Mutual recognition

ABSTRACT: This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-reflective knower has authority over her own mental states, while the Spectator does not. I highlight the implications of this construal for a theory of action, and call attention onto some other interesting normative relations between the self-reflective agent and the Other that escape both the first-person and the third-person approach. My contention is that the authority of self-reflection (and of reason) is best understood as a relation of mutual recognition be-tween self and other...

This article argues that the ASEAN Member Nations need to support the establishment of a Mutual Recognition Agreement for Teaching Services to build a stronger ASEAN Community, to support the achievement of the 2030 UN Sustainable Development Goals, and to enhance quality and respect for the teaching profession.

This article attempts to present the unity as well as the difference between Hegel's and Dewey's social philosophical approaches to struggles for recognition. It argues that interpreting Dewey's Lectures in China as a commentary on Hegel sheds new light on Dewey's social philosophy as a recognition theoretical whole. Furthermore, the resulting "experimentalist" account of recognitive relations, norms and values might turn out to present a fruitful perspective in contemporary discussions on recognition.

In the article I argue that Hegel and Deleuze/Guattari construct two distinct political paths toward immanence. Both of these paths have as their starting point Rousseau's bourgeois. I show that both thinkers follow Rousseau in his attempt to construct political immanence and abandon the position of private man. However, in doing so they move in opposite directions. Hegel seeks to convert the bourgeois into the citizen , with the intention of reformulating the immanence of state-life presented in the The Social Contract by extending mutual recognition a distinct space in the form of civil society. In contrast Deleuze/Guattari move in the direction of becoming-animal along the lines of the Discourse on Inequality, by reformulating the relationship between life and society. At the same time, I argue that the overcoming of the problems that Hegel and Deleuze/Guattari identified in Rousseau introduces new ones and that the dangers inherent in the project of immanence cannot disappear.

This paper is about the interest of the second-person to ethics. The focus of recent discussion has been the explanatory power of the second-person, rather than its careful description or the very possibility of what is described. This paper is something of a corrective. Its aim is to get the claim that the second-person matters to ethics into a clearer focus with a view to raising further questions and puzzles.

In this chapter I distinguish between a) recognition of persons, b) normative acknowledgement and c) institution-creating acceptance. All of these go beyond a fourth, merely descriptive sense of the word “recognition,” namely identification or re-identification of something as something. I distinguish four aspects of "taking someone as a person": R1 A Belief that the other is a person, and can engage in agency-regarding relations.R2 Moral Opinion that the choice whether and when to engage with persons is ethically significant.R3 Willingness to refrain from wronging the other person, and to respond adequately to the normatively relevant features of the other (regardless of whether the willingness is ultimately selfish or not).R4 Unselfish Recognitive Attitudes explaining such willingness; such as genuine respect or genuine concern or solidarity. The second section asks: is mutual recognition between individuals necessary, sufficient, paradigmatic or desirable for group agency? I also ask: is interaction or communication necessary for mutual recognition? I also ask what kinds of groups emerge from mutual recognition as persons? The third section studies more briefly acknowledgement and normativity (Reasons, Values, and Principles). The fourth section discusses the nature of acceptance necessary for the existence of institutions.

This book represents the main output of the research project titled “Prison overcrowding and alternatives to detention”, funded by the European Commission and completed in the spring of 2016. The resarch started from the acknowledgment that both European and national legal sources increasingly associate the use of non-custodial sanctions and measures with the “pragmatic” objective of reducing the prison population. The present publication, therefore, openly places emphasis on the relationship between the expansion of some alternatives to detention and objective of reducing the incarceration rates. The book begins with a first section dedicated to the ‘supranational sources’  regarding alternatives to detention. It does so by highlighting the prioritarian deflationary function that alternatives to imprisonment have come to perform under European law. The book also features a second section made up of national reports. The latter have all the same structure. They start off by providing an overview of the prison population in the fifteen years between 2000 and 2015. Then follows a presentation of the alternative sanctions or measures in force in the national legal system, broken down according to the procedural stage in which they can be applied. The book ends with a chapter dedicated to  “cross-cutting” conclusions drawn on the basis of the overall results of the research and in particular the conclusions of the national reports.

The 'Europeanisation' of the fight against crime is a broad and much-contested notion. This in-depth analysis of the role of the EU in fighting crime within the area of freedom, security and justice explores the impact of EU policies in the Member States, the progressive convergence of Member States' criminal law systems, the emergence of mutual recognition as an alternative to harmonization, and the incremental development of the ECJ's jurisdiction. The essays also explore the limitations inherent in EU counter-crime policies and the changes brought about by the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon. These changes are discussed both collectively and within individual substantive areas in which the EU has taken an active role in fighting crime, such as corruption, money laundering, terrorism, organised crime and extradition.

