Relativism (Philosophy)

Susan Haack, “The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth.”

Abstract: “Much truth is spoken, that more may be concealed,” wrote Mr. Justice Darling in 1879. Opening with an articulation of the distinction between truth (the concept) and truths (particular true propositions), this paper is largely devoted to: developing an account of the dual meaning of “partially true” – “true-in-part” vs. “part of the truth”; and (ii) understanding the reasons for, and the dangers of, the very common tendency to tell only part of the relevant truth. 


Keywords: truth, truths, partial truth, Ramsey, laconicism, vagueness, deception

Relativists about knowledge ascriptions think that whether a particular use of a knowledge-ascribing sentence, e.g., “Keith knows that the bank is open” is true depends on the epistemic standards at play in the assessor’s context—viz., the context in which the knowledge ascription is being assessed for truth or falsity. Given that the very same knowledge-ascription can be assessed for truth or falsity from indefinitely many perspectives, relativism has a striking consequence. When I ascribe knowledge to someone (e.g., when I say that, at a particular time, “Keith knows that the bank is open”), what I’ve said does not get a truth-value absolutely, but only relatively. If this semantic thesis about the word “knows” and its cognates is true, what implications would this have for epistemology, the philosophical theory of knowledge? The present aim will be to engage with this mostly unexplored question, and then to consider how the epistemological conclusions drawn might bear on the plausibility of a relativist semantics for “knows”.

Einstein's Special Relativity is based on a postulation that the light speed in vacuum is constant no matter the light sources and observers. Because light speed is very much faster than the speed of light source, it is nearly impossible to measure the light speed on a light source moving at a comparable speed. Since there is no solid proof yet that light speed is constant, it is fair to ask what if light speed is not constant. Based on Photon Inertia Transformation and Yangton and Yington Theory, Equation of Light Speed is proposed, such that Doppler Redshift can be explained by Acceleration Doppler Effect, and Event Horizon can be interpreted by the competition between Absolute Light Speed and star acceleration speed. Both of them can also be considered as the nature proofs of that light speed is not constant. In addition, if light speed is indeed constant, then interference shall be found in Michelson Morley Experiment even Aether doesn't exist. On the contrary, if light speed is not constant, then Einstein's Special Relativity shall not be true simply because of the wrong assumption, and Velocity Time Dilation cannot be true either. Furthermore, for the same reason, relativism could be totally false and Length Contraction could be induced from human's visual memory instead of Special Relativity. After all, it is the purpose of this review to give a sound answer to the question "What if light speed is not constant".

El futuro Benedicto XVI advierte acerca de los peligros de la masonería, dispositiva para el relativismo y solidaria de la matriz gnóstico-idealista de la cultura contemporánea. Es el voto favorable del Card. Ratzinger acerca de la permanencia en el CIC (1983) de la excomunión latae sententiae  para los adherentes a la secta masónica. Afirma que a la esencia misma de la esta pertenece el relativismo según un doble significado: a) relativismo entre lo verdadero y lo falso, relativismo entre el bien y el mal. Este relativismo se funde con la concepción filosófica moderna, especialmente con el idealismo de Hegel. El pensamiento de Rahner y autores similares comparte mucho con la mentalidad masónica, agnóstico-racionalista hacia los dogmas católicos e inmanentista hacia lo Divino. La cultura y la ética de la muerte encuentran  justificación ideológica en el terreno del gnosticismo (antiguo y moderno) que rechaza al Dios de la creación y de los Dogmas. Su influjo, especialmente a través de las universidades, es  peligroso para la vida de la Iglesia y sus pastores.

The effect of the individual analyst on research findings can create a credibility problem for qualitative approaches from the perspective of evaluative criteria utilized in quantitative psychology. This paper explicates the ways in which objectivity and reliability are understood in qualitative analysis conducted from within three distinct epistemological frameworks: realism, contextual constructionism, and radical constructionism. It is argued that quality criteria utilized in quantitative psychology are appropriate to the evaluation of qualitative analysis only to the extent that it is conducted within a naive or scientific realist framework. The discussion is illustrated with reference to the comparison of two independent grounded theory analyses of identical material. An implication of this illustration is to identify the potential to develop a radical constructionist strand of grounded theory.

