Nuclear deterrence

In an age where nothing seems clear-cut it is wonderful to have a hero and an even clearer villain. Putin is the new Hitler, an obsessive maniac with no respect for human life. The Ukrainians, by contrast, remind us of our parents and grandparents and their pluck during World War II, when Britain stood alone. But, of course, nothing is ever quite so simple. So, at this stage in the war, what is the balance of the good, the bad and the ugly?

Economic sanctions have become the tool of choice for U.S. policymakers to influence international affairs. On issues ranging from nuclear nonproliferation to human rights, the United States typically imposes sanctions with the goal of inducing a government to change its behavior. Yet sanctions often have more potential to deter unwanted actions than to compel policy reversals, and the greatest impact of sanctions sometimes involves the signals they convey about likely future U.S. steps. Maximizing the overall effectiveness of U.S. economic pressure therefore requires concerted efforts by policymakers in the executive branch and Congress to make sanctions more effective instruments of deterrence and signaling. Doing this will also have positive knock-on effects, helping to limit the unintentional escalation of international competition and preserve the utility of sanctions as a vehicle for addressing security challenges and protecting universal norms. This report highlights several areas for action by U.S. policymakers.

The 70th anniversary of the founding of the PRC on 01 Oct 19 was marked by the biggest ever parade in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. This brief analyses the event in the midst of seminal geopolitical developments involving China, inter alia the elevation of Xi Jinping as China’s President for life, China’s geopolitical rivalry and ‘trade war’ with the US, and the popular unrest in Hong Kong. From the Indian perspective, this needs to be contextualized with China’s earnest to reorder the global order, beginning with a China-led unipolar Asia; and specifically, for the Indian Navy, its increasing military-strategic foot-print in the Indian Ocean.

This paper argues that the practice and performance of nuclear deterrence can never be fully representative or democratic due to the particular pressures placed on leaders by the nuclear condition. For nuclear deterrence to be effective – and for nuclear weapons to have any political value – a leader must always convince both their electorate as well as any possible foe, that they are willing to use nuclear weapons in extremis, irrespective of whether this is their true position. In any nuclear-armed state, where politicians privately believe that using nuclear weapons is always wrong, but publicly stress that possessing nuclear weapons to use as a deterrent is right, they are forced to act dishonestly. These tensions are particularly acute in the UK context given the reliance on just one form of nuclear weapons system for deterrence and the concurrent requirement to pre-delegate secret orders through a " letter of last resort ". The consequences for democratic nuclear-armed states are troubling; for public morality, the personal integrity of democratic leaders, and for true democratic accountability. The paper concludes that public criticism of political leaders, and citizen voting choices, ought to take account of the problem of transparency posed by policies of nuclear deterrence.

The appearance on Russian TV stations Channel One and NTV of the plans for a nuclear torpedo/unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) has prompted much interest among observers.  Among other aspects, its probably salted warhead attracted much attention, the addition of Cobalt-59 ensuring long-lasting radiation designed to render a wide area uninhabitable for years. The July 1948 Baker test in Bikini Atoll illustrated the effects of a shallow underwater explosion. Missile defence experts have noted how, in line with Russian commentary, the system seems to be designed to bypass Western progress in this field. There’s another significant aspect of the possible construction of this weapon: its impact on the international law of the sea.

From this perspective, there are at least three issues that need to be discussed: whether a submarine carrying nuclear torpedoes may carry out innocent passage through another country’s territorial waters, the 1971 treaty banning nuclear weapons on the seabed, and whether a coastal state may restrict the presence of submarines carrying nuclear torpedoes in its EEZ. This paper examines the three.

Can we make comparisons of nuclear deterrence and cyberdeterrence in modern era. States conduct their critical infrastructures with SCADA systems. Also states make network centric warfare in our age. Because of all these reasons, cyberattacks costs high damages. During Cold war, nuclear deterrence provided a diplomatic balance between Soviets and USA. In this article, we are questioning that does cyberdeterrence affect the world as much as nuclear deterrence? effective as much as nuclear deterrence because characteristic of cyber space is very different from our conventional war types and rules.

Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare sketches a clear picture of the potential impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the digitized battlefield, broadening our understanding of critical questions facing decision-makers. This book demystifies the hype surrounding AI in the context of nuclear weapons and, more broadly, future warfare. Specifically, it highlights the potential, multifaceted intersections of this disruptive technology with nuclear stability. The inherently destabilizing effects of AI in the military sphere may exacerbate tension between nuclear-armed great powers - especially China and the United States - but not for the reasons you may think.

In February this year, at the École de Guerre in Paris and at the Munich Security Conference, France’s President Emmanuel Macron again reiterated the need to strengthen European autonomy in foreign and security policy and presented yet another proposal in this area. This time he offered to launch a strategic dialogue on the role of the French nuclear deterrence in Europe’s collective security. Although the proposal is addressed to all of France’s European partners, the most important response will come from Germany. Official reactions in Berlin have so far been consistent with the German approach to French defence initiatives – Germany declared it is ready for such a dialogue but remains cautious about its goals. Berlin does see the need to boost Europe’s role in foreign and security policy and recognises Paris as its most important partner in this field. However, Germany’s approach differs considerably from that of France. Berlin prefers to strengthen the EU’s security and defence policy and the European pillar in NATO, rather than build European strategic autonomy under French leadership. At the same time it does not necessarily have the required political will and military means to back up its own rhetoric.

