Mario Bunge

Por "cientificismo" refiro-me à tese de que todos os problemas cognitivos são melhores resolvidos adotando uma abordagem científica, também chamada de "método científico", "espírito da ciência" e "atitude científica". Embora a maioria dos filósofos contemporâneos rejeite o cientificismo, é provável que todos os cientistas o pratiquem, mesmo aqueles que nunca se depararam com a palavra. Este artigo oferece uma defesa de um tipo particular de cientificismo: a visão de que a ciência é o tipo mais verdadeiro e profundo de conhecimento da natureza e da sociedade.

No distinctive feature seems to fit the process of philosophical inquiry other than the act of deliberation common to any other rational enterprise. I will argue for a heuristic- and erotetic based approach for posing and solving philosophical problems. A set theoretic view of philosophical inquiry asserts that general statements are truth conditions for the specific concepts they entail (i.e. for these to be meaningful in a common background) and remain presupposed even when adopting the form of an implicature. It is the job of philosophers with scientific training to unearth them, or  scientists with philosophical vocation to propose them as a means of clarifying scientific knowledge.

Por qué el psicoanálisis es una pseudociencia para M. Bunge. Según explica M. Bunge en su tratado de La Investigación Científica: "El psicoanálisis no debe confundirse con la psicología ni con la psiquiatría. El psicoanálisis pretende ser una teoría y una técnica terapéutica. Como teoría sería aceptable si se mostrara que es suficientemente verdadero; como técnica, si se mostrara que es suficientemente eficaz. Pero para poder sostener la pretensión de verdad o la pretensión de eficiencia, un cuerpo de ideas y practicas tiene que someterse el mismo a los cánones de desarrollo de la ciencia pura y aplicada, por lo menos si desea ser tomado por una ciencia. Ahora bien, el psicoanálisis no consigue pasar las pruebas de cientificidad.

Antes de comenzar a hablar sobre el relativismo moral, hace falta responder a una cuestión más básica: ¿qué es el relativismo? El Diccionario de la lengua española define el relativismo como: teoría filosófica «que niega el carácter absoluto del conocimiento, al hacerlo depender del sujeto que conoce» (RAE, s.f.). En primer lugar, esta definición nos pone en contexto, pues nos dice que estamos en el ámbito de la filosofía del conocimiento. En segundo lugar, nos sitúa en un debate concreto: el conocimiento, ¿depende de cada uno o es en sí mismo válido para todos? Y, en tercer lugar, nos dice en qué consiste la posición relativista: el relativismo sostiene que el conocimiento depende del sujeto que conoce. Mario Bunge nos ofrece una definición más descriptiva del relativismo: «el relativismo es la tesis de que no hay verdades ni valores objetivos y universales: que todo es del color del lente con que se mira, y lo que vale para una tribu no tiene por qué valer para ninguna

جاء كتاب بونغيه في أغلبه جدليا وأحيانا متفردا بالرأي، لكن بونغيه قدم فيه بوضوح رؤية عقلانية ومعتدلة حول صناعة المعرفة العلمية، وبالمقابل تصوره أين صُنع التطور الأمثل للعلم الاجتماعي، وأين تقع عوائقه، بطريقة إقناعية، وفي كل الأحوال جاء الكتاب مغازلا لعلماء الاجتماع، وهو سبب كاف لتحقيق أفضل تلق لكتابه.

La ciencia es un estilo de pensamiento y de acción: precisamente el más reciente, el más universal y el más provechoso de todos los estilos. Como ante toda creación humana, tenemos que distinguir en la ciencia entre el trabajo -investigación-y su producto final, el conocimiento. En este Capítulo consideraremos tanto los esquemas generales de la investigación científica -el método científico-cuanto su objetivo.

Drawing extensively on the research findings of natural and social sciences both in America and Europe, Reframing the Social argues for a critical realist and systemist social ontology, designed to shed light on current debates in social theory concerning the relationship of social ontology to practical social research, and the nature of "the social." It explores the works of the systems theorist Mario Bunge in comparison with the approach of Niklas Luhmann and critical social systems theorists, to challenge the commonly held view that the systems-based approach is holistic in nature and necessarily downplays the role of human agency.

