Game Theory

Suppose that a large number of individuals are randomly matched into groups where each group plays a finite symmetric game. Individuals breed true according to their individual material payoffs, but the expected number of surviving offspring may depend on the material payoff vector to the whole group. We show that the mean-field equation for the induced population dynamic is equivalent to the replicator dynamic for a game with payoffs derived from those in the original game. We apply this selection dynamic to a number of examples, including prisoners' dilemma games, coordination games, hawk-dove games, a prisoners' dilemma with a punishment option, and common-pool games. For each of these, we provide conditions under which our selection dynamic leads to other outcomes than those obtained under the usual replicator dynamic. By way of a revealedpreference argument, we show how our selection dynamic can explain certain stable behaviors that are consistent with individuals having social preferences.

This position paper illustrates the use of a natural framework for the modelling, analysis, and design of engineering systems that involve two or more controllers, each of which has an associated objective function. Such systems arise when ordinary single controller systems are networked through communication links so that the information available to each controller may contain aspects of the other systems' states and the optimization of each objective function is no longer decoupled from each other. Single controller optimization is no longer directly applicable. Appropriate to the study of such systems is the theory of games that has been developing in mathematics, economics, and engineering for the past 60 years. There are extensive applications in economics, but in engineering the applications are scarce. In recent years, there has been great attention to global problems such as the negative environmental impact of energy use, and global warming. These problems arise from complex systems with multiple controllers. Among the approaches for dealing with the problems, there should be one on a total systems approach with a game theory base. A natural framework for this is the subject of this policy paper.

We use a dynamical systems approach to model the origin of bargaining conventions and report the results of a symmetric bargaining game experiment. Our experiment also provides evidence on the psychological salience of symmetry and efficiency. The observed behavior in the experiment was systematic, replicable, and roughly consistent with the dynamical systems approach. For instance, we do observe unequal-division conventions emerging in colmnunities of sylnmetricaily endowed subjects.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 sought to end the monopoly that once existed in the telecommunications industry. Since its adoption, the telecommunications industry has been undergoing a period of rapid change and development. The entry of new players into the market encouraged them to seek new ways to attract and keep customers. These changes have led to a rapid influx of new technology and services. Many times what defines a monopoly is not clear in every circumstance and there are many pending lawsuits for violations of antitrust laws in the courts today. Economic models are useful in resolving issues of whether a monopoly truly exists, or whether claims are unsubstantiated. Previous models were applicable only in certain situations. These models are unreliable in predicting monopolies outside the parameters for which they were designed. This research will develop and test an economic model that accurately predicts the existence of a monopoly in the telecommunications sector, based on the United States of America's marketplace case, as the best representative example to deal with.

This thesis investigates artworks born at the convergence of digital media and contemporary performance, and the ways in which technology impacts the field of performance. The term digital media refers to technology that produces digitised (as opposed to analogue) content such as text, audio, video, graphics and metadata. Contemporary performance refers to artworks that combine different artistic traditions—experimental theatre and dance, video art, visual art, music composition and performance art—in a single performance event. The convergence of these two fields has produced a significant body of technological works of art that challenge and reconfigure traditional conventions in contemporary performance. This thesis examines the impact of digital media on the ways performance is created, received and experienced, and the extent to which media open up new possibilities for creative expression and may generate new art forms.
I mapped the field by defining three large categories that mark the heterogeneous landscape of technologically enhanced performances today, namely multimedia theatre, telematic performance and pervasive performance. Methodologically, I combined hermeneutic methods of interpretation and reflection with academic forms of practical inquiry, combining textual analysis of relevant works from each of the three categories—such as Ghost Road (Murgia and Pauwels 2012), make-shift (Jamieson and Crutchlow 2010) and Rider Spoke (Blast Theory 2007)—with the practical development and analysis of a pervasive performance experiment titled Chain Reaction (Pérez 2009 and 2011). Theoretically, the project is interdisciplinary, bringing together performance theory, digital media studies, experimental game scholarship and experiential art documentation.
In discussing the ways in which digital media impact contemporary performance, I identify a number of traditional conventions in the field of theatre and performance that are currently being challenged. These are in the areas of audience participation, use of space, actor role, rehearsal and staging, and performance documentation. Central arguments in the thesis are, on the one hand, that researchers, critics and practitioners must look beyond the visionary expressions of aesthetic potential in order to grasp the real state of technologically enhanced art forms. On the on the other hand, it is only by considering both, the horizon-pushing high-tech along with the purpose-orientated low-tech, that a more grounded understanding of the present impact of developing technology on art culture can and should be reached.

