Proxy Wars

This article examines contemporary modes of American warfare. It posits the concept of “vicarious warfare” as a means of capturing prominent patterns in warfighting approaches. Although rooted in long-standing traditions of military practice, vicarious warfare is sufficiently novel as to be identifiable as a distinct phenomenon. The precise manifestation or combination of vicarious methods vary according to the specific circumstances and political contexts prevailing in different theaters. However, America’s general preference is to fight its wars by delegating tasks to proxies and limiting exposure of its own military to danger. Where U.S. forces are employed directly, this takes place largely in the shadows. Such approaches have clear attractions, offer undoubted tactical advantages, and permit successive administrations to maintain a persistent tempo of operations that evades rigorous democratic scrutiny. Yet, prominent cases and numerous studies suggest that vicarious warfare has a high potential to generate counterproductive effects and significant strategic harm.

This study focuses on the political change and conflict period in Yemen since 2011. It aims to define how the conflict period is formed by considering the turning points of the conflict. The study argues that the rebellions that started for regime change in 2011 in Yemen turned to a proxy war after January 2014 and that they are still on this ground. The National Dialogue Coalition, which was founded in 2013 to govern the transition period. However its failure at the beginning of 2014, is considered a turning point in this sense. In the power gap that has emerged since this date, the conflict has intensified among the local powers, but the support and direct intervention of international actors has come to a more visible level. The study assumes Iran, Saudi Arabia/United Arab Emirates and the United States as the international actors, and Houthis (Ansarullah), former regime forces and Yemen al-Qaeda as the local forces of the proxy war. The proxy war is a consequence of struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

This study analyzes how migrants are militarized through analyzing an Iranian proxy, namely Liwa Fatemiyoun, as a case study. Liwa Fatemiyoun is a proxy group formed from migrants of the Shiite ethnic group of Afghan Hazaras by Iran. Shiite Hazaras immigrated to Iran due to ongoing civil wars in Afghanistan to find a safe haven. Numbering more than two million and crossing the borders illegally, Hazaras were recruited by the Iranian army either voluntarily or for a certain amount of money or by force. They were sent to Syria to protect holy shrines, but most of them found themselves in fronts. By analyzing the proxy group's formation, this study concludes that Iranian regime guards (IRGC) mostly conscript Afghan migrants and refugees to Liwa Fatemiyoun forcibly thereby exploiting their vulnerability and human rights. Besides, by referring to past experiences, the study asserts that Iran may also move the proxy group to Afghanistan if necessary after US troops' withdrawal. This study mainly wielded news, including those in Persian and institutional reports, and made interviews for its analysis. By examining Liwa Fatemiyoun, the study is expected to contribute to ethnoreligious migration literature from a security perspective.

Foreign governments frequently intervene in armed conflicts by sponsoring rebels against their adversaries. A sponsorship is less costly than a direct military intervention, but rebels
often defy orders, desert ghting or turn guns against their sponsors. Under what conditions
do rebels defect against their sponsors? Drawing on organizational theory, I argue that as rebel organizations become less centralized and formalized, the rebels are likely to defect against their sponsors. This occurs because non-centralized organizations have weak central
leadership and allow for dispersed decision-making, both of which narrow the manipulative capacity of sponsors. Due to these disadvantages, non-centralized rebel movements are
less accountable to their sponsors, cannot credibly commit to rapidly change their policies
in response to changes in the sponsor's demands and suer from frequent and destructive quarrels between the top and lower echelons. Using multilevel logistic models for panel data,
I test my argument on a novel dataset. My quantitative analysis shows that rebel structure is a robust predictor of defection.

Why do some militant groups defect against their sponsors, while others remain loyal? Pakistan's sponsorship of Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba offers a controlled case comparison as the former turned its guns against Islamabad, while the latter remained obedient despite a similar strength, ethnic ties to the regime, and the presence of alternative supporters. What explains Jaish's defection and Lashkar's
loyalty? Drawing on organizational and principal-agent theory, I argue that militant organizations that are more decentralized and factionalized are more likely to turn on their sponsors, because their weak command and control as well as dispersed decision making limit the militant leaders' ability to follow through on their commitments to the sponsors and makes it more difficult for the sponsors to discipline the militant
organization. When a sponsor attempts to coerce such organizations into submission by detaining militant leaders, freezing or confiscating their material assets the rank-and-
file is likely to turn guns against the sponsor.