The paper evaluates the strategic impact of hypersonic missiles. It first provides a short overview of the current American, Russian and Chinese hypersonic missile programmes and of their strategic rationale. It then examines the effects of such weapons on the nuclear equilibrium (Mutual Assured Destruction - MAD), notably the problem of ambiguity and the conceptual limitations of MAD; arguing that it is impossible to ascertain beforehand whether they will lead to nuclear escalation in case of conflict between major powers. The paper then explains that hypersonic missiles are primarily intended for conventional (non-nuclear) use. Finally, it examines a crisis scenario, arguing that hypersonic missiles increase the threat perception of a rapid and debilitating attack and consequently push contenders towards a 'first strike' logic that makes the crisis more acute and may lead to a (nuclear) escalation.

What happened, in the years leading up to Valentine's Day 2014, that made a canister of nuclear waste burst open and spew out fire underground at a US facility for the long-term disposal of radioactive military waste? According to one widely publicized scenario, a simple run-of-the-mill typo led to organic kitty litter mistakenly being used to soak up liquid in the drum instead of another kind of absorbent material. This ultimately led to a reaction that made heat and pressure build up in the drum, causing it to erupt. But was that "simple" clerical error symptomatic of a much deeper, system-wide problem-- involving a US Energy Department plan to rush the pace of nuclear waste disposal? What were the political, social, and financial elements involved in making Los Alamos' waste drum #68660 erupt that February night? What can be done to prevent similar accidents – which can have price tags of hundreds of millions of dollars or more – from happening again in the future? A cultural anthropologist spent 10 weeks onsite after the event, logging 43 interviews and trying to answer these questions. Here is what he found.

“It would seem that awareness of the nuclear danger should be precisely the common denominator with which statesmen of both countries would exercise restraint and seek mutual understanding to strengthen confidence, to avoid the irreparable. However, I must say that I do not see it on the part of the current administration and they may be moving toward the dangerous red line.

War spins the wheels of history. It changes societies, alters lives, and brings about new dimensions to inflict more brutality on human beings. This is what happened in the aftermath of World War II, when the advent of the nuclear weapons set about a chapter of sophisticated and lethal warfare. Conventional war between the great powers has since been antiquated. It only puts to display the apparent capabilities of the adversary so that deterrence remains intact. War has now become multilevel and multi-dimensional. In such a case hybrid warfare strategy comes to play-which falls under the third dimension of warfare and includes application of both conventional and non-conventional means. It becomes lethal because it brings together the use of technology and cognition to bring about destruction and disruption. On the other hand, the Strategic Interaction theory examines the asymmetric dimension of warfare which a weaker party undertakes in order to subdue or challenge its adversity. To put all this in context, India and Pakistan both being nuclear states do not directly confront each other by conventional means; rather they opt for the non-conventional means. The doctrinal change and rapid military modernization drive by India creates security dilemma for Pakistan. This paper studies that how India has employed hybrid warfare strategy against Pakistan, what are the vulnerabilities of Pakistan that India is exploiting and can exploit, how Pakistan can confront this type of warfare.

The Kargil War of 1999 was one of the three wars fought by India and Pakistan over the disputed region of Kashmir. Pakistan’s incursion into the Kargil sector of Indian occupied Kashmir across the internationally recognized Line of Control led to a series of military operations that finally culminated in the withdrawal of the Pakistani forces in the face of mounting pressure from the international community. The war was fought against the backdrop of India and Pakistan’s nuclear testing followed by a peace process convened to build confidence in the uneasy security context.
The purpose of this report is to assess the conflict in all its dimensions in order to highlight the key incompatibilities that led to the war. The report conducts a contextual and structural analysis of the conflict, along with an evaluation of the parties involved, the dynamics of the conflict and potential for conflict regulation to reach its final conclusion. The findings of the report show that the conflict was a result of Pakistani military command’s aim to internationalize the Kashmir issue and design a military solution to the dispute. It is also revealed that the nuclear capacities of both the states acted as a deterrent to a nuclear war but it also elicited security concerns globally and drew out a decisive international response.
The report has analyzed all of the aforementioned key components of the conflict to conclude that the Kargil war was fought by Pakistan and India to gain leverage in matters of national security and interests while using the nuclear backdrop as a deterrent to escalation into an all out nuclear war.

In 2009, after US president Barack Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize for, amongst others, his commitment to long-term nuclear disarmament (BBC,2009), Time Magazine published an article titled “Want Peace? Give the Nuke a Nobel”. This reflects the long-standing claim that, far from a threat to world peace, nuclear weapons--or the fear of them--can actually be instrumental in reducing the incidence of violent conflict, by deterring not merely their own use, but also any conventional war that could trigger a nuclear exchange. Though the fear of 'Mutually Assured Destruction' has long been a well-established concept in (nuclear) deterrence theory, few have taken this argument to its logical conclusion--the idea, developed most famously by Kenneth N. Waltz in his controversial ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better’ (1981), that if the mutual fear of nuclear war can deter states from conventional war, and if such deterrence is stable, then perhaps measured nuclear proliferation to other countries could be the best stabilizer of regional and global conflict, ultimately creating zones of 'Nuclear Peace'.

