Papers by Anandi Hattiangadi
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
In this paper, I take issue with a core commitment of logical conventionalism: that we impose a l... more In this paper, I take issue with a core commitment of logical conventionalism: that we impose a logic on ourselves by adopting general linguistic conventions governing our use of logical terms, thereby determining the meanings of the logical constants and which of our inferences are valid. Drawing on Kripke’s ‘adoption problem’, I argue that general logical principles cannot be adopted, either explicitly or implicitly. I go on to argue that the meanings of our logical terms, and the validity of our inferences, cannot depend on our adoption of logico-linguistic conventions.
Synthese
John MacFarlane has recently argued that his brand of truth relativism provides the best solution... more John MacFarlane has recently argued that his brand of truth relativism provides the best solution to the puzzle of future contingents: assertions about the future that express propositions that are metaphysically neither necessary nor impossible. In this paper, we show that even if we grant all of the metaphysical, semantic and pragmatic assumptions in terms of which MacFarlane sets and aims to solve the puzzle, his truth relativism is not apt to solve the problem of future contingents. We argue that the theory fails to vindicate the intuition that future contingent propositions are neither true nor false, leaving the theory open to a charge of Reductio. We show that these problems cannot be answered while preserving the core tenets of truth relativism.
Normativity and the Problem of Representation
The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, 2019
It is disputed what norm, if any, governs assertion. We address this question by looking at asser... more It is disputed what norm, if any, governs assertion. We address this question by looking at assertions of future contingents: statements about the future that are neither metaphysically necessary nor metaphysically impossible. Many philosophers think that future contingents are not truth apt, which together with a Truth Norm or a Knowledge Norm of assertion implies that assertions of these future contingents are systematically infelicitous.In this article, we argue that our practice of asserting future contingents is incompatible with the view that they are not truth apt. We consider a range of norms of assertion and argue that the best explanation of the data is provided by the view that assertion is governed by the Knowledge Norm.
Synthese, 2021
This paper takes issue with an influential interpretationist argument for physicalism about inten... more This paper takes issue with an influential interpretationist argument for physicalism about intentionality based on the possibility of radical interpretation. The interpretationist defends the physicalist thesis that the intentional truths supervene on the physical truths by arguing that it is possible for a radical interpreter, who knows all of the physical truths, to work out the intentional truths about what an arbitrary agent believes, desires, and means without recourse to any further empirical information. One of the most compelling arguments for the possibility of radical interpretation, associated most closely with David Lewis and Donald Davidson, gives a central role to decision theoretic representation theorems, which demonstrate that if an agent’s preferences satisfy certain constraints, it is possible to deduce probability and utility functions that represent her beliefs and desires. We argue that an interpretationist who wants to rely on existing representation theorems...
1. Introduction 2. The Sceptical Argument 3. Norms and Normativity 4. The Sceptical Solution 5. R... more 1. Introduction 2. The Sceptical Argument 3. Norms and Normativity 4. The Sceptical Solution 5. Reductionism 6. Anti-Reductionism 7. Prescriptivity 8. Conclusion Bibliography Prescriptivity
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2003
In Making if Explicir, Brandom aims to articulate an account of conceptual content that accommoda... more In Making if Explicir, Brandom aims to articulate an account of conceptual content that accommodates its normativity-a requirement on theories of content that Brandom traces to Wittgenstein's rule following considerations. It is widely held that the norma-tivity requirement cannot be met, ...
This chapter investigates what we disagree about when we disagree about logic, on the assumption ... more This chapter investigates what we disagree about when we disagree about logic, on the assumption that judgments of logical validity are normative. If logic is normative, then the popular anti-realist thesis that there are no normative facts or properties generalizes—it entails that there are no logical facts or properties. When faced with this anti-realism, it is tempting to endorse a pluralist thesis, according to which two people who disagree about the validity of an argument can both say something true. This chapter explores the limitations of three prominent forms of pluralism: contextualism, relativism, and expressivism. It argues that none of these forms of pluralism gives an adequate account of what we disagree about when we disagree about logic.
This paper takes issue with Lewis' influential argument for the supervenience of the semantic on ... more This paper takes issue with Lewis' influential argument for the supervenience of the semantic on the nonsemantic based on the possibility of radical interpretation. Radical interpretation is possible only if an ideal being, who is omniscient about the non-semantic truths, can deduce the semantic truths a priori. The radical interpreter appeals to a set of criteria of interpretation choice, such as most notably some kind of Principle of Charity. It is argued in this paper that the radical interpreter faces an insoluble aggregation problem: the radical interpreter must jointly apply several criteria for evaluating interpretations in order to determine which interpretation is best overall. First, the situation of the radical interpreter is formally modeled using the machinery of social choice theory. Second, it is argued that either Arrow's impossibility theorem or a variant of it applies to the situation of the radical interpreter. The upshot is that radical interpretation is impossible, and Lewis' argument for semantic supervenience fails. There are many ways to characterise supervenience more precisely. For an overview, see McLaughlin and Bennett (2014). A more precise characterisation is given in §2.
Journal of Moral Philosophy
In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends the error theory by rejecting all competitors to it... more In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends the error theory by rejecting all competitors to it. My aim here is to defend one brand of realism from Streumer’s objections: primitivim. The primitivist holds that there exist sui generis normative properties that do not supervene on any descriptive properties. It is argued that Streumer’s objections to primitivism can be met.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
It is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is t... more It is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is to say that for any two metaphysically possible worlds w and w′, and for any entities x in w and y in w′, any isomorphism between x and y that preserves the natural properties preserves the moral properties. In this paper, I put forward a conceivability argument against moral supervenience, assuming non-naturalism. First, I argue that though utilitarianism may be true, and the trolley driver is permitted to kill the one to save the five, there is a conceivable scenario that is just like our world in all natural respects, yet at which deontology is true, and the trolly driver is not permitted to kill the one to save the five. I then argue that in the special case of morality, it is possible to infer from the conceivability of such a scenario to its possibility. It follows that supervenience is false.
A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 2017
Philosophical Studies, 2014
Philosophical Studies, 2014
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Papers by Anandi Hattiangadi