This study examines the Iran-Saudi rivalry within the context of the changing balance of power in the Middle East. The main research questions were determined to be what the dynamics of the Iran-Saudi rivalry are and what type of role Turkey may play within the rivalry between the two countries. Three essential arguments were developed within this context. The first argument is that the regional balances were broken by the US occupation of Iraq in 2003 and by the 'Arab Spring' process resulting in the regional hegemony rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The second one is that Iran desired to utilize the Arab Spring process as an opportunity to become a regional hegemonic power. On the other hand, the policy of the US to withdraw from and leave the Middle East to its allies Israel and Saudi Arabia caused King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud to adopt a regional leadership policy. Within this framework, the study argued that the rivalry to become the new regional hegemon of the Middle East re-surged between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two historic rival powers of the Middle East. The third argument is that the rivalry between the two countries was mainly in the form of a proxy war but resulted in the fact that the balance of power struggle in the region reached to the proxy war balance as no country managed to outcompete the other.

Öz

Bu araştırmada Ortadoğu'daki İran-Suudi rekabeti, değişen güç dengeleri bağlamında incelenmiştir. Makalenin temel araştırma sorusu, İran-Suudi rekabetinin dinamikleri nelerdir ve iki ülke arasındaki rekabette Türkiye'nin rolü ne olabilir olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu bağlamda üç temel argüman geliştirilmiştir: Birincisi, ABD'nin 2003 yılında Irak işgali ve 'Arap Baharı' sürecinin bölgesel dengeleri bozduğu ve iki ülke arasında bölgesel hegemon olma rekabetine yol açtığı tezi geliştirilmiştir. İkincisi, İran, Arap Baharı sürecini bölgesel hegemon güç olmak için bir fırsat olarak kullanmak istemiştir. Öte yandan ABD'nin

Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, it has become a magnet for many countries and organization that, concerned for their own interests, cannot keep their hands out of the pot. As a result, Syria has regressed about six decades, to the period when its weakness left it prey to the influence of both regional and international powers.  Of all the countries that have taken vigorous action against the regime of Bashar Assad, Saudi Arabia stands out. King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz was the first senior Arab leader to break the silence and condemn the Syrian president’s repression of the protests. Abdullah was also the first Arab leader to call openly for arming the Syrian opposition.
The present study analyzes the relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria and examines the kingdom’s motives for getting involved in an internal Syrian war. I will review the ties between the two countries, from the advent of the present regime in Syria until the zenith of the civil war, looking at both official relations as well as the indirect messages conveyed through various channels. I will also look at the history of the Saudi intervention inside Syria and the means it has employed for that.

Iran's influence and presence in Iraq have increased significantly in recent years. The collapse of the Saddam's dictatorship in 2003, after the US invasion, served to inflate Iran's influence in Iraq, particularly in the post-ISIS era. In this connection, Iran has used various means and tools to develop its strategy in Iraq. This article argues that Iran's current strategy in Iraq stems from a Realpolitik agenda rather than an ideological one, concerned more with political, economic, and security interests than pursuing revolutionary objectives per se. To this end, Tehran has largely relied on long-established relationships with several pro-Iranian political parties and militia groups. These relationships are often couched in religious ideological terms as a foundation and justification for its future strategy in post-ISIS Iraq. The questions that this paper will address are the following: what was Iran's role in defeating ISIS in Iraq? How has Tehran benefitted from its long-term relationships with Iraqi political parties and militia groups? What are the Iranian sources of power in Iraq and how do they help Iran gain strategic dominance in Iraq?

Öz Bu çalışmanın amacı, yeni savaşlar olarak tarif edilen yeni çatışma düzeninin biçimlerinden biri olan vekâlet savaşının incelenmesi, avantajlarının ve dezavantajlarının tartışılmasıdır. Bununla beraber bu yeni biçimin yarattığı güvenlik meselelerinin tartışılması da hedeflenmiştir. Konunun ve konu etrafında incelenecek ana temanın belirlenmesinde; günümüz dünyasında gittikçe yakıcı bir sorun haline gelen "insani güvenlik" meselesi ve vekâlet savaşının bu mesele üzerindeki olumsuz etkisi; belirleyici olmuştur. Konunun incelenmeye değer bulunmasının bir diğer nedeni ise dilimizde üretilmiş özgün çalışmalar bakımından vekâlet savaşı çerçevesi ile ilgili çok sınırlı çalışma bulunmasıdır. Çalışmada öncelikle yeni savaşlarda asil/vekil sarmalında bulanıklaşan temel bir meseleye, düşmanın "kim" olduğuna ışık tutulmaya, daha sonra ise güvenliğin insani ve ulusal çerçevede nasıl sağlanabileceğine dair tutarlı bir yol haritası çizebilmeye yardımcı olacak bir tartışma yürütülmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, çalışmada öncellikle vekâlet teorisi ve siyasal teoriye etkisi ortaya konmuş daha sonra ise vekâlet teorisin temel sorunlarından biri olan, vekâlet maliyetleri ve bunların ne dereceye kadar engellenebileceği tartışılmıştır. Ardından, yeni savaşlarda "vekil" kullanmanın sebepleri ve modern savaş düzenini dönüştürerek vekâlet savaşlarını ortaya çıkaran çerçeve incelenmiştir vekâlet savaşları nedenleri bakımından incelendiğinde, savaşın politik ve iktisadi maliyetlerinin düşürülmesi nedeniyle sapılan bir yol olarak görünmektedir. Sonuçları bakımından incelendiğinde ise ulus-devletlerin savaş tekelleri olma vasıflarını kaybetmeleri, şiddetin simetrik savaş kalıplarını kale almayan gruplar tarafından uygulanır hale gelmesi,

