Consent

Public confidence in policing has received much attention in recent years, but few studies outside of the US have examined the sociological and social-psychological processes that underpin trust and support. This study, conducted in a rural English location, finds that trust and confidence in the police is shaped not by sentiments about risk and crime, but by evaluations of the values and morals that underpin community life. Furthermore, to garner public confidence the police must be seen first to typify group morals and values and second to treat the public with dignity and fairness. All these findings are consistent with the perspective that people are Durkheimian in their attitudes towards crime, policing and punishment – a perspective developed here in this paper.

Background: The consent and community engagement process for research with Indigenous communities is rarely evaluated. Research protocols are not always collaborative, inclusive or culturally respectful. If participants do not trust or understand the research, selection bias may occur in recruitment, affecting study results potentially denying participants the opportunity to provide more knowledge and greater understanding about their community. Poorly informed consent can also harm the individual participant and the community as a whole. Methods: Invited by local Aboriginal community leaders of the Fitzroy Valley, the Kimberley, Western Australia, The Picture Talk project explores the consent process for research. Focus groups of Aboriginal community members were conducted to establish preferences for methods of seeking individual consent. Transcripts were analysed through NVivo10 Qualitative software using grounded theory with inductive and deductive coding. Themes were synthesised with quotes highlighted. Results: Focus groups with Aboriginal community members (n = 6 focus groups of 3-7 participants) were facilitated by a Community Navigator as a cultural guide and interpreter and a researcher. Participants were recruited from all main language groups of the Fitzroy Valley-Gooniyandi, Walmajarri, Wangkatjungka, Bunuba and Nikinya. Participants were aged ≥18 years, with 5 female groups and one male group. Themes identified include: Reputation and trust is essential; The Community Navigator is key; Pictures give the words meaningmilli milli versus Pictures; Achieving consensus in circles; Signing for consent; and Research is needed in the Valley. Conclusion: Aboriginal communities of the Fitzroy Valley recommend that researchers collaborate with local leaders, develop trust and foster a good reputation in the community prior to research. Local Aboriginal researchers should be employed to provide cultural guidance throughout the research process and interpret local languages especially for elders. Pictures are preferred to written text to explain research information and most prefer to sign for consent. The Fitzroy Valley welcomes research when collaborative and for the benefit of the community. Future research could include exploring how to support young people, promote health screening and improve understanding of medical knowledge.

The present paper explores how young people construct gendered social meanings and cultural norms surrounding sexual and bodily expression in youth sexting culture. Previous research suggests youth sexting is a gendered phenomenon in which young men are able to seek social capital through sexting, whereas young women are subject to social shaming and harassment. Drawing upon findings from group and one-to-one interviews with 41 young people aged 14–18, I show how constructs of risk, shame, and responsibility operated along gendered lines. Young people attributed agency and legitimacy to young men’s sexual practices, whereas young women were disempowered, denied legitimacy, and tasked with managing gendered risks of harm in youth sexting culture. I discuss how young women negotiated and navigated risk and shame and, in some instances, made space for safe, pleasurable sexting experiences despite and within these narratives. The accounts of two young women, who shared experiences sexting and social shaming, are presented to show some of the ways young women make sense of social meanings and cultural norms on individual and interpersonal levels. I conclude that challenging gendered harm requires a (re)legitimisation of feminine sexuality and bodily expression away from narratives of risk and shame.

For decades, feminists have intervened in a sexually violent culture. Many public health professionals, educators, and activists who design these interventions have called for complex conceptualizations of communication, yet communication studies scholars have not written extensively on consent. Moreover, researchers outside the field rarely rely on insights from the discipline. Accordingly, I offer a critical review of consent activism and research, and I highlight disciplinary assumptions that could enhance existing knowledge. I argue that many feminist academic/activist interventions use false ideas about communication, what I call communication myths: discourse merely reflects reality, and local discourse is disconnected from larger social Discourse. I show how these communication myths resonate with rape-supportive arguments. By suggesting communication should be unambiguous during consent, anti- violence educators/activists lower the standard for communicative competence, disconnect it from historical-cultural context, and miss opportunities to politicize consent. I argue feminists can challenge communication myths to build on existing interventions while more fully dismantling rape culture.

