Nietzsche and Mach

Peter Bornedal RECONSTRUCTING NIETZSCHE’S EPISTEMOLOGY WITHIN THE POSITIVIST AND PRAGMATIC TRADITIONS Today we possess science precisely to the extent that we have decided to accept the testimony of the senses – as we still sharpen them, arm them, and learn to think them through. The rest is miscarriage and non-yet-science. Nietzsche: Götzendämmerung1 1. The Thing-in-itself and the True-Apparent Distinction Nietzsche criticizes the „thing-in-itself‟ and the „true-apparent distinction‟ throughout his work. However, the „thing-in-itself‟ changes value from being understood as a „hidden‟ thing to being understood as a substantial, homogeneous, distinct, and independent „thing.‟ „Perspectivism‟ as epistemological doctrine emerges as the logical consequence of the latter criticism of the thing as distinctly and substantially „in-itself.‟ 1.1. Nietzsche‟s Epistemology in Analytic Readings In various often highly complex arguments, we sometimes detect in Analytic critique an urgency to restore the „thing-in-itself‟ and the „trueapparent‟ distinction to Nietzsche‟s epistemology. The analytic commentator is frequently reading Nietzsche‟s perspectivism as paradoxical or inconsistent in two different directions, logically and ontologically. Ad 1. Logically, one reads Nietzsche‟s remarks on „perspectivism‟ as meta-statements on knowledge, understood as universal all-inclusive propositions of the form, „all knowledge is perspectival,‟ and from here 1 Nietzsche: GD, Die „Vernunft‟ in der Philosophie 3, KSA 6, p. 75. References to Nietzsche‟s work conform to usual standard. KSA: Sämtliche Werke Kritische Studienausgabe. Ed. G. Colli & M. Montinari. Berlin/New York (W. de Gruyter), 1967-77. FW: Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, KSA 3. GD: Götzendämmerung, KSA 6. GM: Zur Genealogie der Moral, KSA 5. JGB: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KSA 5. NF: Nachgelassende Fragmente, KSA 7-14. WL: Über Wahrheit und Lüge in aussermoralischen Sinne, KSA 1. WM: Der Wille zur Macht. Stuttgart (Kröner Verlag), 1996. 2 the logician extracts the Liar Paradox.2 If the sentence says that „all knowledge is perspectival,‟ the sentence includes itself as perspectival and is therefore not truly true, and it must follow that „Perspectivism‟ as creed defeats itself. This typically impels the commentator to inquire whether Nietzsche can want to express such a paradox, while it gives the commentator the opportunity to suggest logically more satisfying alternatives to the purported paradox. Ad 2. Ontologically, perspectivism is seen as constituting a problem, since it allows the object-world to dissipate into perspectives and as such seems to defend that our sensible knowledge is „only‟ perspectival or „only‟ interpretation, not factual. If our seeing is perspectival, the objectivity of the world as an independent reality (subject-, mind-, language-, and theory-independent) is at stake, since one has allowed interpretations, interests, and contexts to determine objects in their being. The analytic-rationalist reader tends to object to Nietzsche‟s perceived introduction of relativism, skepticism, or idealism on the supposedly strong counter-argument that if everything is „our perspective,‟ we necessarily must presuppose an objective world, which is there to be seen from „different angles.‟3 If we ask what comes first, the „object‟ or the „different angles‟ from where we see it, the sound answer gives itself, „the object.‟ As such, perspectivism can only be an epiphenomenon, reconfirming the solid existence of an independent and real world. After this fundamental rebuttal of Nietzsche‟s epistemological position, we then notice that analytic commentary often starts a rescuing operation meant to save Nietzsche from his alleged inconsistencies; we notice that within an overall destructive critique, benevolent intentions (or „charitable readings‟) usually are more common than malevolent. As the point of departure, one always attempts to repair the supposed paradox of perspectivism as it is perceived to lead us to all the dangerous „isms‟ – 2 3 On the paradox, see e.g., Dowden, Bradley: “Liar Paraodox” in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy or Russell, Bertrand. Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950, ed. by Robert C. Marsh, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. (1956). We find such arguments in for example M. Clark: Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991; cf. p. 136-139) or in B. Leiter: Nietzsche on Morality (London, Routledge, 2002) & Leiter: “Perspectivism in Nietzsche‟s Genealogy of Morals,” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality (ed. R. Schacht. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); p. 344. For objections to the approach, see e.g., Lightbody, B.: “Nietzsche, Perspectivism, Anti-realism: An Inconsistent Triad”; in The European Legacy, Vol. 15/4, 2010, and C. Cox: Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 3 skepticism, relativism, or idealism – as such jeopardizing serious epistemic commitment to a „real‟ and „true‟ world. In this analytic-rationalist drive to restore things-in-themselves to Nietzsche – not only in the form of substance and matter, but sometimes also in the form of forces, causes, selves, or morals – one appears to defend what H. Putnam has labeled „metaphysical realism‟ as a few commentators have remarked,4 i.e., the defense of an objective mind-, language-, and theory-independent world about which we form knowledge as representation of that world as it is in-itself. In philosophical elaboration of this view, the „correspondence theory of truth‟ offers the most obvious account of the notion. Theories are accordingly true or false depending on whether they fit or do not fit the objectivity of things antedating them. As I shall argue, the idea of this objective world is persistently criticized throughout Nietzsche‟s work, from the early Wahrheit und Lüge to the late Nachlaß material, while „perspectivism‟ emerges as his label for an alternative epistemology. I see a number of problems emerging from the analytic-rationalistic approach that are avoided in one aligns oneself closer to Nietzsche‟s text and intellectual context, one of them being that if one insists on the objectivity of the object, while permitting „perspectivism‟ only as subjective representations of the object, it remains unexplained how knowledge of the supposedly solid and permanent world is produced among subjects with different, competing, and often opposing beliefs. It seems then that the proud display of epistemic commitment achieves the opposite of what it intends, because it destabilizes knowledge in an even more radical sense than what Nietzsche was intending. One ends up defending a position that Mach would dismiss as „naïve subjectivism‟: “Naïve subjectivism [construing] variant findings of one person under variable conditions and of different persons as so many cases of appearance in contrast with a hypothetical constant reality, is no longer admissible.”5 4 5 The discussion has been addressed by Abel, G.: Interpretationswelten: Gegenwartsphilosophie Jenseits von Essentialismus and Relativismus. Frankfurt, Suhkamp Verlag, 1995. L. Anderson discusses the correspondence theoretical interpretations of Nietzsche‟s perspectivism with reference to Putnam in “Truth and Objectivity in Perspectivism”; Synthese 115, 1-32, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998. Mach, E.: Knowledge and Error: Sketches on the Psychology of Enquiry (Translation T. J. McGormack. