IRAN'S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE IN A POST-ISIS IRAQ

Asian Affairs ISSN: 0306-8374 (Print) 1477-1500 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raaf20 IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE IN A POST-ISIS IRAQ Beston Husen Arif To cite this article: Beston Husen Arif (2019): IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE IN A POST-ISIS IRAQ, Asian Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/03068374.2019.1636525 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2019.1636525 Published online: 24 Jul 2019. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 47 View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=raaf20 Asian Affairs, 2019 https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2019.1636525 IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE IN A POST-ISIS IRAQ BESTON HUSEN ARIF Beston Husen Arif obtained his M.A. in International Studies Advanced from the University of Wollongong in Australia. He is currently a lecturer at the University of Sulaimani, Department of Politics and International Relations. He has published articles in a number of academic periodicals. Email: [email protected] Introduction During and after the Iran-Iraq war, Iran became a safe heaven for most of the Shi’a’s opposition leaders and parties from Iraq. Their efforts to support Iraqi proxies in the country predate the 2003 US military invasion. Iran worked closely with several Shi’a parties and groups in Iraq, among them the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which later changed its name to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). Tehran helped them to organise and finance their organisation as well as providing assistance to the SCIRI’s military wing, the Badr Corps Militia. Iran also helped key elements and leaders of the Islamic Dawah Party and trained its militant wing.1 Iran continued to support these parties and benefited from its old relations with them to increase its influence in Iraq. After the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 by the US, Tehran has encouraged its allies in Iraq to participate in the political process and to form a single list in every election, in order to avoid splitting the Shia vote among several competing parties.2 With Iran’s help, the Shi’a have succeeded in securing the majority of the seats in the post-2003 parliamentary elections and in forming a government. They have also tried to marginalise the roles of other sectarian groups, particularly the Sunni and the Kurds. The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014, the speed at which it captured large geographical areas in a short period of time, as well as its ability to recruit thousands of fighters from around the world, surprised Iran. ISIS’s potential power and the future threats it could pose to the Islamic Republic became one of Iran’s main concerns.3 © 2019 The Royal Society for Asian Affairs 2 IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE From this perspective, ISIS was portrayed by Iran as the main threat to its interests and its national security in the region. Consequently, Iran was heavily involved in Iraq’s effort to defeat ISIS through its support of Shi’a militia groups inside the Popular Mobilization Forces, providing both economic and military assistance. Moreover, General Qassem Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s Quds Force, played an important role in leading military operations against ISIS, as well as acting as a special advisor for the Iraqi Army’s fighting strategies. Following the defeat of ISIS in Iraq, Iran’s aims have stemmed from a Realpolitik agenda rather than an ideological one, concerned more with political, economic, and security interests than pursuing revolutionary objectives per se. To this end, Tehran has largely relied on long-established relationships with several pro-Iranian political parties and militia groups. These relationships are often couched in religious ideological terms as a foundation and justification for its future strategy in post-ISIS Iraq. The questions that this article will address are the following: what was Iran’s role in defeating ISIS in Iraq? How has Tehran benifitted from its long-term relationships with Iraqi political parties and militia groups? What are the Iranian sources of power in Iraq and how do they help Iran to gain strategic dominance in Iraq? Historical Background The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 redefined Baghdad’s relations with neighbouring countries, especially Iran. The two countries fought a long, bloody war in the 1980s, attempting to assert their influence in the Persian Gulf. Saddam Hussein, a tyrannical Sunni leader who ruled Iraq until 2003, suppressed various Iraqi communities, mainly the Shi’a in the south and the Kurds in the north. In Iran, the Islamic revolution of 1979 brought a Shi’a government to power with an expressed intent to export the Islamic revolution to other countries in the region. Saddam, as Iran’s neighbour, worried that the successful revolution in Iran would encourage the Shi’a community in Iraq to rise against the Ba’athist regime in Baghdad which had been in power since 1968. In order to prevent Iranian influence in Iraqi Shi’a communities, the Ba’athist regime assassinated the highest Iraqi Shi’a cleric in 1980, Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr. Their aim was to mitigate any risk of a Shi’a revolution. Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, who was a prominent Iraqi Shi’a cleric, fled to Iran to avoid being assassinated by the Iraqi regime.4 IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE 3 Saddam, trying to find a justification to invade Iran, stepped back from the 1975 Algiers Accords in the summer of 1980. This accord had concluded a roadmap for organising the disputed Shatt al-Arab waterway.5 Saddam’s regime stated that “since the rulers of Iran have violated this agreement from the beginning of their reign as the Shah before them, I announce before you that we consider the March 1975 agreement abrogated.”6 On September 7, 1980, Tehran was accused by the Iraqi government of shelling some Iraqi border towns which belonged to Iraq according to the Algiers agreement.7 Following this, Saddam made the calamitous decision to invade Iran with the intention of destroying the nascent Islamic government in Iran, leading to the longest and most destructive war in the Middle East.8 The Iran-Iraq war lasted eight years, causing hundreds of thousands of casualties on each side, and became an excuse for the Iraqi regime to use chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurdish people in northern Iraq. After the Iranian revolution, Tehran hosted a number of important Shi’ite leaders and groups who strongly opposed Saddam Hussein’s regime, including the SCIRI and its militia wing, the Badr Brigade. The militia joined Iran’s army against the Iraqi Ba’athist regime and played an active role in the war, actively protecting Iran’s border with Iraq. Even during the war, the Badr fighters conducted several attacks against Iraqi officials, specifically in southern Iraq. At the end of the 1991 Gulf war, an unsuccessful uprising occured and the SCIRI temporarily occupied the Iraqi port of Basra.9 As a respone to the uprising, the Ba’athist regime killed and injured thousands of people, indiscriminately firing into residential areas. Following the failed uprising, SCIRI and its military wing withdrew to Iran and became the strongest opposion Shi’ite group against Saddam Hussein’s regime.10 The Iran-Iraq war caused the Iranian regime strongly to distrust international laws and institutions. It also led to the resumption of Iran’s nuclear programme, which had been suspended by the Islamic Republic after the fall of the Shah’s regime. Iranian communities and politics were affected by the war and its consequences, and these still play a significant role in shaping Iran’s domestic and foreign policies to the present day.11 Throughout the 1990s, Iran and Iraq viewed each other as regional rivals. Steady tension between them persisted despite the announcement of a US policy of dual containment toward Iran and Iraq. This policy was designed by the Clinton administration as part of the new US designation of rogue states. It was expected that this policy would bring the two neighbours closer together, but throught the 1990s, the two nations 4 IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE continued to view each other as sources of insecurity. In 2003, when the US took military action against Iraq to topple Saddam, Iran, which in principle deeply desired any effort to eliminate the Iraqi regime, was unprepared and reluctant to give direct to support to the US. This reaction was understandable given that Iran itself was viewed as one of the ‘axes of evil’, a concept introduced by the Bush administration.12 Iran was not in the end inclined to help overthrow Saddam when the US action created both apparent security threats to Iran, and increased its risk of becoming the next target of the Bush administration? However, when the US failed to follow its invasion of Iraq with action against Iran, Tehran continued to pursue a comprehensive strategy to expand its influence in Iraq through its relationships with major Iraqi political parties and militia groups. This made Iran the most influential foreign actor in post-2003 Iraq. The situation allowed Iran to build on its natural geopolitical advantages in relation to Iraq, the two both being Shi’ite-majority countries, sharing a long history of religious and cultural ties and a 900-mile border. The fall of Saddam’s regime created a remarkable opportunity for Iran to build a cordial relationship with Iraq and increase its influence in the country.13 With the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Iran went on to intervene even more actively in coordination with the global coalition against ISIS. Iran’s ISIS Policy in Iraq In 2014, ISIS made substantial advances in Iraq, gaining control of about one-third of Iraq’s territory. These territorial gains included Mosul, the second largest city in the country, due to the collapse of the Iraqi armed forces. The weak performance of the Iraqi forces against ISIS led to many volunteer fighters joining paramilitary groups rather than the shattered military forces. These militia forces gathered under an umbrella organisation called the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) after a fatwa, calling for people to fight ISIS, was declared by the Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani.14 