The intention of this paper is to clarify how state patrons control non-state proxy forces fighting on their behalf. In order to address the subject matter thoroughly, specific attention was paid to a number of questions including a) the criteria determining patron-proxy relations, b) factors influencing the selection process of proxy forces, and c) principles governing the maximisation of potential benefits of using proxies, whilst simultaneously reducing risks and associated costs. The author applied a neo-realistic research paradigm to his work. Patron-proxy relations were presented in the context of the principal-agent theory, as well as through detailed analysis of ongoing scenarios involving Iran and Hezbollah, Russia and the Donbass separatists, Pakistan and Kashmiri militias, the US and Syrian rebels. The essence of war by proxy is to influence the strategic result of an armed conflict without direct, full-scale, military intervention. The use of non-state proxy, external actors is aimed at maximising their political goals and strategic interests whilst maintaining "plausible deniability". By supporting non-state proxies, indirectly or by providing limited direct assistance, sponsors operate below the threshold of war. Empirical analysis of proxy war cases proves that such models may both guarantee "strategic victory" or become a "double-edged sword". One of the key challenges for external powers engaged in war by proxy is to avoid unintended consequences (blowback). The author argues that elements such as ideology, ethnicity or religion do not necessarily ensure control over proxies, whilst the range of common goals and interests, and the level of the proxy's dependency, are crucial.

The article identifies the main features of the PSMCs' involvement in counterterrorism operations and outlines what their future involvement might look like with its implications for international peace and security. The main methods used to gather data and to draw inferences are a content analysis of relevant primary and secondary sources, and a discourse analysis, used as a method of examining the prevailing discourse surrounding the activities of PSMCs, seeking to understand the level of transparency, accountability and attributability of these actors. So far, the PSMCs' potential for counterterrorism has not been fully exploited. There are many challenges surrounding the existence and operations of PSMCs, mainly lack of transparency and accountability, the continuous significance of the plausible deniability and political expediency PSMCs provide to nation governments, and an insufficient and inadequate international regulatory and control framework with no sanction or enforcement mechanisms. Most recently, the tendency to re-legitimise PSMCs' activities can be identified. There will most probably be an expansion of PSMCs' activities in the near future, as climate change consolidates security as a commodity, not a right. Therefore, there is a renewed urgency for adequate and effective international regulatory and control mechanisms on their activities on the international level.

The geopolitical location of Yemen makes the country an area that has always drawn the attention of external actors interested in expanding their influences in the Arabian Penin-sula. During the period of the Cold War, the territory of today's Yemen was a theater of geopolitical rivalry, where the interests clashed between both superpowers and regional actors. During the conflict in North and South Yemen, external entities played an im-portant role as they drove the dynamics of these conflicts counting on achieving their own strategic objectives. The purpose of this article is to seek answers to the questions: who, how and why was engaged in armed conflicts in the territory of North and South Yemen during the Cold War era, and what long-term consequences of this commitment can be observed today?

The military operation in Yemen is significant departure from Saudi Arabia's foreign policy tradition and customs. Riyadh has always relied on three strategies to pursue its interests abroad: wealth, establish a global network and muslim education and diplomacy and meadiation. The term "proxy war" has experienced a new popularity in stories on the Middle East. A proxy war is two opposing countries avoiding direct war, and instead supporting combatants that serve their interests. In some occasions, one country is a direct combatant whilst the other supporting its enemy. Various news sources began using the term to describe the conflict in Yemen immediately, as if on cue, after Saudi Arabia launched its bombing campaign against Houthi targets in Yemen on 25 March 2015. This is the reason, why author try to answer for following questions: Is the Yemen Conflict Devolves into Proxy War? and Who's fighting whom in Yemen's proxy war?" Research area includes the problem of proxy war in the Middle East. For sure, the real problem of proxy war must begin with the fact that the United States and its NATO allies opened the floodgates for regional proxy wars by the two major wars for regime change: in Iraq and Libya. Those two destabilizing wars provided opportunities and motives for Sunni states across the Middle East to pursue their own sectarian and political power objectives through "proxy war".