This paper examines the idea that commercial law has the capacity to evolve spontaneously in the absence of a clear state authority because of its unique nature. I argue that the manner of interaction implied by commerce plays a crucial role in this ability as it involves a high degree of overall engagement. This I term “high engagement,” which I divide into two elements: repetition and the creation of clear cycles of interaction. Together they produce identifiable legal norms and subsequent compliance. Game theorists have long recognized the importance of repeated interaction in inducing cooperation; however, how the manner of commercial interaction itself facilitates this process has been left largely unexamined. Part I presents a brief overview of the concept of reciprocity and spontaneous law theory. In Part II, a more detailed explanation of the notion of high engagement is offered. Here I set out exactly how high engagement is instrumental in the emergence of legal norms. Finally, the paper concludes that the element of high engagement indeed plays a decisive role in commercial law’s ability to evolve and function in a decentralized, spontaneous fashion—an important insight in terms of the future international development of the modern law merchant as it emerges in the absence of a single legislative authority.

In 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) released a draft of a new Japanese constitution. This is astonishing, because it intends to destroy all three principles of current constitution, or to renounce the modern constitutionalism. Despite the most important function of the constitution being the restriction of governmental power, the LDP/government is eager to abolish it, so the human rights of Japanese people are being threatened. We Japanese should rediscover the significance and roots of the current constitution.
    It is generally believed that the current Constitution of Japan is simply based on a draft by GHQ/SCAP or General Douglas MacArthur. However, this recognition is not accurate. This paper, opposing such views, focuses on two stream of thinking, to which certain Japanese thinkers and politicians have been involved in: (1) One is Kempo Kenkyukai, including Iwasaburo Takano, Tatsuo Morito, and Yasuzo Suzuki, whose draft was conversely a basis of GHQ’s draft. In particular, Suzuki was one of the successors of the tradition of Japanese liberals led by Emori Ueki or Sakuzo Yoshino since the Meiji/Taisho era. (2) The other is the pacifism of Kijuro Shidehara, who originated the Article 9 which renounces war. They say it was just “imposed” by MacArthur, but this is not true, according to testimonies by Shidehara’s secretaries and friends. In reality, Shidehara himself asked MacArthur to “impose” it on Japanese government in order to save the Tenno system, and it is not just an ideal but a radical solution to the prisoner’s dilemma of armaments race.
    These facts allow the recognition that the Japanese constitution is not simply “made in America,” because it was, at least partially, derived from the tradition of Japanese liberal thought. We should develop this tradition and re-achieve true modernization, so that the fundamental freedoms and human dignity of individuals are fully respected.

Some of Law and Economics’ basic claims have come to be criticized as a result of empirical findings that question their viability. Particularly, the premise that agents consistently act rationally and with their self-interest in mind seems problematic. What the consequences of the criticism mean for Law and Economics’ tenability depends largely on the questions whether (1) some elements are unassailable to the alternative’s objections and (2) the alternative is a systematic whole. It is argued that Law and Economics may be salvaged, if it is minimized and its ambitions are tempered. This means focusing on the stable, a priori, elements inherent to it.

This manuscript examines the evolution of internet value systems in the motion control industry. We believe the primary reason behind the inconsistent performance of that industry's adoption of the internet in the supply channel was largely due to poor strategy. Using a the concepts of bias exchanges and game theory it is suggested that internet strategies such as disintermediation and first-mover advantage were elusive because firms focused too much on technology and not enough on customer value. Lessons for managers and future decisions are offered.

