Barry Smith

School of Advanced Study, University of London, Institute of Philosophy, Faculty Member

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Running the Institute of Philosophy, in the School of Advanced Study in University of London. The Institute exists to promote research in philosophy nationally and international. We run research projects, host post-doctoral researchers and visiting fellows and organise many conferences and workshops.

The Institute houses the interdisciplinary Centre for the the Study of the Sense: http://thecenses.org/
as well as the Centre for Logic and Language, and the Centre for Computing in Philosophy. It is the home of PhilPapers, run by Dr David Bourget, and provides support for Philosophy Bites run by Nigel Warbuton and David Edmonds.

The Institute has several partnerships with UK, European and US universities and participates in several research networks. See the website for details: www.philosophy.sas.ac.uk

We have has several successful collaborations with philosophy departments in the UK and the rest of the world and we welcome such opportunities.

My own philosophical interests are in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and cognitive science. I work on knowledge of language, self-knowledge, predicates of taste, flavour perception and neuroscience. I also write about the philosophy of wine.

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Externalism and Authoritative Self‐Knowledge

Knowing Our Own Minds, 2000

This paper defends a qualified observational model of authoritative self‐knowledge, which centres... more This paper defends a qualified observational model of authoritative self‐knowledge, which centres on two features of ordinarily observable characteristics that help explain a subject's direct awareness of them. The first is that they are basic, in that one does not have to know of any underlying fact in virtue of which they apply when they do; and the second is that it is generally necessary and sufficient for the application of such a characteristic that it seems to a normal observer, in normal circumstances, that it does apply. The view is defended against two well‐known misgivings about modelling such knowledge on observation: first, that there is a telling structural disanalogy, since observation normally involves three components, namely, the item perceived, an intermediary, non‐conceptual sensation state, and a judgement grounded in that sensation state, whereas self‐knowledge of an intentional state apparently involves analogues of the first and third components only, nam...

Barry Smith

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