Consent governs innumerable everyday social interactions, including sex, medical exams, the use of property, and economic transactions. Yet little is known about how ordinary people reason about the validity of consent. Across the domains of sex, medicine, and police entry, Study 1 showed that when agents lack autonomous decision-making capacities, participants are less likely to view their consent as valid; however, failing to exercise this capacity and deciding in a nonautonomous way did not reduce consent judgments. Study 2 found that specific and concrete incapacities reduced judgments of valid consent, but failing to exercise these specific capacities did not, even when the consenter makes an irrational and inauthentic decision. Finally, Study 3 showed that the effect of autonomy on judgments of valid consent carries important downstream consequences for moral reasoning about the rights and obligations of third parties, even when the consented-to action is morally wrong. Overall, these findings suggest that laypeople embrace a normative, domain-general concept of valid consent that depends on the possession of autonomous capacities, but not the exercise of these capacities. Autonomous decisions and autonomous capacities thus play divergent roles in moral reasoning about consent interactions: while the former appears relevant for assessing the wrongfulness of consented-to acts, the latter plays a role in whether consent is regarded as authoritative and therefore as transforming moral rights.

One of the reasons that elections have come to be so widely valued across the globe lies in their perceived ability to increase citizens' consent to be governed by their representatives. Yet inversely, one may ask what election results tell us about citizens' consent. For instance, to what extent can election winners be assumed to be backed up by citizens' consent? Does voting automatically imply consent to the outcome of the election? What does abstention mean? This paper addresses the question of what election results tell us about citizens' consent, from an empirically informed normative perspective. The question is of political importance, because the connection between voting and consenting is often exploited for political gain, and because representative institutions are now being increasingly questioned by citizens themselves. This paper pleads for caution in any endeavor to interpret election results (as well as abstentions) in terms of consent. As we will see, each (non)voter's motives and assessments are unique and can only be ascertained by asking him about these, and not from his sole act of voting. In addition, much variation is to be expected regarding what is being consented to, and to what degree.

This paper examines how, on Internet HIV/AIDS support groups, participants discuss the ethics of disclosing HIV seropositivity to partners. The data consist of all mentions of disclosure culled from over 16,000 pages overall of posts from 16 different groups, hosted on seven separate sites. The paper focuses on two main questions. First, apart from providing support and information, did the groups also debate moral dilemmas (and, despite groups’ common perception as ‘safe spaces’ for non-judgmental exchanges, did these discussions include moral judgments and conflicts)? Second, did use of this new medium generate a new, alternative ethical discourse, or merely replicate existing discourses? The data demonstrate that online support groups did engage in debating, and trying verbally to enforce, certain views of the ethics of seropositivity disclosure. The most common view advocated full disclosure, though a range of positions existed. Unlike with most online support groups described elsewhere, these discussions often included harshly-expressed moral judgments. The groups did not generate a truly new, alternative discourse, but served as clearinghouses for and transmitters of existing ‘off-line’ discourses, both mainstream and alternative. Implications and limitations of the present study, and areas for further research, are discussed.

Democratic governance is under increasing scrutiny as a result of waning trust in political institutions, and a widening gap between public aspirations and government performance. The purpose of this paper is to address what is currently diagnosed as a democratic deficit by calling into question the notion of consent, procedures advocated in its pursuit, and its relationship with democracy. To this purpose, the paper reviews seminal works that have investigated the nexus of democracy and consent over time: The Calculus of Consent, The Engineering of Consent and Manufacturing Consent. In this, it presents different understandings of the processes whereby consent is arrived at, and questions whether they support or undermine democratic aspirations.

Hypospadias is a relatively common genital condition in which the urethral opening forms on the underside of the penis, as opposed to at the tip of the glans. Patients with hypospadias are typically referred for surgery during infancy or early childhood. Recent evidence, however, indicates that many individuals with hypospadias do not experience the functional or psychosocial difficulties that are commonly attributed to the condition, and that surgical intervention for hypospadias carries substantial risk of adverse outcomes. In this article, we review published outcomes data and conduct an in-depth analysis of the typical rationales for hypospadias surgery, taking into consideration both the potential benefits and harms of the procedure, as well as the existence of non-surgical alternatives. We argue, firstly, that most childhood surgeries for hypospadias are performed for anticipated future problems concerning function and cosmesis, rather than extant problems that serve to undermine the child’s well-being. Secondly, we contend that the surgery can be safely performed after an age of consent without increasing the absolute risk of surgical complications to an ethically meaningful degree. We conclude that surgery for hypospadias should typically be performed only if requested by the affected individual, under conditions of informed consent.