Let the relativist be right. There then would remain the possibility that -despite our relativistic way of talking -there are absolute moral facts "out there", facts that we have not yet learnt to properly represent. Surely a relativism that leaves open this possibility is too tame to be worthy of extended philosophical debate (REF!!!) In order to merit the latter, the relativist should be taken to propose that facts about epistemic justification, and facts about morality, are relative and not absolute.

Is knowledge relative? Many academics across the humanities are happy to say that it is. However, those who work in mainstream epistemology, the philosophical theory of knowledge, generally take for granted that it is not. Metaepistemology and Relativism questions whether the kind of anti-relativistic background that underlies most typical projects in mainstream epistemology can on closer inspection be vindicated. To this end, prominent and diverse argument strategies for epistemic relativism are considered and criticised. It is shown that a common weakness of more traditional argument strategies for epistemic relativism is that they fail to decisively motivate relativism over scepticism. Interestingly, though, this style of objection cannot be effectively redeployed against the new (semantic) variety of epistemic relativism—itself introduced only in the past decade. Although new (semantic) epistemic relativism constitutes an entirely different kind of challenge to mainstream epistemology than traditional forms, the new variety itself faces a dilemma. Once the dilemma is appreciated, it will be shown that the threat to mainstream epistemology that epistemic relativism is best understood as posing is in fact a very different one than we’d be originally inclined to think.

In the conclusion to “Anything but Argument?”, after measuring her intellectual distance from Onora O’Neill, Cora Diamond writes: “the arguments I have given are in a sense quite useless.” – I propose to elucidate Diamond’s treatment of distances (“Moral Difference and Distances,” “the Gulfs between Us,” to mention titles of two of Diamond’s papers)—in both metaphysics and ethics.

§1 presents Diamond’s suspicions regarding a conception of people as distant because they accept different thought-systems—“play different language-games.” We can make connections, Diamond argues, even across thought-systems; arguing with people who are different from us is not a priori useless. Things get trickier in philosophy, however, when the distances are between not thought-systems, but expectations from and conceptions of philosophy. §§2-3 discuss such distances between Diamond and O’Neill, and between Diamond and Saul Kripke. Here, I argue, bridging an intellectual gap, for Diamond, requires eliciting change in the philosopher’s will. §4 puts philosophical alongside moral distances. In ethics too, Diamond thinks, we typically need to examine wills—others’ but also our own. I discuss the personal aspect of this, the exposure and imaginative involvement it requires.

In this article, we discuss a simple argument that modal metaphysics is misconceived, and responses to it.  Unlike Quine’s, this argument begins with the banal observation that there are different candidate interpretations of the predicate ‘could have been the case’.  This is analogous to the observation that there are different candidate interpretations of the predicate ‘is a member of’.  The argument then infers that the search for metaphysical necessities is misguided in much the way the ‘set-theoretic pluralist’ (Clarke-Doane & Hamkins [2017]) claims that the search for the true axioms of set theory is.  We show that the obvious responses to this argument fail.  However, a new response has emerged that purports to prove, from higher order logical principles, that metaphysical possibility is the broadest kind of possibility applying to propositions, and is to that extent special.  We distill two lines of reasoning from the literature, and argue that their import depends on premises that a ‘modal pluralist’ should deny.  Both presuppose that there is a unique typed hierarchy, which is what the modal pluralist, in the context of higher-order logic, should disavow.  In other words, both presupposes that there is a unique candidate for what higher-order claims could mean.  We consider the worry that, in a higher-order setting, modal pluralism faces an insuperable problem of articulation, collapses into modal monism, is vulnerable to the Russell-Myhill paradox, or even contravenes the truism that there is a unique actual world, and argue that these worries are misplaced.  We also sketch the bearing of the resulting ‘Higher Order Pluralism’ on the theory of content.  An upshot is that, if Higher Order Pluralism is true, then there is no stable metatheory from which to characterize higher order reality.