La constitution d'un espace sans frontières intérieures constitue l'un des objectifs majeurs de l'Union européenne. La présente contribution a pour objet d'analyser les moyens qui permettent de décloisonner les ordres juridiques nationaux au sein de cet espace. Elle se penche, en particulier, sur les principes de reconnaissance mutuelle en droit du marché intérieur et de confiance mutuelle en droit de l'espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice ainsi que sur les critiques qui leur sont adressées et les limites qui leur sont reconnues.

Full-text article can be sent upon request. ABSTRACT: The European Union has learned from past failures and is attempting an ambitious paradigm shift by adopting Regulation 2018/1805, which implements the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders. The new instrument addresses major weaknesses of previous EU initiatives and instruments of international law and it introduces important improvements: direct applicability of the new rules, broader scope of the types of decisions covered, limited list of grounds for non-recognition and non-execution, clearer deadlines, better protection of the rights of victims and bona fide third parties in cross-border cases of freezing and confiscation. Of course, since the concepts and methods of mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders are relatively new, the authorities involved must familiarize themselves with the new framework in order to avoid problems at the level of implementation. Indeed, to ensure the effectiveness of EU action, the implementation of the new EU instrument is more important than its formal adoption.

In this essay, I argue that Fichte's political philosophy, in response to the problem of social cooperation, defends a conception of political society as a system of mutual recognition. I examine his theory of right, recognition, property, contracts, and family right.

This article engages critically with Margaret Gilbert's proposal that joint commitments are necessary for collective emotions. After introducing Gilbert's concept of joint commitment (Section 2), and the joint commitment account of collective emotions (Section 3), we argue in Section 4 that research from developmental psychology challenges the necessity of joint commitments for collective emotions. In that section, we also raise a more principled objection to Gilbert's account, independently of developmental considerations. Section 5 develops a complementary line of argument, focused on the notion of mutual recognition. While we agree with Gilbert that mutual recognition has an important role to play in an account of collective emotions, we take issue with her attempt to analyse face-to-face based mutual recognition in terms of the concept of joint commitment. We conclude by sketching an alternative analysis of collective emotions that highlights the role of interpersonal identification and socially mediated self-consciousness.

These are the slides that accompanied a lecture to the Aristotelian Society (interleaved with notes to the speaker).
http://www.aristoteliansociety.org.uk/proceedings/mp3/thompson.mp3 is probably not intelligible without them; of course it's probably not intelligible with them either.

Resumen: El enfoque de la economía civil desarrollado por Luigino Bruni y Stefano Zamagni durante los últimos 20 años, es una propuesta alternativa al modelo económico tradicional basado en la racionalidad perfecta del homo œconomicus. Deudor de fuentes antiguas, como el Iluminismo napolitano, propone la necesidad de recuperar la relacionalidad en el ámbito económico. Especialmente aquella implicada en la generación y potenciación de bienes relacionales, recursos intangibles que permiten tanto un óptimo desarrollo económico como social y humano. El objetivo de este estudio será, por un lado, ofrecer un análisis de esta propuesta humanista de economía para comprender tanto su alcance como sus posibilidades y, por otro, apoyándose en la propuesta de ethica cordis desarrollada por Adela Cortina, proponer orientaciones para acercar el enfoque al post-convencionalismo exigido por una sociedad plural.

The purpose of this article is to observe the evolving relationship of mutual trust and fundamental rights in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) of the European Union (EU). The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has long prioritized the effectiveness of instruments based on mutual trust through an unimpeded system of mutual recognition. Arguments based on a violation of fundamental rights were understood by the CJEU as contradicting the presumption of compliance, refuting mutual trust, and, subsequently, hindering the automaticity of mutual recognition. However, the CJEU has now accepted, both in criminal and asylum law, that the presumption of compliance should not be conclusive, that mutual trust is not blind and mutual recognition should not be absolute, where it specifically prescribes so. Rights are arguably now being taken seriously. The article observes an emergent, but carefully controlled dynamic of rights-based assessment through case-by-case analysis by illustrating three phases of mutual trust. However, the article argues that this dynamic is slow, unclear and inadequate. It suggests that national authorities should take a proactive role, promoting real and constructive relationships of trust and allowing an individual assessment of rights violations via exercising a rights-based review. The latter is based on a proper understanding of trust, as an evolving concept based on evidence. Respect for rights, terminological clarity, enhanced judicial communication, and acknowledgment of shared values are the way forward for the unchartered territory of mutual trust.