The aim of this article is to provide a critical review of one of the most worrying aspects of the euthanasia policy and practice in Belgium – the deliberate shortening of lives of some patients without their explicit voluntary request. Some suggestions designed to improve the situation and prevent abuse are offered.

We will argue that clarifying the “moral core” of consent offers a common metric by which we can evaluate how well different legal frameworks are able to protect the central moral rights and interests at stake. We begin by revisiting how legal frameworks for digital consent developed in order to see where there may be common moral ground and where these different cultures diverge on the issue of protection of personal information. We then turn to ethics to clarify the central interests and rights at stake in morally transformative consent, in order to provide a common basis for evaluating the different legal frameworks. Ultimately, we seek the moral core of digital consent in order to reimagine its role in international conflicts.

It is widely accepted that consent is a normative power. For instance, consent can make an impermissible act permissible. In the words of Heidi Hurd, it "turns a trespass into a dinner party… an invasion of privacy into an intimate moment." In this chapter, I argue against the assumption that consent has such robust powers for moral transformation. In particular, I argue that there is a wide range of sex that harms or wrongs victims despite being consensual. Moreover, these cases are not limited to those where consent is vitiated by background conditions. I start by calling this category of consensual sex Bad Sex. I then distinguish subspecies of this category, including psychological pressure, social coercion, and epistemically unsafe sex. I end by responding to an objection on which we should treat at least some subspecies of Bad Sex as rape. Though this alternative proposal is often motivated by ameliorative and strategic considerations, I argue that such considerations actually count against collapsing the categories of Bad Sex and rape.

In December 2015, Wales became the first country in the United Kingdom to move away from an opt-in system in organ procurement. The new legislation introduces the concept of deemed consent whereby a person who neither opt in nor opt out, is deemed to have consented to donation. The data released by the NHS in July 2017 provides an excellent opportunity to assess this legislation in light of concerns that it would decrease procurement rates for living and deceased donation, as well as sparking an increase in family refusals. None of these concerns have come to pass, with Wales experiencing more registered donors, fewer family refusals and more living donations. Though, as the number of actual donors have dropped slightly from a high level, the situation must be monitored closely in the years to come.

Background: This paper proposes a refocusing of consent for clinical genetic testing, moving away from an emphasis on autonomy and information provision, towards an emphasis on the virtues of healthcare professionals seeking consent, and the relationships they construct with their patients.

Newborn bloodspot screening (NBS) involves testing a small sample of blood taken from the heel of a newborn for a number of serious and life-threatening conditions. In Canada, the practice of NBS falls under provincial jurisdiction with no national coordination. We know little about the actual process of obtaining
informed consent for NBS and how these experiences might differ across provinces or between key stakeholders such as parents and healthcare professionals (HCP). This study will extend an emerging literature on the opinions and experiences of parents and HCPs regarding consent practices to newborn screening in Canada.

Parents' and Healthcare Professionals' Experiences of Consent for Newborn Bloodspot Screening. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275520029_Parents%27_and_Healthcare_Professionals%27_Experiences_of_Consent_for_Newborn_Bloodspot_Screening [accessed Apr 27, 2015].

Individual victims of injustice may permissibly engage in a range of dissident activities to challenge unjust practices, policies, or institutions, so they could better enjoy their entitlements as a matter of justice. Resisters typically claim to engage in resistance for a larger group of victims but the conditions leading to resistance tend to prevent them from obtaining a clear mandate from their ‘constituents’. In recent debates on legitimate authority to use defensive force, several theorists argue that such authority requires actual and informed consent of the victims on whose behalf resistance is undertaken. This article argues against that view. Two interpretations of the consent requirement are examined. In the first, consent of the people is measured by popular support for a resistance movement. In the second, consent is regarded as a kind of moral resource that can serve to justify defensive force. After refuting the arguments in support of the consent requirement, this article develops an alternative account of legitimate authority in forceful resistance which is not based on consent. It identifies a set of criteria for evaluating the insurgents’ claim to legitimate authority.