This paper aims at showing the many ways in which the self-referential dimension is present – by being both dramatically shown and argumentatively thematized – in Plato’s Theaetetus. A general reading of the whole dialogue is provided and argued for, which individuates self-referentiality as its very speculative keystone: the Theaetetus exhibits an attempt to attain knowledge of knowledge where the soul comes to cognize the soul itself (its own cognitive powers), through producing opinions about opinions, appearances about appearances, even dreams about dreams; the characters discuss about discussing, get things wrong about getting things wrong, make digressions about making digressions where the philosopher characterizes the philosopher, they search for a logos of “logos”, and so on. Such a widespread self-referential dimension shows its speculative value as it is combined with a both a progressive and retroactive way of proceeding: each stage of the research – by way of an immanent criticism – brings about the next one and shows
its very meaning only retrospectively, from the point of view of the next stage, and each new stage both overcomes but also “preserves” the previous one, so that the aporetic end of the dialogue is only apparent and needs to be taken as an incompleteness rather than as a failure.

According to a recent challenge to Kratzer's canonical contextualist semantics for deontic modal expressions, no contextualist view can make sense of cases in which such a modal must be information-sensitive in some way. Here I show how Kratzer's semantics is compatible with readings of the targeted sentences that fit with the data. I then outline a general account of how contexts select parameter values for modal expressions and show, in terms of that account, how the needed, contextualist-friendly readings might plausibly get selected in the challenge cases.

By looking at a canonical article representing academic philosophy’s orthodox view against cultural relativism, James Rachels’ “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism,” this paper argues that current mainstream western academic philosophy’s fear of cultural relativism is premised on a fear of the racial Other. The examples that Rachels marshals against cultural relativism default to the persistent, ubiquitous and age-old stereotypes about the savage/barbarian Other that has dominated the history of western engagement with the non-western world. What academic philosophy fears about cultural relativism, it is argued, is the barbarian of the western imagination and not fellow human beings. The same structure that informs fears of cultural relativism, whereby people with different customs are reduced to the barbarian/savage of the western imagination, can be seen in the genesis of international law which arose as a justification for the domination of the Amerindian (parsed as “barbarians”). It is argued that implicit in arguments against cultural relativism is the preservation of the same right to dominate the Other. Finally, it is argued that the appeal of the fear of cultural relativism is that, in directing moral outrage at others, one can avoid reflecting on the failures of one’s own cultural tradition.

Haack distinguishes numerous different versions of relativism (depending on what is said to be relative to what, and in what sense), and argues that some of these are true and harmless,  some false, and some undermining. She continues be disambiguating Putnam's "conceptual relativism," and showing that it is either tautologous or else self-contradictory, depending how it is interpreted.

The chapter tackles the complex, tension-ridden, and often paradoxical relationship between relativism and conservatism. We focus particularly on radical conservatism, an early twentieth-century German movement that arguably constitutes the climax of conservatism's problematic relationship with relativism. We trace the shared genealogy of conservatism and historicism in nineteenth-century Counter-Enlightenment thought and interpret radical conservatism's ambivalent relation to relativism as reflecting this heritage. Emphasizing national particularity, historical uniqueness, and global political plurality, Carl Schmitt and Hans Freyer moved in the tradition of historicism, stopping short of full relativism. Yet they utilized relativistic elements-such as seeing irrational decisions or the demands of "life" as the basis of politics-to discredit notions of universal political morality and law,  hereby underpinning their authoritarian agendas. Oswald Spengler, by contrast, took the relativistic impulses to the extreme, interweaving his conservative authoritarianism and nationalism with full-fledged epistemic, moral, and political relativism. Martin Heidegger has recently been perceived as the key philosopher of radical conservatism, and his thought arguably channeled antimodern aspects of historicism into contemporary political thought. We conclude by analyzing how some radical conservative arguments involving cultural relativism and plurality still reverberate in contemporary theorists such as Samuel Huntington, Aleksandr Dugin, and Alain de Benoist.

La philosophie de Hegel peut se rapporter au thème du relativisme de deux manières, à la faveur d'une « tension palpable entre deux aspects de [sa] théorie de la rationalité 240 ». D'une part, il est patent qu'en identifiant la philosophie à une forme d'idéalisme objectif culminant dans l'appréhension rationnelle du sens universel de l'être comme « idée absolue » puis comme « esprit absolu », l'auteur de l'Encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques adopte une posture « absolutiste », universaliste, rationaliste, qui l'inscrit dans la tradition anti-relativiste initiée par Platon et relayée, entre autres, par Aristote, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant ou Schelling. D'autre part, dans une posture qui contraste cette fois-ci avec une telle tradition anti-relativiste, Hegel s'en prend à une conception trop abstraite de l'absolutisme philosophique, dialectisant les thèses figées de l'entendement, dépassant les dualismes conceptuels qui donnaient une consistance apparente au rationalisme anti-relativiste (subjectif/objectif, particulier/universel, apparence/essence…) 241 , et surtout plongeant l'anthropologie philosophique désincarnée de ses prédécesseurs (tributaire du « paradigme mentaliste » qui régit la philosophie moderne 242