The suggestions that nuclear weapons might be ‘the best [and] only peacekeeping weapon that the world has ever known’ [Sagan & Waltz,2010: 92], and that their ‘horizontal’ proliferation to other states might constitute ‘an international good’ [Waltz, 2009, 431], are remarkable and highly controversial, as they fly in the face of both the Non-Proliferation Treaty (‘NPT’), as well as dominant attitudes in the West towards many nuclear-threshold states, such as Iran and North Korea.

Driven by the question "would the world be safer if more nations had nuclear weapons?", this article examines the chief arguments presented against and in favor of broad nuclear proliferation, and their counterarguments. To answer this question, I briefly theorize the positive or negative impact, on deterrence
stability and military-organizational safety, of conditions such as asymmetrical strategic force strengths or -postures (counterforce / countervalue); novel technologies (cost-effective missile shields), operational protocols
(‘launch-on-warning’) and finally several ‘deterrence-breaking’ strategies ('Hamburg grab'; 'madman strategy').

In terms of structure, this essay will present the general architecture of deterrence theory; common arguments against Waltz's 'laissez-faire' nuclear proliferation--and their validity. It will be considered if the ‘nuclear peace’-model, even if valid for the Cold War, is sufficiently applicable and transposable to other contexts to warrant Waltz’ advocacy of ‘total proliferation’—or whether proliferation should be ‘limited’ because the safety and stability of nuclear deterrence are not assured, either because its strategic logic can be subverted in ‘rogue states’ who lack rationality and restraint, or because the 'vulnerability' of 'poor’ nations small arsenals invites a decapitation strike. I will argue that this is not the case, and that Waltz’s ‘total’ form of proliferation optimism is indeed the most, or even the only legitimate ‘pro-proliferation’—or indeed, non-disarmament—argument.

Nevertheless, I conclude that even Waltz's cogent formulation fails to make the case for a ‘nuclear world’ being meaningfully safer, as it does not come to terms with how instability, irrationality, and most importantly organizational accidents are not mere imperfections of nuclear deterrence, but rather irreducible, essential, and inevitable to it, making systemic breakdown inevitable, cataclysmic, and in the long-term terminal.

Since the end of the Cold War, many scholars questioned the relevance of nuclear weapons in a world where is not clearly defined as unipolar or multipolar. Many critics of the nuclear weapons see them as the outdated tools of the power and hegemony of an outdated system and a theory, simply Realism. Nevertheless, despite the risks of vertical and horizontal spread of nuclear weapons to new states or to demonic non-state actors, sovereign states still stock them and share an enormous amount of budget to modernize these outdated tools. Notwithstanding with the critics of them, in this article, we will approach these tools with our reference to the Neoclassical Realism and try to define what nuclear proliferation means in a world where modified Realism resurged with its old school thoughts and with its tools of foreign policy. This article merely answers the critics of Realism and nuclear weapons' presence in accordance with the systematic and unit-level analysis rather than doing it with an ethical and utopian bias.

Özet: Soğuk Savaş'ın sonundan itibaren, birçok akademisyen tek kutuplu mu yoksa çok kutuplu mu olduğu bilinmeyen bir dünya da nükleer silahların gerekliliğini sorguladı. Nükleer silahların eleştirmenleri, onları, mazide kalmış bir teori ve sistem olan Realizmin güç ve hegemonya anlayışını sürdüren modası geçmiş araçlar olarak nitelendiriyordu. Nükleer silahların yatay ve dikey olarak diğer devletlere ve şiddet yanlısı devlet-dışı aktörlere yayılmasına rağmen, birçok egemen devlet bu modası geçmiş aletleri depolamayı sürdürüyor ve bunları modernize etmek için büyük miktarda bütçe ayırmaya devam ediyor. Bu eleştirmenlerden ayrı olarak, bu araçlara, Neo-klasik Realizmi referans alarak eski kavramların da yardımıyla Realizmin yükseldiği bir dünyada dış politikanın bir aracı olarak bakacağız. Bu makale, Realizmin eleştirmenlerine, etik ve ütopik bir bakış açısıyla değil, sistematik ve aktör bazlı bir analizle yanıt vermeyi hedefliyor.

The pandemic of 2020-21 could be the first “painful contraction” of a birth.  From the optimistic spectacles of Bucky Fuller's "World Game, " the sense of emergency might have had  the markings of an economic and spiritual renaissance.  Economic emergencies shook the stability of governments worldwide, while isolationism and old-time tribal mentalities resurfaced.  This paper makes the point that this has taken place  at the same time as a melting Arctic opens up vast areas for resource extraction. 

In a "Fuller" world, the maximization of this newfound wealth for world equilibrium should be of critical priority. But if we don’t take action to avert the latest round of resource wars, we could face “limited nuclear” fallout alongside global warming.

