Putin's foreign policies

The Syrian war will allow Russia to recover its naval presence in the Mediterranean. The Russian Navy will have more facilities at the same time that the Chinese Navy will appear in this scenario. This new situation will give us a new world order; this period we call "Tens Calm". Something similar happened after Bismarck Era, the period called "Armed Peace" (1890-1914), when the global balance was broken. This pre-war environment in the media could have been avoided. Russia today tries to recover its old deployment in the Mediterranean to become a global power.

Hai-Nyzhnyk P., Chupriy L., Fihurnyi Y., Krasnodemska I., Chyrkov O. (2018). Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine: ethnonational dimension and civilizational confrontation. Saarbrucken (Germany): LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. 229 p.

The expert-analytical study analyzes the preconditions, course and contemporary socio-political consequences of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation, which has signs of not only direct and covert, but also inter-state conflict and even civilizational confrontation.

Hat die derzeitige politische Ordnung in Russland mittel- und langfristig Bestand? Die fundamentale Herausforderung der Fortexistenz des heutigen kleptokratischen Regimes Russlands in den kommenden Jahren wird das Zusammenfallen zweier systemunterwandernder Tendenzen – ökonomischer Stagnation und politischer Transition – sein. Deren kombinierter Effekt wird selbst kluge Kremlführung nicht ohne weiteres neutralisieren können. Es wird daher früher oder später wieder zu einem System- und nicht nur Führungswechsel in Russland kommen, worauf der Westen sich bereits heute einstellen sollte.

In political science an accent on individuals (political leaders) in researching politics is neither popular nor advocated one. In authoritarian countries like Russia or China, however, political leaders and their personalities are a crucial factor in trying to understand the political processes there. Both Vladimir Putin in Russia and Xi Jinping in China have dominated their respective political systems. This, combined with good state of Russia-China relations makes it an interesting case study of the influence of political leaders on authoritarian countries. Both Putin and Xi are new type of leaders: they both follow the main ideas of political realism (though with "national differences") and they share a 19 th century outlook on the global affairs ("concert of powers") yet they use contemporary means to fulfil these interests. Their personal understanding provides a predictability and stability: both Putin and Xi function in accordance with balance of power and respect for zones of influence concepts. That is why differences in other spheres, like Rus-sia's and China's approaches to the USA do not influence the general good mood of Sino-Russian relationship.

The article aims to develop an analytical model for foreign policy experts in order to gain a better understanding of Russian-U.S. relations. The content of Russian-U.S. relations is categorized into practical and ideational agendas. This article argues that the dynamics of interaction between these two coexisting agendas is crucial for understanding the dynamics of Russian-U.S. relations. Descriptive analysis is used to study, categorize, and explain such dynamics. The paper also includes an analysis of the correlation between the practical and ideational agendas. The proposed approach helps to better understand how the unique conceptual landscape of Russian-U.S. relations influences their practical domain. This approach can be used as a separate explanatory model or in combination with explanatory models of major theories.

Today’s expert literature on the Kremlin’s subversive activities in Europe is often confusing in terms of the concepts and definitions used by authors in their reports and analyses. This paper aims to remedy this shortcoming by providing a comprehensive theoretical framework for analyzing the malign influence of Putin’s Russia in Europe in the most efficient way.

We define malign influence in Europe as a specific type of influence that directly or indirectly subverts and undermines European values and democratic institutions. We also put the concept of malign influence in the context of political warfare in order to delineate the meaning of such influence: it does not belong to the areas of cooperation between nations in times of peace.

The paper highlights major areas in which actors of Putin’s Russia exercise malign influence, identify main categories of Russian operators and their European facilitators that conduct or help conduct the Kremlin’s political warfare against the West, and, finally, describes vulnerabilities of European states to malign influence of Putin’s Russia.

Wenn ein Unterzeichnerland des Vertrages selbst vor einem der fünf Garanten des Sperrabkommens nicht sicher sein kann: Welchen Sinn hat dann das Verbot der Nichtweiterverbreitung von Kernwaffen? Im Austausch gegen einen Abbau von Nuklearwaffen erteilen drei atomwaffenbesitzende UNO-Sicherheitsratsmitglieder dem abrüstenden Land kollektive, ausdrückliche und schriftlich fixierte Sicherheitszusagen. Eines dieser Großmächte erklärt jedoch 20 Jahre später diese Vereinbarung für nichtig: Welches Land ohne eigene Atomwaffen oder enges Bündnis mit einer Nuklearmacht kann sich nun der Unverletzlichkeit seiner Grenzen noch sicher sein? Wenn selbst eine mit Ausnahmerechten ausgestattete Vetomacht im UNO-Sicherheitsrat sich auf Kosten eines Nachbarstaates territorial ausdehnen kann, dann wird das internationale Atomwaffensperrregime zum Selbstbedienungsladen der offiziellen Nuklearmächte.