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976 (German edition, 1905)), p. 6. 4 1.2. Different Aspects of the “Thing-in-Itself‟ In reconstructing Nietzsche‟s epistemology, we can hardly overestimate the importance of his challenge to the notion of the „thingin-itself‟ and to the „true-apparent distinction.‟ It is a critical engagement he reiterates from his earliest to his latest writings, although his early views undergo a revision especially concerning the thing-in-itself. We are able to discern three possible definitions of the always criticized „thing‟: (1) It can be conceived as a hidden some-thing, as if it is a substance or a lump of matter actually existing albeit not accessible forus. In this sense, the „thing‟ is both in-itself and hidden, but it is still assumed to be present in its hiding (this seems to be the most common and traditional interpretation, which Nietzsche is most obviously addressing, in critical discussion, in the early WL). (2) It can be conceived as a Grenzbegriff as according to F. A. Lange,6 indicating an unknown but indeterminable realm not accessible to us given our biological speciesspecific perceptive-cognitive limitations as Homo Sapiens. The more inaccessible the notion becomes, the more we must acknowledge „appearances‟ as our only reality (cf. Lange). Furthermore, the emergence of evolutionary biology as well as research in vision and sensation (made by, e.g., H. von Helmholtz, Du Bois Raymond, G. Th. Fechner, and E. Mach) can be seen as supporting this „naturalized‟ version of the „thingin-itself.‟ In this biological-physiological sense, we can conceive the „thing‟ as that which is below Fechner‟s “thresholds.”7 Accordingly, we happen to have a perceptive-cognitive apparatus imperfect in its perception of detail and limited to perception above a certain sensational threshold. That which we are incapable of perceiving below our „threshold‟ (beyond a certain limit) is conceived as the „in-itself.‟ (3) The thing-in-itself may finally be seen as that which we in commonsensical or „pragmatic‟ perception without further ado understand as a „thing‟ before we start analyzing or contemplating its properties, elements, relations, contexts, or perspectives. In this sense, the thing is no longer understood as in-itself as hidden, as inaccessible, or as below threshold, but rather as an in-itself of the distinct, homogeneous, and unified object. A „thing‟ is now our spontaneous cognitive abstraction, abbreviation, or interpretation 6 7 “Das „Ding an sich‟ ist ein bloßer Grenzbegriff.” Lange, Fr. A.: Geschichte des Materialismus, Zweites Buch. Geschichte des Materialismus seit Kant, op. cit. p. 50. See also Stack, G.: Lange and Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 217-18. Cf. Fechner, G. Th.: Elements of Psychophysics. New York/Chicago, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. Translated by H. Adler. 5 of complexes of relations and sense-data, which we necessarily carry out when we perceive properly speaking, i.e., when we transform a world of sensation-elements into simple and crude „objects.‟ In any of these three aspects, the „thing‟ is in Nietzsche always that which is falsely regarded as „true‟ contrary to that which is „apparent.‟ The last aspect has here our special attention, because when the „thingitself‟ changes value from its first to its third aspect, the issue is no longer our ignorance about the „hidden,‟ but about the isolated and discrete. The „thing-in-itself‟ becomes a „thing-as-it-is‟ falsely assuming a homogeneous object with its self-evidently ascribed substantiality and extension. This last aspect is the most pertinent in the discussion of Nietzsche‟s perspectivism, as it assumes objectivity constituted as such, i.e., without relations to other things, eyes, or minds.8 The logical consequence of discarding the notion of an „object as such‟ is paving the way for a perspectival-phenomenal world of relationships. As we shall see, Nietzsche‟s epistemological perspectivism becomes Phenomenalism and indeed Relativism. 1.3. The Development in the Understanding of the „Thing‟ in GD The famous aphorism from Götzendämmerung (GD), “Wie die „wahre Welt‟ endlich zur Fabel Wurde,” may serve us as a quick summary of the development of the understanding of the „thing-in-itself‟ as Nietzsche would see it. After two pre-Kantian positions and one Kantian position, Nietzsche introduces in his three final positions the abolishment of the „thing.‟ In his positions from (4) over (5) to (6), the deconstruction of the Kantian „thing‟ is carried out in still more uncompromising language, to the extent that we end up with a „thing‟ that is hardly recognizable as Kantian any longer. If position (4) states that the “true world” is unreachable and unknowable, position (5) infers that it is useless and can be discarded; the recognition that a „true‟ world is unreachable and need not concern us is entailing the realization that a „true world‟ is useless baggage we can get rid of. After this realization, Nietzsche suggests (6), the somewhat puzzling conclusion that the notion of an apparent world is useless too. This conclusion immediately appears as counter-intuitive given that we without a „true‟ world are inclined to believe that we are left with an „apparent.‟ 8 Several passages from the late work substantiates this interpretation, for example in NF 1885-86, KSA 12, 2[85], KSA 12, 2[149], KSA 12, 2[154], KSA 12, 9[40], KSA 12, 10[202]) 6 2. Eliminating the True-Apparent Distinction When Nietzsche abandons the true-apparent distinction, a world emerges disrobed of all logical, teleological, and/or theological rationalizations. In the chaotic world of becoming no grandiose narratives or moral fictions survive. Not even the binary „true-apparent‟ survive, because an always emerging world is no longer an appearance of something else; the „apparent‟ is not a reference to the „true.‟ There is no depth to the world, but „only‟ a phenomenal surface of relationships and relationships between relationships, ad infinitum. Only what we do with that surfaceworld is a „fiction,‟ the world itself is no fiction; it „does not lie.‟ 2.1. Beyond the Classical Binary: Appearances without Things Position (6) seems out of nowhere to declare the „apparent‟ world abolished as well as the „true.