We study dominant strategy implementable direct mechanisms that minimize the expected surplus from core deviations. Using incentive compatibility conditions, we formulate the core deviation miminimization problem as a calculus of variations problem and then numerically solve it for some particular cases.

We study the interaction between optimal routing overlay and Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) Traffic Engineering (TE) in a single Autonomous System (AS). Our work is motivated in part by the work of Qiu et al [1], in which the interaction between overlay selfish routing and TE is brought up. However, our work is different in that [1] assumes each overlay user controls an infinitesimal amount of traffic demand and makes routing decisions independently. We study a single large scale and centrally controlled overlay network that controls a non-negligible portion of traffic demand and does optimal routing on application level. Akamai exemplifies this type of overlay. We further assume that the proportion of overlay traffic is significant enough to influence the routing decisions of TE.

Abstract—Autonomous demand response (DR) is scalable and has minimal control overhead on utilities by encouraging users to minimize their own energy expenditure. While the prior results on autonomous DR are promising, they are all limited to homogeneous grid topologies, such as a microgrid or a small distribution feeder. In this paper, we take the first step to investigate autonomous DR in heterogeneous grid topologies, i.e., a macrogrid, where users who participate in autonomous DR pro-grams are scattered across different buses. Our analysis requires expanding the existing autonomous DR to also include power flow analysis across the power grid. To gain insight, we perform two analytical case studies and show that the results can be very different from the results previously reported on homogeneous autonomous DR systems. We also provide recommendations to design efficient, fair, and practical autonomous demand response systems in heterogeneous smart grid topologies.

This study investigated a dilemma faced by companies when they set their prices -to engage in tacit price cooperation to achieve acceptable average profits or to increase market share through intensive price competition. The results obtained in a seven-firm oligopoly were followed for over four years. A comparison of firms competing in THE MULTINATIONAL MANAGEMENT GAME showed that oligopolistic competition led to Nash equilibrium as suggested by Game Theory. Initial profits were transformed into longer-term losses and company share prices fell. The results suggest it is advisable for firms to pursue legal ways to obtain "cooperative competition" which results in benefits to stakeholders, that would otherwise not occur, as well as making the industry an attractive investment, helping to sustain the economy's development while being socially responsible by improving wages and creating and maintaining jobs.

In the present article, we propose a new model based on our recently proposed information relativity theory for explaining dark matter and dark energy and for inferring about the nature of their interactions. The model gives rise to a matter-wave duality, similar to the realistic de Broglie-Bohm model. We allude briefly to the model's applications in predicting and explaining quantum phenomena; then we utilize it to construct a simple quantum cosmology of the universe, according to which dark matter and dark energy are, respectively, quantum matter and dual-wave energy at cosmic scales. We use the model to explain, in physical terms, the dynamic interaction among matter, dark matter, and dark energy as functions of the recession velocities and redshifts of celestial objects, such galaxies, quasars, etc. Contrary to the standard cosmological model, the predicted distributions of matter and dark energy densities, as functions of redshift, are far from being uniform, with matter reaching its maximal energy density at a point of quantum phase transition equaling the golden ratio (z ≈ 1.618). The predicted dynamics between matter and dark energy are shown to a function of the celestial's object recession velocity (or redshift). We derive general terms for predicting the amount of matter and dark energy in any redshift range and show that our predictions confirm with recent observations-based ΛCDM cosmologies. The model predicts that, for redshift z ≤ 1 2 , corresponding to recession velocity β ≤ 1 3 , the universe is dominated by matter, while for z > 1 2 (β > 1 3 ), it is dominated by dark energy. This prediction alleviates the so-called "coincidence problem," by providing a physical explanation as to why the density of the two components at the present time are equal.

Current and future wireless environments are based on the coexistence of multiple networks supported by various access technologies deployed by different operators. As wireless network deployments increase, their usage is also experiencing a significant growth. In this heterogeneous multi-technology multi-application multi-terminal multiuser environment users will be able to freely connect to any of the available access technologies. Network selection mechanisms will be required in order to keep mobile users ''always best connected'' anywhere and anytime. In such a heterogeneous environment, game theory techniques can be adopted in order to understand and model competitive or cooperative scenarios between rational decision makers. In this work we propose a theoretical framework for combining reputation-based systems, game theory and network selection mechanism. We define a network reputation factor which reflects the network's previous behaviour in assuring service guarantees to the user. Using the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, we model the user-network interaction as a cooperative game and we show that by defining incentives for cooperation and disincentives against defecting on service guarantees, repeated interaction sustains cooperation.