A Rússia no século XXI se caracteriza pela dependência da exportação em alguns setores de sua economia, como o energético e o militar, os quais, ao mesmo tempo, permitiram a expansão econômica do país e o aumento do prestígio da nação no século XXI. Por sua vez, a imposição de sanções econômicas sob a economia russa, por parte dos países ocidentais, sob a escusa de retaliações à supostos posicionamentos agressivos russos, ampliaram a vulnerabilidade econômica do país. Como resposta a esse quadro, ou mesmo por necessidade, as decisões de Política Externa e de Segurança (PES) da Rússia sofreram mudanças. Este artigo tem por finalidade descrever alguns dos principais impactos que a condição de Vulnerabilidade Econômica Russa (VER) acarreta sobre a PES do país. Para tanto, realizar-se-á uma revisão bibliográfica acerca do tema, bem como serão utilizados documentos oficiais sobre a PES nacional, dados e análises da estrutura produtiva do país.

تسعى الأطراف الدولية المتدخلة في الأزمة السورية إلى إطالة أمد الصراع التركي-الكردي في سوريا لاستنزاف القدرات العسكرية التركية، وتحجيم النفوذ التركي في سوريا، بهدف استبعاد أنقرة من معادلات تقاسم مناطق النفوذ بعد نهاية الصراع. وفي المقابل، تسعى تركيا لإيجاد موطئ قدم لقواتها في سوريا، وانتزاع الهيمنة على المناطق الحدودية الفاصلة بين تركيا وسوريا من وحدات حماية الشعب الكردية، بالإضافة إلى تأسيس مسارات مستديمة للإمداد العسكري لدعم الفصائل السورية الموالية لها.
وفي هذا الإطار، يتناول هذا التحليل تقييم أبعاد التدخل التركي الذي دخل في أسبوعه الرابع، ويتناول الأهداف التركية من وراء هذه العملية، وأبرز تداعياتها السياسية، والعوامل المؤثرة على مستقبلها.

This time I decided
to draw attention to a
significant role (which was a surprise for many
experts) of Chechen terrorists in a battle of
Islamic state that has become a main threat to
the West. Based on this role, it is not only
possible, but vital to examine the potential li
nks
between the Islamic state and Russian secret
services.

Every year, the world leaders gather for conference at Munich to discuss global peace and security. But, the conference of 2007 is of exceptional nature because of the famous speech of Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose speech was not very different from that of the ‘Great Funeral oration’ by famous ancient Athenian General Pericles, which was patriotic and concerning peace of the world.

Perhaps, there is a need of Hermeutic and philological approaches to understand the interpretation of verbiage of his speech. Vladimir Putin painstakingly gesticulated various dimensions of the global political transformations that took place in the Post-cold war arena. The key focus of the speech was global security architecture and the failure of the unipolar world order to maintain peace and stability. Moreover, the speech also pinpointed the future dimension of security in Europe and Eurasia, involving NATO and Russia. Because, various significant political and strategic development occurred at the global level since 2007, including Russian-Georgian Fiasco (2008), Arab Spring (2011), and Russian-Ukrainian Conflict (2014).

The crisis in Ukraine is an unprecedented OPPORTUNITY. Never before has there been such a global opposition to psychotic “political” intention than the global righteous indignation expressed relative to Putin’s psychotic unprovoked attack on Ukraine. Experiencing such a crescendo of humanitarian solidarity is extremely rare and fleeting, and it is only possible because of the technological Fourth Estate (the electromagnetic media-field) that has framed the political issues involved. There can be no question that the current crisis in Ukraine has global significance, and media-framing of this fact has been compelling. However, the technology of “psychological framing” with information and communication technologies (ICTs) has advanced much further than longstanding advertising techniques of coercion through target-market identification that still holds the media captive. Science has now established the fact that human perceptions of ontological “reality”—in a context of the electromagnetic (EM) unified field of quantum field theory (QFT)—have the structure of NARRATIVE ARCHITECTURE.  In other words, reality has dramatic structure.  “An infinity of energetic resonances cavort in the form of “personal/collective dramas”. Good dramatic structure was defined by Plato who established the “framework” (character, exposition, lysis) that is a problem-solving formula that widely in use (Lakoff, G, 2008, 2002; Jacoby, 1973; Jung, C, 1933). The salient feature of Plato’s dramatic architecture is “plot” which unfolds from “exposition” (statement of a story’s problem) to lysis (resolution of the story’s problem) with adherence to “premise” (Schafer, SB, 2007; Glassner, A, 2004, p. 69).