‟ Is Nietzsche‟s world now a „fiction‟ or an „idea‟; is he a „fictionalist‟ and an „idealist‟; is he suggesting the abandonment of both empirical and transcendent world? I will answer in the negative and suggest that he in (6) is discussing the concept of the real rather than the real. If we abandon the concept of the „true,‟ we immediately annihilate the classical hierarchical opposition between „true‟ and „apparent‟ according to which „true‟ is appreciated and „apparent‟ depreciated. If there is no „true world‟ as concept, the background on which appearances emerge as appearances disappears and the philosophical dichotomy true versus apparent collapses. From a structural-linguistic point of view, it is the law of binary opposition that nothing can reside in one term. According to binary logic, the opposition A versus B is translated into the opposition A versus non-A, where A and non-A are co-dependent in their complementariness. The two positions are linked, and if we erase one, we erase the link as such; A is powerless to designate anything without the help of non-A, and vice versa. Therefore, when we retract one term in the opposition, both terms lose value, because they are asserted only through their reciprocal difference in their link. This is the hard rule for the binary opposition or what Nietzsche calls the antithesis, and in several notes it is explicitly as „antithesis‟ he understands the opposition „truth-appearance.‟9 If his position (6) applies on the level of conceptual logic, it entails no judgment about the ontological existence of an appearing world. Thus, on 9 See e.g., NF, 1886-87, KSA 12, 6[23], NF, 1886-87, KSA, 12, 6[23], NF, 1887, KSA12, 9[91], or letter to Carl von Gersdorff, late August, 18669 7 the one hand, we have an appearing world that will continue to appear as it has always been appearing, on the other, we have a rejection of „appearances‟ as linked to „truth,‟ i.e., understood as outward representations of or references to a „true‟ world. „Appearances‟ have in other words lost their sign-function, they no longer refer to a truer double. E. Mach is expressing the same idea when in Science of Mechanics he says, “Sensations are not signs of things. [ . . . ] The world is not composed of „things‟ as its elements, but of colors, tones, pressures, spaces, times, in short what we ordinarily call individual sensations.”10 Therefore, Nietzsche can in GD still go on maintaining that “Die “scheinbare” Welt ist die einzige”.11 With an analogy, we may suggest that he envisions the world like the surface of a piece of paper, but without a backside (as a coin without flipside, a recto without verso). The idea is paradoxical and impossible to conceptualize in classical geometry, but it at least serves to illustrate that Nietzsche presupposes a flat metaphysical universe, in which it is absurd to entertain notions of a hypothetical extra-real or supernatural world, because his new „superapparent‟ world implies a world of impenetrable surfaces only. Metaphysically speaking, we live in (or on) this two-dimensional flatland blending seamlessly into this flatland ourselves (since our selves are „flat‟ as well).12 2.2. Senses do not Lie . . . It must follow that if the apparent world is the only „world,‟ it cannot be a „falsification.‟ When the „thing-in-itself‟ has been abandoned, there is nothing left to falsify. The surface is what is and can only present itself as such. Therefore Nietzsche can with logical consistency declare that senses “do not lie at all [sie lügen überhaupt nicht]”; only what “we make of them is a lie,” namely of “unity, of thinghood, of substance, of 10 11 12 Mach, Ernst: Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of its Development. (Translation T. J. McCormack. Chicago/London, Open Court, 1919); p. 483. Nietzsche: GD, Die Vernunft in der Philosophie, II 2. In his letter to von Gersdorff, he with agreement summarizes Lange‟s positions: “[Lange‟s] conclusions are summed up in the following three propositions: 1) The world of the senses is the product of our organization. 2) Our visible (physical) organs are, like all other parts of the phenomenal world, only images of an unknown object. 3) Our real organization is therefore as much unknown to us as real external things are. We continually have before us nothing but the product of both.” Nietzsche: Letter to Carl von Gersdorff, late August, 1866; quoted from T. Brobjer: Nietzsche‟s Philosophical Context, op. cit., p. 33. 8 permanence.” (GD II, “Die Vernunft in der Philosophie”). R. Avenarius had expressed a similar idea in his “Prolegomena”: “The senses do not deceive, but the judgment does.”13 Since we do not and cannot receive something differently from how we receive it, nor have any influence on what and how we receive what we receive, we can no longer talk about simple sense-data as lying. Since furthermore, sense-data are our primary encounter with the world, we cannot conclude that they are about something that is not a lie, because that would falsely imply that we could have an encounter with this other something. Consequently, if Nietzsche like the early positivists is reducing everything to appearances, he has abandoned the logical possibility for falsifying a ground. That seems to be why M. Clark famously has concluded that Nietzsche in late writings abandons his so-called „falsification-thesis.‟14 Clark sees that Nietzsche rejects the „thing-in-itself,‟ and asks quite pertinently, “What is left to be falsified?” The straightforward answer would seem to be „nothing,‟ insofar as we construe Nietzsche to imply that there is no „true‟ world left to be falsified. However, Clark‟s concludes that there is no falsification of „the true world,‟ as she assumes that everything remains non-falsified – in an argument often defended in her Nietzsche commentaries. Clark defends consequently a Nietzsche, who in „late work‟ concludes that a true world of objects as self-presently available is carried over into human perception. Clark and like-minded assume a camera-theory of knowledge where the image of the object duplicates the object, as they tacitly assume that the human eye sees the world neutrally and flawlessly (like the lens of a camera). 13 14 Avenarius is here quoted from H. Kleinpeter, op. cit., p. 69, as the perceptive Kleinpeter continues the passage: “similar views have been stated by Nietzsche and Mach.” Ibid. See M. Clark, ibid., p. 120. M. Clark‟s argument that Nietzsche eventually abandons his so-called „falsification-thesis‟ (the idea that truth and knowledge are „illusions‟ falsifying the world), has been met with objections from several quarters in Nietzsche-commentary, e.g., L. Anderson: “Overcoming Charity: The Case of Clark‟s Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy.” (Nietzsche-Studien, vol. 25, 1996), and N. Hussain: “Nietzsche‟s Positivism” (European Journal of Philosophy 12:3, Blackwell, 2004). I find especially Hussein‟s response compelling as he develops Nietzsche‟s position in juxtaposition to Mach‟s. This strategy helps him to see Nietzsche as both “rejecting the thing-in-itself, accepting a falsification thesis and defending empiricism.” Hussain: “Nietzsche‟s Positivism,” op. cit., p. 357. In response to Hussain, Clark and Dudrick dismiss the correspondences between Nietzsche and Machean positivism, in Clark & Dudrick: “Nietzsche‟s Post-Positivism”; The European Journal of Philosophy, Blackwell, 2004. 