RESUMO: Neste trabalho, temos como objetivo investigar o desacordo entre Filosofia e Sociologia do Conhecimento Científico em torno da noção do relativismo. Esse desacordo orbita ao redor da Tese da Igual Validade e da Tese do Construcionismo Forte, compreendendo que Epistemologia e Filosofia da Ciência refletem imagens sociais de suas épocas. David Bloor (2011) declara que é hábito dos filósofos antirrelativistas confundir a Tese da Igual Validade e a Tese do Construcionismo Social Forte com o relativismo da Sociologia do Conhecimento Científico. Justificando que esse debate situa-se entre Epistemologia, Filosofia da Ciência e Sociologia do Conhecimento Científico, uma vez que há diferentes atribuições sobre a formação de crenças para o conhecimento científico, o problema desse artigo é o seguinte: se os argumentos relativistas de David Bloor (2011) criticam posturas epistemológicas antirrelativistas, então o relativismo do Programa Forte endossa o relativismo epistêmico ? Para respondermos esse problema, partimos da seguinte hipótese: se as Teses do Programa Forte se dirigem a diversos modos de se conhecer, então seu relativismo é epistêmico. Palavras-chaves: Epistemologia, Filosofia da Ciência, Sociologia do Conhecimento Científico, Relativismo, Relativismo Epistêmico.

I argue that the comedian Stephen Colbert has “got to be kidding” —that he can’t really believe the arguments and positions that he espouses on his show The Colbert Report. To support this conclusion, I show that the positions and arguments that Colbert defends on his show—individual and cultural relativism, truthiness, and a “right” to uninformed opinions—are so obviously flawed that the principle of charity demands that we interpret Colbert as only kidding.

El relativismo ha ingresado en el mundo de la filosofía. a partir de la época de Protágoras, Y se resiste a abandonarlo. Es cierto que las doctrinas más influyentes de la antigüedad y algunas no menos prestigiosas de tiempos posteriores se constituyeron en una poderosa reacción contra el relativismo, pero nunca lograron desterrarlo definitivamente. En nuestra época se advierte un brioso resurgimiento que se manifiesta en dimensiones tan diversas como la ética, la epistemología, la ontología y las teorías acerca de la verdad. Desde el principio, sin embargo, el relativismo se ha enfrentado a una evidente dificultad: la autorrefutación. En el caso de la verdad, por ejemplo, si se interpreta que una proposición p cualquiera es verdadera sólo de una manera relativa, parecería que su negación no-p puede ser verdadera del mismo modo y, consecuencia, la propia afirmación de que toda proposición es verdadera de un modo relativo sería tan verdadera como su contraria. En vista de este peligro, los argumentos que esgrimen los filósofos relativistas suelen estar bastante matizados. Así, se intenta evitar la formulación de un relativismo radical y se opta por alguna variante más moderada o se opta por algún otro recurso, como el de abandonar o reemplazar la noción de verdad. La cuestión que se plantea, entonces es la de determinar hasta qué punto esa clase de elaboraciones logra producir una versión sostenible del relativismo. El propósito de este trabajo es precisamente, examinar la postura de Nelson Goodman a la luz de ciertas consideraciones acerca de las dificultades que debe enfrentar toda posición relativista.

In this paper I explore several ways in which critical realist and relativist arguments and ontological claims have been presented in recent debates, with especial reference to organization studies. The purpose of this exploration is to consider whether discussions have, or could have, moved away from reductive bottom-line arguments in the ways sometimes suggested by commentators, both theoretically and rhetorically. I argue that despite claims to the contrary, elements identified in earlier relativist critiques of some forms of realist argumentation still persist, although relativists themselves are not immune to criticism. Neither Critical Realism nor its adapted forms of (lower case) critical realism (such as those applied in organization studies) escape the trap of bottom-line rhetoric, despite their claims of offering a sophisticated stratified ontology that departs from empiricist views of science. They only succeed in moving the bottom line forward from a flattened world of ready-made pieces of furniture to flat-pack structures-to-be-actualized. Moreover, despite changes in the content of their arguments, the rhetoric of critical realists reveals the continuance of underlying strategies of power based on commitments to theology rather than ontology. Part of the problem, I conclude, is a consequence of constructing these textual exchanges as ‘debates’ in the first place.