The significance of this fact is that with the emergent media-age of virtual illusion, humans have the power to frame reality with the technological media—agency that should be attuned to FIRST CAUSE INTENTION (FCI). Proof of this fact can be stipulated because of the existence of the media-field that exemplifies this human creativity. What is not currently “known”, or yet deduced, is that this human creation—like a Jungian dream—can provide “meaningful insight” as to both human and divine PURPOSE. The media-field is structurally framed to accomplish meaningful insight about FIRST CAUSE INTENTION (FCI).  That divinely inspired FCI exists for the purpose of creating “responsible embodied transduction of EM energies” into an essentially humanitarian resonant quality in the dimension of material form.  The virtual media-field is the best example of this “embodied” purpose, but the toxic state of the media reflects a serious failure of responsibility for creating FCI COHERENT ENTRAINMENT (universal harmony).

Humanitarian craftsmen now have the responsibility to “intuit” FCI and to devise the “blueprint” (frame) for a Global Culture of Conscience (Soul). Currently, the media is structured to lead us into entropy (death), so change must be immediate. When mediated rhetorical dynamics are translated into the dynamics of physics and “coherent entrainment”, the DNA of First Cause media-framing becomes very specific and quantifiable. In-order to optimize the fleeting “opportunity” presented by the Ukrainian struggle, humanitarians must consciously accept the dynamics of EM coherent entrainment with the planetary Soul.

The Russian Federation is currently and will remain, for the foreseeable future, the country that possesses the second largest number of nuclear warheads. This highly armed state has, like the Soviet Union before it and the US today, an overkill capacity. As their communist predecessors in the Kremlin, the political leaders of post-Soviet Russia command enough weapons of mass destruction to destroy humankind several times. Russia's current rulers, moreover, act within a political system in which parliamentary control of the armed forces, checks and balances between branches of power, civil society monitoring of officials, or investigative journalism on top politicians are either absent or underdeveloped. Russia's political system represents a form of electoral authoritarianism in which power holders are only dependent on the integrity of their command chain, and of their public support constantly regenerated by the government's information policies.

Die geringe Aufmerksamkeit der deutschen Elite und Öffentlichkeit für die Ukraine ist vor dem Hintergrund der hohen Opferzahlen der Ukrainer im Zweiten Weltkrieg geschichtsvergessen. Trotz einer Reihe begrüßenswerter deutscher Initiativen bezüglich der Ukraine, bestimmen nach wie vor Naivität und Stereotypen das Verhältnis vieler Deutscher zum zweitgrößten Flächenstaat Europas. Das deutsche Engagement in russischen geoökonomischen Projekten wird in Kiew mit Furcht und Verbitterung wahrgenommen. Eine Reorientierung der Ostpolitik und stärkere Präsenz der Ukraine im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands ist überfällig. Eine intensivere deutsche Beschäftigung mit ukrainischen außen- und innenpolitischen Belangen würde eine schrittweise Heranführung der Ukraine an die EU zum Ziel haben.

Это договорное предложение о прекращении российско-украинского конфликта. Эта книга открывается исследованием братоубийственных элементов, которые преследовали восточнославянскую историю, и попыткой сформулировать импровизированный пакт, направленный на то, чтобы остановить этот элемент, который уже несет ответственность за гибель миллионов украинцев.

Review article on the books:
Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism. By Charles Clover. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016.
The Gumilev Mystique: Biopolitics, Eurasianism, and the Construction of Community in Modern Russia. By Mark Bassin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016.
Eurasianism and the European Far Right: Reshaping the Europe-Russia Relationship. Edited by Marlene Laruelle. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015.
Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir. By Anton Shekhovtsov. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017.