9 The element of truth in Clark‟s reading is of course that Nietzsche does indeed establish that senses „do not lie,‟ although he in the same passage continues to explain that what we make of them explicitly do: was wir aus ihrem Zeugniss m a c h e n , das legt erst die Lüge hinein (we notice that „machen‟ is emphasized). So, sense-receptions may not lie, but our processing of them lie, falsify, or interpret. “Die „Vernunft‟ ist die Ursache, dass wir das Zeugniss der Sinne fälschen (ibid.).” This so-called „Vernunft‟ is perceptive, and must be pre-linguistic since it is the spontaneous abbreviation and simplification of a chaotic sense-data world. It is accountable for an elementary cognitive-perceptive ordering of the universe, which we would share with all higher animals.15 Nietzsche is here expressing a view identical to views of Avenarius and Mach, presented even in similar vocabulary, since Mach too talks about the distinct, independent, and self-identical object as a „fiction.‟ If in Nietzsche, senses or impressions do not „lie‟ (but perceptions do) it is because there is nothing left to lie about; it is the „that about which‟ that disappears, i.e., the supposed thing-hood or objectivity outside us. This has the consequence that the world of „objects‟ is annihilated as origin of knowledge – not restored. In Analytic-Rationalist epistemology, the world of objects is the origin of knowledge (therefore is true by definition); in the new empiricism of Nietzsche, Avenarius, and Mach, the world of objects is the end-product of a perceptive and conceptual processing (asserting something to be true). 2.3. Nietzsche‟s Positions in the Context of his Peers We notice that Nietzsche positions (3), (4), (5), and (6) in GD resemble positions discussed by a number of predecessors and contemporaries such as Kant, Schopenhauer, Drossbach, Comte, Helmholtz, Du BoisReymond, Teichmüller, Lange, Spir, Avenarius, and Mach. The Kantian position (3), with its often-criticized „thing-in-itself,‟ finds a variation during 19th century thinking, for example when Schopenhauer and later Drossbach reinterpret the „thing-in-itself‟ into a „force-in-itself.‟ Already in his early essay, On the Fourfold Root,16 Schopenhauer suggests as „ground‟ for all becoming, matter and force. To 15 16 We recall that Schopenhauer anticipated Nietzsche when already in the Fourfold he talked about the “intellectual character of perception.” He already then distinguished between „raw sense data‟ and „perceptive reason.‟ Cf. Schopenhauer: Fourfold, loc. cit. p. 58. Schopenhauer: On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. See also Schopenhauer: On the Will in Nature. (London: George Bell, 1889). 10 Schopenhauer, we experience change because cause-effect relations repeat themselves in a never-ending succession of causes changing into effects, as these effects become causes for new effects, etc., which indicates that our world is in a constant state of becoming. However, Schopenhauer believes there must be a foundation for his „world of becoming,‟ and argues that „change‟ must presuppose two affairs that precondition change, but themselves do not change, matter and force. Still, as an indeterminable „something,‟ both matter and force are an „enigmatic x,‟ and as such in the position of the „thing-in-itself.‟ This idea of a force preconditioning cause-effect relations is by Drossbach developed into a radical force-metaphysics in work, which Nietzsche had read.17 Drossbach‟s point of departure is the usual critique of the „thingin-itself,‟ which he like several neo-Kantians is criticizing as knowable objectivity. If according to this critique we do not perceive bodies and matter, it becomes an open question what we then perceive18 In resolving this pertinent question, Drossbach regresses to an extreme forcemetaphysics, which is far removed from the empiricist, sensualist, phenomenalist, and positivist agendas of several of his contemporaries, including Nietzsche. To Drossbach, we only perceive what „acts‟ on us and since neither things (which are passive) nor appearances (which are effects of something that acts, therefore also passive) „act‟ on us, we are left with the alleged effect „forces‟ have on us (his examples indicate that he takes for granted that he may apply the sense of „pressure‟ in tactile perception to all kinds of perception). He can therefore conclude that only forces are epistemologically „real,‟ that only forces are „really perceived.‟19 It is well-known that Nietzsche on several occasions dismisses this idea of „acting forces‟ (whether this dismissal is his critical response to Schopenhauer or Drossbach). To Nietzsche, a „force‟ acting on an appearance re-applies his often criticized doer-deed metaphysics, the notion of the „doer‟ conditioning and determining the „deed.‟ Drossbach‟s „force‟ becomes such an undifferentiated, unconditioned, and unknown „doer.‟ It can only constitute a metaphysical principle contrary to that 17 18 19 I am here referring to two works by Drossbach, Über die Objecte der Sinlichen Wahrnehmung. Halle, C. E. M. Pfeffer, 1865, and Über die scheinbaren und die wirklichen Ursachen des Geschehens in der Welt. Halle: C. E. M. Pfeffer, 1884. Drossbach: Über die Objecte, op. cit., 6-7. Drossbach: Über die Objecte, op. cit., 11 11 unique experience and observation of world in the radical empiricism that was more attractive to Nietzsche.20 A force in itself we cannot perceive.21 Nietzsche‟s position (4), that we cannot and will never know the physical world as a thing-in-itself, but only as an apparent world for-us, repeats the „ignorabimus-argument‟ in Du Bois-Reymond, who had concluded that not only are we ignorant (ignoramus) about matter and force, but we must also accept that we can never hope to understand, that we will stay forever ignorant about them (ignorabimus).22 Given our ignorance, we are condemned to stay within the realm of the knowable, i.e., the appearing. A. Comte too had admonished us to, “give up the search after the origin and hidden causes.”23 And Nietzsche important source of influence, F. Lange, repeating the same insight, gives the advice that we as consequence should give up all search for the inaccessible „thing‟ (corresponding to Nietzsche‟s position (5)): “Who says that we are to occupy ourselves at all with the inconceivable „things-in-themselves‟? [ . . . ] Do not the [natural sciences] accomplish what they accomplish, quite independently of the ideas as to the ultimate grounds of all nature? 24 Several scientists of the nineteenth century, such as H. C. Ørsted and M. Faraday, adopt this economical principle of knowledge in their research into electromagnetism, as they realize they no longer need a speculative explanation of nature. The power or force of magnetism is accepted as an unknown, a thing-in-itself, and therefore utterly irrelevant. To ruminate over the nature of forces „inside‟ the magnet is a sterile enterprise, worthy only of „philosophers.‟25 Discussing the view, Lange‟s “corrected Kantianism” becomes, in his own succinct expression, “a materialism of the phenomenon”26 – neither 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 M. Riccardi is of an opposite opinion: “Despite several fundamental differences, both [Nietzsche and Drossbach] defend the view that reality is ultimately constituted by force or power centres.” Riccardi, M.: “Nietzsche‟s Sensualism” in European Journal of Philosophy (Blackwell, 2011), p. 233. Avenarius repeats the same idea: “Not even the most precise observation of moving things makes us perceive the force.” Avenarius, R.: Philosophie als Denken der Welt Gemäss dem Princip des kleinsten Kraftmasses. Leipzig, Fues‟s Verlag, 1876; p. 45. Du Bois-Reymond, E.: Über die Grenzen des Naturerkennens. 