Kick-starting a major technology growth-spurt, a newly-created Bank of Gaia is proposed to broker all future polar resource extraction. The goal is to avoid  the next international shut-down while creating collateral against which large-scale population resettlement projects could begin . 

Self-sufficient but isolated new colonies with low ecological impacts (somewhat based on Soleri's 'arcologies'), would be he basis of the immediate need for a next generation of  sustainable manufacturing technologies, of factories that can efficiently build anything for local use only. Funded by the sale of its non-renewable resources, the Bank of Gaia would be "buying back ownership of human claims to property," redistributing this "newfound" wealth to governments worldwide for new infrastructural development needs of the new colonies built in the earth's hinterlands.

A new era could be defined and funded by Gaia. It would pay the impending costs of adjusting to her destabilized crust (the impacts of global warming) but banked against the long-term future of her deeper resources that we no longer own but must pay for..  Non-renewables would no longer be "free for the cost of extraction." Through a counter-intuitive collusion of J.M. Keynes with the Quesnay, the earth will become a direct source of financial support, eventually underwriting and upending the private banks. Utopian experiments can be carried out while resettling imperiled populations. Teilhard de-Chardin's vision of 'Civitas Dei' can again be a gleam in the eye of humanists whatever their faith.  Parallels to John Law’s bank, the Mississippi Bubble and 18th century colonization schemes are critically well-noted. Control of the Bank of Gaia? We might consider Buckminster Fuller's "World Game" in the hands of AI.

Les Etats adoptent-ils une posture plus ambitieuse, plus agressive ou plus provocante une fois qu'ils disposent d'un nombre minimal d'armes nucléaires ? Cette question, longtemps éclipsée par celle de "l'équilibre de la terreur", s'avère d'une pertinence croissante.

How might nuclear deterrence be affected by the proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous systems? How might the introduction of intelligent machines affect human-to-human (and human-to-machine) deterrence? Are existing theories of deterrence still applicable in the age of AI and autonomy? The article builds on the rich body of work on nuclear deterrence theory and practice and highlights some of the variegated and contradictory – especially human cognitive psychological – effects of AI and autonomy for nuclear deterrence. It argues that existing theories of deterrence are not applicable in the age of AI and autonomy and introducing intelligent machines into the nuclear enterprise will affect nuclear deterrence in unexpected ways with fundamentally destabilising outcomes. The article speaks to a growing consensus calling for conceptual innovation and novel approaches to nuclear deterrence, building on nascent post-classical deterrence theorising that considers the implications of introducing non-human agents into human strategic interactions.

This article demystifies the hype surrounding AI in the context of nuclear weapons and, more broadly, future warfare. Specifically, it highlights the potential, multifaceted intersections of this disruptive technology with nuclear stability. The inherently destabilizing effects of military AI may exacerbate tension between nuclear-armed great powers, especially China and the United States, but not for the reasons you may think.

North Korea is perilously close to developing strategic nuclear weapons capable of hitting the United States and its East Asian allies. Since their first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has struggled to perfect the required delivery systems. Kim Jong-un's regime now appears to be close, however. Sung Chull Kim, Michael D. Cohen, and the volume contributors contend that the time to prevent North Korea from achieving this capability is virtually over; scholars and policymakers must turn their attention to how to deter a nuclear North Korea. The United States, South Korea, and Japan must also come to terms with the fact that North Korea will be able to deter them with its nuclear arsenal. How will the erratic Kim Jong-un behave when North Korea develops the capability to hit medium- and long-range targets with nuclear weapons? How will and should the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China respond, and what will this mean for regional stability in the short term and long term? The international group of authors in this volume address these questions and offer a timely analysis of the consequences of an operational North Korean nuclear capability for international security.

"Kim and Cohen's volume on North Korea offers a 360 degree view of one of the most vexing problems for US foreign policy and national security. The authors each bring a unique analytic angle to the problem ranging from deterrence theory to the foreign policies of key protagonists like the United States, South Korea, and China. There is something here for both the expert and the general reader who want to make sense of this enigmatic regime and its increasingly risk-acceptant behavior." ― Victor Cha, D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Professor of Government and International Affairs and Director of Asian Studies, Georgetown University. Former White House NSC director for Asia and US deputy head of delegation for the Six Party Talks, and author of The Impossible State: North Korea Past and Future

"A set of first rate papers address the enduring North Korean nuclear saga and its strategic and political implications. The contributors capture the complexity of deterrence and compellence in Korea and the emerging strategic scenarios while providing fresh light on the choices the regional and international players are making. A must read for all interested in nuclear proliferation and East Asian security." ― T.V. Paul, James McGill Professor of International Relations, McGill University

The present work examines the possibility of a serious undermining of European security architecture in the near future, due to a synthesis a series of factors. One of these factors is the deconstruction of European militaries with a possible parallel drastic reinforcement of Russian armed forces. The reinforcement of Russian military capabilities could come about indirectly because of a sudden increase of China's land forces capabilities, in the event that the USA and its allies succeed in containing the rising Chinese air and naval capabilities within the China Sea. At the same time, the USA are shifting the centre of gravity of their geopolitical strategy, and therefore their military power, towards the Pacific and China, limiting their presence in Europe and further denuding western military capabilities. This work proposes the establishment of a sort of humble RMA on the part of the EU in order to reinforce European deterrent capabilities in fragile geo-systems like those of the Baltic Republics. This European RMA will be based on affordable precise strike weapon systems that will act within the framework of decentralized war fighting models based on a scientific paradigm that will take advantage of the principles of chaos and complexity (ChaoPlexity).