The aim of this report is to provide guidance to assist in the international convergence of quality assurance, benchmarking and assessment systems to improve dental education. Proposals are developed for mutual recognition of qualifications, in order to aid international movement and exchange of staff and students including and supporting developing countries. Quality assurance is the responsibility of all staff involved in dental education and involves three levels: internal, institutional and external. Benchmarking information provides a subject framework. Benchmarks are useful for a variety of purposes including design and validation of programmes, examination and review; they can also strengthen the accreditation process undertaken by professional and statutory bodies. Benchmark information can be used by institutions, as part of their programme approval process, to set degree standards. The standards should be developed by the dental academic community through formal groups of ...

Mutually adaptive interaction involves the robot as a partner as opposed to a tool, and requires that the robot is susceptible to similar environmental cues and behavior patterns as humans are. Recognition, or the acknowledgement of the other as individual, is fundamental to mutually adaptive interaction between humans. We discuss what embodied recognition involves and its behavioral manifestations, and describe the benefits of implementing it in HRI.

The paper, in Finnish, discusses in an introductory manner Hegel's views about religion and philosophy, and the tópic of mutual recognition; with brief notes on how the views fair today that philosophy should save the phenomena that myths and religions express, and that religious arguments in the public sphere should be translatable to a secular form; and the implications of that to struggles for recognition

A conflict arises from two basic insights concerning what recognition is. I call them the mutuality–insight and the adequate regard–insight. The former is the idea that recognition involves inbuilt mutuality: ego has to recognize the alter as a recognizer in order that the alter’s views may count as recognizing the ego. There always needs to be two–way recognition for even one–way recognition to take place. The adequate regard –insight in turn is that we do not merely desire to be classified as recognizers, but to be treated adequately, in the light of any and all of our normatively relevant features.
Both of these insights build on a third central idea, that recognition from others matters because it is relevant to one’s practical relations–to–self: say, respect from others is relevant for self–respect. But crucially for this paper, the two insights pull in different directions – they are in tension when it comes to deciding the scope of “recognition”. This paper is an attempt to negotiate the tension by comparing and assessing more and less restricted views on “recognition”.
I discuss four issues on which definitions of recognition may be more or less restricted. The first question concerns the scope of possible recipients of recognition, and the second question possible recipient-dependent conceptual restrictions on whether recognition has taken place at all. On these questions I try to be true to both of the two conflicting insights. The mutuality–insight leads naturally to a strict conception of recognition (only recognizers can be recognized; recognition takes place only when two–way recognition takes place). By contrast, the adequate regard –insight leads to an unrestricted view (also other beings than recognizers can be treated adequately, and one–way adequate regard is conceptually possible). I argue that the tension between these is best negotiated by a two–part story, which will distinguish terminologically recognizing (and being recognized) from successfully giving and getting recognition. It is slightly unfortunate to have to draw such technical terminological distinctions, but drawing this distinction helps to make substantive points that upon reflection need to be made, given the mutuality–insight and adequate regard–insight. Or so I argue.
The other two questions are: what sort of responses to what sort of features amount to recognition. Again, the adequate regard –insight would lead to an unrestricted normativist view: any kinds of responses that are normatively called for by any normatively relevant features may be cases of recognition. The mutuality – insight might motivate a narrower suggestion developing the idea that only other recognizers (or persons) can be recipients of recognition : only the kind of features that can only be had by other recognizers (or persons) can serve as the basis of recognition, and only the kind of responses, which are forms of taking the other as a recognizer (or a person) count as recognizing . I will argue that while such responses to such features are an important subclass of recognition, the unrestricted normativist view captures the full scope of recognition better. We should not in advance define recognition in a restricted way which rules some cases out (even though the mutuality–insight might seem to motivate some restrictions). We can fully preserve the force of the mutuality–insight with the two–part story, without restricting the scope of features and responses that amount to recognition.