1872. Hamburg, Tredition Classics, Reprint; p. 43. Comte, A.: op. cit. p. 2 Lange, Fr. A.: History of Materialism, 2nd Book, 1st section, p. 200. Cf. Lange, History of Materialism, 2nd Book, 2nd Section, p. 163. Cf. G. Stack: “With this conception of a materiale Idealismus Lange, before the phenomenologists, and independent of them, was seeking a mediation between materialism and idealism, a “third way.” [ . . . ] I believe that [Nietzsche] absorbs and reflects the materio-idealism or idealo-materialism that Lange 12 „metaphysical realism‟ nor „idealism,‟ but a theoretical creed foreshadowing Nietzsche‟s position (6) and his notion of a phenomenal Relations Welt, reminiscent of the explicit phenomenalism of Avenarius and Mach. 3. Perspectivism, Phenomenalism, Relativism Perspectivism is phenomenalism. The insight emerges as a logical consequence of the criticism of the „thing-in-itself‟ insofar as a „no‟ to the „thing-in-itself‟ is a „no‟ to a depth-dimension for Truth and a „yes‟ to horizontal surfaces of relationships. „Perspectivism‟ implies that (1) knowledge emerges from a selection of relations, determined (2) according to survival and advancement interests of a particular biological species. Since „relationships‟ replace „substances,‟ perspectivism is relativism. 3.1. Nietzsche in the Phenomenalist tradition H. Kleinpeter, O. Ewald, P. Frank, R. von Mises, and other Machean philosophers of science saw Nietzsche as a member of their group of phenomenalist, positivist, and pragmatic thinkers.27 Especially Kleinpeter was explicitly regarding Nietzsche as a representative for the new phenomenalist-positivist movement with its strong adherence to evolutionary biology: First of all, Nietzsche‟s theory of knowledge [Erkenntnislehre] is thoroughly biological. Everywhere do we feel the formative influence of Darwin, even in the details. Strongest revealed in Nietzsche is however the opposition to the Absolute; he is perhaps the most radical representative for relativism in the theory of knowledge [er ist vielleicht der radikalste Vertreter des Relativismus in der Erkenntnistheorie]. [ . . . ] Pragmatism is entirely part of Nietzsche. The truth of the categories, logic, he views in their use for advancing our insight and our actions, in the last analysis to advance the organism. 28 27 28 sketches.” Stack, G. J.: Lange and Nietzsche. Berlin, New York (Walter de Gruyter), 1983, p. 97. Recently, this relation between Nietzsche and phenomenalists like Mach and Kleinpeter has been noticed also by P. Gori: “Nietzsche as Phenomenalist?” in Heit, et al: Nietzsches Wissenschaftsphilosophie, Berling/New York, Walter de Gruyter, 2011; & Gori: “The Usefulness of Substances. Knowledge, Science and Metaphysics in Nietzsche and Mach.” In Nietzsche-Studien 38, Berlin/New York, Walter de Gruyter, 2009. Kleinpeter, Hans: Letter to Ernst Mach, 22.12.1911; in Nietzsche Studien bd. 40 (Berlin/New York, de Gruyter, 2012; ed. Pietro Gori); p. 295. 13 Nietzsche‟s contribution to the theory of knowledge is not limited to this reformulation of the Kantian teaching. He would also be the creator of a new positive theory of knowledge based on biology. Darwin would be the great guiding star for his life and work. [ . . . ] Nietzsche is no longer a mere precursor for phenomenalism, but is himself effectively its most important representative.29 With his [Nietzsche‟s] penetrating truth-critical spirit, he realized the impracticality of the current ideal of knowledge; truth is un-knowable: o n l y t h r o u g h t h e glasses of our concepts is it possible for us to see t r u t h . Appearance is a necessity; it arises as a result of the nature of our knowledge. In this sense, all knowledge is relative; an absolute unconditional truth is not only unreachable but also unthinkable and logically impossible. Nietzsche destroys Kant‟s a priori and transforms his teaching into relativism. 30 P. Frank too sees Nietzsche‟s thinking as echoing Mach‟s, and regards them even as representatives of the enlightenment project: Nietzsche is the other great enlightenment philosopher of the end of the nineteenth century. The harmony of his epistemological views with those of Mach, who had gone through an entirely different course of instruction and possessed an entirely different temperament and entirely different ethical ideals, seems to me to be evidence for the fact that such view must have penetrated to the enlightened minds of that time. [ . . . ] I am strengthened by the striking agreement of his [Mach] views with [ . . . ] Friedrich Nietzsche. [ . . . ] The more one delves into the posthumous works of Nietzsche, the more clearly one observes the agreement, particularly in the basic ideas related to the theory of knowledge. 31 Phenomenalist, positivist, and/or pragmatic philosophers of science like Kleinpeter, Frank, and von Mises are especially impressed by Nietzsche‟s criticism of the Kantian „thing-in-itself‟ and his emphasis on a relational sensation-world replacing the old-fashioned „schoolphilosophical‟ belief in a world of substances. In this, they see obvious parallels to Mach‟s epistemology. In addition, they frequently notice the shared evolutionary-biological understanding of knowledge in both Nietzsche and Mach. 29 30 31 Kleinpeter, H.: Der Phenomenalismus: Eine Naturwissenschaftlichen Weltanschauung. Leipzig, Verlag von J. A. Barth, 1913; p. 27 [my emphasis]. Kleinpeter, H.: Der Phenomenalismus: Eine Naturwissenschaftlichen Weltanschauung. Leipzig, Verlag von J. A. Barth, 1913, p. 27. Frank, P.: Between Physics and Philosophy. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1941; p. 51. Frank has several positive references to Nietzsche also in his The Law of Causality and its Limits (Vienna: Springer Verlag, 1932). R. von Mises refers to Nietzsche on several occasions in his Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1951), and Mach‟s biographer J. Blackmore comments on this association as well in his: Ernst Mach: His Work, Life, and Influence. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 123. 