter is its significant regional and global consequences – from spiralling sectarianism across the Middle East to a profound challenge to America’s status as the last remaining superpower and its use of military power for ‘humanitarian’ ends. The argument here is that these three important legacies set in train a sequence of events that have served as the collective catalyst for the expansion of the ‘Islamic State’ from mid-2014.

The systematic savagery leveled by the Assad regime in Syria against its own citizens has sparked moral outrage and fueled calls for international intervention to stop the slaughter. For an increasing number of analysts this means indirect intervention by providing military and non-military assistance to opposition forces. In this Brief, Eva Bellin and Peter Krause argue that a distillation of the historical experience with insurgencies and civil wars, as well as a sober reckoning of conditions on the ground in Syria, make clear that this type of intervention would likely exacerbate the harm that it seeks to eliminate by prolonging the current bloody stalemate. Instead, the authors consider two alternative forms of intervention: choking the regime’s capacity for battle and restructuring the incentives to encourage regime elites to step down.

This study examines both Syrian Conflict and Critical Security Studies (CSS), as known Welsh/Aberystwyth School. The security situation in Syria, especially security of chosen case, the Ethnic and sect groups/communities has been examined in the lens of CSS. The role of ethnic and sect groups is very important in this state. From independence of Syria until beginning of the civil war, there have been many problems between those groups, and it has been blown-up with the protests then, became a conflict between the ethnic and sect groups. After a long-time conflict, many people have been killed and displaced. It is time to secure Syria. Of course, Emancipation, human security and derived concept are very important for a decision on security and which are also highlighted by CSS. In any case, a security decision is taken by actors, it should include emancipation of individuals and communities like sects and ethnic communities.

Le conflit Syrien, c’est des années de guerre, des milliers de morts et des millions de réfugiés. Une population plus que jamais divisée et aux intérêts opposés. Bain de sang généralisé, ce conflit est une guerre à la fois civile, religieuse et froide. Il oppose de nombreux acteurs à la fois internes, mais aussi régionaux et internationaux.

Le territoire se retrouve ainsi morcelé et de nombreux spécialistes ont avancé l’hypothèse d’une partition de la Syrie. En effet, depuis 2011, rien n’indique qu’une sortie de crise est proche. Les acteurs locaux se disputent des territoires stratégiques (Idleb, Hama, Homs, Damas) et malgré la poussée des rebelles depuis le début du conflit, l’armée syrienne n’est pas prête de céder sur ces points clés. De nombreuses organisations extrémistes se sont mêlées au conflit, à l’image de l’Etat Islamique (EI), qui tente de planter son drapeau noir sur toutes les collines où il passe. Acteur majeur du conflit, l’EI, financé par des personnes privées de la péninsule arabique, concentre toute l’attention des occidentaux. Catalyseur du recrutement pour le djihad, la campagne de propagande de l’EI parcours le web et semble fonctionner : des milliers d’européens partent à l’ « aventure », inquiétant les services de sécurité quant à leurs intentions à leur retour (Charlie Hebdo, Thalys…). On peut également citer le groupe extrémiste Jabat Al-Nosra qui entretient des relations étroites avec certains groupes rebelles.
Les occidentaux quant à eux ont longtemps refusé d’agir. Obama avait fixé la « ligne rouge » à l’usage des armes chimiques mais les représailles n’ont pas été au rendez-vous. Aujourd’hui ils s’attaquent à Daesh à la fois en Irak et en Syrie.  Mais sans déploiement de troupes au sol, comment imaginer l’éradication de l’organisation terroriste ? La stratégie occidentale est de plus en plus floue, entre le « ni Assad, ni Daesh ». Elle semble cependant être forcée et réorientée par le cours des évènements. En effet, l’intervention Russe en Syrie permet à Poutine de prendre l’initiative et exclue surtout toute intervention contre Assad. Protéger ses installations à Tartous et se rendre indispensable quant à la résolution du conflit sont les deux raisons majeures de l’intervention russe à court terme. Cependant, difficile d’anticiper ses motivations politiques et donc ses actions militaires à moyen/long-terme.

Dès lors, on peut se demander si l’intervention militaire russe en Syrie remet en cause le scénario de la partition du pays ?

Emettre de tels jugements sur le conflit syrien ne peut se faire sans en comprendre tous les tenants et aboutissants. Il s’agit donc dans un premier temps d’analyser les dynamiques géopolitiques du conflit. Puis, au regard de ces éléments, nous aborderons les thèses qui poussent à croire en la partition du pays pour enfin analyser l’influence de l’intervention russe sur cette hypothèse plus que posée.