While the exact size of the PMF has never beeen established, estimates range from between 60,000–140,000 fighters. According to a statement by a PMF spokesman, by the end of 2016 the organisation included around 142,000 fighters and 50 or so different groups. Since its formation, the PMF was instrumental in liberating most of Iraq’s ISIS controlled cities and towns.15 IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE 5 Certain media outlets have reported that of 66 armed groups forming the PMF, 44 of them take their orders directly from Iran.16 Iran has strong and historical relations with some of the groups inside the PMF, for instance Badr. Badr was originally founded in Iran in 1982 during the Iran-Iraq war, as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq’s military wing (SCIRI). Other groups, such as Kataib Hizballah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Saraya al-Salam emerged in the post-2003 era with the help of Iran, and more specifically the IRGC’s Qods Force commander Qassem Suleimani.17 The fear of ISIS and its expansion led Iraqi Shi’ite leaders and the Iraqi government increasingly to rely on Iran and their Shi’ite militia group affiliates in order to fight ISIS and protect Baghdad. These paramilitary forces, with Iran’s support, have proven to be an irreplaceable force in the fight against ISIS, playing a crucial role in preventing the expansion of ISIS’s territorial control. Generally speaking, Iraqi dependence on Iran has provided further opportunities for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to be more involved in Iraqi issues. The IRGC is a paramilitary organisation founded during the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and is now an essential part of the Iranian armed forces. It was successful in protecting Iranian interests, holy sites, and Iranian citizens after the expansion of ISIS in Iraq and Syria in 2014. When ISIS made substantial advances toward the Iranian border and issued threats against Iran, the IRGC successfully protected its borders. Their defeat of ISIS increased their popularity among the Iranian people.18 The Iranian government linked the threat of ISIS with their efforts to decrease Iran’s isolation, improve its regional influence, reinforce its ties with global powers, and increase its gains regarding the nuclear negotiations with the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (the so-called P5 + 1).19 When defeating ISIS in Iraq and Syria became an international priority, Iran and the US engaged in limited coordination on a tactical level. Indeed, some Iranian officials welcomed US air strikes on ISIS targets in Iraq. The successful joint effort by the Iraqi forces, Kurdish Peshmarga, and Shi’ite militias, with the support of US air forces, to free Amerli in August 2014 and conduct operations in Tikrit in 2015, are examples of their cooperation.20 Despite the lack of diplomatic relations between Washington and Tehran, both shared common goals in Iraq: maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity; defeating ISIS; and supporting Baghdad’s capacity to protect and stabilise the country.21 Iran exploited the ISIS threat to create a new image for itself as the protector of religious minorities in the region, including the 6 IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE Shi’ites, Christians, and Yezidis. As a result, Iran played an important role in supporting proxy groups in Iraq, providing military, economic, political, and humanitarian assistance to key stakeholders such as the Shi’ites and the Kurds.22 By July 1 2014, Tehran had delivered seven Su-25 Frogfoot Attack Jets directly to Baghdad.23 Iran also provided military advisors, ammunition, intelligence information and electronic signals, multiple rocket launchers, and drones to fight ISIS. Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah commanders supervised these systems and the PMU training center.24 Indeed, Iraqi Shi’ite leaders were actively seeking advice from Iran about how to combat ISIS. In 2016, during a conference titled “The World with Iraq to defeat Daesh”, former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi stated that the presence of Iranian advisers in Iraq was at the Iraqi government’s request.25 Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the former Iraqi Foreign Minister, stressed in a press conference that Iran’s commander Major General Qassem Soleimani was assisting Iraq in fighting ISIS at the request of the Baghdad government. According to Iraqi Foreign Ministry spokesman, “the presence of Iran’s military advisors under the command of Major General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq comes at the request of the legitimate government of Iraq for confronting the terrorists and extremists causing instability and insecurity in the Arab country and the region”.26 Moreover, On October 2017, the Iraqi government rebuffed a call from the US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to disband Iranian-backed paramilitary units that fought alongside Iraqi forces to defeat ISIS. In his statement, Tillerson said “the Iranian militias that are in Iraq, now that the fight against Daesh and ISIS is coming to a close, those militias need to go home. The foreign fighters in Iraq need to go home and allow the Iraqi people