14 In the context of current commentary, these are rather surprising and unconventional assessments. The emphasis on the connection between Nietzsche and Central European Phenomenalism and Positivism virtually disappeared in later 20th century receptions and has only recently resurfaced thanks to a small group of intellectual historians.32 3.2. Teichmüller on the Brink of Introducing Perspectivism In his Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt,33 Teichmüller introduces a dichotomy between „perspectival perception‟ of an apparent [scheinbare] world and a non-perspectival real [wirkliche] world – a discussion, which must have engaged Nietzsche into developing his own notion on „perspectivism‟ in the later work.34 Teichmüller offers an analysis of perspectivism that reminiscences Nietzsche and Mach‟s. The precondition is an „apparent‟ world without 32 33 34 We have mentioned N. Hussain, P. Gori, and M. Riccardi. However, T. Brobjer has been particular thorough in documenting Nietzsche‟s relationship to these early phenomenalist, positivist, and pragmatic schools of thought at the turn of the century: “Nietzsche read texts by Ernst Mach in a public reading room in Zürich in 1884. [ . . . ] Later, probably in 1886 or 1887, Nietzsche bought and read one of Mach‟s most important works, Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen. [ . . . ] We know that he read it, for two pages contain annotations. Brobjer, Nietzsche‟s Philosophical Context, op. cit., p. 94. Brobjer also notices that the connection between Nietzsche and Positivism has been neglected: “Nietzsche‟s relation to critical positivism (empirio-criticism) has received no attention at all by historians of philosophy in spite of the fact that he had read books by the two founders of critical positivism, Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach (although he never mentions or discusses any of them explicitly). [ . . . ] There has been almost no awareness and discussion of Nietzsche‟s reading of three of the most significant contemporary philosophers of science: Emil Du Bois-Reymond (1818–96), Richard Avenarius (1843–96), and Ernst Mach (1838–1916).” Brobjer, ibid., pp. 17-18 & 91-92. Brobjer correctly points out that seeing Nietzsche in relation to these early positivists “can help us to understand his often paradoxical statements regarding positivism, empiricism, truth, and science.” Brobjer, ibid., 17-18. Also R. Small and G. Moore have contributed to illuminate various aspect of this inheritance. Finally, we may recall that already Danto saw a connection between Nietzsche and the positivist/pragmatic movements; cf. Danto: Nietzsche as Philosopher, op. cit., p. 65. Teichmüller, G.: Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt: neue Grundlegung der Metaphysik. Breslau, Verlag von W. Keobner, 1882. We know from Brobjer that Nietzsche re-read Teichmüller‟s work in the mideighties: “During the autumn of 1885, [Nietzsche] reread Teichmüller‟s Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt [ . . . ] for a second time [ . . . ] very attentively, writing down arguments and quotations, with page references.” Brobjer: Nietzsche‟s Philosophical Context, op. cit., p. 97. 15 unity, stability, and permanence, fluctuating in time and space. Contrary to Nietzsche, however, Teichmüller sets about to think a principle beyond that fluctuating unstable surface, a principle that can bring unity and permanence to our appearing perceptions. His theoretical point of departure is the phenomenal perspectivism, but his theoretical purpose is to restore unity in the perspectival world. This he does, not by reasserting a thing-in-itself as objectivity, but by deducing a unifying „I see‟ in or behind all perspectival seeing. We look at the appearing surface as in a mirror, seeing ourselves in the mirror as appearing surface as well, but we “completely forget” the “real I” seeing that appearing surface. Therefore Teichmüller concludes: “We see then that it is our I [Ich], our substantial being [sein], our best-known, most certain and in-alienable being, whose image we see reflected in the mirroring of objects. Therefore, there is [es giebt] no other source for the concept of substance than the I.”35 Much of the conceptual material in the passage is adopted by Nietzsche (e.g., the concept of substance deriving from the „I‟), but given different value. Most importantly, Nietzsche has no desire to establish a seeing self that is self-identical, simple, unifying, and substantial, but sees rather the self as another aspect of the fragmented perspectival world. Mach concurs, even did an effort to illustrate the idea in a sketch where we see the torso, waist, legs of the artist lying on a couch, but – since he is drawing himself – not his face. Consequently, in Mach as in Nietzsche, the „I see‟ is always and necessarily missing and shall never „appear‟ to us except when we fortuitously add a mirror; i.e., add the appearance of ourselves revealing the „I see‟ as appearance. 3.3. The Relations-Welt In aphorism 354 from FW, Nietzsche addresses several issues such as language, communication, consciousness, and thinking. He concludes the aphorism by explicitly labeling his epistemological position, “phenomenalism and perspectivism”: At bottom, all our actions are incomparably and utterly personal, unique, and boundlessly individual, there is no doubt; but as soon as we translate them into consciousness, they no longer seem to be. – This is the true phenomenalism and perspectivism, as I understand it [ Diess ist der eigentliche Phänomenalismus und P e r s p e k t i v i s m u s , wie ich ihn verstehe]: The nature of a n i m a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s entails that the world of which we can become conscious is merely a surface- and sign-world [Oberflächen- und Zeichenwelt], a generalized and degraded world where everything that becomes conscious becomes shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-mark; everything becoming 35 Teichmüller, op. cit., p. 347 16 conscious involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, and generalization. [ . . . ] We simply have no organ for k n o w i n g , for „truth‟: we „know‟ (or believe or imagine we do) exactly as much as is u s e f u l to the human herd, to the species. (FW 354, KSA 3, p. 593) We notice that „perspectivism‟ and „phenomenalism‟ are used synonymously as concepts for the one and same position, supporting my argument that perspectivism is phenomenalism. We notice as well that Nietzsche‟s „perspective‟ is species-specific, implying that it is as Homo Sapiens we construct the world according to our perspective in contrast to all the possible perspectives of other species and the impossible perspective of an omniscient all-seeing nobody. This species-specific perspectival world is explicitly understood as a relationship-world, seen differently from species to species. The world, apart from our condition of living in it, the world that we have not reduced to our being, our logic, and psychological prejudices does n o t exist as a world „in-itself‟ it is essentially a world of relationships [Relations-Welt]: it has, under certain conditions, a d i f f e r e n t l o o k [Gesicht] from each and every point [Punkt]; its being [Sein] is essentially different in every point; it presses upon every point, every point resists it. [ . . . ] Our particular case is interesting enough: we have produced a conception in order to be able to live in a world, in order to perceive just enough to e n d u r e i t . (NF 1888, KSA 13, 14[93]). Repeating for emphasis: The world does not exist as a world „in-itself‟ it is essentially a world of relationships [Relations-Welt]. Thus, the objectworld is transformed into a world of relationships, where a „point‟ is here the abstract idea of a location from where something has a relation to something else. There is thus no absolute location – i.e., no absolute „eye‟ seeing and no absolute „cause‟ effecting. We cannot imagine a point except as an intersection in the net. Take away the „net,‟ and we will in vain try to locate the „point.