Theoretically sophisticated and investigating the work of a theorist whose work has until now received insufficient attention in Anglo-American thought, this book will be of interest to those working in the field of social theory, as well as scholars concerned with philosophy of social science, the project of analytical sociology, and the nature of the relationship between the natural and social sciences.


Reviews:

“This is the clearest and most comprehensive discussion of contemporary social ontology. The author's definitions and illustrations of such key concepts as those of system, process, mechanism, and emergence, often used sloppily, are lucid. And his evaluation of the competing theories is magisterial. This book should greatly help any social theorists and philosophers seeking clarity and depth.” (Mario Bunge, McGill University, Canada)
 
“Poe Yu-ze Wan has produced an impressive book that brings social systems theory into the twenty-first century. In a beautifully well-judged argument that deserves to be widely read, he shows how social theorists are moving towards mechanismic explanation and ‘emergentist systemism’ – and why they are right to do so.” (Dave Elder-Vass, Loughborough University, UK)

“Every scholar interested in this literature needs to read this book simply to be able to claim that he or she is acquainted with the state of the art and with the now staggering breadth of writings on the various inter-related subjects.” (Omar Lizardo, University of Notre Dame, US)

“Whoever wishes to become introduced to the contemporary philosophical debate on causality (with special reference to social causality) cannot do better than studying this book.” (Wolfgang Krohn, University of Bielefeld, Germany)

“…dieses Klar gegliederte und flüssig geschriebene Buch…. Auch kann dieses Buch jedem zu Diensten sein, der sich einen konzisen Überblick über die Probleme und Argumente zu verschaffen sucht, welche die Entwicklung einer wissenschaftstheoretisch informierten „erklärenden Soziologie“ nicht erst seit jüngster Zeit begleiten.” (Michael Schmid, Bundeswehr University Munich, Germany)

El propósito de este curso es desarrollar las problemáticas fundamentales de la Filosofía de la técnica, partiendo de las teorías propuestas por Carl Mitcham y Andrew Feenberg. Ambos autores serán los disparadores para repensar y poner en cuestión las reflexiones y/o planteamientos de autores tan dispares como heterogéneos, como lo son: M. Heidegger, J. Ellul, M. Bunge, M. Á. Quintanilla, la primera generación de la Escuela de Frankfurt (T. Adorno, M. Horkheimer y H. Marcuse), como también J. Habermas, P. Sloterdijk, G. Simondon y D. Haraway.

Presentación PowerPoint/Ciencia, una síntesis (UTN FRBA)
Qué es el conocimiento (natural o precientífico/científico)
Qué es y cómo se divide la ciencia;
Cuásl es su origen histórico (la Revolución científica y Galileo):
Cuál es su método (método axiomático; método inductivo; método hipotético-deductivo)

Resumen. El transhumanismo es un movimiento filosófico que propone el Mejoramiento Humano (Human Enhancement) como medio para lograr un estado evolutivo más fructífero del Homo Sapiens al que denomina Transhumano. En el presente documento a modo de recuento y contribución teórica del pensamiento transhumanista se responderá primero a la pregunta qué es el Transhumanismo, así como se definirán los conceptos propios de su filosofía; y segundo, se planteará cuál es el proyecto que posee.

Palabras clave: transhumanismo, posthumanismo, human enhancement, tecnología, futurismo, filosofía