The primary aim of this paper is to expose a hitherto unnoticed metaepistemological mistake which features in various prominent arguments for epistemic relativism. In particular, I show that—at a crucial juncture—several popular strands of argument for epistemic relativism trade indispensably on a special instance of the naturalistic fallacy. Once this point is highlighted and sharpened, it will be shown that the would-be epistemic relativist faces a dilemma: either embrace the naturalistic fallacy (and all that this entails) or accept that, without committing this fallacy, the relativist's own argument ultimately supports relativism no more than scepticism.

In this response to Bloch et al., after thanking them for their careful work exploring what's wrong with modus morons, Haack poses a series of more philosophical questions about the grounds of logic---questions she believes are beyond the scope of the "philosophical proof theory" they adopt. She also explains how her approach to relativism differs from Paul Boghossian's apparently much less nuanced critique.

Ttler=‘Ttler is true’ says of itself that it is true. It is a truth-teller. I argue that we have equally telling arguments (i) to the effect that all truth-tellers must have the same truth-value (ii) and the effect that truth-tellers differ in truth-value. This is what I call the Truth-Tellers paradox. This paradox stems from the fact that the truth-value of a truth-teller like Ttler should be determined by the fact that it says of itself that it is true (which entails (i)) but that it cannot be determined by that fact (as witnessed by (ii)). The Truth-Tellers paradox resem- bles the classical semantic paradoxes like the Liar. In both cases, a form of self-reference allows us to derive a contradiction from oth- erwise plausible semantic and logical principles. Furthermore the Truth-Tellers paradox can be formulated without using sentences which are in an intuitive sense ungrounded, it thus severs the link, almost universally taken for granted, between the semantic para- doxes and ungroundedness. Finally, some classical solutions to the Liar do not generalize to the Truth-Tellers paradox.

The following review explores Intercultural Information Ethics (IIE) in terms of comparative philosophy, supporting IIE as the most relevant and significant development of the field of Information Ethics (IE). The focus of the review is threefold. First, it will review the core presumption of the field of IIE, that being the demand for an inter- mission in the pursuit of a founding philosophy for IE in order to first address the philosophical biases of IE by western philosophy. Second, a history of the various philosophical streams of IIE will be outlined, including its literature and pioneering contributors. Lastly, a new synthesis of comparative philosophies in IIE will be offered, looking towards a future evolution of the field. Examining the interchange between contemporary information ethicists regarding the discipline of IIE, the review first outlines the previously established presumptions of the field of IIE that posit the need for an IE as grounded in western sensibilities. The author then addresses the implications of the foregoing presumption from several non-western viewpoints, arguing that IIE does in fact find roots in non-western philosophies as established in the concluding synthesis of western and eastern philosophical traditions.

In this paper, I respond to criticisms raised in three contributions to the present volume. Namely, Luca Zanetti's paper on " Inescapable hinges. Steps towards a transcendental hinge epistemology " , Natalie Ashton's on " Extended rationality and epistemic relativism " , and Sebastiano Moruzzi's on " Hinge epistemology and alethic pluralism ".

Chi per anni ha affermato che la verità non esiste, oggi invoca agenzie statali per intercettare le notizie non vere. Il parere di Vladimiro Giacché, autore de "La fabbrica del falso" L'anno nuovo sembra essersi aperto con una sindrome che sta contagiando diversi ambienti, quella delle cosiddette "fake news", le notizie false.

This thesis is a defense of the view that reality is relative. First I start with semantic relativism, then, I show that semantic relativism implies reality relativism. To argue for semantic relativism, motivated by arguments by W.V. O. Quine and L. Wittgenstein, I use two examples about personal identity. The first one is about abortion and the second one is about brain transplantation cases. Next, I show that if meaning is relative then whatever we call reality is also relative since our access to reality is through language. After my arguments, I consider two objections. The first one is David Lewis’ objection. Lewis claims that due to the natural structure of the world words tend to refer to some objects (or set of objects) as opposed to others. Hence, he argues against the semantic relativity thesis. The second objection is that relativism is self-refuting because it relativizes itself. I reply to both objections.