Sin dall'ascesa della famiglia degli Al-Asad, la Siria è stata schiacciata dalla censura e dal terrore politico. Questo elaborato cerca di far luce sulle strategie adottate dagli scrittori e intellettuali siriani per combattere la repressione culturale e la censura sulla scrittura.

Silvered Water, Syria Self-Portrait(2014) is a French-Syrian film made by Usama Muhammad and Wiam Simav Bedirxan, an elementary school teacher, over the past years of the civil war.

The war started in 2011, after the wave of Arab Spring protests and this movie is basically a found-footage made from online archives such as mobiles phones or mini-cameras videos. It also includes footages made by the two film-makers themselves. The first part of the film gives an overview of the conflict, documenting the multilateral destructions of lives and infrastructures in Homs, while the second one is more centered on the correspondence between Usama and Wiam. Wiam first contacted Usama to know if he was still in Homs to film and make a documentary about the conflict, but he was already in Paris. Usama indeed went into exile to France while Wiam stayed in Homs. So their only way to communicate is using the Internet to exchange and send videos and messages.

The film itself is constructed as a work “in progress”. The shots are indeed gathered and juxtaposed according to the logic of the stream of consciousness, as they follow the thoughts of the two filmmakers. The stream of consciousness is a narrative mode characterized by its non-linearity and its randomness. It could be seen as “the multitudinous thoughts and feelings which pass through the mind1.” In the first part of the film, Usama's voice over is way more than present while he delegates it to Wiam in the second one. This use of the stream of consciousness as a method of editing actually echoes a reality of the war : the considerable quantity of videos posted on Youtube everyday, either by the rebels or by the government officers, is a striking fact that is really important to take into account when one studies representations of war.

This variety witnesses the multiplicity of points of view involved in the conflict as it challenges the censorship instituted by Bachar Al-Assad It is therefore interesting to think about the status of these videos in such a regime: to what extent can they represent an alternative to propaganda? Do they embody a form of “Underground”, and if they do, how can we define it? These are the questions to which I will try to bring an answer. Firstly, I will show how new technologies can tell a counter-history, enabling a reverse angle on the catastrophe. In other words, it will be the opportunity to examine how they shape an alternative version of History. Then, it will be interesting to study the modes of filming at work in such videos, shared between spontaneity and a desire to stage reality. Finally, I will try to define what is potentially “underground” in such a form of expression, how it can convey the revolutionary speech. This analysis will be a chance to redefine, or at least, to complete the notion of underground in light of the practices involved by the evolution of technologies.

• There has been an awful lot of noise and blowing wind of late across all forms of social media about an impending WWIII between the United States and Russia, most of which involves further involvement and an intensified escalation within Syria. With the US airstrikes (alongside its allied partners, the UK and France) on Friday night (American time), that crescendo is no doubt going to hit an all-time high of anticipation. To that I offer one small contrary warning: don't hold your breath for the mushroom clouds just yet.

The following pages analyse the motivations behind the Russian and Chinese vetoes that prevented three Security Council resolutions from entering into force. In particular, their commonly accepted argument that they used their veto power in order to prevent a repetition of the regime change that happened in Libya will be challenged on various grounds as it seems that it was not an outright objection of regime change but rather the frustration of having been left aside during the post-Gaddafi scramble for oil and other economic benefits, that led to their voting behaviour. In addition, Russia almost had no other option than using its veto power because of its close ties to the Assad regime. Here, Libya rather created an environment of distrust that Russia cling on its ally in fear that a newly-imposed regime would not continue this special relationship.