In the eighth volume of his Treatise on Basic Philosophy (Bunge 1989) Mario Bunge articulates a detailed theory establishing ethics on the basis of a scientific philosophy. Analogously, the Islamic legal theorist of Andalusia, Shāṭibī (1320-1388 C.E.), sought to resolve massive Islamic doctrinal disagreements by establishing a common denominator that could unify the Islamic legal theories of his time. This paper argues that Shāṭibī’s ethical theory when compared with Bunge’s scientific-humanistic ethics, will 1) transform our understanding of the secular-religious divide in ethics and 2) will assist contemporary Islamic ethicists in finding common grounds with scientific-humanistic ethics.
Not all religious ethics are based on theological mythology or dominated by superstitious rituals, as Shāṭibī’s theory demonstrates. Equally, not all secular ethics lead to subjective relativism, anarchy, or loss of meaning as Bunge’s theory establishes. The symmetry between these two theories is seen in Shāṭibī’s concept of “moral hierarchy.” According to Shāṭibī, norms are not perpetually fixed. Rather, “necessities” take precedence over “needs” and these over “desirables.” Necessities are “pentagonal”, to mean the preservation of “social existence” takes precedence over the protection of the “self”; that over “mind”; that over “lineage”; and that over “property.”
In contrast, in Bunge’s ethics the satisfaction of “life” takes precedence over “health” and that over “happiness.” Doing the right according to Bunge is a social harmonization project by which everyone achieves their welfare without jeopardizing anyone else’s. The path from Shāṭibī’s Islamic ethics to Bunge’s modern one is a matter of updating the naturalistic and sociological grounds while abstaining from outdated theological language. This comparison should be of interest to scholars of cultural studies and global ethics that often operate under an assumption of inherent irreconcilability between premodern and non-western cultures on the one hand and western and modern cultures on the other.

Estudiamos el cambio y la destrucción como nociones filosóficas que deben definirse y analizarse utilizando un lenguaje formal. Para lograr nuestro objetivo, presentamos algunas nociones filosóficas como individuo sustancial, propiedad y estroma. Proponemos una teoría de eventos y espacios posibles que formalizamos utilizando la teoría de categorías y en virtud de la cual podemos explicar las ideas de <<materia>> y <<forma>> tal como se utilizan en la filosofía escolástica. Luego elaboramos una teoría de cómo y cuándo se aplica el cambio a cada categoría de ser que hemos definido. Finalmente, exploramos cómo tal idea se relaciona con el conocimiento, el valor y la acción, es decir, cómo el cambio afecta y es afectado por la epistemología y la ética, términos que entendemos en el sentido más general posible.

Abstract: This essay argues that 1- Third World philosophical apprenticeship involves two opposites; enslavement if associated with imitation or an intelligence exploration that seeks to learn from the other’s achievements for the sake of surpassing or catching up with it. 2- There are deep divergences in the direction of 20th century philosophy between a Franco-German marriage and an Anglo-German one. The former dominated the Arab world due to the congeniality of the European left, the higher costs of studying humanities in Anglophone countries, and the literary leanings of the Arabs. 3- This Continental domination produced harmful results seen in the spread of seven claims promoting "the death of philosophy", abandoning scientific research, and giving up on development. 4- Focusing the funding of Arab students in the west on languages and literatures exacerbated the problem, in that taking a philosophical look at the galaxy of modernization became confined to the lens of “literary criticism.” 5- Hence, Continental Philosophy became an obstacle to modernization in the Arab world and a subject of justifiable mockery by traditional readers matriculated in Arab Islamic scholasticism. 6- After doing justice to many German and French scientists, social-scientists, and orientalists, who follow the research traditions of the enlightenment and modernity, the essay emphasizes that Anglophone specialists in philosophy avoid works in postmodern philosophy because it violates philosophical requirements, e.g., logical coherence, empirical support, and theory construction. 7- Finally, a comprehensive philosophical system exists in the Anglophone philosophies, translated into Arabic, and surpasses Continental ones. In this system, “the Tree of Philosophy” comprises “ten integral branches”. 8- Accordingly, philosophy is defined as a deep reflection on clear, consistent, and verifiable meanings, subject to methodological revision, and seeking beauty and good in the context of interaction with local and global cultures in order to advance social prosperity and justice. 9- Studying the listed translated works of these philosophies can enable Arab readers to explore the “nervous system” of modernization and development.