Desenvolvida em 1944 por Neumann e Morgenstern, a Teoria dos Jogos (TJ) é uma modelagem matemática capaz de auxiliar no processo de tomada de decisão de jogadores em um jogo. Um jogo pode ser descrito como uma situação em que duas ou mais pessoas, ou instituições, tomam decisões com base no que imagina que o seu oponente decidirá. Fundada sobre os pilares da Economia, a TJ atualmente abrange diversas áreas, como Biologia, Computação, Psicologia, Sociologia, Desenvolvimento Militar, Ensino, Educação, entre outras. Na Educação e no Ensino, vários trabalhos vêm sendo desenvolvidos no Brasil, devido aos diversos aspectos da TJ, como por exemplo: processos de tomada de decisão, racionalidade e lógica; se constituírem competências em documentos oficiais de educação, como os Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais e a Base Nacional Comum Curricular. Dessa forma, objetivou-se o desenvolvimento de um produto educacional, como forma de contribuir para a inserção da TJ na Educação Básica. Inicialmente, foi elaborada uma pesquisa do tipo Estado da Arte, para analisar o que vem sendo produzido com a TJ no contexto educacional brasileiro. Esta pesquisa resultou em 30 trabalhos (Artigos Científicos, TCCs, Dissertações e Teses); desses 30, 13 procuram uma intervenção em sala de aula, seja como aplicação ou proposta de aplicação; os 17 restantes abrangem outros contextos importantes da Educação, como a gestão escolar, os sistemas de seleção de alunos e professores, métodos de avaliação e a análise do comportamento de alunos e funcionários de instituições de ensino. Com os trabalhos, que realizaram a intervenção em sala, foi produzido uma análise minuciosa a fim de identificar as atividades desenvolvidas, os níveis e anos escolares, entre outros aspectos. Em um segundo momento, tomando como base os trabalhos investigados, foi elaborada uma atividade, que foi aplicada aos participantes (14 discentes de Licenciatura em Ciências Naturais e Matemática, 3 professores da rede pública de ensino, 1 professora universitária) do Projeto Residência Pedagógica (PRP) da Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso, Câmpus de Sinop. A atividade explorou o processo de tomada de decisão em um jogo de diversas rodadas; nesse jogo os alunos, dispostos em duplas, assumiam o papel de professores particulares que disputavam o mercado consumidor deste serviço. A disputa ocorria entre os integrantes da dupla, no quesito preço da hora de aula, sendo que podiam aumentá-lo ou mantê-lo, e que os resultados individuais dependiam da decisão de seu concorrente. Após a aplicação do jogo, foi apresentada uma breve história da TJ, assim como seus fundamentos, tipos de jogos, princípios, e por fim, a socialização dos resultados da atividade prática. Um dos resultados discutidos com os participantes foram as estratégias adotadas, pois percebeu-se que o Tit-for-Tat (Olho por Olho) foi a mais presente (73,86% das jogadas), ou seja, na maioria das vezes, a decisão dos participantes em cada rodada foi tomada com base na decisão de seu oponente na rodada anterior. Buscando a inserção da TJ na Educação Básica, essa atividade possibilitou mostrar aos participantes uma teoria que, até então, era desconhecida por todos, explorando conteúdos matemáticos do currículo básico regular (tabelas, porcentagens, frequências relativas, gráficos) e aspectos formativos em documentos oficiais (tomada de decisão, racionalidade, lógica, dentre outros). Como apontado pelos participantes, a TJ mostra-se como uma importante teoria e com grande potencial de utilização na Educação Básica, auxiliando o desenvolvimento de competências e na ressignificação da matemática no contexto escolar.

