Publications by Susan Turner Haynes
Politics & Poilcy
In a move some equate with a "turn to religion," state, regional, and international donors now al... more In a move some equate with a "turn to religion," state, regional, and international donors now all seek to partner with religious organizations to deliver international humanitarian aid. Evidence indicates, however, that this invitation is not always accepted. The United States serves as a prominent example. Although the US went so far as to establish an office in USAID to facilitate coordination with faith-based organizations in 2003, the number of religious organizations receiving USAID funds remains low. My research suggests that this is also true of faith-based aid applications. An online survey of over 400 US-based nonprofits with international operations reveals that perceptions of government bias likely deter many religious NGOs in the US from applying for government funds. While this explanation may be unique to the US, it may also provide a testable hypothesis to scholars studying similar dynamics in other donor countries and organizations.
PS: Politics & Political Science, 2020
One of the most alarming trends of the past decade has been the rise in authoritarianism and the ... more One of the most alarming trends of the past decade has been the rise in authoritarianism and the growing support of strongman politics among citizens of democratic regimes. College instructors have a unique opportunity to challenge such thinking at a time when many of their students are still forming their political beliefs. Using a game, instructors not only can show students the perils of authoritarianism, they also can potentially expand students’ appreciation of democracy. This article describes a game suitable for this purpose. Students take on the role of workers, soldiers, and rulers in a military dictatorship to learn about the “guns-and-butter tradeoff” and authoritarian uncertainty.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Review, 2019
hile most contemporary analyses of South Asian nuclear dynamics acknowledge the presence of a str... more hile most contemporary analyses of South Asian nuclear dynamics acknowledge the presence of a strategic triangle between the region’s three nuclear players, the primary focus usually remains on the rivalry between India and Pakistan. Discussions of Sino-Indian relations remain limited. This is likely attributed to the stability in the two countries’ relations, yet it is worth asking why this stability exists and whether it is likely to continue in the future. Although China and India have an acrimonious relationship, their asymmetric nuclear capabilities and threat perceptions mitigate the danger of a traditional security dilemma. India may perceive China’s nuclear aggrandizement to be a security threat, but the same is not true of China, which has a vastly superior nuclear force and is largely shaping its nuclear-force structure in response to the threat it perceives from the United States. This dynamic makes a serious conventional or nuclear conflict highly unlikely.
At the turn of the twenty-first century, several scholars characterized China as the " forgotten ... more At the turn of the twenty-first century, several scholars characterized China as the " forgotten nuclear power. " This label derived from the opacity surrounding China's nuclear force and the assumed innocuousness of China's force developments. Over the past decade, however, the tone of the conversation has changed as China has increased its transparency and capabilities. China is now the fourth-largest nuclear weapon state, and if it continues on its present trajectory, it will surpass France to become the third. It also has recently developed a credible nuclear triad. Many scholars argue that the increasing size and sophistication of China's nuclear force should draw the attention of other nuclear weapon states and evoke calls for China's participation in the disarmament conversation. This article explores what such cooperation might look like by highlighting the conditions likely to elicit Chinese participation. ✵ ✵ ✵ ✵ ✵ When the world's most powerful nuclear weapon states signed and ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), they committed themselves to one day pursuing nuclear disarmament. That day has come for four of the five nuclear powers. Over the past two decades, Britain has reduced its force by half, France has decreased its force by one-third, and the United States and Russia have worked bilaterally to cut their forces by 90 percent. China, meanwhile, has continued to increase its nuclear arsenal, with the justification that its force levels remain far below those of the two nuclear superpowers. According to its leaders, it is not yet time for China to cooperate, since it is the responsibility of the nuclear superpowers to lead the way.
Although China was once labeled the world’s “forgotten nuclear power,” its growing nuclear force ... more Although China was once labeled the world’s “forgotten nuclear power,” its growing nuclear force and recent strategic ballistic missile interceptor tests have allowed it to effectively rid itself of the title. In fact, some US policy makers now cite China as the most likely nuclear power to
engage in an arms race with the United States. Baohui Zhang’s new book, China’s Assertive Nuclear Posture, supports this prediction. According to Zhang, we can expect China to add as many as 500 offensive nuclear weapons to its arsenal in the coming years. We can also expect China to continue to advance its space-warfare and missile-defense capabilities.
Zhang credits the anarchic world order for these outcomes. Anarchy, he claims, necessitates that states look after their own security, and whether China seeks to ensure its security by maximizing
power (à la offensive realism) or by maintaining power (à la defensive realism), it must balance against the United States. More specifically, since US ballistic missile defense (BMD) undermines China’s ability to carry out nuclear retaliation against the United States, China
must advance its security by pursuing additional offensive weapons, space warfare, and missile-defense capabilities. This article reviews Zhang's newest book and assesses its contribution to the field.
Since the end of the Cold War, China is believed to have doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal,... more Since the end of the Cold War, China is believed to have doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal, while the other nuclear powers under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have cut their forces in half. Many analysts explain China’s buildup as a direct response to US missile defense. This article takes a broader view, looking at the threat China perceives from the United States as well as from other nuclear players under the penumbra of US hegemony. A state-by-state analysis provides a multidimensional look at China’s nuclear security environment, allowing deeper insight into the motivations behind China’s modernization.