Los principios de reconocimiento mutuo y Estado de origen, tal y como han sido moldeados y modulados por el Tribunal de Luxemburgo, siguen siendo la clave en la realización del mercado interior de servicios. La eliminación de las barreras que obstaculizan el desarrollo de las actividades de servicios entre Estados miembros es un medio esencial de reforzar la integración y de fomentar un progreso económico y social equilibrado y sostenible. Ahora bien, la supresión de estos obstáculos no puede hacerse únicamente mediante la aplicación directa del artículo 49 TCE, ya que, por un lado, resolver caso por caso mediante procedimientos de infracción sería, especialmente a raíz de las ampliaciones, una forma de actuar extremadamente complicada para las instituciones nacionales y comunitarias y, por otro lado, la eliminación de numerosos obstáculos requiere una coordinación previa de las legislaciones nacionales, coordinación que también es necesaria para instaurar un sistema de de cooperación administrativa. No obstante, tales principios no pueden ser entendidos en términos absolutos sobre el acceso y la actividad del servicio, entregados a la competitividad global de los prestadores de servicios que circulan libremente por la Unión Europea. El mantenimiento del modelo social europeo no sólo legitima sino que justifica la actuación del Estado de destino en el control y supervisión de tales actividades de conformidad con los (administrativos) principios comunitarios de no discriminación, necesidad, equivalencia y proporcionalidad. La Directiva 2006/123/CE sobre servicios responde a este reto y se ha presentado ante la opinión pública europea como una solución transaccional entre diferentes modelos ideológicos relativos el funcionamiento del mercado. Se ha sacrificado el enunciado del principio de Estado de origen (Propuesta Bolkestein) a favor del principio de libre prestación de servicios que concita y codifica el acervo jurisprudencial del TJCE acerca del mismo. No obstante, su esencia se mantiene y se refuerza mediante una necesaria simplificación administrativa y el establecimiento de una laxa cooperación administrativa.
The principle of mutual recognition and country of origin, as they have been build and modulated by the Court of Luxembourg, continue to be a key factor in the accomplishment of the internal market of services. The elimination of barriers to the development of service activities between Member States is essential in order to strengthen integration and promote balanced and sustainable economic and social progress. Those barriers cannot be removed solely by relying on direct application of Article 49 of the Treaty, since, on the one hand, addressing them on a case-by-case basis through infringementprocedures would, especially following enlargement, be extremely complicated for national and Community institutions, and, on the other hand, the lifting of many barriers requires prior coordination of national legal schemes, including the setting up of administrative cooperation. Nevertheless, such principles cannot be understood in absolute terms in relation to the access and the activity of the service, devoted to the global competitiveness of the providers of services who circulate freely within the European Union. The maintenance of the European social model not only legitimizes but also justifies the action of the country of destination in the control and supervision of such activities in accordance with the administrative community principles of non-discrimination, necessity, equivalence and proportionality. Directive 2006/123/EC on services replies to this challenge and has appeared before public European opinion as a transactional solution between different ideological models relative to the functioning of the market. The terms of reference of the principle of country of origin (Bolkestein’s proposal) have been sacrificed in favour of the principle of free provision of services that codifies the case-law of the Court of Justice on the matter. Nevertheless, its essence is maintained and is reinforced by means of a necessary administrative simplification and the establishment of a flexible administrative cooperation.

Tässä artikkelissa käsittelen Axel Honnethin kriittistä teoriaa ja tunnustusteoria. Pyrin esittelemään Honnethin sosiaalifilosofista ajattelua yleisesti lähestymällä hänen rikasta tuotantoaan irreduktiivisesti sosiaalisten vääryyksien näkökulmasta.

The present article lays out the difference between two psychotherapeutic paradigms: one silencing mental patients, the other one intending to give them back their voice. According to Foucault, medicine from the 17th century gradually breaks the dialogue between madness and normality and the language of psychiatry becomes the monologue of the reason. Freudian psychoanalysis was the first attempt to break this silence. Freud's communicative therapy brought back madness to the field of discourse and showed the possibility of dialogue with abnormality. In many case studies, however, Freud authoritatively pushes his own understanding over his patients. Psychoanalysis seems liberative; however, there is a perceptible tension between the Freudian theory and the practice. I used Sándor Ferenczi's oeuvre to propose a synthesis of the original Freudian intention and the analyst's hierarchical position in practice. He also focused on the communicative potential of the therapy, but he experimented more broadly to find the most suitable form of doctor-patient relationship. Hence, Ferenczi's oeuvre opens up alternative therapeutic attitudes and allows a more nuanced implementation of Freud's original thoughts.

This paper analyses the role of international mobility and mutual recognition to regional community building in the ASEAN region by reviewing policy documents and international student mobility statistics. ASEAN policy directives have evolved from regional economic cooperation to ASEAN Community building despite the limited mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) on professional services, and low and unbalanced intra-ASEAN student mobility. However the non-ratification of the 2011 UNESCO Asia and Pacific Recognition Convention, and the slow implementation of various regional frameworks supporting the establishment of an ASEAN Higher Education Area have limited the potential contribution of mobility and mutual recognition to the ASEAN Community building project. Recommendations to enhance its contribution includes expanding and implementing ASEAN MRAs to all professional disciplines, the development and institutionalisation of an ASEAN quality assurance system, promoting a balanced intra-ASEAN mobility, and ratification and implementation of the 2011 UNESCO Asia and Pacific Recognition Convention (Tokyo Convention).