Seemingly sensible proposals to Kyiv to partially satisfy Moscow’s demands in Eastern Ukraine are counterproductive. They ignore the record of compromising with Russian revanchism, and underestimate the unexplored potential of serious sanctions. They also do not take into account the political mood that has emerged in Ukraine since the start of the war in 2014.

Can Putin really be considered a neo-Eurasianist? Is his policy of ‘multipolarism’ a direct consequence of his neo-Eurasianist inclinations? If so, why did he try to construct closer relations with the US in the post-September 11 period? Is this a real pro-Atlanticism or did Putin’s pro-Atlanticism simply result from the pragmatist tendencies in his foreign policy? Could it be that he had suspicions - from the very beginning of his tenure - about the chances of Russia in following a more neo-Eurasianist foreign policy? These are some of the questions this study will try to concentrate on. Only by finding responses to these questions, one can make judgements about Putin’s neo-Eurasianist inclinations in his foreign policy. However, in order to find such responses, one should also try to take a closer look at neo-Eurasianism’s views about Russian foreign policy. Thus, first of all it is necessary to note down some key elements of the neo-Eurasianist paradigm regarding Russia’s position in the new context of international relations, and to consider the views of two significant figures, Aleksandr Dugin as a theorist and Yevgenii Primakov as a practitioner, about the Russian foreign policy in order to evaluate Putin’s relationship with neo-Eurasianism in his foreign policy.

Die aufgeführten Tatsachen und eine Reihe anderer aufschlussreicher Aspekte der denkwürdigen Ereignisse vom Februar-März 2014 sind in der Ukraine und unter Osteuropaexperten an Universitäten und Think-Tanks sowie bei Regierungen und zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen im Westen bekannt. Dennoch scheinen viele westliche Beobachter, die schnell mit Kommentaren über die Vergangenheit, Annexion und Zukunft der Krim bei der Hand sind, einige oder gar die meisten dieser Tatsachen nicht zu kennen beziehungsweise zu ignorieren. Stattdessen schenken etliche Kommentatoren dem apologetischen Narrativ des Kreml Glauben: Ein lediglich etwas holprig initiiertes Referendum hat jedenfalls zu einer Grenzverschiebung geführt, die angeblich von der übergroßen Mehrheit der Krimbewohner lange und entschieden gewollt worden war und vorgebliches historisches Unrecht wieder gut machte.

Looking at the examples of the Gazprom’s gas import arrangements in the several East European countries, this paper suggests that the centrality of the intermediary companies’ role in them cannot be explained with purely economic or even political factors.

The data gathered in the course of this research confirms the assumptions developed on the base of modeling Putin’s Russia as a kleptocratic regime: in most cases, there are convincing evidence suggesting that the intermediation schemes created numerous opportunities for private individuals close to the government in Russia or its gas trade partner countries to benefit from the intermediation arrangements ultimately at the expense of Russian citizens' interests. Thus, the concept of a kleptocracy indeed provides us with important insights into understanding Putin regime’s policies, including those affecting international gas trade.

The focus of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it outlines the geopolitical rationale behind contemporary Russian expansionism, as well as presents the asymmetric mechanisms utilized by Russia to solidify its authority in the post-communist space. The four commonly used theoretical frameworks explaining Russian expansionism were described and critically assessed. Apart from this, the Russian and foreign political philosophic thought of the 19-21 centuries was referred to, to trace the evolution of the Russian Byzantium-type governing tradition and national identity. On the other hand, the paper assesses the features of post-colonial Ukrainian political culture and unveils premises for the emergence of its statehood in the 1990s. The major differences between Russian and Ukrainian political cultures and identities are emphasized. Finally, the hypothesis tested is that a democratic Ukraine – strengthened by cooperation with its Western allies – will become an obstacle of Russian expansionism in the future.

Putin’s Russia suffered a bitter defeat in the first weeks of the Russian-Ukrainian war. However, the Kremlin will keep on trying to place Ukraine into its orbit, as well as project its influence further into the Western world. Unceasing and dynamic aggrandizement under strong leadership is one of the most functional approaches to statecraft in Russia, tested by history and implemented today. In this light, Ukraine has become the vanguard of the Western world. No European nation should feel safe, as there are no limits to the Kremlin’s appetites.