‟ As little as Mach‟s elements exist alone, Nietzsche‟s „points‟ do. This Nietzschean Relations-welt is objectively relative; it is not subjectively relativized or becoming relative because we as individuals walk around and look at pre-given objects from different angles, or voice our different opinions on different objects or issues.36 As such, Nietzschean/Machean Relativism is not a disguised Subjectivism. It is rather the other way around: instead of the world being objective in-itself 36 It is objective as is Einstein‟s theory of relativity (inspired from Mach). Like in Einstein movement and velocity of bodies is relative because there is no absolute rest that the velocity of moving bodies can be measured against. Still, the theory of relativity does not abandon the relative universe to subjective interpretation. 17 with us relativizing this in-itself, the world is in-itself relative, while we objectify this relative world out of biological-cognitive necessity and thanks to our abstracting intelligence. We create unity out of the fragmentary, and this is our species-specific „falsification‟ of (our socalled „lie‟ about) the world, which is understood originally as presenting itself as sensation (e.g.: “Die Sensationen sind die letzte Realität.” (NF 1888, KSA 13, 11[332]; see also KSA 13, 14[93]). There is no the world, there is only our world, given to us from our biological species-specific perspective (cf.: we are “adapted to a perspectival way of seeing [ . . . ] as creatures of our species must in order to preserve their existence.” (NF 1886, KSA 12, 6[23])).37 4. The Status of the Object in Perspectival Epistemology The Object does not disappear in Perspectival Epistemology, but is explained as constructed from a string of Physical, Physiological, and Psychological impressions woven together to form what is called „object.‟ An empirical world of relations of elements is after-reconstructed as a world of objects, but under „precise analysis,‟ there is no radical distinction between the three domains, the physical, the physiological, and the psychological (formalized in Mach as strings of letters). According to this „string-theory‟ of elements, the distinction between object and subject collapses and we can no longer precisely determine what is objective and what subjective. Consequently, we can also not clearly determine essential objectivity. 4.1. Elements are Qualities In the notion „element,‟ Mach is introducing a neutral entity that may apply equally to the three traditional centers of knowledge, the physical, the physiological, and the psychological. In his notion of elements, Mach was undoubtedly informed by one of his important sources of influence, G. Th. Fechner.38 Fechner had in a number of experiments demonstrated that „raw‟ stimuli had to be 37 38 This Darwinism in Nietzsche‟s thinking has been discussed by a number of commentators; so Stegmaier, W.: “Darwin, Darwinismus, Nietzsche. Zum Problem der Evolution,” in Nietzsche Studien 16. Berlin, New York (Walter de Gruyter), 1987; and Richardson, J.: Nietzsche‟s New Darwinism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. See Fechner, G. Th.: Elements of Psychophysics. New York/Chicago (Holt, Rinehart and Winston), 1966. Translated by H. Adler. 18 increased in intensity before they were noticed. He concluded that “it can be shown that every stimulus [ . . . ] must already have reached a certain finite magnitude before it can be noticed at all – that is, before our consciousness is aroused by a sensation.”39 This implied that there was a “threshold” below which the subject did not sense and register stimuli, but remained unconscious about them. When stimuli became conscious, it happened in qualitative jumps from a zero-sensation response to a sensation-response. At a seemingly arbitrary point, the mind was affected and it started to become aware. Accordingly, we may see a Machean element as a sensation of which the mind has become aware. In a qualitative jump, an anonymous sensedata has become a conscious sensational element. An element cannot be a sensation of which we are not aware. Nietzsche concurs in this understanding, when he writes, Qualities are our insurmountable barriers. [ . . . ] All our feelings of value (i.e., all our feelings) adhere to qualities, that is, to the perspectival „truths‟ that are ours and nothing more than ours, that simply cannot be „known.‟ [ . . . ] Qualities are our real human idiosyncrasy: wanting our human interpretations and values to be universal [ . . . ] is one of the hereditary insanities of human pride, which still has its safest seat in religion. (NF, KSA 12, 1886-87, 6[14]). In the passage, qualities are our “real human idiosyncrasy,” imposed on the world by us as one of our “hereditary insanities of human pride.” That „idiosyncrasy‟ is perspectivism in the most rudimentary Nietzschean sense. The qualitative world is our world, a world invested with feelings and values. As humans, we cannot sense quantities, but only qualities, which are the limits or “barriers” within which we „construct‟ our world (this position reaches back to the discussion of „forces,‟ which we also cannot sense). Within these barriers, we formalize, schematize, and quantify our experiences as an after-reconstruction or secondary elaboration. „Knowledge‟ is this ordering, schematization, conceptualization, organization, and interpretation of the world. It only manifests a „truth‟ that is our own, thus a perspectival rather than universal truth. Nietzsche seems to find this point self-evident, when he continues the passage by insisting, “Need I add, conversely, that quantities „in themselves‟ do not occur in experience, that our world of experience is only a qualitative world.” (NF, 1886-87, KSA 12, 6[14]). 39 Fechner, op. cit., p. 199. 19 4.2. On the Constitution of Objectivity Qualities are the nether limit in Nietzsche, while elements are the nether limit in Mach. Mach tries to organize these elements, although they have in principle the same epistemological weight. He suggests three sets of elements as corresponding to the physical, physiological, and psychological, and formalizes these three sets respectively: (1) A B C . . . (complexes consisting of outside, physical, spatio-temporal, objects), (2) K L M . . . (complexes of bodily sensations, and related objects), and „3‟ α . . . (complexes of imagination, memory-images, etc.).40 If we accept this new notational system, we can say that our perception of an object (or of something we spontaneously construct as an object) is the coming-together of a string of elements, say A C L M . . . , in such a way that the string (A C L M . . . ) is the object. In this anti-Aristotelian epistemology, an „object‟ is an appearances constructed as a string of elements. We will represent to ourselves the object as a body. However, under “precise analysis,” there is no determinable body in the Nietzsche-Machean Relations-Welt. Under precise analysis, we are presented with certain elements standing in relations to each other and to the perceiving subject. Only the relations remain permanent, while the properties are in constant flux and change. In Nietzsche‟s