In Intimate and Committed Love This project brings a hermeneutic moral framework to bear on contemporary psychological understandings of intimate, committed relationships. Specifically, Blaine Fowers' and Jessica Benjamin's understandings of what it means to have a good relationship are re-interpreted from the perspective of Gadamer's Truth and Method. This effort addresses a contemporary cultural tendency to see intimacy and morality as independent and often contradictory values for relationships. Jessica Benjamin's Bonds of

This article argues that two modern reinterpretations of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes, that is the BBC's Sherlock (2010–) and CBS's Elementary (2012–), differ in their representations of the city in ways that bear significant political ramifications. In particular, Sherlock repeats many of the social structures of Conan Doyle's stories that construct an imperial cosmopolitan vision of life in London, while Elementary offers an interpretation of Holmes's life in modern New York with a critical cosmopolitan ethos. Building on the works of Craig Calhoun, Ann Stoler, Paul Gilroy, and Walter Mignolo, this article argues that imperial cosmopolitanism refers to a colonial node wherein the global circulation of goods and people leads to increases in segregation, social differentiation, and ethnocentrism, whereas critical cosmopolitanism refers to circumstances under which the arrangement of the global city creates increased contact between various kinds of people as well as decreased social differentiation, which may lead to mutual understanding, solidarity, and what Lauren Berlant calls political empathy. This article demonstrates these two divergent approaches by analysing the programmes' aesthetic choices, depictions of social contact between Holmes and the diverse inhabitants of the city, and the representations of women, particularly with regard to the casting of Watson. As a result, the article finds that Sherlock depicts London from above as a space that must be strategically traversed to maintain social distance, while Elementary depicts New York from street level as a space wherein Holmes learns to encounter diverse others as co-equal citizens and the audience is invited to experience multiple perspectives. Consequently, Sherlock reiterates an imperial cosmopolitan view of urban globalisation, while Elementary includes key preconditions for the emergence of critical cosmopolitan mentalities.

As one of the newer Members of the European Union, this article outlines how Cyprus has adapted to the spirit of European Criminal Justice. As ‘the cornerstone’, the focus of this article is on mutual recognition in criminal matters and in particular the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision which has acted as a blueprint for other mutual recognition measures. The article considers the implementing legislation and the case law to date. On the whole Cyprus has embraced with open arms the principles adding safeguards it regards necessary to uphold rights and freedoms whilst remaining flexible in it its stance to the extent of even amending its Constitution.

Over the last four decades, the concept of collective identity has attracted considerable attention and generated extensive discussions in the various branches of philosophy, as well as in the human and social sciences. The progressive erosion of stable social milieus and of community cohesion have resulted in the increasing politicization of group identities. On the one hand, this development raises the theoretical question of understanding the very nature of collective identity and the constitution of collective identities. On the other hand, though, the urgent concern for responsible practice in collective identities formation, emerges in all its practical and increasing problematicity.

This study compares Philip Pettit’s account of freedom to Hegelian accounts. Both share the key insight that characterizes the tradition of republicanism from the Ancients to Rousseau: to be subordinated to the will of particular others is to be unfree. They both also hold that relations to others, relations of recognition, are in various ways directly constitutive of freedom, and in different ways enabling conditions of freedom. The republican ideal of non-domination can thus be fruitfully understood in light of the Hegelian structure of ‘being at one with oneself (Beisichsein) in another’. However, while the Hegelian view converges with Pettit on non-domination and recognition, their comprehensive theories of freedom are based on radically different metaphysics. One key difference concerns the relationship between freedom and nature, and there is a further difference between Pettit’s (ahistorical) idea of the concept dependence of freedom, and the Hegelian (historical) idea of the conception dependence of freedom.

Keywords: Pettit; Hegel; freedom; non-domination; mutual recognition; republicanism; ‘being at one with oneself’; social freedom