This paper provides a systematic attempt to empirically describe the ways in which athletes' consent to take part in sport is socially constructed, communicated, and understood by others. Due to a notable lack of prior research on this topic, we draw on insights from sex research to theorise consent as a communicative social practice, specifically applying this notion to interpreting the world of competitive combat sports. To do so, we combine data from across numerous studies using the method of concatenated exploration, producing a post-hoc, longitudinal, cross-contextual qualitative analysis of the ways in which consent is practiced in such settings. We then outline a four-point typology of how consent is performed, including the following categories: overt communication; subtle communication; assumed consent; and deferred consent. We conclude by arguing that the apparent predominance of subtle, assumed and deferred consent presents some worrying implications for athletes' freedom, potentially undermining the morally transformative potential of consent within these ostensibly 'violent', often injurious sports contexts.

Many conceive information and communications technologies (ICT) as providing a free space which bolsters the freedom of individuals. This is because the technologies, and the ways we use them, are thought to be grounded in consent given by individuals. However, it will be argued that individuals, by their own self-regulated consent-based actions when using ICT, are actually alleviating their own individual freedoms. This novel phenomenon, which Deleuze and Guattari have drawn our attention to, is a consequence of the de-territorialization and re-territorialization of desires, shaped by power processes, and practiced within Control Societies. This process is disguised as 'choices' made by free and self-aware individuals who give their 'consent'.

The current ethical and regulatory framework for research is often charged with burdening investigators and impeding socially valuable research. To address these concerns, a growing number of research ethicists argue that informed consent should be adapted to the risks of research participation. This would require less rigorous consent standards in low-risk research than in high-risk research. However, the current discussion is restricted to cases of research in which the risks of research participation are outweighed by the potential clinical benefits for the individual research participant. Furthermore, current proposals do not address the worry that risk-adapted informed consent may result in enrolling participants into research without their autonomous authorization. In this paper, we show how the standard view of informed consent – consent as autonomous authorization – can be adapted to risk even when the research does not have a favourable risk-benefit profile for the participant. Our argument has two important implications: first, it implies that current and proposed consent standards are not adequately calibrated to risk and, second, that consent standards also need to be adapted to factors other than risk.

Making a contribution to the sociology of intimacy, this article aims to present how lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, and queer people live their ethical non-monogamous relationships in Italy. Giving great space to the concept of consent through the literature on the ethics of care, I will refer to different conceptualizations of critical consent given by feminist and BDSM communities, spaces in which ethics is based on unveiling power structures through the focus on consent. In fact, the centrality of the collective dimension in embracing ethical non-monogamies appears fundamental, challenging the self-help – and neoliberal – literature according to which polyamory is just a personal choice. Afterwards, I will deepen the concept of care, developing it through its means of communication, attentiveness, responsibility, and responsiveness within relationships. Presented this way, care recognizes us all as interdependent: at the same time, care-givers and care-receivers. I suggest that this interdependency is symbolized by the kintsugi, the Japanese art of repairing broken pottery with a mix of golden powder, a representation of the manifold matrix of care, composed of care-giving, care-receiving, and care for oneself.

As our understanding of the brain increases, it seems likely that new biomedical techniques for altering human behavior will be developed. One potential application of such techniques is within the context of the rehabilitation of offenders. This prospect may seem attractive, given the social and economic costs of crime and the limited effectiveness of traditional punishments at reducing reoffending (see, e.g. Ministry of Justice 2013). On the other hand, the fact that the brain is so intimately connected with an individual's identity, personality and capacity for making autonomous choices gives rise to distinct concerns about the use of directly interfering with brain functioning. This paper begins by indicating a number of neuroenhancements that might be used in rehabilitation programmes in the future, if sufficiently safe and effective. Secondly, it outlines and replies to some of the main arguments for prohibiting neuroenhancement of offenders altogether. Thirdly, it examines the opposite position -that neuroenhancement of offenders should be mandatory. Fourthly, it argues that the case for mandatory interventions is ultimately unpersuasive. Provided sufficiently safe and effective interventions are developed, the best policy would be to provide such interventions on a voluntary, basis. The paper ends by discussing some of the issues that need to be addressed to ensure that offenders' consent to neurointerventions is truly voluntary.