This is the first study to compare the philosophical systems of secular scientific philosopher Mario Bunge (1919-2020), and Moroccan Islamic philosopher Taha Abd al-Rahman (b.1945). In their efforts to establish the philosophical underpinnings of an ideal modernity these two great thinkers speak to the same elements of the human condition, despite their opposing secular and religious worldviews. While the differences between Bunge’s critical-realist epistemology and materialist ontology on the one hand, and Taha’s spiritualist ontology and revelational-mystical epistemology on the other, are fundamental, there is remarkable common ground between their scientific and Islamic versions of humanism. Both call for an ethics of prosperity combined with social justice, and both criticize postmodernism and religious conservatism. The aspiration of this book is to serve as a model for future dialogue between holders of Western and Islamic worldviews, in mutual pursuit of modernity’s best-case scenario.

Cyber attacks by domestic and foreign threat actors are increasing in frequency and sophistication. Cyber adversaries exploit a cybersecurity skill/knowledge gap and an open society, undermining the information security/privacy of citizens and businesses and eroding trust in governments, thus threatening social and political stability. The use of open digital hacking technologies in ethical hacking in higher education and within broader society raises ethical, technical, social, and political challenges for liberal democracies. Programs teaching ethical hacking in higher education are steadily growing but there is a concern that teaching students hacking skills increases crime risk to society by drawing students toward criminal acts. A cybersecurity skill gap undermines the security/viability of business and government institutions. The thesis presents an examination of opportunities and risks involved in using AI powered intelligence gathering/surveillance technologies in ethical hacking teaching practices in Canada. Taking a qualitative exploratory case study approach, technoethical inquiry theory (Bunge-Luppicini) and Weick’s sensemaking model were applied as a sociotechnical theory (STEI-KW) to explore ethical hacking teaching practices in two Canadian universities. In-depth interviews with ethical hacking university experts, industry practitioners, and policy experts, and a document review were conducted. Findings pointed to a skill/knowledge gap in ethical hacking literature regarding the meanings, ethics, values, skills/knowledge, roles and responsibilities, and practices of ethical hacking and ethical hackers which underlies an identity and legitimacy crisis for professional ethical hacking practitioners; and a Teaching vs Practice cybersecurity skill gap in ethical hacking curricula. Two main S&T innovation risk mitigation initiatives were explored: An OSINT Analyst cybersecurity role and associated body of knowledge foundation framework as an interdisciplinary research area, and a networked centre of excellence of ethical hacking communities of practice as a knowledge management and governance/policy innovation approach focusing on the systematization and standardization of an ethical hacking body of knowledge.

La creación del Comité Nacional de Facilitación del Comercio proporcionará a la República Argentina una posibilidad histórica: abordar su problemática de Comercio Exterior de una forma integral y sistémica, con la debida participación de todos los sectores involucrados en el competitivo mercado internacional, en donde los méritos, no son solamente empresarios, sino de todo el sistema que les sirve de soporte.

In the field of sociological theory, after the decline of Parsons’ version of structural functionalism, Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory came to be seen as the major representative of systems thinking. While Luhmann’s autopoietic systems ontology is sophisticated and deserves serious consideration, the author argues that the prevailing identification of Luhmann’s constructivist-oriented approach with the systems approach itself is problematic mainly for two reasons. First, as the works of the Argentinian-Canadian systems theorist Mario Bunge demonstrate, the systems approach can be fruitfully based on (some version of) scientific realism. Second, the adherents to Luhmann’s constructivist epistemology in sociology seldom engage in a detailed examination of the various critiques of anti-realism offered by scientific and critical realists. Drawing on the literature on philosophy of science, especially the writings of Bunge and a few leading critical realists, the author suggests that a serious Luhmannian sociologist is obligated to provide more cogent and detailed discussions on philosophy of (social) science before taking an opinionated position on epistemology.