წინამდებარე ნაშრომში განვიხილავ ევროპული კავშირის სამართლის ერთ-ერთი უმნიშვნელოვანეს საკითხს - ერთობლივი აღიარების პრინციპი - რომელიც შიდა ბაზარზე ვრცელდება. აღნიშნული პრინციპი სწორედ იმიტომ იპყრობს დიდ ყურადღებას, რომ იგი დადგენილია ევროპული კავშირის ერთ-ერთი უძლიერესი ინსტიტუტის, ვროპული კავშირის მართმსაჯულების სასამართლო, პრაქტიკის საფუძველზე. შესაბამისად, მიმოვიხილავ ამ პრიციპის შექმნის წინამძღვრებს, საქმის სამართლებრივ გარემოებებსა და სასამართლოს განმარტებას, რომელსაც დღესაც უდიდესი გავლენა აქვს ევროპული კავშირის შიდა ბაზარზე.
რეფერატის მთავარ მიზანს წარმოადგენს ურთიერთაღიარების პრინციპის ეფექტურობის აღწერა ევროკავშირის სამართლებრივ წესრიგში. უპირველეს ყოვლისა, ყურადღება გამახვილდება იმ საკითხზე, თუ რაოდენ მნიშვნელოვანი როლი შეასრულა ზემოაღნიშნულმა პრინციპმა საქონლის თავისუფალი გადაადგილების სფეროში და რატომ არის ის გარანტი საქონლის თავისუფალი მოძრაობისათვის;
რეფერატის პირველ ნაწილში შევეხებით ერთობლივი აღიარების პრინციპის ფუძემდებლურ სასამართლო პრაქტიკას, ხოლო მეორე ნაწილში ვისაუბრებთ აღნიშნული წესიდან გარკვეულ გამონაკლისებზე.
ა.ჰერიტერის თქმით, „ერთობლივი აღიარება, როგორც ინსტიტუციური წესი არეგულირებს ბაზარზე ინტეგრაციას და უზრუნველყოფს საქონლის, მომსახურებისა და პირთა თავისუფალ გადაადგილებას, რაც დაფუძნებულია ეროვნულ კანონმდებლობაზე და აღიარებს სხვა წევრ სახელმწიფოებში განსხვავებულ, თუმცა ექვივალენტური რეგულაციების ლეგიტიმურობას“.1
სათანადოდ ფუნქციონირებადი შიდა ბაზარი და შესაბამისად საქონლის თავისუფალი გადაადგილება სამართლიანი კონკურენციის გარანტიას აძლევს ეკონომიკური ცხოვრების სუბიექტებს. პრაქტიკაში ხშირად ჰქონია ადგილი ისეთ შემთხვევებს, როდესაც კერძო კომპანიები ცდილობდნენ მოეპოვებინათ დომინანტი პოზიცია ევროპის ბაზარზე; აღსანიშნავია, წევრი სახელმწიფოთა მცდელობაც ბაზარზე რეგულაციის დაწესებისათვის, რაც სამართლიანი და თავისუფალი კონკურენციის შემაფერხებელი ასპექტია. მიუხედავად იმისა, რომ გაერთიანებამ შეძლო აღმოეფხვრა ისეთი სახის დაბრკოლება, როგორიცაა საბაჟო გადასახადი, თავდაპირველად მაინც ვერ უზრუნველყოფდა შიდა ბაზრის მიერ მოცემული შესაძლებლობების გამოყენების საშუალებას. ამ კუთხით, უაღრესად მნიშვნელოვანი როლი შეასრულა ევროპული კავშირის მართმსაჯულების სასამართლომ, რომელმაც შეიმუშავა ერთობლივი აღიარების პრინციპი, რომელმაც, თავის მხრივ, ხელი შეუწყო ჰარმონიზაციის პროცესს.
ერთობლივი აღიარების პრინციპი, როგორც კონცეფცია გარდამტეხი მნიშვნელობის მქონე აღმოჩნდა ევროპის კანონმდებლობისთვის, ვინაიდან მოახერხა წევრ სახელმწიფოთა შორის ბარიერებთან მიმართებით შემორჩენილი დაბრკოლებების გადაწყვეტა, რაც ხელის შემშლელი ფაქტორი გახლდათ ერთიანი ბაზრის მიზნების სისრულეში მოყვანისათვის.

We examine how third party certification with quality management standards and mutual recognition of certification through international agreements of accreditation bodies creates trust between trading partners and increases bilateral trade. We focus on the food, bever-age and tobacco industry and use augmented gravity models for the 2000-2008 period. Our results show that quality management certifications are positively correlated with bilateral trade. Certifications help to reduce information asymmetries and signal commitment to quality production processes. Moreover, our results show that mutual recognition of certi-fication has a positive and significant effect on trade. Members of the mutual recognition agreement for quality management standards have higher bilateral trade flows than non-members. Mutual recognition is in particular beneficial for markets access in high-income countries. We conclude that technical cooperation programs for developing countries’ con-formity assessment services might be effective means to increase trade performance of developing countries.