1. Introduzione. 2. Il Confronto geopolitico. 3. Alcuni elementi di geopolitica iraniana. 4. L'origine del confronto con Israele. 4.1. Le ambiguità nei rapporti Iran-Israele. 5. L'elezione di Ahmadinejad. 6. La minaccia iraniana come esistenziale per Israele. 7. Implicazioni dell'arsenale nucleare iraniano. 8. La compromissione dell'assetto strategico israeliano. 8.1. Alcuni elementi sulla dottrina nucleare israeliana. 8.2. Come potrebbe iniziare uno scontro nucleare. 8.3. Il dibattito sull'opacità e i rischi connessi alla disclosure. 8.4. La funzione stabilizzatrice dell'atomica israeliana. 8.5. La via iraniana all'opacità. 9. Opzioni -la revisione della dottrina nucleare israeliana. 9.1. Gli esiti del Project Daniel. 10. Verso un Medio Oriente multinucleare. 11. Conclusioni. 12. Bibliografia

The chapter deals with peculiarities of establishment of the regional
nuclear nonproliferation regime in the Asia Pacific as well as its condition in the modern period. From the standpoint of research methodology, the paper actively utilizes advances of the international regimes theory. The author analyses premises of the formation of different aspects
comprising nuclear nonproliferation system in the Asia Pacific region,
from military and politics (e.g. positive security assurances provided
to NNWSs) on out to economy (in particular, with regard to the situation
on the nuclear energy and raw materials market). Special attention is paid
to the pressing problems of nuclear nonproliferation, NWFZs in the region and their functioning and role of the nuclear factor on the agenda
of the regional organisations. In spite of certain legal discrepancies intrinsic to the nonproliferation regime in the APR, states of the region
make a significant contribution to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons
and disarmament globally.

Pakistan and India, as two nuclear neighbors in South Asia with a hostile historical legacy, have limited strategic options to pursue in an environment where uncertainty and threat are constant. In this context, India has moved in the recent past from a traditional deterrence towards a more escalatory posture under Modi led fascist regime. The primary emphasis of this study is to analyze how do India's intimidating tactics, particularly hybrid warfare undermine the security balance between India and Pakistan constantly causing the bilateral relations to swing between deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Indian war gaming tactics are a direct threat to conventional and nuclear deterrence.

Généralement associées à l’imaginaire issu de la science-fiction, littéraire ou cinématographique, utopique ou dystopique, les technologies de l’intelligence artificielle ont investi ces vingt dernières années des domaines de plus en plus vastes de la vie des individus et des collectivités. Il n’est pas un secteur qui, aujourd’hui, ne soit influencé, affecté, normé ou administré par l’IA et ses algorithmes avancés. Les forces armées, à l’image des sociétés qu’elles servent, n’échappent pas à cette tendance. Désormais, les technologies de l’intelligence artificielle, appuyées par des algorithmes complexes et la multitude des données provenant de l’emploi fait des réseaux numériques les plus diversifiés, ont étendu leur emprise – et peut-être même leur empire – sur presque tous les aspects de la vie humaine. La guerre en fait partie et certains se demandent déjà si elle demeurera une dialectique de volontés humaines.

L’intelligence artificielle, qui se situe d’ores et déjà au cœur d’une course technologique réelle, s’apprête à bouleverser tant les processus de décision politique que les modes d’action militaire des forces armées. Comme chaque révolution technique, celle de l’IA participera à l’émergence de nouveaux acteurs et la relégation d’anciens, quand il ne s’agira pas purement et simplement de leur effacement. Qu’elles en maîtrisent les applications ou qu’elles en subissent les effets, les organisations de défense de demain connaîtront des transformations sans précédent. Entre « Singularité », « hyperguerres », « guerres algorithmiques », « systèmes d’armes autonomes », « cryptographie quantique », « flash wars » et « IApocalypses », les concepts, les perspectives et les scénarios s’entrechoquent et laissent entrevoir un futur incertain. Bienvenue dans l’ère stratégique de l’intelligence artificielle.

Proliferarea armelor de distrugere în masă Fenomenul de față este considerat drept una dintre cele mai importante amenințări de securitate, de la începutul secolului XXI. Îl găsim prezentat în discursul public, fie în declarații, fie în documentele și în politicile marilor actori internaționali, începînd cu 1998, dar cu o intensitate crescândă o dată cu loviturile teroriste ale organizației Al-Qaeda, îndreptate împotriva Statelor Unite, din 11 septembrie 2001. Capitolul de față începe cu o definire a tehnologiilor, alături de un scurt istoric, urmate de o discuție teoretică asupra impactului proliferării, a regimurilor de control și dezarmare și a acțiunilor militare propuse pentru a remedia slăbiciunile percepute ale normelor și instituțiilor internaționale, în aceste zone tematice.