Contemporary civil conflicts are increasingly inter- and trans-nationalized: dis- tinctive conflict dynamics extend beyond the boundaries of the respective states and are exposed to foreign involvement, in different forms. Within this trend stands the often mentioned but yet to be fully grasped role of non-state actors, referred to as, among others, proxies, mercenaries, militias (pro- government or not), or insurgents. The article revises the debate on sponsor- proxy relations from a twofold standpoint. First, it connects sponsor-proxy dynamics with current systemic changes by treating the MENA region as an example of a decentered multipolar system. Second, it examines sponsor-proxy dynamics by engaging in a conversation with scholarship on (armed) non-state actors. To do so, the article applies the sponsor-proxy analytical framework to the case studies of the relationship between Iran and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq, and between Turkey and the Syrian National Army (SNA) in Syria. The main argument is that the two cases show a peculiar pattern of sponsor-proxy dynamics, one that is influenced by proxy plurality and competi- tiveness, on the one hand, and by the political relevance of proxies besides their military role.

20. yüzyılda Ortadoğu’da petrol ve doğal gaz kaynakları açısından zengin ülkelerin ekonomik, sosyal ve teknolojik açıdan sınırlı imkanlara sahip olması, Batılı ülkelerin kaynak zengini ülkeler üzerinde hakimiyet kurmasına ve bu ülkeleri sömürge haline getirmesine zemin hazırlamıştır. Bu anlamda Ortadoğu’da başlayan Batılı ülkelerin enerji kaynaklarını kontrol etme mücadelesi 21. yüzyılda Kuzey Afrika’ya da sıçramıştır. Böylece enerji kaynakları için sürdürülen mücadele, I.Dünya Savaşı’ndan Arap Baharı’nın tetiklediği Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika’daki iç savaşlara kadar hız kesmeden devam etmiştir. 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrası Irak, Arap Baharı’nın ardından Suriye ve Libya, görünürde iç savaşın yaşandığı ancak gerçekte enerji kaynakları için kapsamlı bir mücadelenin yürütüldüğü, Batılı ülkelerin ve bölgesel güçlerin vekalet savaşlarına sahne olan ülkeler haline gelmiştir. Bu kapsamda bu çalışmada, 20. yüzyılda yaşanan krizlerden hareketle Irak, Suriye ve Libya’daki enerji savaşları analiz edilmiş ve bu savaşların farklılaşan, benzeşen yönleri ve değişen aktörleri üzerinde durulmuştur. Çalışmada enerji savaşlarına müdahil olan küresel ve bölgesel aktörlerin yürüttüğü mücadele ve bu aktörlerin siyasi hedefleri tartışılmıştır. Tarihsel bir bakış açısıyla küresel enerji rekabetinin ve enerji kaynaklarının kaynak zengini ülkelerin siyasi tarihini nasıl etkilediği sorusunun cevabı aranmıştır.

Abstract: As a new form of warfare, proxy war does not require arm contacts to invade a country. Through conspiracy, propaganda and the establishment, a country may be ravaged by other more powerful countries. As a developing country with abundant natural and human resources, Indonesia becomes an easy target for super power countries to launch their proxy wars. Therefore anticipatory measures to stem the dangers of a proxy war are needed. This study used a qualitative approach through interviews. The conclusions of this study are: (1) the perceptions ofthe East Java's PTKIN students on the issue of proxy war. First, in terms of its notion, there are four perceptions about proxy war. Two of them do not have compatibility with the theory of proxy war. Second, the perception of the dangers of proxy war in which there are two perceptions: 1) that the proxy war is absolutely very dangerous and 2) that it cannot be justified simply to be dangerous or not before its victims arise. Third, in the constellation of proxy war, Indonesia has been for a long time in its vortex as Indonesia is a country with abundant natural and human resources.