to regain control”.27 In response to Tillerson’s statement, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared that substates forces were Iraqi and not Iranian proxies. Another statement by his office stressed that the PMF “should be encouraged because they will be the hope of country and the region” and they “defended their country and sacrificed themselves to defeat the Islamic State group”.28 The participation of some Iranian backed militias in operations regarding the control of disputed territories has increased concerns about Iran’s dominance in Iraq.29 Despite US opposition to and disagreement with the PMF’s continued existence, Haider al-Abadi issued a decree on March 8, 2018 formalising the inclusion of Shi’ite paramilitary groups into the country’s security forces. According to the decree, paramilitary fighters will be given the same rights and salaries as the members of IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE 7 the armed forces under the control of the Ministry of Defense.30 The inclusion of the PMF in the Iraqi armed forces will consolidate Iran’s influence inside the Iraqi military. Some of the PMF groups take orders directly from Iran and are loyal to the Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Among these groups are: the Badr Organization, Ktaib Hizballah, and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. This will further politicise Iraqi security forces and feed into potential future sectarian conflict. The Instruments of Iranian Influence in Iraq The Iranian regime’s policy in Iraq is based on a combination of various tools, including both hard-power and soft-power mechanisms. Since 2003, Iran has heavily relied on both types of power to increase its influence and dominance in Iraq. Iran’s instruments of influence include the following: The Use of Political Parties and Militias Iran has long used hard power in Iraq in order to pursue its interests. Since the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran has supported various Iraqi militias with arms, training, and funding. In the early 1980s, the IRGC Qods Force as mentioned above played an integral role in the formation of the (SCIRI) and its affiliated militia, the Badr Corps. The IRGC Qods Force continued to provide extensive funding and training to these militant groups, amounting to nearly $20 million a year.31 The Badr Corps conducted attacks against Saddam Hussein’s regime throughout the 1990s, under the direction of the Quds Force. Indeed, the group was a part of the Quds Force’s operations in Iraq, helping to disseminate propaganda, recruit dissidents, and collect intelligence.32 After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Tehran had an opportunity to exploit its historical links with these armed groups and political parties in order to strengthen its position in Iraq. Thus, Iran continued its support for political allies and Shi’ite militants, and helped exiled Iraqi political parties and entities to return to Iraq. From 2003 to 2005, Iran encouraged Shi’ite Islamist parties to join the political process by forming a single coalition to participate in Iraq’s general elections. The Shi’ite population of Iraq is about 60% of the total population, which ensured a Shi’ite dominated government.33 Tehran not only maintained its protracted relationships with SCIRI, the Dawa party, and the Badr organisation, but it also welcomed close ties with other Shi’ite militants, 8 IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE such as the Sadrist Movement and other new Shi’ite groups that emerged after 2003. The Sadrist Movement was a Shi’ite political movement that emerged under the leadership of Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr in 1990s. The movement was inactive until 2003, when it was reestablished by Muqtada al Sadr, the son of Sadeq al Sadr. Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) was the militant wing of the Sadrist Movement and received training, weapons, and funding from the IRGC Qods Force during the 2004– 2007 period.34 During that time, JAM played a critical role in furthering sectarian conflict and fought against both the US-led coalition in Iraq and the Iraqi government. From 2006 to 2008, the group split as a reaction to Muqtada Al-Sadr’s decision to negotiate with the coalition forces.35 Consequently, in July 2006, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq officially broke away from Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and eventually became a fully independent militia following the Mahdi army’s dissolution in 2008.36 The IRGC Qods Force provides training, weapons, and funding to this group, which has acknowledged responsibility for more than 6,000 attacks against US and coalition forces in Baghdad and several other cities since 2006.37 Without a doubt, pro-Iranian militias performed well against ISIS with the help of the Iranians. After the fight against ISIS ended, Iran encouraged and helped the PMF form an alliance under the name “Fatah” in order to participate in the Iraqi parliamentary election on May 12, 2018. According to the final results announced by The Independent High Electoral Commission, the Fatah Alliance came in second place, securing 47 seats out of the 329 seats in the Iraqi parliament. These militia groups will have a crucial