In this paper we present work on a project funded by the National Science Foundation with a goal of unifying the Artificial Intelligence (AI) course around the theme of machine learning. Our work involves the development and testing of an adaptable framework for the presentation of core AI topics that emphasizes the relationship between AI and computer science. Several hands-on laboratory projects that can be closely integrated into an introductory AI course have been developed. We present an overview of one of the projects and describe the associated curricular materials that have been developed. The project uses machine learning as a theme to unify core AI topics in the context of the N-puzzle game. Games provide a rich framework to introduce students to search fundamentals and other core AI concepts. The paper presents several pedagogical possibilities for the N-puzzle game, the rich challenge it offers, and summarizes our experiences using it.

We present a rigorous treatment of coalition formation based on trust interactions in multi-agent systems. Current literature on trust in multi-agent systems primarily deals with trust models and protocols of interaction in noncooperative scenarios. Here, we use cooperative game theory as the underlying mathematical framework to study the trust dynamics between agents as a result of their trust synergy and trust liability in cooperative coalitions. We rigorously justify the behaviors of agents for different classes of games, and discuss ways to exploit the formal properties of these games for specific applications, such as unmanned cooperative control.

This paper is a case study which describes the application of game-theoretic approach in resource management with specific emphasis on developing optimal strategies of phosphorus applications for soil fertilisation. The approach adopted allows resource managers to consider not only competitive strategies, which were treated as the Nash equilibrium game solutions, but also strategies which imply cooperation between farmers. These strategies were modelled as the cooperative Pareto optima of the game. The objective function of the game has been developed in order to reflect both economic advantages of phosphorus applications and the environmental losses associated with these applications expressed as dollar values. The paper presents algorithms for finding competitive and cooperative solutions of the game for the particular case when no time scheduling is included in the game parametrisation. The results obtained in the paper showed that the cooperative solutions lead to much lesser environmental impacts than that in the case of non-cooperative strategies.

"OV & DP and BRT" some assumptions and a Case Study for studying John Nash "Game Theory" method in logistics and transportation world and that is only a briefly attempt to get familiar with the idea. A thought which asks "Is it possible to model and analyze one of the authenticity of the transport or logistics service request with respect to the Game Theory optimization idea?

The migratory nature of nuisance wildlife populations creates a special management problem by imposing a negative diffusion externality on landowners undertaking control efforts. This paper reviews three cost-minimizing wildlife-control models, each internalizing the diffusion externality under different management scenarios, namely, unilateral management, bilateral management, and centralized management. The three management scenarios lead to different optimal behaviors. Property owners exerting unilateral control must leave some wildlife untrapped to generate sufficient population pressure against the flow of continual immigration from neighboring populations. Analysis of the bilateral model indicates that noncooperating neighboring landowners having varying pay-off functions will end up with leaving all wildlife untrapped in their parcels. Under the centralized management scenario, landowners find it most profitable to collectively delegate the control responsibility of an entire watershed to a single manager. * Corresponding author property owners who suffer damage from untrapped furbearing populations. In the absence of a fur market, furbearing populations can transform from profit-earning economic 'goods' to nuisance-causing economic 'bads.'

Diachronic uncertainty, uncertainty about where an agent falls in time, poses interesting conceptual difficulties. Although the agent is uncertain about where she falls in time, this uncertainty can only obtain at a particular moment in time. We resolve this conceptual tension by providing a transformation from models with diachronic uncertainty relations into “equivalent” models with only synchronic uncertainty relations. The

As defense acquisition costs have soared over the past decade, efforts at reforming the acquisition system have focused intensely on creating more opportunities for competition as a means to reduce costs and incentivize better contractor performance. While competition can, in some cases, reduce costs and improve contractor performance, it is not a cure-all for the problems that plague defense acquisitions. This paper presents a quantitative approach, using game theory to model the effects of competition on contractor pricing. It demonstrates that the way in which a competition is structured can be a determining factor in whether competitive pressure is sufficient to balance the additional development costs of multiple contractors and higher unit costs from splitting the award. Specifically, the way contractors are incentivized to bid (or not bid) depends on the number of rounds of competition, the number of units awarded in each round, and the split in award between the winner and l...