Abstrak: Sebagai bentuk perang baru, perang proksi tidak memerlukan kontak senjata untuk menyerang suatu negara. Melalui konspirasi, propaganda dan pendirian, suatu negara dapat dirusak oleh negara-negara lain yang lebih kuat. Sebagai negara berkembang dengan sumber daya alam dan manusia yang melimpah, Indonesia menjadi sasaran empuk bagi negara-negara super power untuk meluncurkan perang proksi mereka. Karena itu diperlukan langkah antisipatif untuk membendung bahaya perang proxy. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif melalui wawancara. Kesimpulan dari penelitian ini adalah: (1) persepsi siswa PTKIN Jawa Timur tentang masalah perang proxy. Pertama, dalam hal gagasannya, ada empat persepsi tentang perang proksi. Dua dari mereka tidak memiliki kompatibilitas dengan teori perang proxy. Kedua, persepsi bahaya perang proksi di mana ada dua persepsi: 1) bahwa perang proksi benar-benar sangat berbahaya dan 2) tidak dapat dibenarkan hanya karena berbahaya atau tidak sebelum korbannya muncul. Ketiga, dalam konstelasi perang proksi, Indonesia telah lama berada di pusarannya karena Indonesia adalah negara dengan sumber daya alam dan manusia yang melimpah.

No Muslim or Arab country recognised Israel between 1994 and 2020. First it was the UAE (August) that recognised Israel, followed by Bahrain (September), Sudan (October) and now Morocco in December. Each of these countries acted in what the respective governments saw as its national interest rather than sticking with their conventional stance on Palestine. The UAE, a close partner of Saudi Arabia, needed Israel technology, weaponry and market along with Israeli-American strategic support vis-à-vis Iran. Sudan is facing economic hardships and Israeli and American assistane worked as an incentive. Morocco obtained American support to formalise its control over Western Sahara which had hitherto remained the last colony of the modern era.

The trend is likely to continue with more Muslim countries under the Saudi influence following the UAE’s example. Riyadh itself is opening up to Tel Avia though formal recognition of Israel might take time. The Saudi position will likely depend on Mohammad bin Salam’s survival in the saddle. While these Arab states are likely to get closer to Israel, the respective societies sound overwhelmingly anti-Israel. How these authoritarian states manage their restive populations remains to be seen. Another implication of this recognition spree could be ideological in terms of further fuelling of anti-Israel militant organisations some of which are backed by Iran. This has the potential to destabilise the region through proxies. However, strategically and, to and extent, militarily, the pro-Israel Arab states would feel more confident when it comes to countering Iran though the probability of attacking Tehran with Israeli support would be low in the foreseeable future. As far as Pakistan is concerned, the government has vowed not to recognise Israel. However, one may not rule out informal engagement to counter Indian influence. The developments are not likely to help the Palestinians cause. Israel is not likely to change its annexation policy.

War spins the wheels of history. It changes societies, alters lives, and brings about new dimensions to inflict more brutality on human beings. This is what happened in the aftermath of World War II, when the advent of the nuclear weapons set about a chapter of sophisticated and lethal warfare. Conventional war between the great powers has since been antiquated. It only puts to display the apparent capabilities of the adversary so that deterrence remains intact. War has now become multilevel and multi-dimensional. In such a case hybrid warfare strategy comes to play-which falls under the third dimension of warfare and includes application of both conventional and non-conventional means. It becomes lethal because it brings together the use of technology and cognition to bring about destruction and disruption. On the other hand, the Strategic Interaction theory examines the asymmetric dimension of warfare which a weaker party undertakes in order to subdue or challenge its adversity. To put all this in context, India and Pakistan both being nuclear states do not directly confront each other by conventional means; rather they opt for the non-conventional means. The doctrinal change and rapid military modernization drive by India creates security dilemma for Pakistan. This paper studies that how India has employed hybrid warfare strategy against Pakistan, what are the vulnerabilities of Pakistan that India is exploiting and can exploit, how Pakistan can confront this type of warfare.

Proxy wars are a phenomenon widely encountered in the history of armed conflicts. The character and particularity of a proxy war is not determined by direct warfare but by the orchestration of a military conflict serving the political needs of a third state without its direct involvement. This orchestration may assume a variety of forms, and the scale and specifics of each case are determined by the third party’s aims and interests. The category of proxy wars is known in Polish strategic studies, although so far not much attention has been paid to it. This article is an attempt to fill this gap. The main research problem undertaken by the author is to answer the question of what characterises the phenomenon of proxy wars. To answer this question, the author has formulated the following specific problems: 1) what are the definitional frameworks of the phenomenon of proxy wars? 2) what are the strategic goals of waging a war by proxy? 3) what are the forms of the external orchestration of a conflict?