This article explores issues of consent in the context of BDSM. I argue that consent is a complex expression which must be thought beyond the ‘yes means yes, no means no’ that proliferates mainstream debates around consent education. This article draws on qualitative interview data to examine how BDSM practitioners talk about consent and consent violations. It examines how these discussions about consent within a BDSM context interact with non-BDSM discussions and how they do, or do not, inform each other. Though consent is centralized in BDSM as a practice of community-building, sometimes consent violations are ignored or dismissed because this community-building also relies on neoliberal constructions of the autonomous self and heteronormative accounts of desire to explain them. These findings have serious implications for better understanding not only of consent within this subcultural practice, but how heteronormative values saturate contexts where unequal power relations or hierarchies manifest themselves outside of this. By insisting on this nuanced understanding of sexual consent, this article transforms existing debates about consensual sexual practice by exploring consent as a grey area, and where violations are experienced as abusive and where they are not. It also offers pertinent insights into how mobilizing an ethical consent praxis might better attend to questions of consent.

Consumer concerns over the safety of their personal information and the violation of their privacy rights are described as being the single overwhelming barrier to rapid growth of e- commerce. This paper explores the problems for e- commerce users when there is collection, use, and disclosure of personal information that are based on implied consent in e-commerce transactions. It questions the assumption that consent is sufficient to waive privacy interests in relation to e- commerce transactions. It will argue that consent should not necessarily be sufficient to waive privacy interests, and that the collection, use and/or disclosure of personal information should be subject to regulation.

Resumo: As regulações esportivas para definir a elegibilidade na categoria feminina são políticas antigas, datadas do começo do século XX, que atravessam disputas sobre o corpo, suas inscrições e possibilidades de futuro. De modo que a definição de um diagnóstico, com suas articulações de saúde, doença e cuidado terapêutico, concentram alguns atributos significativos para essa determinação de elegibilidade. Acompanhando um pouco da história da ex-judoca brasileira Edinanci Silva, vamos compreender como tais regulações constituem estratégias normativas de controle do corpo e da população, assim como mobilizam os cenários em que os sujeitos existem, se individualizam e cuidam de si. Essa difícil tarefa de consentir num contexto de crise, de risco e de humilhação diz muito sobre os limites dessas mesmas inclusões pelo esporte. No fim, também vamos entender porque a virilização feminina continua a ser medicalizada e importa mais do que a eficiência do rendimento esportivo propriamente dito.
Palavras-chave: intersexualidade; regulações esportivas; consentimento; diagnóstico; masculinidade feminina.

Sexual age-of-consent violations involving adult–adolescent relationships (AARs) are sometimes viewed with ambivalence by the media and are infrequently prosecuted. Two studies conducted in Britain (where the age of consent is 16) examined influences on disapproval of minimally presented AARs between a 14-year-old and a 30-year-old. In Study 1, AARs involving an older man were seen as more harmful and objectionable than those involving an older woman. A second study on a jury-eligible adult population replicated Study 1's gender effects, and also found a difference between legal knowledge and personal belief that the older person had committed a crime. Gender effects in both studies were mediated by perceived harm and emotions.

Affirming the doctrine of informed consent, the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire HB belatedly followed the Australian decision of Rogers v Whitaker, decoupling the duty to inform patients about the material risks of medical treatment from Bolam. The underlying commitment to patient autonomy coincides with a wider body of medical law that protects the right of capacitous adult patients to make treatment decisions, even if others consider those decisions bizarre and even if they will cause the patient serious harm. It is seemingly anomalous, therefore, that the Supreme Court in Montgomery referred to a 'therapeutic exception' (TE), as this suggests an underlying paternalistic approach. Contrary to this view, international examples suggest that a TE does not necessarily conflict with commitment to patient autonomy. In some countries, the exception mitigates the effects of a broadly objective test of materiality by enabling clinicians in exceptional circumstances to protect the autonomy interests of the particular patient. In others, it protects those incapable of an autonomous decision from harm. In England and Wales, however, alternative mechanisms can be interpreted to protect such patients from harm. On this basis, it is argued that the TE is obfuscatory, unnecessary and unjustified.