Modeling is one of the major research areas in social network analysis whose goal is to study networks structure and its evolution. Motivated by the intuition that members in social networks behave selfishly, network creation games have been introduced for modeling social networks. In this paper, our aim is to measure how much the output graphs of a given network creation game are compatible with a social network. We first show that the precise measurement is not possible in polynomial time. Then we propose a method for its approximation; finally, we show the usability of our method by conducting experiments on real network data.

Enterprises in a tourism supply chain (TSC) often optimize their businesses by adopting and operating profit or revenue maximization strategies. This paper investigates the conditions under which these strategies are preferred. We consider a TSC consisting of three sectors: a theme park operator, tour operators and accommodation providers. Simultaneous non-cooperative games are used as decision models of individual enterprises within the same sector while a two-stage sequential game is used to coordinate tourist quantities between the three sectors that form the two layers of the TSC. The theme park determines the admission price, while the accommodation sector achieves market clearing prices through quantity competition. After learning the decisions of the theme park and the accommodation sector, the tour operator sector decides final price of package holiday through quantity competition. Several observations are derived from equilibrium solutions. First, tour operators and accommodation providers that select the revenue maximization strategy obtain larger market shares and profits than those that select the profit maximization strategy, while the theme park operator generally prefers enterprises in the other two sectors to select the revenue maximization strategy. Second, the profit maximization strategy is a better choice when all enterprises in each of the sectors choose the same strategy. Finally, if tour operators and accommodation providers are free to choose their own strategies, there is a market equilibrium where profit and revenue maximization strategies could coexist.

Morality is serious yet it needs to be reconciled with the free play of alternatives that characterizes rational and ethical agency. Beginning with a sketch of the seriousness of morality modeled as a constraint, this paper introduces a technical conception of play as degrees of freedom. We consider two ways to apply game theory to ethics, rationalist and evolutionary game theory, contrasting the way they model moral constraint. Freedom in the rationalist account is problematic, subverting willful commitment. In the evolutionary account, freedom is also problematic, leading to an infinity of possible social norms with dubious normative force. While these two approaches complement each other, we argue that the evolutionary approach is superior on both theoretical and practical grounds.

We analyze a one-shot experiment on the traveler's dilemma in which members of the Game Theory Society, were asked to submit both a (possibly mixed) strategy and their belief concerning the average strategy of their opponents. Very few entrants expect and play the unique Nash equilibrium, while we observe a fifth playing the cooperative solution of the game, i.e. a

This article applies mathematical methods to investigating (extremely) simplified versions of the team selection problem for football managers. The team selection problem – obviously a game problem – is analysed game theoretically, but some funny results of a combinatorial nature are also added. In general, the findings indicate that the problem of selecting a football team is a very demanding task. Still, a simple comparison between win and profit maximising game models indicate surprising complexity in game prediction.

Migration processes of customers between alternative providers are becoming more and more relevant. Providers competing for migrating customers may adopt a delaying strategy to retain customers who are willing to leave, facing regulatory sanctions for that unfair behaviour. The contribution of this paper is to propose a game-theoretic model to describe the resulting competition among providers. For that model, both stable and unstable Nash equilibria are shown to exist and the providers' equilibrium strategies can be derived, in general numerically. In the stable equilibrium case the delaying strategy predicted by the model introduces a mean delay that is a strongly nonlinear (decaying) function of the sanction value.

started an investigation of the duality between selection hypotheses for X ⊆ R and selection hypotheses for the Pixley-Roy space of X. Daniels, introduced the "open-open game". We extend some results of Daniels (1988) by connecting the relevant selection hypotheses with game theory (Theorems 2, 3, 14 and 15) and Ramsey theory (Theorem 10, Corollary 11, Theorem 23 and Corollary 24). Our results give answers to some of the questions asked by .