Here we focus on two questions: What is the proper semantics for deontic modal expressions in English?  And what is the connection between true deontic modal statements and normative reasons?  Our contribution towards thinking about the first, which makes up the bulk of our paper, considers a representative sample of recent challenges to a Kratzer-style formal semantics for modal expressions,  as well as the rival views—Fabrizio Cariani’s contrastivism, John MacFarlane’s relativism, and Mark Schroeder’s ambiguity theory—those challenges are thought to motivate. These include the Professor Procrastinate challenge to Inheritance (the principle that ‘If ought  and  entails , then ought ), as well as Parfit’s miners puzzle regarding information-sensitive deontic modals. Here we argue that a Kratzer-style view is able to meet all of the challenges we’ll consider.  In addition, we’ll identify challenges for each of those rival views.  Our overall conclusion is that a Kratzer-style semantics remains the one to beat.
With this assumption in place, we then ask how we should understand the relationship between true deontic modal statements and normative reasons.  Should, for example, we hold that the truth of such a statement entails the existence of a normative reason for some agent to comply?  Here we argue that, in many cases, acceptance of Kratzer’s semantics for deontic modals leaves open for substantive normative theorizing the question of whether an agent has a normative reason to comply with what she ought to do.

This was my undergraduate senior thesis.

In the notorious class "Justice and the Common Good," my friends and I learned to ask philosophical "what is" questions, like "What is Piety?" and "What is a Person?" We never came up with any good answers. By drawing from the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, I want to show that we failed because those questions themselves make no sense and are therefore unanswerable; they make false expectations of language, and they seek after rules that do not exist. By moving away from them, we can clarify our thinking, prevent bad problems, and continue productively in both philosophy and theology.

La influencia de la filosofía positivista ha propiciado que, en el mundo contemporáneo, se tienda a identificar verdad y objetividad. Este artículo se propone argumentar que: a) el concepto de objetividad es una reducción indebida del concepto clásico de verdad; b) las premisas en las que se basa la teoría de la objetividad no son axiomáticas, como parecen, y conducen a contradicciones; c) es necesaria una rehabilitación de la concepción realista de verdad, libre de las ataduras del pensamiento positivista.

En Ways of Worldmaking, Nelson Goodman les pone nombres a las dos características prominentes de su concepción ontológica. Califica su rechazo de varias posiciones clásicas --el materialismo, el idealismo y el dualismo--y encuadra su pensamiento en una forma radical de relativismo a la que denomina irrealismo. El punto de partida de su argumentación se encuentra en la convicción de que afirmar la existencia de una realidad independiente, un mundo "ready made" cuyas propiedades puedan ser descubiertas gracias al empleo de nuestras facultades cognitivas, es una tesis que se autorefuta. Porque cualquier intento de avanzar en la descripción de ese mundo independiente en sí mismo solamente podría dar lugar a la disposición de sus componentes en objetos, clases, formas de organización, etcétera, que responderían a nuestra propia manera de percibir, conceptualizar y expresarnos. Si intentáramos decir algo acerca de ese mundo, no estaríamos refiriéndonos a sus propiedades intrínsecas, Nuestra actividad se limitaría a brindar lo que Goodman llama "una versión", en cuyo caso, si es que aludimos a algún mundo, se trata exclusivamente del que se corresponde con esa versión. Goodman no rechaza completamente la posibilidad de la existencia de una realidad inefable que de algún modo esté relacionada con las versiones que proponemos, pero la desprecia porque piensa que un mundo así "no es algo por lo que valga la pena luchar a favor o en contra".

Putnam and Davidson both defended coherence theories of justification from the early 1980s onward. There are interesting similarities between these theories, and Putnam’s philosophical development lead to further convergence in the 1990s. The most conspicuous difference between Putnam’s and Davidson’s theories is that they appear to fundamentally disagree on the role and nature of conceptual schemes, but a closer look reveals that they are not as far apart on this issue as usually assumed. The veridicality of perceptual beliefs is a cornerstone of both Davidson’s and Putnam’s later (but not earlier) coherentism. However, this thesis introduces a form of weak foundationalism into their theories, and consequently, those are strictly speaking not pure coherence theories, but hybrids between coherentism and foundationalism.