Küreselleşmenin etkilerinin giderek daha yoğun olarak hissedilmeye başlandığı günümüz dünyasında işletmeler; yoğun rekabet ortamı içinde rakiplerine karşı rekabet üstünlüğü elde edebilmek, teknolojinin gelişimiyle birlikte ürün ve hizmet farklılıklarının
ortadan kalktığı koşullarda diğer markalar arasından tercih edilebilmek ve farkındalık yaratabilmek adına çeşitli stratejiler geliştirmektedir. Bu stratejilerin başında ise Kurumsal Sosyal Sorumluluk (KSS) çalışmaları gelmektedir. KSS anlayışı, işletmelere toplumdan
aldıklarını topluma geri verme, faaliyette bulundukları toplumsal sistem başta olmak üzere yerküreye karşı sorumlu davranma, var olan sorunların çözümüne ortak olma imkânı tanımaktadır. İşletmelerin kullandıkları, doğada serbest halde bulunan kaynakların küresel
anlamda yaşanılan sorunlar nedeniyle git gide azalması ve azalan bu kaynakların canlı hayatını tehdit etmesi, işletmelerin ekosisteme daha duyarlı davranmaları zorunluluğunu beraberinde getirmektedir. Zorunluluk hali dışında, demokratik toplumların temelini oluşturan; örgütlenme, gösteri yapma hakkı gibi unsurlarla birlikte çevre hareketleri ve bilinçli tüketicilerin varlığıyla önemli bir duyarlılık halini alan KSS; günümüzde tüketici ve
çalışan sadakatini sağlama, paydaşlarla iyi ilişkiler geliştirme vb. gibi birçok avantajın stratejik anahtarını oluşturmaktadır. Madalyonun diğer yüzünde, KSS çalışmalarının etik bağlamda, hiçbir yarar ve geri dönüş beklemeden yapılması gerekliliği, elde edilen
avantajlar nedeniyle çelişkiler yaratmakta ve konunun eleştirel olarak sorgulanmasını beraberinde getirmektedir. Temel varoluş nedeni kâr elde etmek olan işletmelerin, KSS çalışmaları aracılığıyla toplumun beğenisini kazandığı, toplum tarafından onanarak rıza ve
dolayısıyla meşruiyet elde ettikleri yadsınamayacak bir gerçektir. KSS anlayışı ile toplumsal rıza ilişkisinin sorgulanması noktasında ise karşımıza hegemonya olgusu çıkmaktadır. Literatür taramasına dayalı bu çalışma; KSS anlayışının eleştirel açıdan irdelenmesini, KSS ile hegemonya ve rıza arasındaki ilişkinin sorgulanmasını içermektedir.

El derecho a morir con dignidad es un concepto vago y que recibe múltiples interpretaciones, muchas de ellas inapropiadas. Se propone la necesidad de que sea el médico quien se haga responsable de proteger los derechos del paciente, de garantizar el uso racional de los recursos y de velar porque las decisiones sean apropiadas y proporcionadas a la situación del paciente, a su pronóstico, expectativas y deseos, pero también, a la utilidad esperada y a la relación costo-beneficio. Se enfatiza que la dignidad puede ser entendida de muchas maneras y que, a veces, en su nombre se somete al paciente, o lo hace él mismo, a sufrimientos, dolor y complicaciones que podrían haberse evitado, no necesariamente en busca de prolongar la vida. Se hace énfasis en que, cuando no hay probabilidades razonables de supervivencia o cuando no puede ya buscarse mejorar la calidad de vida, deben enfocarse los esfuerzos en procurar calidad de muerte.

Trials with highly unfavourable risk–benefit ratios for participants, like HIV cure trials, raise questions about the quality of the consent of research participants. Why, it may be asked, would a person with HIV who is doing well on antiretroviral therapy be willing to jeopardise his health by enrolling in such a trial? We distinguish three concerns: first, how information is communicated to potential participants; second, participants' motivations for enrolling in potentially high risk research with no prospect of direct benefit; and third, participants' understanding of the details of the trials in which they enrol. We argue that the communication concern is relevant to the validity of informed consent and the quality of decision making, that the motivation concern does not identify a genuine problem with either the validity of consent or the quality of decision making and that the understanding concern may not be relevant to the validity of consent but is relevant to the quality of decision making. In doing so, we derive guidance points for researchers recruiting and enrolling participants into their HIV cure trials, as well as the research ethics committees reviewing proposed studies.

Thomsen explores the nexus of media, Feminism and freedom of speech in Scandinavia, and relates the vulnerability in cyberbullying and hate porn to historical questions on women’s liberation movements and the constitutional rights of free speech. A reading of the interfacial exchanges in the TV series SKAM connects freedom of speech to the ability to master media. Young feminists argue against the sharing of images without consent, and acclaim playfulness on the Internet. Thomsen discusses the intensification of affect in interfaces as a folding between feeling the body from within and seeing it from the outside, and thus the consent to have one’s image shared on the Internet is key to a freedom of expression in which vulnerability plays a creative role.