State Proxies worst Culprits in Afghanistan and there is nothing anyone can do about it
August 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.16706.40642
Project: Strategy
Agha H Amin

First read paper below :----
My comments on Dr Yaylas Paper link below :---
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342475949_Preventing_Terrorist_Recruitment_through_Early_Intervention_by_Involving_Families/comments
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342492236_Preventing_Terrorist_Recruitment_-_An_Impossible_Idea
I was specifically asked by RESEARCH GATE to comment on this article and my comments below are based on my 41 years experience and written with UTMOST DEPTH OF CONVICTION
I HAVE ACHIEVED WHATEVER I WANTED IN LIFE AND HAVE NO DESIRE OR INTEREST WHETHER MY CONVICTIONS ARE LIKED OR DISLIKED BY ANYONE .
My intellectual endeavours will outlive my physical life duration .
(1) Brilliant analysis and this scribe is in total agreement .
(2) However major issue which this scribe noted in seeing US Afghan war and Soviet Afghan war is that 90 % of so called terrorists are STATE PROXIES . (3) So what can families do when the STATE like in Soviet Afghan War , pakistan with active support of states like USA , UK, Saudi Arabia,Egypt,UK,France ,China,UAE, Qatar,Bahrain,Kuwait, Denmark , Germany recruited MAD DOGS or converted innocent children into MAD DOGS (4) University of NEBRASKA Press was tasked by USA state to print pamphlets GLORIFYING JIHAD and GLORIFYING EXPLOSIVES and WEAPONS (5) The Only Pashtun dominated state in the world was destroyed by USA, Pakistan,KSA,UK,France and smaller hirelings ! (6) Taliban are active Pakistani state proxies since 1994 so how to prevent Pakistani and Afghan children from being radicalised, specially orphans in Madrasssas etc (7) Syrian war where I did a SIGINT Contract where Syrian young people were trained by USA , KSA, Jordan ,Turkey ,UK,France,Germany , Denmark,Newzealand,Australia to attack Syrian state which was secular and non Islamist
RADICALISATION OF PASHTUNS
Worst VICTIMS were PASHTUNS of both Pakistan and Afghanistan as these were regarded as a separatist threat by Pakistani state in 1977-78 when the war started. Pashun refugees were by force kept in refugee camps as HOSTAGES and their male adult relatives sent by force by Pakistanis illegitimate ruler Zia to fight SO CALLED JIHAD ! This exercise was FULLY SUPPORTED BY USA, UK, FRANCE ,DENMARK,AUSTRALIA,CHINA, NEWZEEALAND AND GERMANY .
Guerrilla war was supported by Zia only in areas south of Hindu Kush which was Pahtun majority so entire infrastructure of Pashtun areas was destroyed , 90 % of MINES were planted in Pashtun areas and Pashtuns were radicalized for which today USA and NATO is paying the price and even Pakistans mostly non Pashtun army is suffering casualties in fighting Pashtun led insurrection , which it created by its own follies.
THE HARDEST PART IS HOW TO DEAL WITH THE STATE THE TRAINER AND CATALYST OF 90 % ALL SO CALLED TERRORISTS OR WHAT THEY CALL STATE PROXIES IN THE WORLD.
My full Support to the author but he is HELPLESS and we are HELPLESS
99 % ISIS OR DAESH SO CALLED MEMBERS I SAW IN AFGHANISTAN WERE PROXY AND SUB CONTRACTOR OF SOME STATE INCLUDING USA , PAKISTAN, MANY OTHER WESTERN CENTRAL AND EASTERN STATES
High-Ranking Islamic State Leader Killed
Afghan Intelligence Says High-Ranking Islamic State Leader Killed
https://www.rferl.org/a/afghan-intelligence-says-high-ranking-islamic-state-leader-killed/30762171.html

In this chapter, I argue that a better and clear comprehension on the characteristics, causes and consequences of African conflicts, are a necessary condition for an effective understanding on current and future dynamics of South Atlantic security. Any possibility of South Atlantic regional maritime governance has its odds shaken by the recurrence and scale of the wars in Africa. Moreover, what is most striking, the blurred view of African conflicts, their political, institutional and regional basis, are a basic cause for the incomprehension of their systemic causes and for bringing about more sustainable responses, in land or sea. In order to contribute to overcoming this challenge, I tried to organize the secondary literature that approaches Africa wars and contrast them with the empirical research I have produced in the last eleven years. This includes assessment of documents and databases obtained in Brazil and in field research in southern Africa (South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe) in two occasions, in 2011 and 2013. Based on this theoretical and empirical research, I sustain, in opposition to many popular accounts, that the prevailing wars on the African continent and its notorious complexity and irregularity constitute a security triad. This triad involves, in a relatively integrated way, the increasingly significant presence of irregular groups and non-state actors in armed conflicts; the permanence of proxy warfare and significant inter-state rivalries; and regionalized conflicts capable of articulating regional systems. Their more systemic causes and effects are related to the process of state-building in the continent and its interaction with regional transformations and extra-regional penetration, and more effective responses need to be related to state self-strengthening reforms and regional involvement. Such understanding can bring important lessons for the maritime security of the African Atlantic coast, particularly in understanding the central roles of African regional organizations (ECOWAS, SADC, GGC).