Mitterer's non-dualism is considered to be a major conceptual alternative to (naïve as well as hypothetical as well as internal) realism and to (moderate as well as radical) constructivism and idealism-with more sympathies towards (radical) constructivism. For von Glasersfeld non-dualism is the "third conceptual revision" in philosophy, while for others it is the "most radical position," even more radical than radical constructivism. While outside of philosophy non-dualism is sometimes applied emphatically, in mainstream philosophy it is ignored.
My two questions are: (a) Is Mitterer's critique on dualistic philosophy consistent (in Mitterer's view, all variants of realism and constructiv-ism are dualistic philosophy)? (b) Is Mitterer's non-dualism consistent?
I critically reflect on central theses of non-dualism with the help of established concepts of contemporary philosophy such as the distinctions between object language and metalanguage, and between benign and vicious infinite regresses.
The results: The non-dualistic critique of dualism seems to be misleading. Central arguments of the non-dualistic alternative to dualism are self-contradictory. Even worse, non-dualism could lead to solipsism.
Implications: Non-dualism has so far been discussed in various disciplines such as communication science, geography, and even informatics. It is important for all these disciplines to reflect the arguments developed in this article to prevent non-dualism from being applied uncritically.
Key words: Non-dualism, dualism, object language, metalanguage, benign infinite regress, vicious infinite regress, philosophy of language, language, reality.

The three orations of Antiphon (i.e., 1, 5, and 6, which belong to the last quarter of the 5th century [419/8 411/10]), are the first extant "real" speeches. From what we know of the history of ancient rhetoric, we can assume that Antiphon, with both the "real" speeches and the three modelspeeches, the Tetralogies,2 affords a glimpse of the beginning of ancient practical speechwriting. 3 In addition to being a professional speechwriter, Antiphon taught rhetoric and wrote a rhetorical theory as did Tisias, Corax, and Theodorus before him.4 His speeches therefore exemplify what the rhetorical theory taught at that time, and his handling of commonplaces represents early rhetorical practice. This paper discusses Antiphon's adaptation of a topic from sophistic philosophy to practical speechwriting.

commendation to Rick DuFer:

Bravo 👏 these "conscious" and detailed ones critiques almost like a philosopher lawyer) made on the philosophy of "support" ("historicized" vision like Chomsky, Cacciari, Galimberti but, on the "romantic" and retrograde negation of the scientific paradigm of constant heterogeneous of the West, even Houellebecq) to the current geopolitics place you above any other native analyst or not ... I am at your disposal to integrate you with my broader life experience as you can check on academia edu and QUORA with the Turing live test of the evolutionary conscious consciousness PaleontoLogicaMente ISOCIC :)

Criticism Houellebecq: Inspite being critical of the suicidal postmodernism of the West "romance" and does not attack - as braveMente you do https://youtu.be/-Xlm5ipAVTE - his abstract vision Philosophical and unconscious mind Also nihilistic because not pragmatic ( reporting to the idealized shit huts) critical and unconscious of the evolutionary pragmatic paradigm: (see from Wikipedia)

"I am very dissatisfied with the media treatment reserved for my book in France ... the central point is not Islam, mine is a ferocious attack on the West ... I do not believe that human beings can live in a world that changes constantly.  The absence of balance, of a balance project, is in itself unlivable.  The idea of ​​perennial change makes life impossible. [12] "

encomio a Rick DuFer:

Bravo 👏 questi "coscienti" e dettagliati rilievi (quasi da avvocato filosofo) fatti sulla filosofia del "sostegno" alla visione (storicizzata" come Chomsky, Cacciari, Galimberti ma, sulla negazione "romantica" e retrograda del paradigma scientifico di  costante eterogenesi dell'Occidente, anche Houellebecq) alla geopolitica attuale ti pongono al di sopra di qualsiasi altro analista nativo o meno... Sono a tua disposizione per integrarti con la mia più ampia esperienza di vita come puoi verificare su academia edu e QUORA con il Turing  test dal vivo della coscienza cosciente evolutiva PaleontoLogicaMente ISOCIC :)

Critica a Houellebecq: Nonostante sia critico nei confronti del postmodernismo suicida del "romanticismo" occidentale e non attacca - come fate braveMente https://youtu.be/-Xlm5ipAVTE - la sua visione astratta Mente filosofica e inconscia Anche nichilista perché non pragmatico (riportando  alle capanne di merda idealizzate) critico e inconsapevole del paradigma pragmatico evolutivo: (vedi da Wikipedia)