ÖZET

1990’lı yılların başında Soğuk Savaş’ın sona ermesinden sonra Batılı devletlerce oluşturulmaya çalışılan yeni dünya düzeninden en fazla etkilenen Orta Doğu ülkesi, dış politikasını iki kutuplu uluslararası sistemdeki güç dengelerine ve Sovyetler Birliği’nden gelen askeri ve ekonomik yardıma bağlayan Suriye olmuştur. Suriye’nin, globalleşme, liberal demokrasi, serbest piyasa ekonomisi, insan hakları, uluslararası hukuk gibi değerleri savunduğunu söyleyen Batılı dünya içinde kendine yer bulma çabası, Hafız Esad iktidarının son on yılında başlamış olsa da planlı bir reform hareketi, 2000 yılında Beşşar Esad’ın iktidara gelmesiyle uygulamaya konmuştur. Beşşar’ın başlattığı siyasi ve ekonomik reform hareketi, iktidarının ilk yıllarında Suriye’nin liberalleşmesi ve dışa açılımı açısından önemli değişimleri beraberinde getirmiştir. Batılı gözlemcilerin “Şam Baharı” olarak adlandırdıkları bu dönemde Suriye yönetimi, ülkedeki sivil toplumun ve serbest piyasa ekonomisinin gelişimini teşvik etmiş ve cesaretlendirmiştir. Suriye yönetiminin reformu destekleyen tavrına rağmen “Şam Baharı” dönemi kısa süre sonra devletin baskıcı politikalarının ortaya çıkmasıyla sona ermiştir. “Şam Baharı” döneminden sonra reform süreci dalgalı bir seyir izlemiş ve istikrarlı bir ilerleme kat edememiştir. Uluslararası sistemdeki değişimler ve Suriye iktidarındaki güç dengeleri reform sürecinin yöntemini, kapsamını ve hızını etkilemiştir. Suriye, Orta Doğu’daki diğer devletlere göre demokratik bir dönüşümü gerçekleştirebilecek alt yapıya ve tecrübeye daha fazla sahip olmakla birlikte, içten ve dıştan Beşşar yönetimine yönelen tehditler, güvenlik ve demokratikleşme arasındaki çelişkinin yaşanmasına yol açmaktadır.


ABSTRACT

By the end of the Cold War in the beginning of 1990’s, the Middle East state that has been mostly affected by the Western states policy harmonious to the balance of power politics of the bipolar system and also dependent to the economic and military aid of the Soviet Union. Although the effort for integration to the Western World maintains the values for globalization, liberal democracy, free market economy, human rights and international law has started during the last ten years of Hafiz Assad period a more organized reform movement was put into practice in the year of 2000 with Bashar Assad’s power. The political and economical reform action which Bashar Assad had started, provided important developments with respect to Syria’s liberalizm and global integration in the first years of his governance. In this period called “Damascus Spring” by western observers, Syria government has encouraged the development of civil society and free market economy. Despite the manner of Syrian governance that supports “Damascus Spring” reform ended up after a short time due to government’s tough policies. After the period of “Damascus Spring”, the reform process had a wavy progress and couldn’t have stable process. The change in the international system and the power balances in the Syria’s power has affected the method, extent and momentum of the reform process. However Syria has more fundamental and historical experience than the other Middle Eastern states to realize the democratic transformation, the internal and external threats which direct to Bashar’s governance cause the contradiction between security and democratization.

It took a temporary partition to end the war that tore apart Bosnia in the 1990s. Why not do the same for Syria? In one sense, a partitioned Syria is already visible, its contours drawn by the front lines of the civil war. President Bashar al-Assad has retreated from territory was too difficult for his overextended forces to hold, giving up the attempt to reimpose nationwide control.
In rebeld-held areas, Alawites and minority populations such as Druze and Christian have mostly fled, leaving an almost entirely Suni population. Kurdish areas have also been largely emptied of Sunni Arabs. Regime area by contrast remain diverse; Alawites and Shiites make up just  12% of Syria’s population and Assad’s support relies on other minorities who fear Islamic State more than him. In addition, most internal displacement has been into regime held territory.

With the deadly ISIS advance, the sudden rousing of Shia militias and the threat of Kurdish secession, Iraq faces a host of deep-seated and intractable problems. Together, these events raise a number of serious questions, not just for Iraq and its future but also for the broader
Middle East, the United States and its Coalition partners and the international community. While these challenges and questions will drive much academic debate, political analysis and media discussion in the months and years ahead, they are not the central purpose of this chapter. While there is always a risk in commenting on unfolding events, including the potential to overstate their significance and likely long-term impact, it is difficult to ignore the significance of the deadly ISIS advance and all that has happened since. This chapter argues that key to understanding these events is coming to terms with the three varied and complex legacies of the 2003 Iraq War. The first central legacy of the Iraq War is the ongoing consequences of several critical mistakes made by the US-led Coalition before, during and immediately after the 2003 intervention. The second legacy addressed here is the fact that the 2003 war shattered – perhaps irreversibly - Iraqis fragile cultural mosaic and its rich and complex history of overlapping and intersecting communities, ideologies and narratives. The third and final legacy of the 2003 Iraq War detailed in this chapter is its significant regional and global consequences – from spiralling sectarianism across the Middle East to a profound challenge to America’s status as the last remaining superpower and its use of military power for ‘humanitarian’ ends. The argument here is that these three important legacies set in train a sequence of events that have served as the collective catalyst for the expansion of the ‘Islamic State’ from mid-2014.