The project of the analysis of knowledge in terms of "justified true belief" is an essential part of both traditional and contemporary epistemology. Mario Bunge has gone beyond Gettier's famous counterexamples and has maintained that the conditions of the standard analysis are not only insufficient, but also unnecessary, and that therefore we should pursue a completely different theory of knowledge. In this paper I shall argue , however, that Bunge's criticisms are not decisive, and also that his alternative naturalized epistemology has serious insufficiencies. In particular I will try to show that it cannot account for the specifically epistemic aspects of inferential and testimonial knowledge.

In this article, I examine Niklas Luhmann's, Mario Bunge's and others’ views on emergence, and argue that Luhmann’s epistemological construal of emergence in terms of Totalausschluss (total exclusion) is both ontologically flawed and detrimental to an appropriate understanding of the distinctive features of social emergence. By contrast, Bunge’s rational emergentism, his CESM model, and Wimsatt’s characterization of emergence as non-aggregativity provide a useful framework to investigate emergence. While researchers in the field of social theory and sociology tend to regard Luhmann as the sole representative of systems theory, the latter has been characterized by its diversity, and the writings of such systems theorists as Mario Bunge deserve more (critical) attention from social researchers than they do at present. Finally, this article suggests that the perennial debate over methodological individualism and holism in social science may make real progress if such ambiguous terms as reduction and reductionism are elucidated before they are employed.

Con ocasión del fallecimiento del filósofo de origen argentino Mario Augusto Bunge (1919-2020), se analiza su materialismo sistémico emergentista desde las coordenadas del materialismo filosófico de Gustavo Bueno. Tras criticar su concepción de la filosofía exacta o filosofía científica, se discuten su filosofía de las matemáticas (el ficcionismo moderado) y su filosofía de las ciencias fácticas (el realismo crítico y el cientificismo), confrontándolas con el materialismo formalista y la teoría del cierre categorial. A continuación, se analiza la ontología del materialismo sistémico emergentista, clasificando las ideas de materia, sistema y emergencia que comporta, e indicando cómo el pluralismo continuista bungeano en gnoseología termina resolviéndose en un monismo en ontología, en las antípodas del pluralismo discontinuista propio del materialismo filosófico en ambos planos. Por último, se exponen algunos de los pensamientos de Bunge sobre ética, moral y política, mostrando cómo en ellos el fundamentalismo científico se da la mano con el fundamentalismo democrático.

This article discusses the theories of social emergence developed by Roy Bhaskar and Mario Bunge. Bhaskar's concept of emergent causal power is shown to be ambiguous, and some of the difficulties of his depth-relational concept of social emergence are examined. It is argued that Bunge's systemic concept of emergent property is not only different, but also clearer and more consistent than Bhaskar's concept of emergent causal power. Despite its clarity and consistency, Bunge's definition of the concept of emergent property is shown to be too broad and analytically imprecise for the purposes of an emergentist social ontology. It is argued that Bunge's systemic account of social emergence can be developed further by using William Wimsatt's gradual approach to emergent phenomena and his four conditions of aggregativity of a systemic property. It is shown that these conditions provide useful conceptual tools for clarifying and investigating different kinds of mechanisms of social emergence and developing stronger varieties of the concept of emergent social property than that indicated in Bunge's definition of this concept.

In this article, Niklas Luhmann's pessimistic view of steering (Steuerung) and planning in modern society is contrasted with Mario Bunge’s advocacy of "technoholodemocracy" (or "integral democracy") and some core ideas of the "critical social systems theory" as developed by Christian Fuchs and others. Before that, the holistic leanings of Luhmann’s autopoietic approach, as exemplified by such notions as "structural coupling" and "total exclusion" (Totalausschluss), are briefly examined. I argue for a systems approach that is ontologically sound (that is to say, transcending both holism and individualism), with due consideration given to the role of human actors in designing, maintaining, improving, repairing or dismantling social systems. As the writings of Bunge and critical social systems theorists bear witness, a systems approach does not have to sacrifice human agency to blindly self-unfolding "social systems."