Teaching Documents by Susan Turner Haynes
Introduction: This course surveys the international security landscape with particular attention ... more Introduction: This course surveys the international security landscape with particular attention to the circumstances and choices that shaped security policy after World War II. The course will cover the evolution of war over the past half century, including the emergence of non-state actors, the transition to intrastate war, and the development of increasingly destructive weapons of war. Areas of inquiry include the causes of terrorist group formation, the strategies and objectives of terrorist groups, the organizational constraints facing terrorist groups, and the conditions for group decline. We will also be exploring the theoretical and political landscape associated with terrorism, including the rise of ethnic conflict and intrastate/civil war.
Conference Presentations by Susan Turner Haynes
Since the development of its first atomic bomb in 1964, China has claimed that its nuclear strate... more Since the development of its first atomic bomb in 1964, China has claimed that its nuclear strategy is driven by the desire to have the minimum means necessary to deter adversarial aggression. This argument has been widely accepted in the US, and has long been used to justify a modest increase in China's nuclear force over the past half century. This argument makes sense when one considers China's enhanced production of long-range ballistic missiles like the DF-31 and DF-31A. It is a stretch, however, to apply this argument to other areas, such as China's initial development of thermonuclear weapons and its more recent deployment of operational Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles. In these cases, the cost of development seems to outweigh the gains in defensive security when compared to other alternatives. This paper takes an in-depth look at these cases through the lens of primary source documents to explore the underlying motivation behind their development.
Despite the harsh words admonishing Russian military intervention over the past ten years, the in... more Despite the harsh words admonishing Russian military intervention over the past ten years, the international response has remained limited, allowing Russia to abet the independence of Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, and annex the Crimean peninsula. Among those joining the chorus of critics is China, yet China stopped short of voting for a UNSC referendum condemning the Crimean takeover as illegal. This decision, claims China, was based upon the preeminence of state sovereignty and non-interference in state affairs -concepts that can conveniently condone China's own territorial claims. The question that arises from such a response is whether China is taking cues from its northern neighbor. What lessons has China learned over time from observing Russian aggression and how has the Chinese perspective shifted? Does China see Russia's annexation of Crimea as a "green light" for the seizure of land in the South and East China Seas? This article explores these questions by analyzing a collection of primary source Chinese documents spanning the past seven years.
Drafts by Susan Turner Haynes
Once considered a "forgotten factor" in development studies, religion is now more of an it factor... more Once considered a "forgotten factor" in development studies, religion is now more of an it factor. Whereas twenty years ago the World Bank, Department for International Development, and the United Nations didn't even mention religion on their websites, these same development donors now host multiple conferences a year to discuss the impact of religion on development and actively pursue partnerships with faith-based development organizations (FBDOs). The same is true of the world's largest unilateral aid provider, the United States' Agency for International Development (USAID). This pivot in policy has attracted considerable scholarly attention yet the overall success of such partnership efforts remains generally unknown. We interviewed 36 FBDOs that accepted USAID funding between 2008 and 2020 to better understand their experiences. These interviews allow us to better understand the perceived impact of faith on development as well as the impact of government funding on FBDO missions, operations, and donor giving.
At the turn of the 21st Century, several scholars characterized China as the “forgotten nuclear p... more At the turn of the 21st Century, several scholars characterized China as the “forgotten nuclear power.” This label derived from the opacity surrounding China’s nuclear force and the assumed innocuousness of China’s force developments. Over the past decade, however, the tone of the conversation has changed as China has increased its transparency and capabilities. China is now the fourth largest nuclear weapon state in the world, and if it continues on its present trajectory, it will soon surpass France to become the third. It also has recently developed a credible nuclear triad. Many scholars argue that the increasing size and sophistication of China’s nuclear force should draw the attention of other nuclear states and evoke calls for China’s participation in the disarmament conversation. This paper explores what such cooperation might look by highlighting the conditions likely to elicit Chinese participation. These conditions are identified through an analysis of primary source documents, including documents generated by the Chinese government and discussion notes of track 1.5 dialogues.
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Publications by Susan Turner Haynes
engage in an arms race with the United States. Baohui Zhang’s new book, China’s Assertive Nuclear Posture, supports this prediction. According to Zhang, we can expect China to add as many as 500 offensive nuclear weapons to its arsenal in the coming years. We can also expect China to continue to advance its space-warfare and missile-defense capabilities.
Zhang credits the anarchic world order for these outcomes. Anarchy, he claims, necessitates that states look after their own security, and whether China seeks to ensure its security by maximizing
power (à la offensive realism) or by maintaining power (à la defensive realism), it must balance against the United States. More specifically, since US ballistic missile defense (BMD) undermines China’s ability to carry out nuclear retaliation against the United States, China
must advance its security by pursuing additional offensive weapons, space warfare, and missile-defense capabilities. This article reviews Zhang's newest book and assesses its contribution to the field.
Teaching Documents by Susan Turner Haynes
Conference Presentations by Susan Turner Haynes
Drafts by Susan Turner Haynes
engage in an arms race with the United States. Baohui Zhang’s new book, China’s Assertive Nuclear Posture, supports this prediction. According to Zhang, we can expect China to add as many as 500 offensive nuclear weapons to its arsenal in the coming years. We can also expect China to continue to advance its space-warfare and missile-defense capabilities.
Zhang credits the anarchic world order for these outcomes. Anarchy, he claims, necessitates that states look after their own security, and whether China seeks to ensure its security by maximizing
power (à la offensive realism) or by maintaining power (à la defensive realism), it must balance against the United States. More specifically, since US ballistic missile defense (BMD) undermines China’s ability to carry out nuclear retaliation against the United States, China
must advance its security by pursuing additional offensive weapons, space warfare, and missile-defense capabilities. This article reviews Zhang's newest book and assesses its contribution to the field.