تعد سوريا الحديثة دولة فتية ظهرت إلى حيز الوجود منذ نهاية الحرب العالمية الأولى، وكان لها لحد ما الحدود الحالية ذاتها. وقد استقلت تماما في عام 1946. يتسم تاريخ سوريا في القرن العشرين بالهيمنة الأجنبية والتشكل الصعب للهوية السورية المرتبط بمسألة وحدة الأراضي والوحدة الوطنية. وعلى خلفية الأحداث الجارية في سوريا يلعب العلويون وتأسيس دويلة مستقلة لهم تحت حكم الانتداب الفرنسي بعد الحرب العالمية الأولى دورا ذا أهمية خاصة.

For centuries, the Alawis lived as prisoners in the coastal mountains and came out only to serve as labor for the landowners of Latakia, Tripoli, Homs, and Hama. The rise to power of Hafez al-Assad provided the community a chance for upward mobility. Even if the economic and political context has changed since the days of Ibn Taymiyya, the re-Islamization process within Syrian society raises concerns in the Alawi community, especially since the military opposition is dominated by ISIS and the Nusra Front. If the Bashar al-Assad regime is ousted, the Alawis may choose a territorial partition. They could rebuild the former Alawi state created between 1920 and 1936 by France in the coastal region, though this time the external support would come from Russia and Iran.

Alla base dello studio vi è l’analisi dei personaggi principali, dei fattori e delle cause esterne e interne che costituiscono il conflitto in Siria. L’obiettivo di questa paper è quello di fornire un’analisi scientifica attraverso criteri storico-culturali e sociali delle suddette dinamiche, al fine di comprendere il complesso su cui si basa la totalità degli Stati del Levante, concentrandosi in particolar modo sul caso della Siria. L’elaborato, mira a proporre delle nuove chiavi di lettura prendendo punto da autori esteri specializzati nel settore in modo tale da avere uno sguardo d’insieme sul conflitto troppo spesso affrontato in maniera superficiale e non chiara. La bibliografia presa in considerazione si basa sulle fonti italiane più autorevoli in materia. Per far fronte alla carenza di
opere si è attinto da autori inglesi e francesi, ma soprattutto arabi.
La tesi è articolata in due parti: la prima, volta a comprendere il contesto
mediorientale. In particolare, si pone l’attenzione sul colonialismo, sul rapporto tra politica e Islam quindi la conseguente guerra intestina tra le due correnti. La digressione è necessaria ai fini di avere una visione onnicomprensiva che offrirà gli strumenti di lettura per la parte successiva.
La seconda parte mirerà a spiegare il conflitto attraverso un’analisi specifica della storia politica e sociale della Siria individuando personaggi chiave all’interno del conflitto: gli Alawiti e il loro conseguente peso politico, il Ba’ath e Assad sino a giungere al sistema di alleanze sciite da lui creato a cui si contrappone il fronte sunnita. In conclusione, la tesi avrà fornito degli strumenti critici essenziali per comprendere la molteplicità dei fattori scatenanti spiegando come non sia stata la rivolta del 2011 a dare il via al conflitto ma l’insieme di tutti i fattori esplicati.

A temática que se propõe abordar ao longo deste exercício  prende-se com a necessidade de responder às razões que levam a Rússia a defender o regime  de  Bashar  Al-Assad  e  qual  o  impacto  que  isso  teve  até  aqui  no desenrolar do conflito sírio. A relevância deste tema está relacionada  com a necessidade de entender melhor a relações entre estes dois Estados, como forma  de  também  entender  melhor  o  que  tem  ajudado  o  governo  sírio  a manter-se  no  poder  até  aqui  e  o  que  impossibilitou  uma  intervenção externa no conflito em favor dos rebeldes que se opõem a Al-Assad. Apesar de  ser  um  tema  bastante  comentado  em  termos  de  comunicação  social, carece  de  análises  mais  cuidadas,  tendo  sido  até  aqui  pouco  abordado  em termos académicos. Daí o interesse deste estudo nesta área  em concreto e que se espera que possa elucidar algo mais acerca da Guerra Civil Síria.