Metascientific ontology differs from philosophical ontologies in its objectives, objects and methods. By an examination of the ontological theories of Mario Bunge, we will show their main objective is a unified representation of the world as known through the sciences, that their objects of study are scientific concepts, and that their methods do not differ from those that one expects to find in any rational activity. Metascientific ontology is therefore not transcendent because it does not seek to represent non-concrete objects alien to the world we inhabit and to the sciences that study it, and therefore does not need special faculties and methods to carry out its research. Metascientific ontology is a general scientific discourse on the world because it was designed by and for the sciences.

This first issue of Mεtascience is a posthumous tribute to Mario Bunge, who died in February 2020. This is not the first time, and certainly not the last, that thinkers pay homage to Mario Bunge or that his work is the subject of study, and rightly so, because the man is a humanist and the work worthy heiress of the Enlightenment. Bunge has made a significant contribution to a wide range of disciplines: physics, philosophy, sociology, psychology, cognitive sciences. This issue is also a way to make his thoughts known to a French-speaking readership.

Acudir a la experiencia de otros resulta siempre una opción razonable, no para copiar o meramente imitar sino mas bien para comparar, buscar semejanzas, diferencias, referencias o sugerencias provechosas para el desarrollo del propio pensamiento crítico. Confiarse únicamente de la propia experiencia, puede llegar a transformarse en una reclusión funesta, un ejercicio dañino de simple autoreferencia.

Debates about the links between science and ontology are very active in contemporary philosophy, and, in fact, they have always been present. Despite the various philosophical positions on the subject, they all admit the existence of a metaphysical reality. In contrast, metascience holds that such a reality does not exist. This second issue of Mɛtascience presents seven out of twelve articles that have as a common thread either the metascientific ontology or the Bungean ontology. RÉSUMÉ-Les débats sur les liens qui uniraient la science à l'ontologie sont très actifs en philosophie contemporaine, et, en fait, ils ont toujours été présents. Malgré les diverses positions philosophiques sur le sujet, elles admettent toutes l'existence d'une réalité métaphysique. À l'opposé, la métascience soutient qu'une telle réalité n'existe pas. Ce second numéro de Mɛtascience présente sept articles sur douze qui ont comme fil conducteur soit l'ontologie métascientifique soit l'ontologie bungéenne. Contents

This essay concerns fiction in art and science. I argue that the term ‘fiction’ used in this manner is a category mistake (concept versus genre) and I believe this essay may succeed in “baking philosophical bread” by recognizing a verbal dispute. I am, therefore, suggesting an entire thread of discussion be re-evaluated. I provide an exposé of Catherine Z. Elgin and Nelson Goodman’s brand of fictionalism (i.e. that we glean understandings in the arts and sciences from fictions in the form of non-literal truth) and concentrate on unpacking the concept of fiction. I argue that representations (narratives of all sorts including models) are made of both fictional elements and faceted elements (with the exception of the possible or impossible ideal version e.g. God’s, which, would include only facets). Understandings are not gleaned from fictions but rather from faceted elements so ordered as to create understanding and usually leading to predictions, explanations, and manipulations. I define facets as ordered features whereas fictions (the genre) are groupings of disordered features. Full fiction is, therefore, by definition the expression of nothing or with respect to ideal languages (mathematics), the expression of contradiction. Representations are primitives and both fictions and facets are parts of them. Narratives are thus fictional by degree. Narratives which are highly fictional are of value (often playful) but they still always contain at least one facet. Ultimately all representational activity should be regarded as irreal i.e. incomplete although sometimes connected to reality and caught between a perfectly faceted realist description and complete fiction.

Resumen. En 1993 el biólogo Richard Dawkins publicó “Viruses of the Mind”, un texto en el que analizó las similitudes entre los virus biológicos e informáticos. Las definió como composiciones capaces de infectar un tipo de sistema determinado, copiarse a sí mismos y degradar el funcionamiento del huésped. Es a propósito de dichas características que Dawkins acuña la metáfora de virus mentales o ideas que infectan la mente de una persona. Originalmente identificó la fe como un virus mental. En este trabajo proponemos la existencia de otros virus mentales, los cuales están íntimamente vinculados. Para ello se definió qué es un virus mental, se analizaron sus características, se identificaron 5 tipos de virus mentales y se describió cómo se relacionan a partir de algunos ejemplos. El resultado mostró una retroalimentación y complementariedad entre los virus mentales descritos.