place in the new Iraqi government headed by Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi. Religious Links Religion holds an important place in the relationship between Iraq and Iran. After Iran, Iraq has the second largest Shi’ite population in the world. This makes Iraq a strategic country for Iran, since the majority of the countries in the region are predominantly Sunni, and loyal toward Saudi Arabia and other key Sunni states. Iraq is also home to two significant Shi’ite shrines: Karbala and Najaf.38 These sites are a major destination for Iranian religious visitors. Each month around 40,000 Iranian pilgrims visit holy places in Iraq, and it is estimated that during Ashura commemorations three to four million religious tourists visit Iraq’s holy cities.39 Iran has extensively invested in tourist facilities IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE 9 and infrastructure for pilgrims through the public and private sectors to ensure its control over the holy sites in Najaf and Karbala. Iran has the highest Shi’ite religious authority in the world, an influential factor when it comes to expanding its influence across Iraq. The religious links between Iran and Iraq play a very important role in Iran’s national security and its foreign policy agenda. The concept of Velayat-e Faqih – or the guardianship of the Islamic jurist – is a kind of mixed system of government has been operated by Iran since the country’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, when it introduced into Iran’s constitution and conceptualised by the Qom Seminary in Iran. The idea of Velayat-e Faqih is a development of Shi’a Islam used to justify rule by the clergy through the government and the state. The first supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, expounded Velayat-e Faqih as a method that gives political leadership to faqīh, or jurists, when the divinely inspired imam (successor to the Prophet) is absent. He believed that the characteristics of the faqīh make him the best-qualified man to lead the community. As the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the leader of the 1979 Iranian revolution, Khomeini was widely seen to be in the position of such a man.40 Therefore, Velayat-e Faqih is absolutely central to modern Shi’a Islam and is essential to understand both how the Iranian government operates and how Iran works to influence other Shi’ite political and religious groups beyond its borders. From a religious point of view, Iran’s long-term aims are designed to pull the entire Shi’ite communtiy into the Islamic Republic’s circle of influence, while also reducing the comparative power of the clerics in Iraqi Najaf, especially Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. He is the most influential Shi’ite cleric in Iraq and has millions of followers globally, but largely acts solely as a religious authority and does not often weigh in on partisan politics. As such, he advocates for a religiously pluralistic government in Iraq and supports democracy there as well.41 In other words, Ayatollah Ali Sistani “adheres to the older ‘quietist’ school of Shi’ism that rejects formal rule by clerics, which contrasts starkly with Iran’s approach to religion and governance where clerics hold ultimate power”.42 For its part, the Najaf Seminary, also known as the al-Hawza al-Ilmiyya, has continued to follow its traditional methodology and does not activley participate in politics or seek to empower the clergy over the state. This methodology was widely seen during the leadership of Abu Al Qasim al-Khoei (1970–1992). Al-Khoei decided to distance himself from politics and maintained a quietist stance at the Najaf Seminary, refusing to support the notion of the Velayat-e Faqih esponsed by the Qom seminary. This difference between Najaf and 10 IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE Qom became even more clearly defined when Sistani succeeded al-Khoei in 1992. As a result, the Iranians began a campaign of criticism against him, accusing him of being the Marjah (Grand Ayatollah) of the English.43 Iranian religious leaders eventually want to establish the method of Velayat-e Faqih in Iraq as well, but will find it difficult to accomplish as long as al-Sistani is alive. Iran’s long-term aim is to either replace Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani with a pro-Iranian Ayatollah or reduce the religious status of the Najaf seminary in order to introduce Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the ultimate political and religious authority for Shi’ite Muslims across the world. Since the toppling of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, some sources in Najaf have indicated that there has been a noticeable increase in proIranian Shi’ite religious figures, particularly those who are loyal to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and believe in the Velayat-e Faqih. One man who has been mentioned frequently as a pro-Iranian succesor to al-Sistani was Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, but he died in December 2018. He was not only an Iranian Ayatollah and conservative politician but also an Iraqi citizen and supporter of Velayat-e Faqih. Shahroudi was also an influential political leader in Iran, as he was the former head of Iran’s judiciary for 10 years (1999–2009) as well as the Chairman of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council.44 If a pro-Iranian Ayatollah becomes the successor of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, this would mean the end of the Najaf school of thought where Shi’ite clerics would not interfere in political affairs. Economic Links The economic interdependence between Tehran and Baghdad is historically rooted. Economic sanctions against Iran have increased this relationship in recent years. The economic ties between Tehran and Baghdad developed significantly after the overthrow of the previous regime in Iraq and the emergence of a Shi’ite dominated government in Baghdad. Since then, both countries have been actively working to develop their trade ties. Bilateral trade between the two countries has increased in recent years from $2.8 billion in 2007, to $4 billion in early 2009.45 The figure reached $12 billion in 2015, and is anticipated to nearly double in the coming years.46 Following the defeat of ISIS in Iraq and the destruction caused by the war, Iraq has needed help from other countries to rebuild its infrastructure, especially in Mosul. In light of this, Tehran has encouraged Iranian companies to participate in the reconstruction effort, which has had the IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE 11 additional effect of increasing their economic influence. In particular, Iraq needs more than 23,000 MW of electricity to supply local demand. Since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has continued to cooperate with Iraq in various sectors, particularly in energy and electricity. Over recent years, Iraq has signed contracts to import electricity and natural gas from Iran as an easy and cost-effective way to address its chronic electricity shortages. In 2013, Iraq signed an agreement to import 25 million cubic meters per day of natural gas from Iran to fuel several electric power plants in Baghdad with a total capacitiy of 5000 megawatts (MW). Iraq also has signed a deal to buy up to 1,200 MW of electricity directly from Iran.47 On 27 December 2018, Iranian Energy Minister Reza Ardakanian visited Iraq and met with his Iraqi counterpart Luay al-Khatteeb and the two agreed to a memorandum of understanding outlining long-term cooperation in the energy sector and plans to recontruct Iraq’s aging electrical grid.48 Two weeks later, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif visited Iraq with a delegation of more than 50 Iranian companies for wide-ranging talks, including about the reimposed US sanctions against Tehran. In a press conference following his meeting with Zarif, Iraq’s Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali al-Hakim said: ‘We discussed the unilateral economic measures taken by the US and are working with our neighbour (Iran) on them’.49 The meetings continued on 11 March 2019 when Iranian president Hassan Rouhani made his first official visit to Iraq as president, in order to bolster Tehran’s influence, expand economic ties, and offset renewed US sanctions on Iran. During his three-day visit to Iraq, Tehran and Baghdad signed several memorandums of understanding, including agreements related to railway projects, energy, health, trade, and visa-free travel between the two nations.50 Since President Donald Trump withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal in May 2018 and imposed tough economic sanctions on Iran, tensions between the US and Iran have escalated. There are concerns that Iraq is once again vulnerable to becoming caught in the middle of that geopolitical disupte. Iraq is working to balance its intrests with both the US and Iran and play the role of mediator. As one of the Iraqi premier’s advisors has said: ‘We will not wait until the gates of Hell open. Transferring messages between the two parties and playing the role of mediation is a decision taken by the Iraqi leadership to avoid the outbreak of war between the two sides. Iran has agreed also to allow Iraqis to intermediate between the two sides.’51 Despite US warnings to Iraqi leaders to reduce trade with Iran, Iraq has not suspended its substantial economic relations 12 IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE with Iran. In return, Tehran sees Baghdad as a vital trade partner that could help it to circumvent US sanctions. Use of Public Diplomacy The Islamic Culture and Relations Organisation (ICRO) can be considered as the main tool for Iran’s cultural diplomacy. The ICRO was established in 1995 as a mechanism to develop cultural relations with other countries, especially neighbouring states. This organisation is associated with the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and is directly under the supervision of the Supreme Leader, who directly appoints members of the ICRO’s ruling council. The members of the ICRO operate independently in foreign countries but sometimes in cooperation with Iran’s embassies and consulates.52 Iran has a large embassy in Baghdad along with consulates in Najaf, Basra, Karbala, Sulaimaniyah, and Erbil. In addition, Iran’s post-2003 ambassadors – Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, Hassan Danaifar, and Iraj Masjedi – have deep ties with and connections in the IRGC.53 For example, the current Iranian ambassador to Iraq worked as an assistant