L'Europa è fatta di nazioni che nascono, rinascono, si rinnovano, si fondono, si separano. Forte della sua profonda conoscenza della Russia, Vittorio Strada propone il suo contributo a una discussione sempre aperta su temi cruciali e attuali. Gli interrogativi a cui il libro cerca di dare risposta non sono pochi: si deve parlare di Europa o forse di Europe, aree diverse orientate verso un'unificazione ideale, anziché fuse in una compatta unità? E qual è il rapporto Russia-Europa dai punti di vista religioso, politico, culturale? Come leggere le storie di Polonia e Ucraina, aree che per secoli hanno fatto parte della Russia (dell'impero russo) e che, componenti a pieno titolo della civiltà europea, costituiscono una fascia di transizione? Quali sono le radici dell'eurasismo, il movimento nato negli anni venti che identifica la Russia come uno spazio tra Europa e Asia dotato di una sua specificità, riapparso oggi come ideologia del neoimperialismo russo postsovietico? Le due anime dell'impero, zarista e comunista, come si sono risolte nella Russia attuale? Riflessione storica sul significato della Russia, il volume è utile a tutti coloro che vogliano comprendere anche la "questione ucraina", oggi drammaticamente al centro delle cronache.

This paper serves a looking glass into the geopolitics of the late-1700s and present-day. A special historical and foreign policy comparison of Empress Catherine the Great and President Vladimir Putin's Russification policies in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Baltic, Ukraine, Central Asia, and Caucasus Mountains.

Bu çalışma, küresel ve bölgesel şartların değişimiyle oluşan yeni bağlamın güçlü oyuncularından birisi olan Rusya Federasyonu'nun Putin dönemi ulusal güvenlik stratejilerini inceleyerek Rusya'nın Suriye krizine dahil olmasını ele alacaktır. Bu doğrultuda, özellikle Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin döneminde oluşturulan 2000, 2009 ve 2015 güvenlik strateji belgelerini siyasi, askeri, enerji ve ekonomi odağıyla inceleyecektir. Rusya'nın kısa ve uzun vadede belirlediği hedefler, bu hedefleri gerçekleştirmeye yönelik kullanılan araçlar üzerinden bölgesel ve küresel konjonktürel gelişmelerin ışığında bir sentez oluşturulacaktır. Ayrıca, Rusya Federasyonu'nun ulusal güvenlik belgesinde belirlediği tehditler de ele alınarak, RF'nin Suriye'ye girmesinin nedenleri, Putin dönemi hazırlanan ulusal güvenlik strateji belgeleri ekseninde değerlendirilecektir. Genel olarak, RF'nin Suriye krizine dahil olmasının oluşturulan güvenlik strateji belgeleriyle bağlantılı olup olmadığı ve yıllar içinde belgelerde olan dönüşümde Suriye'nin konumuna odaklanılacaktır.

The EU should revert back to its pre-Minsk approach to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. The main raft of sanctions were introduced before both of the Minsk Agreements were negotiated. Back then, the lifting of sanctions had been linked to a full restoration of, at least, mainland Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Only later was the prolongation of the sanctions tied to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements – including those parts that concern Ukrainian domestic affairs.

n this case I decided to
examine not the current
Russian government
structure
, the interrelation of various clans and
th
eir influence to processes in Russia and
worldwide, but rather focus on why Russia can
now be reasonably called a
country that
sponsors terrorism
2
.
I will also discuss the very
suspicious links between the current regime and
international terrorism, and the historical role of
Soviet Union’s KGB (the foundation of Putin’s
regime) in developing an international terrorism
network.

As sanções norte americanas sobre a Rússia, impostas após o conflito na Ucrânia em 2014 e posterior anexação da Crimeia, mediante plebiscito, possuem, como finalidade, o enfraquecimento do Estado centralizado de Putin, bem como a mudança e o constrangimento de seu comportamento na esfera internacional. O objetivo principal deste trabalho é realizar uma síntese dos fatos mais significativos que dizem respeito à aplicação de sanções econômicas norte americanas sobre a Rússia a partir do ano de 2014. Como objetivos secundários, destaca-se uma breve análise da reação russa à estas sanções, em âmbitos doméstico e externo, e os possíveis impactos geopolíticos desta conjuntura, especialmente no que diz respeito a uma progressiva canalização de esforços da política externa russa para um pivô asiático. Por fim, conclui-se que estas respostas de Moscou se enquadram na tendência progressiva de uma posição mais questionadora e assertiva do Governo Putin diante dos constrangimentos impostos pelo Ocidente nos últimos anos, sobretudo, pelos Estados Unidos.