Abstract. In 1993 the biologist Richard Dawkins published "Viruses of the Mind", a text in which he analyzed the similarities between biological and computer viruses. He defined them as compositions capable of infecting a certain type of system, copying themselves and degrading the functioning of the host. It is with regard to these characteristics that Dawkins coined the metaphor of mental viruses or ideas that infect the mind of a person. Originally he identified faith as a mental virus. In this work we propose the existence of other mental viruses, which are closely linked. For this, what is a mental virus was defined, its characteristics were analyzed, 5 types of mental virus were identified and the way in which they are related was described based on some examples. The result showed a feedback and complementarity between the mental viruses described.

I discuss the recent claims made by Mario Bunge on the philosophical implications of the discovery of gravitational waves. I think that Bunge is right when he points out that the detection implies the materiality of spacetime, but I reject his identification of spacetime with the gravitational field. I show that Bunge’s analysis of the spacetime inside
a hollow sphere is defective, but this in no way affects his main claim.

Resumen Se presenta un análisis de la propues-ta de objeto de estudio de la psicología elaborada desde el metasistema inter-conductual de Jacob R. Kantor, así como su justificación ontológica con base en la ontología científica de Mario Bunge, la cual provee de las herramientas con-ceptuales necesarias para la clarificación de su ubicación y constitución particular con respecto a los demás niveles de or-ganización de la realidad (físico, quími-co, biológico y social). Para esto, se re-aliza un tránsito entre los encuentros y desencuentros de ambos marcos teóri-cos, principalmente en lo que concierne al objeto de estudio de la psicología y su relación con el resto de niveles de organ-ización de la realidad y las implicaciones de esto. Se busca demostrar que el cam-po interconductual constituye una pro-puesta lo suficientemente pertinente que cumple con los diferentes criterios para considerarlo como un objeto legítimo de estudio científico, en tanto sistema fun-cional constituido por el acoplamiento de los procesos en subsistemas sociales/ ecológicos y los procesos organísmicos (del individuo). Palabras claves: emergencia, intercon-ducta, interconductismo, ontología. Es así como un metasistema sería la construcción de principios básicos para una ciencia particular en el cual se es-tablecen los principios ontológicos (car-acterísticas del objeto de estudio) y se derivan los epistemológicos. Tal como es-tablece Kantor (1980), esta construcción debería realizarse aplicando las mismas reglas para la estructuración formal de los sistemas en todas las ciencias, aunque atendiendo a las particularidades del nivel de organización de la realidad bajo estudio. En este sentido, J.R. Kantor, desar-rolló el metasistema interconductual como un modelo específico para la Psi-cología, en el cual estableció las concep-ciones ontoepistemológicas de base para un estudio naturalista y científico de los fenómenos psicológicos, así como para el relacionamiento coherente con el resto de los campos científicos (físico-quíicos, biológicos y sociales). Cabe destacar, que la característica definitoria y el punto de partida del meta-sistema interconductual, como modelo para una ciencia de la psicología, resul-ta ser la definición del objeto de estudio de la psicología como interconducta, es decir, como la interacción organismo-en-torno (Ribes y López, 1984) la cual con-siste en campos, es decir, sistemas de rel-aciones recíprocas. Si bien, para Mario Bunge la psicología verdaderamente científica sería la psic-obiológica (estudio de los procesos men-tales concebidos como un tipo especial de procesos neurales), este texto tiene la intención de mostrar que la imple-mentación de las categorías que ofrece la ontología bungeana permite la justifi-cación del interconductismo como una propuesta que da cuenta de manera pre-Scientia in Verba Mag. 5, 39-48 (2019).

El Acuerdo de Facilitación de Comercio es la gran apuesta de la OMC para reactivar el comercio global. 