"Sono molto insoddisfatto del trattamento mediatico riservato al mio libro in Francia... il punto centrale non è l'Islam, il mio è un feroce attacco all'Occidente... Non credo che gli esseri umani possano vivere in un mondo che cambia  costantemente. L'assenza di equilibrio, di un progetto di equilibrio, è di per sé invivibile. L'idea del cambiamento perenne rende la vita impossibile.[12]"

The legal philosophy of Radbruch appeals to the methodological trialism and relativism as its philosophical premise and theoretical clue, with the ultimate meaning to realize the idea of law, which encounter with the critic of Kelsen in the early period. The public critique to the Positivism and the creation of Radbruch’s Formula, once again, make Radbruch’s post-war writings become the focus of controversy. With the old scores between the Positivism and Natural law Theory, the doubt and concern about the view of relativism, as well as the helpful explanations on the outlet of his theory, Radbruch still uphold his standpoint, and cautiously explore the universal value of law. All of these, therefore, have lead to a series of historical and logical dialogues between Radbruch and other legal theorists from Europe and American, such as Kelsen, Hart, Fuller, and even Holmes and Cardozo. The four dialogues have eventually made each party clearer.
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拉德布鲁赫的法哲学思想，以三元方法论和相对主义为哲学前提与理论主线，始终致力于法律理念的实现，在其早期即面临着凯尔森的诘难。而拉德布鲁赫对实证主义的公开批评以及“拉德布鲁赫公式”的提出，又使拉德布鲁赫战后的理论再次成为纷争的焦点。伴随着实证主义与自然法学的宿怨、对相对主义立场的质疑与忧虑，以及对其理论出路的各种有益阐释，拉德布鲁赫始终持守着自己的立场，审慎地探求法律的普适性价值，由此与凯尔森、哈特、富勒，乃至霍姆斯、卡多佐等诸多欧美法学家进行了一次次历史性的同时也是逻辑性的对话，四次对话最终使各种可能的理论路径都趋向清晰。

Many religious people see the secular worldview as a purely technocratic enterprise that might be efficient with regard to details but lacks holistic principles able to “explain” things. Secular people find the religious worldview equally random and incoherent. At the bottom of the eager religious search for “a center” are not just proper religious concerns, but more generally, what Richard Rorty has described as the mentality of the “liberal metaphysician” who wants “a final vocabulary with an internal organic structure” (Rorty 1989: 92). I compare two critiques of “western” relativism, one formulated by Muslim scholar Ziauddin Sardar and the other by the American philosopher Allan Bloom. Bloom believes that relativism as it is practiced in modern western societies is superficial, lacks self-reflectivity, and therefore loses sight of truth altogether. What Blooms’ vision has in common with Sardar’s idea of “postmodern secularism” is that both are based on circular structures. I then distinguish between Critical and Uncritical Relativism.

This is chapter 8 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It argues for a realist (rather than idealist) interpretation of Yogācāra, and discusses relativism/​perspectivism in Yogācāra and Tiantai/Tendai. Based mostly on ideas by the Yogācāra philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, but with some help from Donald Davidson, this chapter develops a perspectival realist metaphysics that in important respects agrees with Zhiyi’s Tiantai.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949

SUMMARY: Practice relativism is the idea that practices are foundational for bodies of activity and thought, and differ from one another in ways that lead those who constitute the world in terms of them to incommensurable or conflicting conclusions. It is true that practices are not criticizable in any simple way because they are largely tacit and inaccessible. But to make them relativistic one needs an added claim: that practices are ���normative���, or conceptual in character.

Is relativism about truth ever a coherent doctrine? Some people have argued that an answer to this question depends on whether there can be cases of genuine disagreement where those who disagree hold confl icting beliefs towards the same proposition and yet are each entitled to say that what they believe is true. These have been called cases of faultless disagreement and are often explored by considering the case of disagreements about taste. However, this is not the right way to formulate the relativist's doctrine, and the discussions of taste are often based on a faulty view about the nature of taste and about the workings of predicates of taste. I examine the taste case in more detail and consider the prospects for a genuine form of truth relativism.