http://dx.doi.org/10.18566/escr.v26n57.a05

El articulo quiere demostrar las razones por las cuales se precisa de la complementariedad dialectica entre las dos formas de reconocimiento reciproco, la reciprocidad y la mutualidad, si se apunta al telos, nunca completamente alcanzado y siempre esperado, de llevar una vida buena y feliz en comunidad, dado el rol insustituible del conflicto en el seno de la condicion humana y la vida en sociedad. Se centra en las diferencias de matiz, pero importantes entre reconocimiento reciproco y mutuo con el fin de mostrar la potencia de estos conceptos en la comprension del intrincado camino del ser humano para realizar la historia de la vida en comun. La lucha por el reconocimiento es expresion de la tendencia ambigua y ambivalente de la condicion humana que hace de los hombres seres fragiles y desproporcionados, tan capaces del bien como del mal, de la disimetria como de la reciprocidad y de la inclinacion al impulso agresivo, como a las bondades del amor. La capacidad del incremento de sentido del amor, de la autocritica a la mala conciencia y de los esfuerzos generosos de la voluntad por una vida buena en comun, propios del reconocimiento mutuo, resultan ser ingredientes necesarios que deben tenerse en cuenta en las iniciativas de las luchas pacificas por el reconocimiento. Finalmente, estas ideas van a ser aplicadas a algunos rasgos de la experiencia de paz en Colombia para demostrar la necesidad de los gestos de reconocimiento mutuo para vislumbrar un horizonte de configuracion de situaciones duraderas de paz.

The aim of the article is to show why, if the purpose is to lead a good, happy life in society, and bearing in mind the insurmountable role of conflict within human condition, dialectical complementarity is necessary among the two kinds of recognition, reciprocity and mutuality. It focuses on the subtle but crucial differences between reciprocal and mutual recognition, with the purpose of showing the merits of both concepts for understanding the intricate course of human being towards life together. Struggle for recognition is the expression of the ambiguous and ambivalent tendency of human beings that makes them fragile and disproportionate beings, capable of good as well as evil, of dissymmetry as well as reciprocity, of the aggressive impulse as well as the kindness of love. The capacity to increase the sense of love, of self-criticism over a bad conscience and of the generous efforts for a good life together, which are characteristic of mutual recognition, turns out to be a necessary condition for the initiatives of peaceful struggles for recognition. In the end, those ideas are used to explore some features of peace-experiences in Colombia and to show how the gestures of mutual recognition are necessary to think of a lasting setting of peace situations.

The idea that physical and organic structures reoccur on the level of social life is central to the social-critical use of the concept of an “outer second nature” (Testa 2007, 488). In what follows, I will suggest that Hegel’s dialectic of “Lordship and Bondage” offers valuable insights for a critical social ontology of second nature and, in particular, for developing the idea of social philosophy as a diagnosis and therapy of social pathologies (Laitinen & Särkelä 2018). In this famous passage of the Phenomenology of Spirit, death and disease namely reappear on a spiritual level of life in novel, distinctively social shapes, namely, death as “Lordship” and disease as “Bondage.” A peculiar feature of Hegel’s diagnosis of “Lordship and Bondage” is that instead of taking social pathology as a dysfunction of a social organism, he expands the diagnosis by critically describing precisely the healthy organic reproduction as the death of a genuinely spiritual life-form. What on the level of organic life still was healthy in the sense of a frictionless self-maintenance, cannot mean anything else than death and disease to spiritual life.  “Lordship,” I will argue, presents the basic form of spiritual or social death (2). Moreover, similarly to diseases in organic life, which Hegel in his philosophy of nature interprets as both tendencies towards and struggles against death, “Bondage” can serve both to reproduce and to transcend the relationship of domination; therefore, so goes the second claim, “Bondage” can be represented as the basic spiritual or social form of disease (3). First, however, the experiential story must be caught up with by briefly looking at the transition from the “Struggle onto Life and Death” to “Lordship and Bondage” (1).

This paper compares Philip Pettit’s account of freedom to Hegelian ones. Both share the key insight that characterizes the tradition of republicanism from the Ancients to Rousseau: to be subordinated to the will of particular others is to be unfree. They both also hold that relations to others, relations of recognition, are in various ways directly constitutive of freedom, and in different ways enabling conditions of freedom. For example, the republican ideal of non-domination can be understood in light of the Hegelian structure of ‘being at one with oneself (beisichsein) in another’. Hegelian views converge with Pettit’s on non-domination and recognition, although their comprehensive theories of freedom are based on radically different metaphysics. Their biggest difference concerns the relationship between freedom and nature, and there is a further difference between Pettit’s (ahistorical) idea of the concept-dependence of freedom, and the Hegelian (historical) idea of the conception-dependence of freedom.

Many interpreters argue that irrational acts of exchange can count as rational and civic-minded for Hegel – even though, admittedly, the persons who are exchanging their property are usually unaware of this fact. While I do not want to deny that property exchange can count as rational in terms of 'mutual recognition' as interpreters claim, this proposition raises an important question: What about the irrationality and arbitrariness that individuals as property owners and persons consciously enjoy? Are they mere vestiges of nature in Hegel's system, or do they constitute a simple yet valid form of freedom that is not only a part of Hegel's rational system of right, but its necessary starting point? I will argue the latter: The arbitrary, purely egoist self-definition of property owners is the simplest possible type of freedom for Hegel, which he dissects in order to show how the very arbitrary self-definition implicitly relies on an identity between persons, and hence foreshadows the more social forms of freedom Hegel will discuss later in his book. I make this argument by highlighting Hegel's references to his discussion of atoms and freedom in his Logic of Being.