Cyber-physical systems, and the intelligent decision support systems that they enable, carry the promise of greater efficacy in environmental management. The complexity of the physical infrastructure subject to decisions by environmental management systems is often an impediment to this efficacy. Other challenges include fundamental differences in the operation of cyber and physical components, and significant interdependency among the cyber components that facilitate decision support and the physical components they control. The agentbased computing paradigm is proposed for surmounting these challenges, due to the flexibility of software agents as autonomous and intelligent decision-making components. In this paper, we utilize an agent-based system to illustrate the application of game theory to decision support for environmental management, in the context of intelligent water distribution. Simulation results are presented to validate the model proposed, and to investigate the effect of various model parameters on water allocation.

Se indaga el sentido de la conferencia de Sloterdijk
“Normas para el Parque humano” así como las
polémicas por ella suscitada. Se realiza un diagnóstico
de la capacidad crítica del humanismo tradicional. En el
marco del naufragio del humanismo como escuela y
utopía domesticadora humana -marco en el que
Sloterdijk reclama una revisión genético-técnica de la
humanidad- se indaga ¿qué criterios pueden
establecerse para normar las inevitables luchas por los
derechos de la crianza humana? ¿Quiénes y sobre qué
bases debieran hoy detentar el derecho a la crianza?
¿Cómo determinar quiénes son los que educan y los que
son educados? Se proponen nuevos caminos que
tienen en la mediación de la técnica su formulación
discursiva y sus orígenes en las disidencias que, desde
la propia tradición filosófica, reducían la estancia del
hombre en el mundo a su expresión leída y escrita.

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on the Internet are used by attackers to be a nuisance, make a political statement (e.g. the 2009 attack against Estonia), or as a weapon of an Internet extortionist. Effective defense against these is a crucial study area, where advanced simulation techniques play a critical role, because of the enormous number of events involved. This paper considers a methodology for evaluating a game-theoretic defense against DDoS. We first describe a basic form of the defense, note the performance limitations suffered by a naive implementation, and then consider methodologies in which a parallelized approach may accelerate performance.

We study the notion of approachability in a repeated game with vector payoffs from a new point of view using techniques recently developed for qualitative differential games. Namely, we relate the sufficient condition for approachability (B-set) to the notion of discriminating domain for a suitably chosen differential game. The other goal of the present article is to obtain a new precise link between the strategies in the differential game and in the repeated game preserving approachability properties.

The multi-robot patrolling problem is defined as the activity of traversing a given environment. In this activity, a fleet of robots visits some places at irregular intervals of time for security purpose. To date, this problem has been solved with different approaches. However, the approaches that obtain the best results are unfeasible for security applications because they are centralized and deterministic. To overcome the disadvantages of previous work, this paper presents a new distributed and non-deterministic approach based on a model from game theory called Smooth Fictitious Play. To this end, the multi-robot patrolling problem is formulated by using concepts of graph theory to represent an environment. In this formulation, several normal-form games are defined at each node of the graph. This approach is validated by comparison with best suited literature approaches by using a patrolling simulator. The results for the proposed approach turn out to be better than previous literature approaches in as many as 88% of the cases of study. Moreover, the novel approach presented in this work has many advantages over other approaches of the literature such distribution, robustness, scalability, and dynamism. The achievements obtained in this work validate the potential of game theory to protect infrastructures.

In social foraging, scroungers take a disproportionately large share of the food found relative to their own food-searching efforts, while producers find more food than they manage to monopolize. We present a model of social foraging acknowledging the finder's advantage and foraging role asymmetries among individuals but incorporating the possibility that producers and scroungers differ in vigilance level and in vulnerability to predators. This allows simultaneous examination of both foraging benefits and anti-predatory aspects of grouping behaviour. Instead of seeking for equal payoff conditions, we first look for groups in which foraging character combinations and anti-predatory properties of producers and scroungers minimize the phenotype-specific predation hazard over food-intake rate, R i /I i , that is, fixed phenotype R i /I i minima. In the second approach, we allow individuals to change their foraging status to achieve lower R i /I i and look for combinations where it no longer pays for either producers or scroungers to change their roles, that is, evolutionarily stable group compositions, ESS. Various character combinations allow the phenotype-specific minima. In most cases, however, producers' and scroungers' minima are achievable only in different group compositions. The ESS combinations of producers and scroungers deviate widely from those combinations yielding phenotype-specific minima of R i /I i. If individuals are allowed to be flexible in adopting either a producer or a scrounger role, ESS group compositions will emerge, even though they are more expensive for both producers and scroungers in terms of R i /I i than group compositions yielding the phenotype-specific R i /I i minima.