Terrorist violence led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is one of the major issues of Turkey since the 1980s. This violence is based upon Kurdish ethnic identity aimed towards establishing an independent Kurdish state in Turkey’s southeast, northern Iraq, northern Syria and north-western Iran. Despite this aim, the terrorist campaign of the PKK predominantly targets security forces and civilians in Turkey. However, the existence of a terrorist group such a long time raises a question of the impact of external support on the formation and maintenance of the PKK. While Turkey has criticised constantly its southern neighbours on the PKK’s activities and tactics, the regional approaches have been largely neglected in the existing scholarly literature. This article aims to close this gap by focusing on the role played by Iraq, Iran and Syria in the PKK terrorism and Turkey’s counter-terrorism policies. The article argues that the major reasons for the unsuccessful result of Turkey’s effort to destroy the PKK were the approaches of ignorance of the PKK activities and the use of the group as a trump card by the three neighbours and insufficient policies to keep under control the regional dimension of the conflict. The article critically analyses historical relationships between these three states and Turkey to explore how the regional dimension has affected the resolution of this conflict.

Devletler arasındaki rekabetin ve büyük güçlerin mücadele yöntemlerinin değişime
uğramasıyla birlikte savaş kavramının da biçim değiştirdiği bir çağa şahit
oluyoruz. Savaşların maliyetlerinin kazanan devletler için dahi çok büyük boyutlara
ulaşmasının yanı sıra iletişim teknolojisindeki gelişmelerin sağladığı olanaklar,
günümüzde asimetrik savaş yöntemlerini olabildiğince yaygınlaştırmıştır. En
önemli pratiğine Ortadoğu ülkelerinde ve bilhassa Suriye’de şahit olunan yeni
nesil savaşlar, “vekâlet savaşları” olarak adlandırılmaktadır.
Vekâlet savaşlarının bilinen aktörleri, cephede karşılaşan ordular yerine düşük
yoğunluklu savaşlar için sahaya sürülen terör örgütleridir. Orduların cephede
karşılaşmalarının ikincil pozisyona düştüğü, asıl savaşın hedef ülkenin toplumsal
ve siyasal sistemini çökertme ve içten teslim almaya dönüştüğü yeni nesil savaşta
medya da çok önemli bir silah olarak kullanılmaktadır.
Hedef ülke kamuoyu medya faaliyetleri ve sivil toplum örgütleri gibi unsurlar
ile etki altına alınmaktadır. Sert güce dayanan müdahalelerden önce tercih edilen
ve genellikle halk merkezli bir ikna arayışının eşlik ettiği vekâlet savaşlarında
devlet dışı aktörlerin kullanıldığı, toplumsal hassasiyetlerin ve kamplaşmaların
istismar edildiği görülmektedir.
Türkiye’yi 15 Temmuz 2016 tarihinde yapılan karanlık darbe teşebbüsüne
götüren süreçte, FETÖ terör örgütünün medya faaliyetlerinin önemli bir rolü söz
konusudur. Örgüt 15 Temmuz’da silahların namlusunu millete çevirmeden önce,
Türkiye’nin bağışıklık sistemini çökertecek yoğun bir medya faaliyeti içerisinde
olmuştur. FETÖ medyası bilhassa 2013 yılından itibaren örgütün eylemlerine paralel
bir şekilde devletin resmi kurum ve kuruluşlarına açıktan saldırmaya, devlet
sırlarını ifşa etmeye, belirlenen amaçlar doğrultusunda kamuoyu algısı oluşturmaya
ve seçilmiş meşru hükümetleri etkisizleştirmeye çalışmıştır.
Bu çalışmada Türkiye’yi 15 Temmuz ihanetine götüren süreçte FETÖ terör
örgütünün medya yapılanması üzerinde durulmaktadır. Küresel güç savaşında  Türkiye’nin düşmanlarına hizmet eden etkili bir araç haline getirilen FETÖ medyasının,
darbeye giden süreçteki işlevi ortaya konmaktadır.
Çalışma nitel araştırma tekniklerinin kullanıldığı betimsel bir çalışmadır. Belirlenen
amaç kapsamında kaynaklara ulaşılarak incelemeler yapılmakta ve alt
başlıklar halinde durum ortaya konmaktadır.
ABSTRACT
We are witnessing an age in which the rivalry between the states and the
ways of fighting the great powers have changed as well as the concept of war.
In addition to the fact that the costs of wars have reached enormous dimensions
even for winning states, the opportunities provided by the developments
in communication technology have made asymmetric methods of war as widespread
as possible. The most important practice is that the new generation
wars, which are witnessed in the Middle East countries and especially in Syria,
are called “proxy wars”.
The well-known actors of the proxy wars are terrorist organizations that are
put on the scene for low-intensity wars instead of armies facing the front. The
media in the new generation of warfare, where the frontiers of the armies fall
into the secondary position and the main war destroys the social and political
system of the target country and turns it into internal delivery, is also used as a
very important weapon.
The target country is influenced by public opinion media activities and
non-governmental organizations. In Proxy wars which prior to hard-bodied interventions,
a preferred and often community-centered quest for persuasion, it
is seen that non-stated actors has used along with exploitation social sensitivities
and polarization.
In the process leading to the dark coup attempt on July 15, 2016, the media
activities of the terrorist organization of FETÖ have played an important role.
Before turning the weapon to nation on 15 July, the organization had an intense
media activity to knock down the immune system of Turkey. Since the year
2013, in particular, FETÖ media have tried to attack the government’s official
institutions and organizations in an open manner, to disclose state secrets, to create public opinion in the direction of the determined aims, and to neutralize
elected legitimate governments.
This study focuses on the media structure of FETÖ terrorist organization in
the process leading to the betrayal of 15 July. In the global power battle, the
function of the FETO media, which has become an effective tool to serve the
enemies of Turkey, in the process of going to the coup is revealed.
The study is a descriptive study using qualitative research techniques. The
resources are reached within the scope of the determined purpose and the situation
is put into sub-headings.