This paper critically examines Christopher Zurn’s suggestion mentioned above that various social pathologies (pathologies of ideological recognition, maldistribution, invisibilization, rationality distortions, reification and institutionally forced self-realization) share the structure of being ‘second-order disorders’: that is, that they each entail ‘constitutive disconnects between first-order contents and secondorder reflexive comprehension of those contents, where those disconnects are pervasive and socially caused’ (Zurn, 2011, 345-346). The paper argues that the cases even as discussed by Zurn do not actually match that characterization, but that it would be premature to conclude that they are not thereby social pathologies, or that they do not have a structure in common. It is just that the structure is more complex than originally described, covering pervasive socially caused evils (i) in the social reality, (ii) in the first order experiences and understandings, (iii) in the second order reflection as discussed by Zurn, and also (iv) in the ‘third order’ phenomenon concerning the pre-emptive silencing or nullification of social criticism even before it takes Place.

The principle of mutual recognition in connection with criminal law and criminal procedure law, historically has appeared among the legal provisions of international cooperation in criminal matters. It can be stated - in a retrospective view from today -, that the principle functioned in a negative way: the requirement of double incrimination means the non-recognition of the foreign legislature's decision about the necessity of punishment, in other words the double incrimination means the denial of mutual recognition. Even, if it was not called to be eliminated on the stage of generally accepted legal customs and legal regulation for a while, jurisprudence had appreciated the possible success
of the principle already in the early days...

Although John Dewey never developed an explicit “Theory of Recognition,” he did contribute vastly to at least three fields of recognition-theoretical inquiry: the ontology of personhood, social ontology, and the political theory of struggles for recognition. The closest Dewey comes to developing something like an explicit theory of recognition is in his lectures on social and political philosophy in China 1919-1920 (Dewey 1973 & 2015). There he presents a theory of struggles for public recognition as the basic social-ontological framework for an experimentalist social and political philosophy.

Abstract: From some years now, the social sciences have been highlighting the existence of a type of goods that are neither material things, nor ideas, nor functional performances but consist, instead, of social relations and, for this reason, are called relational goods.This contribution proposes to clarify this concept from the viewpoint of relational sociology, which avoids both methodological individualism and holism.Subsequently,it argues that such goods can be produced only by specific social subjects, which the author calls «relational subjects». Relying upon many theoretical and empirical researches, the paper explains in which sense and in which way relational subjects, and the goods they generate, can contribute to making civil society more robust: that is, no longer the typically capitalist society of the market, but an «associational» society able to sustain a mature democracy.

The 'Europeanisation' of the fight against crime is a broad and much-contested notion. This in-depth analysis of the role of the EU in fighting crime within the area of freedom, security and justice explores the impact of EU policies in the Member States, the progressive convergence of Member States' criminal law systems, the emergence of mutual recognition as an alternative to harmonization, and the incremental development of the ECJ's jurisdiction. The essays also explore the limitations inherent in EU counter-crime policies and the changes brought about by the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon. These changes are discussed both collectively and within individual substantive areas in which the EU has taken an active role in fighting crime, such as corruption, money laundering, terrorism, organised crime and extradition.

This study aims to investigate the changes in the mutual recognition between Korea and China from the late 19th century to the early 20th century, and in the international relationship discerned from here. To discuss these topics, the methodologies of digital humanities based on linguistic big data are used. The objective materials that show the relation and the exchange between modern Korea and China suggest that there had been a constant connection. Based on the frequency and co-occurrence relationship of the term ‘China’ and ‘Jina’, the trend can be divided into three stages. The quarters are 1910 and 1920. Before 1910, the most co-occurred words of ‘China’ and ‘Jina’ were related to history, geography, and academics. After 1920, the most co-occurred words of that related to political and cultural movements in China. Co-occurred words of Japan was related to Japan's political situation and economic
exploitation. The results of Chinese database analysis show the change in Korea-China relations since 1830. According to the annual frequency of ‘Joseon’, the trend can be divided into three periods. These three periods are characterized by the traditional regional order, the transition of the East Asian regional order, and the global nationalist and communist movements. Both of two result clearly shows the modern transformation of the regional order in East Asia. In short, the modern text big-data
of Korea and China shows meaningful information about the mutual recognition of the two countries in modern era and the change in international relations behind them.