vocabulary, it is as such we live in a world of constant becoming. This view does not argue idealistically that the appearing object is our idea, our fantasy, or our hallucination. It rather argues that the object is not determinable. I can walk around a disk, view it from different angles, in different light, feel its texture, or in frustration, like honorable Dr. Johnson, give it a good kick to prove its existence, but I remain lost in these and multiple other sensations. They all prove me right that there is a disk-object, but I remain unable to articulate this object as the promised body that can be subtracted from its aspects or properties that I perceive/receive in a perspectival world. Let us exemplify the thinking. A pain-sensation impresses itself from the „outside‟ while being interpreted from the „inside‟ as „pain,‟ and as „this pain‟ (recognized in memory). In Mach‟s formulaic language we may now explain „pain‟ as follows: something, say a needle, (element40 Mach: On the Analysis of Sensations, op. cit., p. 9. I will not here go into a detailed description of Mach‟s formulaic language. Discussions may found in in Mises, R. von: Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding op. cit.; in Sommer, M.: Husserl und der Frühe Positivismus. Frankfurt a/M, Vittoria Klostermann, 1985; and recently, in P. Gori: The Usefulness of Substances, loc. cit., p. 120. 20 group A B C . . . ) touches the skin (element-group K L M . . . ) and is felt as pain (element-group K L M . . .), but as this characterized, recognized, and remembered pain (element-group α . . .), which is partly recognized by perceiving that which touches the skin (element-group A B C . . . ), remembering one‟s fear of needles (elements group α . . .), hereby augmenting the pain-sensation (element-group K L M . . .). Where exactly (“under precise analysis”) is the cause of pain located in these element-groups? The outside helps defining „pain‟ as much as the inside. „Pain‟ is A, K, and α; remove one, and there is no pain! It is not clearly determinable whether „pain‟ belongs to the outside, the inside, or that in-between we call the skin. If we extrapolate on the example and apply it to visual perception, I ask the same question and get the same answer: does an impression belong to the outside, as object; to the inside as recognized/remembered image in our visual cortex, or to that in-between we call the retina? For sure, I can repeat the argument: „perception‟ is A, K, and α; remove one, and there is no perception. In Mach as in Nietzsche the psyche is rather than a camera a filter where the filtration screens material and removes superfluities that are unnecessary or irrelevant to the psychical apparatus. Both of the writers have a biological-evolutionary explanation of this filtration and abbreviation process: the „subject‟ must reduce its perceptions to what it needs and maybe wants to see. It removes impressions unnecessary for the immediate interest in the strength, growth, or perseverance of its own organism. 4.3. The Perspectival World of Claude Monet It is helpful for our understanding of the phenomenal epistemology of Nietzsche and Mach to contemplate the painting of Claude Monet, especially his „series‟ of motives painted at different seasons or different times of day, under different light conditions, or from slightly different angles. His haystacks, his water lilies, or his Cathedrals of Rouen are excellent illustrations of a Nietzschean-Machean phenomenalism. His series of a few dozen paintings of the Cathedral of Rouen, seen at different times of the day and in different light, shows us a destabilized cathedral broken up into „sensation-elements.‟ Here we are presented to a world that is clearly neither a Cartesian substance nor a Berkelean idea, but a complex of sensations, which antedates our mental construction of the physical-material cathedral as object. In Claude Monet‟s world, there is no „thing-in-itself‟ and no „true‟ substance or body, but a world broken up in a flicker of impressions. It is characteristic in impressionist painting 21 that the outline of the object is replaced with brush-stokes of color. The clearly delineated „solid‟ object disappears and is replaced with strokes and points. This technique may occur to us as the painter‟s best analogy on how we cognitively „construct‟ an object. If Monet had painted only one cathedral, he would already have made his point; by painting a series of 28, he demonstrated with great ingenuity how the „permanent object‟ is broken up in an infinite series of flickers of impressions of the same. This insistence on repeating the same also shows us that repetition of the same is never repetition of the self-same, but rather an eternal repetition of variations of the same. Monet‟s serial paintings give us, with Nietzsche‟s phrase, a “new infinite,” cf. FW 374, KSA 3. The surface is inexhaustible. 5. Economy, Simplification, and Biology The condition of the possibility of the formation of knowledge is the ability to abbreviate and simplify a multitude of experiences into a minimal sign-world. The principles of least force (in Avenarius), thoughteconomy (in Mach) and simplification (in Nietzsche) are addressing this cognitive economy characteristic of the human species. When Kleinpeter in his letter to Mach summarizes the similarities between Mach and Nietzsche, he is somewhat at a loss to find in Nietzsche a parallel to Mach‟s principle of Denkökonomie: “The principle of thought-economy [Der Princip der Denkökonomie] I have only occasionally found in Nietzsche.”41 As perceptive as he is, it seems odd that Kleinpeter overlooks this parallel, since Nietzsche‟s discussions of cognitive-linguistic processes as simplifying, abbreviating, and facilitating is the obvious introduction of an economy, and specifically (insofar as we talk about concepts) a thought-economy. This is an important issue deserving much more consideration than I am able to give it here, and which I will continue elsewhere. Here I only demonstrate Denkökonomie by offering the briefest of outlines, which again suggests the fundamental correspondences between Nietzsche, Avenarius, and Mach. If Nietzsche on numerous occasions describe our perceptive-cognitive apparatus as an “Abstraktions- und Simplifikations-apparat” (NF, KSA 41 Kleinpeter, H.: Letter to Mach, op. cit., p. 296. 22 11, 26[61]),42 Avenarius introduces this simplification in his principle of the kleinsten Kraftmasses and Mach in his principle of Denkökonomie. Avenarius states that “the effort, to think a totality of objects according to the greatest economy of force, i.e., under the general concept, and with this make possible a concept for all individual things, is philosophy.” 43 In Science of Mechanics, Mach explains the principle as follows: “[Given] man‟s limited powers of memory, any stock of knowledge worthy of the name is unattainable except by the greatest mental economy. Science itself, therefore, may be regarded as consisting of the most complete presentation possible of facts with the least possible expenditure of thought.”44 List of Literature Abel, G.: “Bewußtsein – Sprache – Natur. 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