for Qasem Soleimani who is the commander of the IRGC Qods Force. Iran’s international media outlets are another instrument thaat Iran has used to increase its influence across the world, and particularly in neighbouring countries. In Iran, the international broadcast media is under the control of the state broadcaster Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), which is directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader who appoints its head every five years in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.54 Al Alam was the first Iranian 24-hour Arabic news channel. It began broadcasting in 2003, after the collapse of the Ba’athist regime in Iraq. The channel is mainly aimed towards Iraq, but also covers Iran, Palestine, Lebanon, and Africa. While Iran’s official language is Persian, most of Iran’s news agencies also provide their content in Arabic, such as Mehr News Agency, Tasnim News Agency, ISNA News Agency, Fars News, and Irna.55 Iran’s second Arabic language channel is AlKowthar which launched in 2006 and serves more religious programmes to Shi’ite communities in the Arab world. Another TV channel, iFilm, offers Iranian films in three languages (Arabic, English, and Persian).56 Tehran thus has various conduits to spread its culture across the region, especially among the countries with a large Shi’ite populations like Iraq. IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE 13 Iran’s Strategy after the Demise of ISIS in Iraq Iran’s new strategies for the post-ISIS era in Iraq are derived from Tehran’s involvement in the war against ISIS and their role in defeating ISIS by supporting pro-Iranian militias. Tehran tried to exploit the Iraqi situation in the post-ISIS period during the Iraqi elections on May 12, 2018. The result of the election was unexpected even for Iran. The Sairoon Coalition, headed by Muqtada al Sadar, obtained the most seats, winning 53 seats out of the total 329. However, the pro-Iranian militias under the Fatah Coalition secured 47 seats, coming in second position. The al-Nasr Alliance, led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi took third place with 42 seats. Taking these results into account, Tehran seeks to strengthen its position with a number of different strategies. Iranian officials have always attempted to create a strong Shi’ite-dominated government in Baghdad with the support of the Pro-Iranian political parties and militias. Tehran succeeded in this goal between 2005 and 2018. The Iraqi parliamentary elections on May 12 and their results however have shown that that it is difficult for Iran to keep all Shi’ite factions within one coalition. In recent years, Sadr, who took the most seats in the 2018 election, has become more nationalistic, focusing more on Iraq’s sovereignty and independence. That means that Iran’s strategies in Iraq will be challenged by Sadr’s nationalist approach. Moreover, Sadr has distanced himself from Iran. He has become highly critical of Iran’s interference in Iraq and has renewed ties with Saudi Arabia. On the announcement of the election results, Sadr’s followers gathered in Tahrir Square in Baghdad to celeberate their victory and express their opposition to Iranian influence by chanting “Iran out, out! Baghdad remains free.” Sadr is working on ending Iranian influence in Iraq, but Tehran is unlikey to accept Sadr’s nationalist project for Iraq during the next four years. Currently, Iran’s hegemony in Iraq is protected by its long and strong ties with Shi’ite militias (funded and trained by the IRGC), including Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, the Hezbollah Movement in Iraq, and the Fatah Alliance led by Hadi Amiri who is very close to Iran. Amiri is also close to the State of Law Coalition, led by former prime minister Nuri Al-Maliki, which secured over 70 seats in Iraq’s previous elections.57 Iran still has influence when it comes to the formation of the new Iraqi government, by gathering its local allies under a large Shi’ite coalition and undermining Sadr’s role in the new cabinet. 14 IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE Iranian leaders never wanted to see the establishment of a democratised state in Iraq or the wider region, or indeed the emergence of a pro-US state on their western borders.58 Since Saddam’s fall in 2003, Iran has considered the presence of US troops on its borders in Iraq as a threat to its national interests. From Iran’s point of view, the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria was the result of western policies, particularly US involvement in the region. Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, stated once that ISIS is the product of two things: first, the US invasion of Iraq and the dynamic of resistance its created; second, the feeling of disequilibrium which has prevailed in some countries in the region since the fall of Saddam.59 Tehran has used its tactical and short-term relationship with the Sadrist movement with the primary aim of undermining the unilateral US policy of excluding Iran from Iraqi politics.60 Sadr has always had an anti-American tone and viewed the US as occupiers. From 2003–8, Sadr and his militias perpetrated violent attacks against US forces and infrastructure in Iraq. While Sadr is currently opposed to Iran’s interference in Iraq, he has acquiesced in forming a tactical and short-term relationship with Iran to counter the US presence in the country. However, this alliance is difficult as Sadr has also become opposed to Iranian influence. In the post-ISIS era in Iraq, Iran is actively working to undermine US political and military policy through extreme elements of the Fatah Alliance, such as Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Harakat Hezbollah alNujaba. Harakat Hezbollah overtly receive support from Iran and openly calls for the withdrawal of coalition troops from Iraq through violent measures.61 The Badr Organization, which has very close ties with Iran, has demanded a full withdrawal of American forces. The spokesman of the organisation, Karim Al-Nouri, stated that “[t]here must be coordination between the two governments on a full withdrawal, and not for [part of the forces] remaining, because their remaining will cause internal division in Iraq and will be a lodestone for terrorism”.62 There is no doubt that with the formation of a new government in Iraq, Iran will attempt to take advantage of its strong link with various local Shi’ite militias to curtail US interests in the region and demand US withdrawal, like in 2011. Iran has not only relied on pro-Iranian Shi’ite paramilitaries to secure its national interests in Iraq, but also encouraged them to transfer their military gains into a political victory by participating in the elections. The IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE 15 acquisition of 47 seats in parliament by the Fatah Alliance provides greater access to government resources, official recognition as a political institution, but also opens up to Iran a more influential role in many issues that will face the Iraqi government in the next four years. Among these issues, and sure to be brought up by Iran, is the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. The question of developing geographical connectivity is significant for Iran. Iraq is geopolitically important in this context. It offers a land route from Iran’s borders, through Iraq, into Syria, ending at Hezbollah’s doorstep in Lebanon and the edge of the Golan Heights.63 Since the spring of 2017, there has been evidence of the construction of such a physical route by the Iranians. This road serves to secure land transportation for the traffic of militiamen, military supplies, and weapons from Iran, through Iraq, to Syria and Lebanon. It could also complement or replace air transport from Tehran to Damascus.64 To secure these corridors, Iran has assigned its proxies, such as Hezbollah, as security forces. Tehran seeks to avoid using its own military forces to supervise these pathways, using local Shi’ite groups instead.65 Maintaining this land bridge would be part of a larger and longer Iranian plan called the “Shi’ite Crescent”. This term was first introduced by Jordan’s King Abdullah when he warned the West of an emerging “Shi’a Crescent,” led by Iran and encompassing Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Iranian leaders have been working tirelessly to expand their influence in the region through this “Shi’ite Crescent” concept. Iranian officials have publicly announced their intention to keep Iraq a unified and integrated country. They have strongly opposed any attempts to divide the country. For example, when the Kurds in northern Iraq held an independence referendum in September 2017,66 Tehran responded with severe measures against Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). They closed their borders with the Kurdistan region and suspended their airspace to flights in and out of the Kurdistan region’s major airports, Sulaymaniyah and Erbil. They also cooperated with the Iraqi and Turkish governments to stand against the KRG.67 Tehran has long opposed any division of Iraq, whether it is by the Kurds or any other sectarian groups. They fear how this may affect the Iranian minorities, particularly the Kurdish population in Iran. They also understood that dividing Iraq into two or three states would mean losing their influence in the country. If a Shi’ite dominance in Baghdad were to vanish, it would provide the US and Israel a chance to make a new alliances near the 16 IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE Iranian borders. The Iranian government will consequently do whatever is necessary to prevent any future division in Iraq. Conclusions This paper argues that Iran has pursued a long-term strategy in Iraq that is more about protecting Iran’s national security and interests rather than pursuing the Islamic revolutionary manifesto. Emerging threats from ISIS in Iraq created a security vacuum in the country. Iran was the first to exploit this situation by instructing its militia allies to fight ISIS with their support. Iran’s influence in Iraq will remain sizable despite some challenges posed by the US and other groups in Iraq. Muqtada alSadr’s movement, which opposes Iran’s influence, remains an obstacle. Tehran has utilised various instruments of power to secure its goals in Iraq, ranging from its historial ties with Iraqi political parties and militias to its economic and religious ties to the country. NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. Joseph H. 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