Les rationalités de l'électronucléaire [Kairos, juin/juillet 2019, pp. 15-17]

Le développement de l'utilisation de l'énergie nucléaire constitue le tournant de l'histoire de l'humanité. La majorité des citoyens pressent qu'on a « mal tourné », mais peu parviennent à mettre de l'ordre dans les arguments contradictoires qui sont manipulés, au propre comme, trop souvent, au figuré, par les factions en présence. S'il fallait opérer à l'aide d'un raccourci saisissant, on pourrait faire remarquer que le risque électronucléaire est totalement injustifié, simplement parce qu'il est impossible de démontrer que le kWh nucléaire est meilleur marché-ou même bon marché. Toute activité humaine comporte des risques ; le risque électronucléaire est supposément maîtrisé et acceptable, mais, si un accident majeur devait se produire dans un pays densément peuplé comme la Belgique, les dégâts se chiffreraient en milliers de milliards d'euros. Or, puisque ce risque n'est pas nul, il serait logique de le prendre en compte dans le calcul du coût du kWh-qui deviendrait dès lors astronomique. De plus, le coût de la totalité du cycle du combustible n'est pas évaluable : d'une part, le démantèlement des centrales demeure largement expérimental ; d'autre part, le coût des techniques de retraitement, de stabilisation et de stockage des déchets hautement radioactifs ne peut être estimé, puisqu'elles doivent produire leurs effets sur 100 000 ans et plus. En conclusion, si le coût réel du kWh nucléaire ne peut être déterminé, on ne peut en aucune façon prétendre que le risque en vaut la chandelle. Dans « L'imposture électronucléaire 2 », on trouve trois discussions complémentaires 3 ; elles sont replacées ici dans leur contexte à l'aide de trois fois trois clefs : 1 Philosophe. Dernier ouvrage paru : Contre le totalitarisme transhumaniste : les enseignements philosophiques du sens commun, Limoges, FYP éditions, 2018. 2 M. Weber, « L'imposture électronucléaire », Les Zindigné(e)s !-La vie est à nous, n° 28, octobre 2015, pp. 14-18. 3 Premièrement, l'utilisation militaire du nucléaire (les réacteurs plutinogènes et les bombes) a été, et reste, décisive pour le développement de l'industrie civile, qui est triple : la production d'électricité (les réacteurs électrogènes), les traitements médicaux par isotopes et les techniques d'imagerie, et la radiostérilisation de matériel médical et d'aliments.

Will the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in strategic decision-making be stabilizing or destabilizing? What are the risks and trade-offs of pre-delegating military force (or automating escalation) to machines? How might non-nuclear (and non-state actors) state leverage AI to put pressure on nuclear states? This article analyzes the impact of strategic stability of the use of AI in the strategic decision-making process, in particular, the risks and trade-offs of pre-delegating military force (or automating escalation) to machines. It argues that AI-enabled decision support tools by substituting the role of human critical thinking, empathy, creativity, and intuition in the strategic decision-making process will be fundamentally destabilizing. In particular, if defense planners come to view AI’s ‘support’ function as a panacea for the cognitive fallibilities and human analysis and decision-making. The article also considers the nefarious use of AI-enhanced fake news, deepfakes, bots, and other forms of social media by non-state actors and state proxy actors, which might cause states to exaggerate a threat from ambiguous or manipulated information, increasing instability.

Ten things you need to know about the nuclear capacity of the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to offer cogent analysis of Iran’s compliance with the existing Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and/or ongoing negotiations by the U.S. to adapt that agreement before joining it once again as a participating party.

Based on a recent International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Iran Verification and Monitoring Report of March 3, 2022 [1], and subsequent Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) analysis [2],  Iran is continuing to advance its nuclear capabilities, hide nuclear research facilities, and thwart international inspections.

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Is peace among nations a utopia? Some would say yes, others would say no. In fact, it depends on how one defines peace. Is it the absence of international conflict or war? Is it the absence of violence or fear of violence both at the national and the international levels? Better yet, isn’t violence embedded in our DNA, as a species? Aren’t we doomed to compete for resources, to constantly put our own survival instinct to work? There is a lot of moving parts in the concepts of war and peace, which make both notions ambivalent and, thus, create sort of a dichotomy. The origins of war date back from prehistoric times; and the causes of war are both endogenous and exogenous, meaning war has both biological and international roots. Acknowledging the ambivalence of conflict and peace, scholars – Aquinas being the first – have come up with the concept of Just war, which legitimizes war and armed humanitarian intervention, bringing to bear, in the process, the paradoxical natural of peacekeeping missions. The utopian or the hopeful think that peace among nations is possible because there are numerous elements of hope for world peace such as: the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, globalization, diplomacy, and nuclear deterrence, to name a few. On the other hand, the dystopian or the skeptical think that the barriers to world peace are too serious for world peace to become a reality. They put forth the following: proliferation of nuclear weapons, geoeconomics, terrorism, the global refugee crisis, and the profitability of arms sales and war itself, to name a few. This mix of optimism and pessimism tend to motivate some of us to consider rather the future of armed conflict instead of considering a pipe dream at both ends of the spectrum. This third category of people think that war and conflict will take place in a totally different environment: cyberspace. They think that future wars will not be positional but, instead, will be subnational.