There are few issues more emotional and divisive than what has become known as “the right to die.” One camp advocates the “death with dignity” approach, according to which the patient is an autonomous being who can form his or her own judgment on the timing and process of dying. The other camp advocates the sanctity of life approach, in which life is intrinsically valuable and should be sustained as long as possible. Is
there a right answer?
    In The Right to Die With Dignity, Raphael Cohen-Almagor takes a balanced approach in analyzing this emotionally charged debate, viewing the dispute uniquely from public policy and international perspectives. This book offers an interdisciplinary, compelling study in medicine, law, religion and ethics. It is, arguably, the most comprehensive book yet to be written on the fascinating question of whether physician-assisted suicide should be allowed. Cohen-Almagor delineates the distinctions between active and passive euthanasia and discusses some of the legal measures that have been invoked in the United States and abroad. He outlines the reasons non-blood relatives should be given a role in deciding a patients’ last wishes. He examines euthanasia policies in the Netherlands and the 1994 Oregon Death with Dignity Act, suggesting improvements to each. Finally, he makes a circumscribed plea for voluntary physician-assisted suicide.

Most of the literature on sexual consent presupposes that consent requires autonomy, and proceeds as though autonomy is a roughly digital property: you either have it or
you don’t, and if you don’t have it then you can’t legitimately consent to sexual activity. But in fact, autonomy is a continuum, and our autonomy is almost always partial. Our
autonomy can be compromised by limitations in our capacities, or by the power relationships within which we are embedded. If we insist that real consent requires full
autonomy, then virtually no sex will turn out to be consensual. Accepting this consequent would either make the notion of consent useless, or it would turn most sex
into rape, and neither is a helpful outcome. I argue that under conditions of compromised autonomy, consent must be socially and interpersonally scaffolded. To understand consent as an ethically crucial but non-ideal concept, we need to think about how it is related to other requirements for ethical sex, such as the ability to exit a situation, trust, safety, broader social support, epistemic standing in the community, and more.

In this chapter I identify three problems affecting the plausibility of group privacy and argue in favour of their resolution. The first problem concerns the nature of the groups in question. I shall argue that groups are neither discovered nor invented, but designed by the level of abstraction (LoA) at which a specific analysis of a social system is developed. Their design is therefore justified insofar as the purpose, guiding the choice of the LoA, is justified. This should remove the objection that groups cannot have a right to privacy because groups are mere artefacts (there are no groups, only individuals) or that, even if there are groups, it is too difficult to deal with them. The second problem concerns the possibility of attributing rights to groups. I shall argue that the same logic of attribution of a right to individuals may be used to attribute a right to a group, provided one modifies the LoA and now treats the whole group itself as an individual. This should remove the objection that, even if groups exist and are manageable, they cannot be treated as holders of rights. The third problem concerns the possibility of attributing a right to privacy to groups. I shall argue that sometimes it is the group and only the group, not its members, that is correctly identified as the correct holder of a right to privacy. This should remove the objection that privacy, as a group right, is a right held not by a group as a group but rather by the group's members severally. The solutions of the three problems supports the thesis that an interpretation of privacy in terms of a protection of the information that constitutes an individual—both in terms of a single person and in terms of a group—is better suited than other interpretations to make sense of group privacy.

In this paper, I argue that deceptive placebo use can be morally permissible, on the grounds that the deception involved in the prescription of deceptive placebos can differ in kind to the sorts of deception that undermine personal autonomy. In order to argue this, I shall first delineate two accounts of why deception is inimical to autonomy. On these accounts, deception is understood to be inimical to the deceived agent’s autonomy because it either involves subjugating the deceived agent’s will to another’s authority or because it precludes the agent from acting effectively in pursuit of their ends. I shall argue that providing an agent with false beliefs is not inimical to their autonomy if they are only able to effectively pursue their autonomously chosen ends by virtue of holding those particular false beliefs. Finally, I show that deceptive placebo use need only involve this latter sort of deception.

The fierce public and scholarly debate over trigger warnings in university classrooms has often characterized the issue as one of academic freedom and ignored the social justice arguments for trigger warnings. In this essay, we argue that trigger warnings expand academic speech by engaging students more fully in their own learning. Specifically, we understand trigger warnings as a means of respecting students' intellectual, emotional, and physical boundaries. By framing trigger warnings in this way, we argue that they are tools of worldmaking to the degree that they promise to improve accessibility, engage students better in learning, and cultivate more socially just and livable campuses.