This study analyzes the implications of the Syria policies of the United States, Russia and China with regard to the international system within the framework of the great power politics. In this context, the main research question of the study is as follows: What are the Syria Crisis' implications and transformative effects for the international system? The study has two fundamental arguments: First, the geopolitical struggle involving the United States, Russia and China begun after the Syria crisis turned to a proxy war between great powers. Second, this struggle also transforms the international system. The Sino-Russian dual campaign to protect the principle of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention of the Westphalian system against the unilateral development of intervention law of the United States in the international system. Özet Bu makalenin temel araştırma sorusu, Suriye krizinin uluslararası sisteme yönelik yansımaları ve dönüştürücü etkileri nelerdir olarak belirlenmiştir. Araştırmada iki temel argüman geliştirilmiştir: Birincisi, Suriye krizinin büyük güçler arasında vekalet savaşına dönüşmesiyle ABD, Rusya ve Çin arasında yürütülen bir jeopolitik mücadele başlamıştır. Suriye krizi üzerinden büyük güçlerin küresel nüfuz mücadelesi realist büyük güç politikasını tekrar ortaya çıkarmıştır. Suriye krizi üzerinden Ortadoğu'da ABD, Rusya ve Çin, nüfuz alanlarını yeniden belirlemeye başlamışlardır. Böylece Suriye, 21. yüzyılın yeni satranç tahtası olmuştur. İkincisi, bu mücadelenin uluslararası sistemi dönüştürmesidir. ABD'nin tek taraflı uluslararası sistemde müdahale hukukunu geliştirmesine karşı Rusya ve Çin ikilisi Vestfalyan sistemin egemenlik ve diğer devletlerin iç işlerine müdahale etmeme ilkelerini koruma yönünde mücadele vermektedir.

. By Timothy J. Stapleton. London & New York: Routledge, 2015. ISBN: 978-1-84893-558-7. Hardback, 204 pages. Tracking is defined as "the ability to pursue and close with an animal or human subject by following signs … left behind in the environment" (page 1). The post-1945 wars of decolonization in Africa were largely characterised by guerrilla campaigns fought by nationalist movements bent on expelling or overthrowing European colonial rulers or white minority settler regimes. The security forces which operated against the nationalist insurgencies, employed a number of counterinsurgency methods to find the elusive guerrillas who often had their staging areas in remote, uninhabited, areas. Tracking was one of the methods used during these counterinsurgency operations to locate and engage insurgents. The use of tracking in counterinsurgency warfare is, furthermore, largely determined by the local geography, technology and colonial culture of each specific military operating environment (pages 2, 137).