In this paper, I address three of the most frequently used arguments for maintaining a significant measure of dependence for international security on nuclear deterrence both globally and regionally:

Nuclear weapons have deterred great powers from waging war against each other, so a world without nuclear weapons will lead to, or at least might encourage, great-power war.
The US nuclear umbrella has deterred nuclear proliferation, so the reduction of the US nuclear arsenal will undermine the credibility of US extended deterrence and create additional incentives for nuclear proliferation.
Nuclear weapons have deterred other powers from invading the territory of those states that possess nuclear weapons and thus leaders of countries with relatively weak conventional capabilities will keep their weapons as an equalizer. A version of this argument focuses on dictatorial regimes or “rogue states” whose very existence depends on their having nuclear weapons.
After showing that these arguments are not as convincing as their frequency suggests, I delineate opportunities that advocates for a nuclear-free world or a world with few nuclear weapons should exploit on their way to advancing their goal, based on the decoupling of nuclear weapons and deterrence.

Since the end of the Cold War, China is believed to have doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal, while the other nuclear powers under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have cut their forces in half. Many analysts explain China’s buildup as a direct response to US missile defense. This article takes a broader view, looking at the threat China perceives from the United States as well as from other nuclear players under the penumbra of US hegemony. A state-by-state analysis provides a multidimensional look at China’s nuclear security environment, allowing deeper insight into the motivations behind China’s modernization.

Over the last years, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) recognized nuclear powers (P5) have substantially invested in modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Even considering the need for replacement of some of the nuclear platforms, analysis demonstrates that the development and deployment of new military systems – like the missile shield or hypersonic systems – has created a strategic domino effect on other nuclear powers, namely Russia and China. This article intends not only to describe some of the nuclear modernizations programs currently being implemented by the P5 but also the strategic
motivations behind the latter.

Quoique premier et principal domaine de l’histoire de la guerre, la puissance terrestre a depuis quelque temps maintenant été dissociée de la notion de « forces stratégiques », ces dernières renvoyant généralement à des moyens longue portée et/ou à de fortes puissances de destruction, au premier rang desquels les armes nucléaires. L’importance croissante de la maîtrise d’espaces communs a parfois conduit à considérer les forces terrestres comme de simples consommateurs d’effets interarmées. Une telle dynamique est désormais remise en cause alors que les puissances occidentales se voient de plus en plus contestées dans leur suprématie sur les « espaces fluides ». Le temps est donc venu de réévaluer la contribution des forces terrestres aux grandes fonctions stratégiques que sont l’intervention, la dissuasion, la prévention, la protection et l’anticipation. Dans chacune de ces missions, les forces terrestres se révèlent être des instruments essentiels, sans alternatives évidentes. Alors qu’il semble clair que l’environnement opérationnel futur sera plus contesté et exigeant, les forces terrestres vont devoir continuer à démontrer leur pertinence pour faire face à des défis tels que le déni d’accès et l’interdiction de zone, l’hybridation des adversaires, ou encore l’ambiguïté stratégique. Dans une telle perspective, elles seront amenées à jouer un rôle central comme forces intégratrices et pourvoyeuses d’effets multi-domaines, contribuant à l’amélioration globale de la résilience et de la capacité de manœuvre.

This paper aims to examine the historical background of India and Pakistan"s nuclear strategic doctrines in the context of nuclear deterrence policy of both states. Primarily, the reason of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan will be propounded as part of their historical conflicts. Second part would emphasize the key parts of the nuclear programme of Pakistan as well as the reactions of India in relation to Pakistan"s nuclear doctrine. Third part would dwell upon the nuclear program of India and strategic importance against Pakistan. Fourth part would point out the impacts and reflection of nuclear armament of India and Pakistan in the West. This part would discuss the reactions of certain NPT designated nuclear weapons states (China and United States) in respect of the strategic nuclear doctrine of India and Pakistan. In this regard, this paper also aims to make sense of the reasons of the volatile relationship between India and Pakistan. Thus, the strategic condition of South Asia would be more comprehensible. Recently, the tendency of US Foreign Policy and speeches of Barack Obama is showing the prominence of South Asia. 1 Since, the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan is still main determinant in South Asia politics. As Barack Obama highlighted, South Asia is one of the most important regions in the world, which may shape global security and world politics as being a salient location for financial interests of western countries and United States as well. In this regard, the nuclear activities in South Asia are question mark for stability in the region.