Para la OCDE la reducción de costos será entre 12,9 y 15,1%, según el tamaño del país. En este marco, la mejora de la competitividad aumentará los flujos comerciales, y mientras más profundas las mejoras, rediseños de procesos y disminución de trabas burocráticas redundarán en los países que las generen.

Para Argentina, acceder al AFC tendrá un valor diferencial. De acuerdo al estudio “Doing Business” del Banco Mundial, el costo de exportar un contenedor desde Argentina es de 1.910 dólares, mientras que el de países afines como Australia es de 1.538 y el de Nueva Zelanda de sólo 694 dólares. Estos datos contienen trámites y documentación, transporte interno y costo de frontera o puerto. Argentina es cara para exportar, por lo cual, la reducción que promete el AFC es esencial para la economía argentina.

Asimismo, la concreción del Comité Nacional de Facilitación de Comercio permitirá desarrollar en todos los operadores del comercio exterior una VISIÓN SISTÉMICA del mismo, de tal forma que los pequeños sacrificios que realice cada actor en su ámbito de competencia redunde en un mejoramiento “sustentables” para todos.

The following paper offers a critical account of positivist research principles, based primarily on the work of Leszek Kolakowski. The paper considers the limitations of the rules of phenomenalism, nominalism, objectivism, and consilience as a prelude to the development of a geosemeiotic approach to observational practices.

Ce premier numéro de Mεtascience rend un hommage posthume à Mario Bunge, décédé en février 2020. Ce n’est pas la première fois, et certainement pas la dernière, que des penseurs rendent hommage à Mario Bunge ou que son oeuvre fait l’objet d’une étude, à juste titre d’ailleurs, car l’homme est un humaniste et l’oeuvre digne héritière des Lumières. Bunge a contribué de façon significative à un très grand nombre de disciplines : physique, philosophie, sociologie, psychologie, sciences cognitives. Ce numéro est aussi une façon de faire connaître sa pensée à un lectorat francophone.

A versiones anteriores de Tres Leyes del Saber, se ha agregado una observacion de Snell sobre la creacion de los sustantivos propios, concretos y abstractos como pre-requisito para el surgimiento del pensamiento racional. Esto esta relacionado con el producto-W, o producto de Wittgenstein cuando se crea saber.

I discuss the recent claims made by Mario Bunge on the philosophical implications of the discovery of gravitational waves. I think that Bunge is right when he points out that the detection implies the materiality of spacetime, but I reject his identification of spacetime with the gravitational field. I show that Bunge's analysis of the spacetime inside a hollow sphere is defective, but this in no way affects his main claim. Keywords Ontology • spacetime • gravitational waves • substantivalism 1 Bunge on the detection of gravitational waves Mario Bunge's paper "Gravitational waves and spacetime" is important for at least two reasons: 1. It is the first paper to discuss some of the deep philosophical problems raised by the recent detection of gravitational waves by LIGO collaboration (Abbott et al. 2016), and 2. In his paper Bunge manifests a change in his ontological views about gravitation and spacetime. A former relationistá la Leibniz, Bunge now claims the identity of the gravitational field and spacetime in the light of the recent detection of gravitational waves. This amounts to some sort of spacetime realism or "substantivalism". I think that Bunge's analysis should be praised as timely and he deserves recognition for his brave intelectual honesty in front of the facts. His analysis and conclusions, however, are not free of some problems. The purpose of this short commentary is to discuss these problems.

El pensamiento del filósofo de la Ciencia Mario Bunge acerca de lo que nos rodea, expone que dicha realidad existe, que es material, independiente, sistémica —todo es un sistema o parte de uno— y emergentista —el todo es más que la suma de las partes—, y que de ella podemos llegar a averiguar, por el ejercicio de nuestras facultades intelectuales y mediante la aplicación cuidadosa del método científico, su naturaleza. Su cada vez más correcto conocimiento, siempre perfeccionable, nos ha de permitir disfrutar más de nuestras vidas y hacer que la puedan disfrutar mejor otras personas. Es decir, hacer algo realmente útil para los demás y para nosotros mismos.