A game theoretic conceptual framework model is presented to highlight strategies undertaken by individual public transport operators, public or private, vis-à-vis operational integration strategies. The Nash equilibrium is used to identify possible outcomes in various market situations. These are compared with reported case studies. The model, as a strategy-guiding tool, may be used to assist transport policy decision-makers concerned with public transport integration in identifying the most cost-effective form of intervention and its timely implementation.

Автор обращается к архивным материалам телевидения, анализирует примеры передач начального периода отечественного вещания. В статье выявляется онтологическая близость игры и телевидения. Автор приходит к выводу о системообразующем характере феномена игры для экранных коммуникаций, в первую
очередь для жанра репортажа. Показано, что телевидение родилось как зрелище, которому интересен homo ludens (человек играющий) и в контексте транслируемой телепрограммы, и за экраном, как зритель и потенциальный участник игрового процесса.

As a famous game in the domain of game theory, both pervasive empirical studies as well as intensive theoretical analysis have been conducted and performed worldwide to research different public goods game scenarios. At the same time, computer game simulators are utilized widely for better research of game theory by providing easy but powerful visualization and statistics functionalities. However, although solutions of public goods game have been widely discussed with empirical studies or theoretical approaches, no computational and automatic simulation approaches has been adopted. For this reason, we have implemented a computer simulator with reinforcement learning agents module for public goods game, and we have utilized this simulator to further study the characteristics of public goods game. Furthermore, in this article, we have also presented a bunch of interesting experimental results with respect to the strategies that agents used and the profits they earned.

Various forms of play emerge around computer games. These types of play, known as out-of-game play or extrinsic play, take place beyond the original game context. Despite their significant contribution to the overall play experience, they are often neglected by the game research community. Conventional game theories such as ludology and narratology do not provide an insightful account of the sociocultural aspects of game play. Therefore, in this article, we report our observations and investigations into different forms of extrinsic play activities in an online virtual setting. Founded on activity theory, we articulate theoretical models that explicate game play in a sociocultural context. Our findings reveal that extrinsic play constitutes reflective play and expansive play, which transform the play activity and transport the players beyond the original boundary of play.

First we define the splitting operator, which is related to the Shapley operator of the splitting game introduced by Sorin . It depends on two compact convex sets C and D and associates to a function defined on C Â D a saddle function, extending the usual convexification or concavification operators. We first prove general properties on its domain and its range. Then we give conditions on C and D allowing to preserve continuity or Lipschitz properties, extending the results in Laraki (2001a) obtained for the convexification operator. These results are finally used, through the analysis of the asymptotic behavior of the splitting game, to prove the existence of a continuous solution for the Mertens-Zamir system of functional equations (Mertens and Zamir (1971-72) and ) in a quite general framework.

Deregulated electricity markets are expected to provide affordable electricity for consumers through promoting competition. Yet, the results do not always fulfill the expectations. The regulator's market-clearing mechanism is a strategic choice that may affect the level of competition in the market. We conceive of the market-clearing mechanism as composed of two components: pricing rules and rationing policies. We investigate the strategic behavior of power generation companies under different market-clearing mechanisms using an agent-based simulation model which integrates a game-theoretical understanding of the auction mechanism in the electricity market and generation companies' learning mechanism. Results of our simulation experiments are presented using various case studies representing different market settings. The market in simulations is observed to converge to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game or to a similar state under most parameter combinations. Compared to pay-as-bid pricing, bid prices are closer to marginal costs on average under uniform pricing while GenCos' total profit is also higher. The random rationing policy of the ISO turns out to be more successful in achieving lower bid prices and lower GenCo profits. In minimizing GenCos' total profit, a combination of pay-as-bid pricing rule and random rationing policy is observed to be the most promising.