Cold War-era, nuclear-policy debates focused on the US-Soviet nuclear balance and various loopholes and openings in arms-control agreements that arguably favored the Soviets at US expense. Missing from these debates was due attention to the Soviet goals that would determine the significance of alleged force imbalances and treaty allowances. A similar preference for tangible indicators confounds the United States and its allies as they seek proscriptions (red lines) and prescriptions (green lights) for suspect nuclear programs. Initial efforts to thwart an Iranian bomb focused unduly on setting a red line to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable behavior; the debate over the subsequent Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has focused inordinately on technical issues and far less on critical assumptions about Iranian motives that will determine whether Iran has appropriate incentives to adhere to the agreement. 1

Overt nuclearization by India and Pakistan in May 1998 threw up doctrinal challenges for the strategist communities of the two countries 2 , which had until then been conveniently swept under the carpet. International pressures with regard to non-proliferation as well as safety and security of nuclear warheads and other nuclear facilities, especially after 9/11, restricted the space for free though process available to the strategists of both the countries. The doctrines that have so far emerged reflect more of apologists' standpoints with respect to international concerns, rather than offering robust doctrinal statements focused at operational intent. Having preponderance in conventional arms, India subscribed to 'No First Use' concept but, soon after, started diluting it by attaching conditionalities to it 3 ; and having un-matching. http://www.idsa-india.org/an-feb-1.01.htm, (accessed on November 11, 2015). " India's "minimum credible nuclear deterrence" doctrine and "no first use" policy are based on the concept of deterrence by denial, rather than deterrence by punishment. Should deterrence ever break down, India will have to pay an enormous price for a nuclear first strike by an adversary before launching massive punitive retaliation. Nuclear doctrine has to be ultimately tested in the crucible of operational reality. Across the entire spectrum of conventional conflict, the first use of nuclear weapons by India does not make sound strategic sense. The real distinguishing feature of India's nuclear doctrine is that it is anchored in India's continued commitment to global, verifiable and non-discriminating nuclear disarmament " .

Cold War-era, nuclear-policy debates focused on the US-Soviet nuclear balance and various loopholes and openings in arms-control agreements that arguably favored the Soviets at US expense. Missing from these debates was due attention to the Soviet goals that would determine the significance of alleged force imbalances and treaty allowances. A similar preference for tangible indicators confounds the United States and its allies as they seek proscriptions (red lines) and prescriptions (green lights) for suspect nuclear programs. Initial efforts to thwart an Iranian bomb focused unduly on setting a red line to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable behavior; the debate over the subsequent Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has focused inordinately on technical issues and far less on critical assumptions about Iranian motives that will determine whether Iran has appropriate incentives to adhere to the agreement. 1

Öz Nükleer silahlar, bu silahlara sahip devletler arasında savaş ve çatışma riskini azaltan bir işlev gör-mektedir. Devletler, askeri güç dengesinde dezavantajlı bir konumda olsalar da, nükleer silah sahibi olmaları durumunda "mutlak caydırıcılık" elde ederler. Böylece nükleer silahlar, güçlü ve zayıf aktörler arasındaki caydırıcı güç dengesini zayıf aktörler lehine düzenleyebilen bir işleve sahiptir. Bu çalışmanın inceleme konusu olan Rusya-Ukrayna ilişkilerinin de bu minvalde değerlendirilmesi gerekmektedir. 2014 Ukrayna krizinde görüldüğü gibi Ukrayna, Rusya'nın Kırım ve Donbas'a dönük gerçekleştirdiği askeri müdahaleler sonucunda egemenlik haklarının ve toprak bütünlüğünün ihlal edildiği bir tabloyla karşılaşmıştır. Ukrayna'nın 1990'larda terk ettiği nükleer silahlar ise, Ukrayna krizi ile irtibatlı olarak tekrardan gündeme gelmiştir. Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasının ardından dünyanın üçüncü en büyük nükleer silah envanterine sahip olan Ukrayna, 1990'ların ilk yarısında gerçekleşen müzakereler sonu-cunda nükleer silahlarını terk etmeyi kabul etmiş ve 1996 yılında tamamlanan bir işlem sonucunda nükleer silahlardan tamamen arınmıştır. Bu süreç baz alınarak bu çalışmada, Ukrayna'nın nükleer silahsızlanma tecrübesinin olası sonuçları 2014 krizi çerçevesinde masaya yatırılmıştır. Ulaşılan sonuç neticesinde, nükleer silah envanterine sahip güçlü rakipler karşısında (Rusya) nükleer silahsızlanma-nın, devletler için (Ukrayna) potansiyel bir ulusal güvenlik riski teşkil ettiği vurgulanmıştır. Abstract Nuclear weapons reduce the likelihood of war and conflict among nuclear-armed states. States that are in an inferior position in the military balance gain "absolute deterrence", if they possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are, therefore, functional devices in calibrating deterrence asymmetry between weak and strong states in favor of the former. In this article's case study, Russia-Ukraine relations, should be understood in this light. As witnessed during the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Russia violated Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity through military incursions into Crimea and Donbas. In the light of Rus-sia's military actions, discussions surrounding Ukraine's elimination of its nuclear arsenal, which took place during the 1990's, have surfaced again. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited the world's third largest nuclear weapons stockpile, which it removed from its soil during a process that was completed in 1996. This work seeks to trace this process and analyze the potential impacts of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament with reference to the 2014 crisis. By way of conclusion, it is argued